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DEBATES  AND  PROCEEDINGS 


CONVENTION 


(fommmttolilj  flf  5las$at|»setts, 


/.- 


_ 


HELD     IN     THE     YEAR 


1.78  8 


AND     WHICH      FINALLY       B.ATIFIED      THE 


CONSTITUTION  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES. 


Printed  by  authority  of  Resolves  of  the  Legislature.  1856. 


..      ...     .o.    » 


BOSTON: 

WILLIAM    WHITE, 

PRINTER   TO    THE    COMMONWEALTH. 

1856. 


* 

•**>* 


ooC 


0^' 


PREFACE. 


There  have  been  four  "  Constitutional  Conventions  "  in 
the  history  of  Massachusetts.  The  first  was  that  which 
formed  the  State  Constitution  in  1779-80  ;  the  second  was 
that  which  adopted  and  ratified  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States  in  1788  ;  the  third  was  held  in  1820-21, 
and  proposed  fourteen  Articles  of  Amendment  to  the  State 
Constitution,  of  which  nine  were  adopted  by  the  people ; 
the  fourth  was  held  in  1853,  and  proposed  a  new  State 
Constitution  which  was  not  adopted  by  the  people. 

The  Journal  of  the  first  Convention  was  printed  by  order 
of  the  legislature  in  1832,  on  the  recommendation  of  the 
Joint  Committee  on  the  Library,  of  which  the  late  Hon. 
Alexander  H.  Everett  was  chairman. 

The  proceedings  of  the  second  Convention  were  of  great 
importance,  and  were  so  regarded  throughout  the  country 
at  the  time.  It  is  quite  certain  that  if  Massachusetts  had 
refused  her  assent  to  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States, 
that  well-devised  scheme  of  government,  the  careful  work 
of  the  patriots  and  statesmen  of  the  last  century,  under 
which  the  nation  has  enjoyed  so  large  a  degree  of  pros- 
perity, would  have  failed.  There  is  ample  evidence  of 
this  in  the  letters  which  are  printed  at  the  end  of  this 
volume. 


263770 


IV  PREFACE. 

The  Constitution  was  adopted  in  the  Massachusetts  Con- 
vention, after  a  full  discussion,  by  a  majority  of  nineteen 
in  a  vote  of  three  hundred  and  fifty-five.  Certain  amend- 
ments were  recommended  by  the  Convention,  a  portion  of 
which  were  in  substance  agreed  to  by  all  the  States.  It  is 
believed  that  at  the  beginning  of  the  session  of  the  Con- 
vention there  was  a  majority  against  the  Constitution. 
The  determination  which  was  reached  must  thus  be  as- 
cribed, in  a  large  degree,  to  the  arguments  which  were 
used  by  the  speakers. 

The  debates  were  reported  in  the  Boston  newspapers  of 
the  time,  the  "  Independent  Chronicle  "  and  the  "  Massa- 
chusetts Centinel,"  and  these  reports  were  collected  into  a 
volume  printed  soon  after  the  adjournment  of  the  Conven- 
tion. A  second  edition  of  this  volume  was  printed  in 
Boston  in  1808  ;  and  its  contents  were  afterwards  repeated 
in  Elliott's  Debates. 

In  the  course  of  the  session  of  the  Massachusetts  legis- 
lature, in  1856,  the  attention  of  the  Joint  Committee  on 
the  Library  was  called  by  the  State  Librarian  to  the  fact 
that  the  volume  of  Debates  was  rare,  there  being  but  a 
single  copy,  and  that  imperfect,  in  the  possession  of  the 
Commonwealth.  The  interest 'and  value  of  the  work  were 
obvious.  Accordingly  the  chairman  of  the  Committee 
offered  the  following  Resolve,  which  passed  both  houses 
without  opposition,  and  was  approved  by  the  Governor, 
March  5,  1856:— 

"  Resolved,  That  the  Report  of  the  Proceedings  of  the  Massachusetts  Con- 
vention of  the  year  one  thousand  seven  hundred  and  eighty-eight  be  reprinted 
under  the  direction  of  the  Committee  on  the  Library ;  that  the  same  number 
be  printed  as  of  ordinary  legislative  documents ;  and  that  one  copy  be  fur- 
nished to  each  member  of  the  executive  and  legislative  departments  of  the 
government  for  the  present  political  year." 


PREFACE.  V 

Upon  inquiry  in  the  office  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Com- 
monwealth, it  was  discovered  that  the  official  journal,  and 
a  small  file  of  documents  relating  to  the  Convention, 
which  had  never  been  printed,  were  in  a  perishable  condi- 
tion. It  was  thought  that  their  publication  would  add  es- 
sentially to  the  value  of  the  Report,  and  that  they  were 
even  necessary,  at  the  present  time,  to  throw  light  upon  the 
discussions.  The  Committee  also  learned  that  an  original 
manuscript,  containing  the  clear  and  striking  notes  of  the 
debates  kept  by  Chief  Justice  Parsons,  of  Newburyport, 
who  was  a  member  of  the  Convention,  was  in  the  posses- 
sion of  the  Boston  Athenaeum,  and  the  Committee  were 
kindly  permitted  to  take  a  copy  of  it. 

The  printed  report  of  the  debates  was  not  in  itself  an 
official  document ;  and  in  order  to  give  a  full  view  of  the 
transactions  of  the  Convention,  it  seemed  to  be  necessary 
that  the  official  journal,  together  with  the  record  of  certain 
other  preliminary  and  subsequent  legislative  proceedings 
should  be  presented  at  the  same  time,  while  Judge  Par- 
sons's  notes,  together  with  a  few  of  the  more  elaborate 
discussions  in  the  public  prints,  would  serve  to  exhibit  a 
clearer  idea  of  the  tone  and  scope  of  the  Debates.  Induced 
by  these  considerations,  the  Committee  proposed  the  fol- 
lowing additional  Resolve,  which,  also,  passed  both  houses 
with  the  same  unanimity  as  the  former,  and  was  approved 
by  the  Governor,  April  8,  1856  : — 

"  Resolved,  That  in  the  reprint  of  the  Report  of  the  Proceedings  of  the  Mas- 
sachusetts Convention,  of  one  thousand  seven  hundred  and  eighty-eight,  there 
shall  be  included  the  Official  Journal  of  the  Convention,  now  in  the  archives  of 
the  State  ;  and  such  other  documents  relating  to  the  subject,  as  in  the  opinion 
of  the  Committee  on  the  Library  may  be  necessary." 


VI  PREFACE. 

In  discharge  of  the  duty  enjoined  by  these  Resolves,  the 
Committee,  after  a  full  discussion  of  the  plan,  appointed 
two  of  their  number — Bradford  K.  Peirce  and  Charles 
Hale — as  a  sub-committee  to  prepare  and  arrange  the  ma- 
terials of  the  volume,  and  to  supervise  its  passage  through 
the  press. 

This  work  has  been  attended  to  with  such  diligence  and 
ability  as  we  were  able  to  bring  to  it.  It  has  been  our 
understanding  of  the  Resolves,  that  we  were  not  to  digest 
the  various  papers  coming  into  our  hands  in  order  to  pre- 
sent a  new  report,  but  to  obtain  and  arrange  such  original 
documents  as  had  been  preserved,  illustrating  the  transac- 
tions of  the  Convention.  We  have  not  sought  to  multiply 
unnecessary  notes,  but  when  an  explanation  seemed  to  be 
required,  or  when  a  quotation  from  the  press  of  the  day 
illustrated  the  text,  we  have  appended  it  at  the  foot  of  the 
page.  In  order  to  preserve  the  official  journal  exactly  as 
it  was  kept  by  the  Secretary  (with  the  exception  of  the 
errors  in  spelling)  we  have  introduced  the  documents  to 
which  it  refers,  in  the  form  of  notes.  Among  these  papers 
will  be  found  several  of  permanent  historical  value. 

We  have  given  special  attention  to  the  correction  of  the 
press  ;  the  original  report  and  many  of  the  papers  being 
sadly  disfigured  by  typographical  errors. 

We  have  been  indebted  to  the  attentions  of  Hon.  George 
S.  Boutwell,  the  State  Librarian,  to  his  Assistant,  Dr.  Jack- 
son, and  to  Hon.  F.  DeWitt,  Secretary  of  the  Common- 
wealth, for  their  assistance  in  consulting  and  using  the 
archives  of  the  Commonwealth  ;  to  the  Boston  Athenaeum, 
for  the  privilege  of  copying  Judge  Parsons's  Minutes, 
already  mentioned,  and  for  the  use  of  its  files  of  newspa- 
pers ;  to  Charles  Folsom,  Esq.,  and  William  F.  Poole,  Esq., 


PREFACE.  Vll 

the  past  and  present  Librarians  of  the  Athenaeum,  for 
facilities  in  using  the  rich  literary  stores  of  that  institution ; 
to  Hon.  Josiah  Quincy,  senior,  Hon.  Edward  Everett, 
Jared  Sparks,  LL.D.,  Hon.  George  Bancroft,  and  Richard 
Hildreth,  Esq.,  for  their  kind  answers  to  questions  asked 
by  the  Committee  in  the  prosecution  of  their  labors.  Mr. 
Quincy  remembers  attending  the  debates  in  the  gallery  of 
the  meeting-house  in  Federal  Street.  Mr.  Bancroft  has 
supplied  us  with  two  letters,  which  are  printed  at  the 
close  of  the  volume,  and  others  have  been  copied  from 
Mr.  Sparks' s  valuable  collections. 

It  will  be  observed  that  three  separate  and  independent 
records  of  the  proceedings  of  the  Convention  are  included 
within  this  volume.  The  first  is  the  Official  Journal  kept 
by  the  Secretary  of  the  Convention,  occupying  pages  29  to 
94,  inclusive.  The  second  is  the  Report  of  Debates,  taken 
by  the*  editors  of  the  newspapers,  occupying  pages  95  to 
284,  inclusive.  The  third  is  Judge  Parsons's  Minutes,  oc- 
cupying pages  285  to  320,  inclusive ; — this  record  unfor- 
tunately closes  abruptly,  ten  days  before  the  adjournment 
of  the  Convention.  The  first  and  third  of  these  records 
are  here  printed  for  the  first  time.  The  second  is  printed 
from  the  volume  published  hi  1808,  which  was  the  second 
edition  of  the  Debates.  The  Constitution  and  documents 
following  it,  beginning  at  page  1  and  ending  at  page  17 
of  this  volume,  are  printed  in  the  order  and  style  of  the 
volume  published  in  1808. 

B.   K.   p. 


J 


COMMITTEE  ON  THE  LIBRARY, 
i8oe, 


BRADFORD  K.  PEIRCE, 
WILLIAM  S.  BRAKENRIDGE, 
AUGUSTUS  C.  CAREY, 

Of  the  Senate. 

LEVI  THAXTER, 
GEORGE  BEAL,  Jb, 
CHARLES  HALE, 

Of  the  House  of  Representatives. 


NOTE  TO  THE  FIRST  EDITION  OF  THE  DEBATES. 


[The  following  Note  was  appended  to  the  first  edition  of  the  Debates.] 

***  The  Printers  who  took  the  minutes  of  the  preceding  Debates,  are  con- 
scious that  there  are  some  inaccuracies,  and  many  omissions  made  in  them.  It 
could  not  be  otherwise,  as  they  were  inexperienced  in  the  business,' and  had 
not  a  very  eligible  situation  to  hear  in  the  Convention.  But  this  they  can  say, 
that  through  the  whole  of  them,  they  have  had  a  sacred  regard  to  justice  and 
impartiality ;  and  therefore  they  are  emboldened  to  hope  for  the  candor  and 
pardon  of  the  gentlemen  in  whose  observations  they  occur,  (from  whom  they 
have  not  been  able  to  obtain  corrections,)  and  of  the  public  in  general. 


Correction. — The  note  on  page  60  is  erroneous  in  stating  that  the  meeting- 
house where  the  sessions  of  the  Convention  were  held,  is  the  building  still 
standing.  The  present  building,  however,  stands  on  the  same  site  as  the  former 
building,  where  the  Convention  sat. 


CONTENTS. 


Preface, iii 

Note  to  the  First  Edition  of  the  Debates, xi 

Commission  of  the  Massachusetts  Delegates  to  the  Federal  Convention,  xv 
Constitution  of  the  United  States  as  proposed  for  ratification 

by  the  Federal  Convention, 1 

Resolutions  of  the  Federal  Convention, 15 

Letter  from  George  Washington,  President  of  the  Federal  Convention, 

to  the  President  of  Congress,     .         .         .         .    .    ' .         .         .  16 

Message  of  Governor  Hancock  to  the  Massachusetts  Legislature,  .         .  18 

Proceedings  of  the  Legislature,  before  the  Convention,         .         .         .  19 

Resolves  of  Massachusetts  calling  a  Convention,  .  -       .         .         .         .  22 

Letter  of  Hon.  Elbridge  Gerry,  read  in  the  legislature,         ...  24 

Official  Journal, 29 

Debates, .95 

Judge  Parsons's  Minutes, 285 

Proceedings  of  the  Legislature,  after  the  Convention,   ....  321 

Public  Sentiment  of  the  Day, 323 

Spirit  of  the  Press, 335 

Letters, 399 

Amendments  to  the  Constitution  adopted  since  the  ratification  by  the 

Convention, 418 

Dates  of  the  ratification  by  the  thirteen  States, 418 

Index, .  419 


COMMISSION  OF  THE  MASSACHUSETTS  DELEGATES. 


COMMONWEALTH  OF  MASSACHUSETTS. 

By  his  Excellency,  James  Bowdoix,  Esq.,  Governor  of  the  Commonwealth 

of  Massachusetts. 

To  the  Honorable  Fraxcis  Daxa,  Elbridge  Gerry, 

Nathaxiel  Gorham,  Rufus  King,  and  Caleb  Stroxg,  Esqrs., 

Greeting : — 

Whereas,  Congress  did,  on  the  21st  day  of  February,  A.  D.  1787,  resolve, 
"  That,  in  the  opinion  of  Congress,  it  is  expedient  that,  on  the  second  Monday 
in  May  next,  a  Convention  of  Delegates,  who  shall  have  been  appointed  by  the 
several  States,  to  be  held  at  Philadelphia,  for  the  sole  and  express  purpose  of 
revising  the  Articles  of  Confederation,  and  reporting  to  Congress,  and  the 
several  Legislatures,  such  alterations  and  provisions  therein  as  shall,  when 
agreed  to  in  Congress,  and  confirmed  by  the  States,  render  the  Federal  Con- 
stitution adequate  to  the  exigencies  of  Government  and  the  preservation  of  the 
Union."  And  whereas,  the  General  Court  have  constituted  and  appointed  you 
their  delegates,  to  attend  and  represent  this  Commonwealth  in  the  said  pro- 
posed Convention,  and  have,  by  a  resolution  of  theirs  of  the  tenth  of  March 
last,  requested  me  to  commission  you  for  that  purpose. 

Now,  therefore,  know  ye,  that  in  pursuance  of  the  resolutions  aforesaid,  I 
do,  by  these  presents,  commission  you,  the  said  Francis  Dana,  Elbridge  Gerry, 
Nathaniel  Gorham,  Rufus  King,  and  Caleb  Strong,  Esqrs.,  or  any  three  of 
you,  to  meet  such  delegates  as  may  be  appointed  by  the  other,  or  any  of  the 
other  States  in  the  Union,  to  meet  in  Convention  at  Philadelphia,  at  the  time, 
and  for  the  purposes  aforesaid. 

In  testimony  whereof,  I  have  caused  the  public  seal  of  the  Commonwealth 
aforesaid  to  be*  hereunto  affixed.      Given  at  the  Council  Chamber,  in 
[l.  s.]    Boston,  the  ninth  day  of  April,  A.  D.  1787,  and  in  the  eleventh  year 
of  the  independence  of  the  United  States  of  America. 

JAMES  BOWDOIN. 
By  his  Excellency's  command. 

John  Avery,  Jux.,  Secretary. 


CONSTITUTION 


UNITED     STATES, 

AS  PROPOSED  FOR    RATIFICATION    BY  THE  SEVERAL    STATES,  AT   THE    GRAND   FEDERAL 
CONVENTION,    SEPT.    17,    1787. 


PREAMBLE 


WE,  the  people  of  the  United  States,  in  order  to  form  a 
more  perfect  union,  establish  justice,  insure  domestic  tran- 
quillity, provide  for  the  common  defence,  promote  the  general 
welfare,  and  secure  the  blessings  of  liberty  to  ourselves  and 
our  posterity,  do  ordain  and  establish  this  Constitution  for 
the  United  States  of  America. 

ARTICLE  I. 

LEGISLATIVE    POWER. 

The  House  of  Representatives. 

Section  1.  All  legislative  powers  herein  granted  shall  be 
vested  in  a  congress  of  the  United  States,  which  shall  consist 
of  a  senate  and  house  of  representatives. 

Sect.  2.  The  house  of  representatives  shall  be  composed 
of  members  chosen  every  second  year,  by  the  people  of  the 
several  states ;  and  the  electors  in  each  state  shall  have  the 
qualifications  requisite  for  electors  of  the  most  numerous  branch 
of  the  state,  legislature. 

No  person  shall  be  a  representative  who  shall  not  have 
attained  to  the  age  of  twenty-five  years,  and  been  seven  years 
1 


2:\  \ :  .•:  •;;  ;'•/;: :  p^opdsijD  constitution.  [1787. 

a  citizen  of  the  United  States,  and  who  shall  not,  when  elected, 
be  an  inhabitant  of  that  state  in  which  he  shall  be  chosen. 

Representatives  and  direct  taxes  shall  be  apportioned  among 
the  several  states  which  may  be  included  within  this  Union, 
according  to  their  respective  numbers,  which  shall  be  deter- 
mined by  adding  to  the  whole  number  of  free  persons,  including 
those  bound  to  service  for  a  term  of  years,  and  excluding 
Indians  not  taxed,  three-fifths  of  all  other  persons.  The  actual 
enumeration  shall  be  made  within  three  years  after  the  first 
meeting  of  the  congress  of  the  United  States,  and  within 
every  subsequent  term  of  ten  years,  in  such  manner  as  they 
shall  by  law  direct.  The  number  of  representatives  shall  not 
exceed  one  for  every  thirty  thousand ;  but  each  state  shall  have 
at  least  one  representative ;  and  until  such  enumeration  shall 
be  made,  the  state  of  New  Hampshire  shall  be  entitled  to  choose 
three;  Massachusetts,  eight;  Ehode  Island  and  Providence  Plan- 
tations, one ;  Connecticut,  five  ;  New  York,  six  ;  New  Jersey, 
four  ;  Pennsylvania,  eight;  Delaware,  one;  Maryland,  six  ;  Vir- 
ginia, ten ;  North  Carolina,  five ;  South  Carolina,  five,  and 
Georgia,  three. 

When  vacancies  happen  in  the  representation  from  any  state, 
the  executive  authority  thereof  shall  issue  writs  of  election  to 
fill  such  vacancies. 

The  house  of  representatives  shall  choose  their  speaker  and 
other  officers  ;  and  shall  have  the  sole  power  of  impeachment. 

Senate. 

Sect.  3.  The  senate  of  the  United  States  shall  be  composed 
of  two  senators  from  each  state,  chosen  by  the  legislature 
thereof,  for  six  years  ;  and  each  senator  shall  have  one  vote. 

Immediately  after  they  shall  be  assembled  in  consequence  of 
the  first  election,  they  shall  be  divided,  as  equally  as  may  be, 
into  three  classes.  The  seats  of  the  senators  of  the  first  class 
shall  be  vacated  at  the  expiration  of  the  second  year ;  of  the 
second  class  at  the  expiration  of  the  fourth  year ;  and  of  the 
third  class  at  the  expiration  of  the  sixth  year ;  so  that  one- 
third  may  be  chosen  every  second  year ;  and  if  vacancies  hap- 
pen  by   resignation   or   otherwise,  during  the   recess   of  the 


1787.]  PROPOSED    CONSTITUTION.  3 

legislature  of  any  state,  the  executive  thereof  may  make  tem- 
porary appointments,  until  the  next  meeting  of  the  legislature, 
which  shall  then  fill  such  vacancies. 

No  person  shall  be  a  senator  who  shall  not  have  attained  to 
the  age  of  thirty  years,  and  been  nine  years  a  citizen  of  the 
United  States,  and  who  shall  not,  when  elected,  be  an  inhab- 
itant of  that  state  for  which  he  shall  be  chosen. 

The  vice-president  of  the  United  States  shall  be  president 
of  the  senate,  but  shall  have  no  vote  unless  they  be  equally 
divided. 

The  senate  shall  choose  their  other  officers,  and  also  a  pres- 
ident pro  tempore ,  in  the  absence  of  the  vice-president,  or  when 
he  shall  exercise  the  office  of  president  of  the  United  States. 

The  senate  shall  have  the  sole  power  to  try  all  impeach- 
ments ;  when  sitting  for  that  purpose,  they  shall  be  on  oath 
or  affirmation.  When  the  president  of  the  United  States  is 
tried,  the  chief  justice  shall  preside  ;  and  no  person  shall  be 
convicted  without  the  concurrence  of  two-thirds  of  the  members 
present. 

Judgment,  in  cases  of  impeachment,  shall  not  extend  fur- 
ther than  to  removal  from  office  and  disqualification  to  hold  and 
enjoy  any  office  of  honor,  trust,  or  profit,  under  the  United 
States ;  but  the  party  convicted  shall  nevertheless  be  liable  and 
subject  to  indictment,  trial,  judgment  and  punishment  accord- 
ing to  law. 

Sect.  4.  The  times,  places  and  manner  of  holding  elections 
for  senators  and  representatives,  shall  be  prescribed  in  each 
state  by  the  legislature  thereof ;  but  the  congress  may,  at  any 
time,  by  law,  make  or  alter  such  regulations,  except  as  to  the 
places  of  choosing  senators. 

THE  GENERAL   CONGRESS. 

The  congress  shall  assemble  at  least  once  in  every  year,  and 
such  meeting  shall  be  on  the  first  Monday  in  December,  unless 
they  shall  by  law  appoint  a  different  day. 

Sect.  5.  Each  house  shall  be  the  judge  of  the  elections, 
returns  and  qualifications  of  its  own  members,  and  a  majority 


4  PROPOSED    CONSTITUTION.  [1787. 

of  each  shall  constitute  a  quorum  to  do  business  ;  but  a  smaller 
number  may  adjourn  from  day  to  day,  and  may  be  authorized 
to  compel  the  attendance  of  absent  members,  in  such  manner, 
and  under  such  penalties,  as  each  house  may  provide. 

Each  house  may  determine  the  rules  of  its  proceedings, 
punish  its  members  for  disorderly  behavior,  and,  with  the 
concurrence  of  two-thirds,  expel  a  member. 

Each  house  shall  keep  a  journal  of  its  proceedings,  and 
from  time  to  time  publish  the  same,  excepting  such  parts  as 
may  in  their  judgment  require  secrecy ;  and  the  yeas  and  nays 
of  the  members  of  either  house,  on  any  question,  shall,  at  the 
desire  of  one-fifth  of  those  present,  be  entered  on  the  journal. 

Neither  house,  during  the  session  of  Congress,  shall,  without 
the  consent  of  the  other,  adjourn  for  more  than  three  days,  nor 
to  any  other  place  than  that  in  which  the  two  houses  shall  be 
sitting. 

Sect.  6.  The  senators  and  representatives  shall  receive  a 
compensation  for  their  services,  to  be  ascertained  by  law,  and 
paid  out  of  the  treasury  of  the  United  States.  They  shall,  in 
all  cases,  except  treason,  felony  and  breach  of  the  peace,  be 
privileged  from  arrest  during  their  attendance  at  the  session  of 
their  respective  houses,  and  in  going  to  and  returning  from 
the  same  ;  and  for  any  speech  or  debate  in  either  house,  they 
shall  not  be  questioned  in  any  other  place. 

No  senator  or  representative  shall,  during  the  time  for  which 
he  was  elected,  be  appointed  to  any  civil  office  under  the  au- 
thority of  the  United  States,  which  shall  have  been  created,  or 
the  emoluments  whereof  shall  have  been  increased  during  such 
time ;  and  no  person  holding  any  office  under  the  United 
States  shall  be  a  member  of  either  house  during  his  contin- 
uance in  office. 

THE  POWERS   OF   CONGRESS. 

Sect.  7.  All  bills  for  raising  revenue  shall  originate  in  the 
house  of  representatives ;  but  the  senate  may  propose  or  con- 
cur with  amendments,  as  on  other  bills. 

Every  bill  which  shall  have  passed  the  house  of  representa- 
tives and  the  senate,  shall,  before  it  become  a  law,  be  presented 


1787.]  PROPOSED    CONSTITUTION,  5 

to  the  president  of  the  United  States;  if  he  approve,  he  shall 
sign  it ;  but  if  not,  he  shall  return  it  with  his  objections,  to 
that  house  in  which  it  shall  have  originated,  who  shall  enter 
the  objections  at  large  on  their  journal,  and  proceed  to  recon- 
sider it.  If,  after  such  reconsideration,  two-thirds  of  that 
house  shall  agree  to  pass  the  bill,  it  shall  be  sent,  together 
with  the  objections,  to  the  other  house,  by  which  it  shall  like- 
wise be  reconsidered,  and,  if  approved  by  two-thirds  of  that 
house,  it  shall  become  a  law.  But  in  all  such  cases,  the  votes 
of  both  houses  shall  be  determined  by  yeas  and  nays  ;  and  the 
names  of  the  persons  voting  for  and  against  the  bill  shall  be 
entered  on  the  journal  of  each  house  respectively.  If  any  bill 
shall  not  be  returned  by  the  president  within  ten  days  (Sun- 
days excepted)  after  it  shall  have  been  presented  to  him,  the 
same  shall  be  a  law,  in  like  manner  as  if  he  had  signed  it, 
unless  the  congress,  by  their  adjournment,  prevent  its  return, 
in  which  case  it  shall  not  be  a  law. 

Every  order,  resolution  or  vote,  to  which  the  concurrence  of 
the  senate  and  house  of  representatives  may  be  necessary, 
(except  on  a  question  of  adjournment,)  shall  be  presented 
to  the%president  of  the  United  States ;  and  before  the  same 
shall  take  effect,  shall  be  approved  by  him,  or,  being  disap- 
proved by  him,  shall  be  repassed  by  two-thirds  of  the  senate 
and  house  of -representatives,  according  to  the  rules  and  limita- 
tions prescribed  in  the  case  of  a  bill. 

Sect.  8.  The  congress  shall  have  power : — To  lay  and 
collect  taxes,  duties,  imposts  and  excises ;  to  pay  the  debts, 
and  provide  for  the  common  defence  and  general  welfare  of 
the  United  States  ;  but  all  duties,  imposts  and  excises  shall  be 
uniform  throughout  the  United  States  : — To  borrow  money  on 
the  credit  of  the  United  States  : — To  regulate  commerce  with 
foreign  nations,  and  among  the  several  states,  and  with  the 
Indian  tribes: — To  establish  an  uniform  rule  of  naturalization, 
and  uniform  laws  on  the  subject  of  bankruptcies  throughout 
the  United  States  : — To  coin  money,  regulate  the  value  thereof, 
and  of  foreign  coin,  and  fix  the  standard  of  weights  and 
measures : — To  provide  for  the  punishment  of  counterfeiting 
the  securities  and  current  coin  of  the   United   States; — To 


6  PROPOSED    CONSTITUTION.  [1787. 

establish  post  offices  and  post  roads : — To  promote  the  progress 
of  science  and  useful  arts,  by  securing  for  limited  times  to 
authors  and  inventors  the  exclusive  right  to  their  respective 
writings  and  discoveries : — To  constitute  tribunals  inferior  to 
the  supreme  court : — To  define  and  punish  piracies  and  felo- 
nies committed  on  the  high  seas,  and  offences  against  the  law 
of  nations  : — To  declare  war,  grant  letters  of  marque  and 
reprisal,  and  make  rules  concerning  captures  on  land  and 
water : — To  raise  and  support  armies  ;  but  no  appropriation 
of  money  to  that  use  shall  be  for  a  longer  term  than  two  years : 
— To  provide  and  maintain  a  navy : — To  make  rules  for  the 
government  and  regulation  of  the  land  and  naval  forces : — To 
provide  for  calling  forth  the  militia  to  execute  the  laws  of  the 
Union,  suppress  insurrections,  and  repel  invasions : — To  pro- 
vide for  organizing,  arming  and  disciplining  the  militia,  and 
for  governing  such  part  of  them  as  may  be  employed  in  the 
service  of  the  United  States,  reserving  to  the  states  respec- 
tively, the  appointment  of  the  officers,  and  the  authority  of 
training  the  militia,  according  to  the  discipline  prescribed  by 
congress : — To  exercise  exclusive  legislation  in  all  cases  what- 
soever, over  such  district,  (not  exceeding  ten  miles  squa§e,)  as 
may  by  session  of  particular  states,  and  the  acceptance  of  con- 
gress, become  the  seat  of  the  government  of  the  United  States ; 
and  to  exercise  like  authority  over  all  places  purchased  by 
consent  of  the  legislature  of  the  state  in  which  the  same 
shall  be,  for  the  erection  of  forts,  magazines,  arsenals,  dock- 
yards and  other  needful  buildings :  and  to  make  all  laws 
which  shall  be  necessary  and  proper  for  carrying  into  execu- 
tion the  foregoing  powers,  and  all  other  powers  vested  by  this 
constitution  in  the  government  of  the  United  States,  or  in  any 
department  or  officer  thereof. 

RESTRICTIONS    UPON   CONGRESS. 

Sect.  9.  The  migration  or  importation  of  such  persons  as 
any  of  the  states  now  existing  shall  think  proper  to  admit, 
shall  not  be  prohibited  by  the  congress  prior  to  the  year  one 
thousand  eight  hundred  and  eight :  but  a  tax  or  duty  may  be 
imposed  on  such  importation,  not  exceeding  ten  dollars  for 
each  person* 


1787.]  PROPOSED    CONSTITUTION.  7 

The  privilege  of  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus  shall  not  be  sus- 
pended, unless  when,  in  cases  of  rebellion  or  invasion,  the 
public  safety  may  require  it. 

No  bill  of  attainder  or  ex  post  facto  law  shall  be  passed. 

No  capitation  or  other  direct  tax,  shall  be  laid,  unless  in 
proportion  to  the  census  or  enumeration,  herein  before  directed 
to  be  taken. 

No  tax  or  duty  shall  be  laid  on  articles  exported  from  any 
state. 

No  preference  shall  be  given,  by  any  regulation  of  commerce 
or  revenue,  to  the  ports  of  one  state  over  those  of  another ; 
nor  shall  vessels  bound  to  or  from  one  state,  be  obliged  to 
enter,  clear,  or  pay  duties  in  another. 

No  moneys  shall  be  drawn  from  the  treasury  but  in  conse- 
quence of  appropriations  made  by  law ;  and  a  regular  state- 
ment and  account  of  the  receipts  and  expenditures  of  all 
public  money  shall  be  published  from  time  to  time. 

No  title  of  nobility  shall  be  granted  by  the  United  States ; 
and  no  person  holding  any  office  of  profit  or  trust  under  them, 
shall,  without  the  consent  of  the  congress,  accept  of  any  pres- 
ent, emolument,  office,  or  title,  of  any  kind  whatever,  from 
any  king,  prince,  or  foreign  state. 

RESTRICTIONS    UPON    RESPECTIVE   STATES. 

Sect.  10.  No  state  shall  enter  into  any  treaty,  alliance,  or 
confederation ;  grant  letters  of  marque  and  reprisal ;  coin 
money  ;  emit  bills  of  credit ;  make  any  thing  but  gold  and 
silver  coin  a  tender  in  payment  of  debts  ;  pass  any  bill  of 
attainder,  ex  post  facto  law,  or  law  impairing  the  obligation  of 
contracts  ;  or  grant  any  title  of  nobility.  No  state  shall,  with- 
out the  consent  of  the  congress,  lay  any  imposts,  or  duties 
on  imports  or  exports,  except  what  may  be  absolutely  neces- 
sary for  executing  its  inspection  laws  ;  and  the  net  produce 
of  all  duties  and  imposts,  laid  by  any  state  on  imports  or 
exports,  shall  be  for  the  use  of  the  treasury  of  the  United 
States  ;  and  all  such  laws  shall  be  subject  to  the  revision  and 
control  of  the  congress.  No  state  shall,  without  the  consent 
of  congress,  lay  any  duty  of  tonnage,  keep  troops,  or  ships  of 


8  PROPOSED    CONSTITUTION.  [1787. 

war,  in  time  of  peace,  enter  into  any  agreement  or  compact 
with  another  state,  or  with  a  foreign  power,  or  engage  in  war, 
unless  actually  invaded,  or  in  such  imminent  danger  as  will 
not  admit  of  delay. 


ARTICLE  II. 

EXECUTIVE   POWER. 

Sect.  1.  The  executive  power  shall  be  vested  in  a  presi- 
dent of  the  United  States  of  America.  He  shall  hold  his 
office  during  the  term  of  four  years ;  and,  together  with  the 
vice-president,  chosen  for  the  same  term,  be  elected  as  fol- 
lows : — 

Each  state  shall  appoint,  in  such  a  manner  as  the  legislature 
thereof  may  direct,  a  number  of  electors,  equal  to  the  whole 
number  of  senators  and  representatives  to  which  the  state  may 
be  entitled  in  the  congress :  but  no  senator  or  representative, 
or  person  holding  an  office  of  trust  or  profit  under  the  United 
States,  shall  be  appointed  an  elector. 

The  electors  shall  meet  in  their  respective  states,  and  vote 
by  ballot  for  two  persons,  of  whom  one  at  least  shall  not  be 
an  inhabitant  of  the  same  state  with  themselves:  and  they 
shall  make  a  list  of  all  the  persons  voted  for,  and  of  the  num-. 
ber  of  votes  for  each  ;  which  list  they  shall  sign  and  certify,  and 
transmit,  sealed,  to  the  seat  of  government  of  the  United  States, 
directed  to  the  president  of  the  senate.  The  president  of  the 
senate  shall,  in  the  presence  of  the  senate  and  house  of  repre- 
sentatives, open  all  the  certificates,  and  the  votes  shall  then  be 
counted.  The  person  having  the  greatest  number  of  votes,  shall 
be  the  president,  if  such  number  be  a  majority  of  the  whole 
number  of  electors  appointed :  And  if  there  be  more  than  one 
who  have  such  majority,  and  have  an  equal  number  of  votes, 
then  the  house  of  representatives  shall  immediately  choose  by 
ballot  one  of  them  for  president;  -and  if  no  person  have  a 
majority,  then  from  the  five  highest  on  the  list,  the  said  house 
shall,  in  like  manner,  choose  the  president :  but  in  choosing  the 
president,  the  votes  shall  be  taken  by  states,  the  representation 
from  each  state  having  one  vote ;  a  quorum  for  this  purpose 


1787.]  PROPOSED    CONSTITUTION.  9 

shall  consist  of  a  member  or  members  from  two-thirds  of  the 
states,  and  a  majority  of  all  the  states  shall  be  necessary  to  a 
choice.  In  every  case,  after  the  choice  of  the  president,  the 
person  having  the  greatest  number  of  votes  of  the  electors  shall 
be  the  vice-president.  But  if  there  shall  remain  two  or  more 
who  have  equal  votes,  the  senate  shall  choose  from  them,  by 
ballot,  the  vice-president. 

The  congress  may  determine  the  time  of  choosing  the  elec- 
tors, and  the  day  on  which  they  shall  give  their  votes :  which 
day  shall  be  the  same  throughout  the  United  States. 

No  person,  except  a  natural  born  citizen,  or  a  citizen  of  the 
United  States  at  the  time  of  the  adoption  of  this  constitution, 
shall  be  eligible  to  the  office  of  president ;  neither  shall  any 
person  be  eligible  to  that  office,  who  shall  not  have  attained  to 
the  age  of  thirty-five  years,  and  been  fourteen  years  a  resident 
within  the  United  States. 

In  case  of  the  removal  of  the  president  from  office,  or  of  his 
death,  resignation,  or  inability  to  discharge  the  powers  and 
duties  of  the  said  office,  the  same  shall  devolve  on  the  vice- 
president  ;  and  the  congress  may  by  law  provide  for  the  case 
of  removal,  death,  resignation  or  inability,  both  of  the  presi- 
dent and  vice-president,  declaring  what  officer  shall  then  act 
as  president ;  and  such  officer  shall  act  accordingly,  until  the 
disability  be  removed,  or  a  president  shall  be  elected. 

The  president  shall,  at  stated  times,  receive  for  his  services  a 
compensation,  which  shall  neither  be  increased  nor  diminished 
during  the  period  for  which  he  shall  have  been  elected ;  and 
he  shall  not  receive,  within  that  period,  any  other  emolument 
from  the  United  States,  or  any  of  them. 

Before  he  enter  on  the  execution  of  his  office,  he  shall  take 
the  following  oath  or  affirmation : — 

"  I  do  solemnly  swear,  (or  affirm,)  that  I  will  faithfully  exe- 
cute the  office  of  president  of  the  United  States,  and  will,  to 
the  best  of  my  ability,  preserve,  protect,  and  defend  the  consti- 
tution of  the  United  States." 

Sect.  2.     The  president  shall  be  commander-in-chief  of  the 
army  and  navy  of  the  United  States,  and  of  the  militia  of  the 
several  states,  when  called  into  the  actual  service  of  the  United 
2 


10  PROPOSED    CONSTITUTION.  [1787. 

States.  He  may  require  the  opinion,  in  writing,  of  the  princi- 
pal officer  in  each  of  the  executive  departments,  upon  any 
subject  relating  to  the  duties  of  their  respective  offices,  and  he 
shall  have  power  to  grant  reprieves  and  pardons  for  offences 
against  the  United  States,  except  in  cases  of  impeachment. 

He  shall  have  power,  by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of 
the  senate,  to  make  treaties,  provided  two-thirds  of  the  senators 
present  concur ;  and  he  shall  nominate,  and,  by  and  with  the 
advice  and  consent  of  the  senate,  shall  appoint  ambassadors, 
other  public  ministers  and  consuls,  judges  of  the  supreme 
court,  and  all  other  officers  of  the  United  States,  whose  appoint- 
ments are  not  herein  otherwise  provided  for,  and  which  shall 
be  established  by  law :  but  the  congress  may  by  law  vest  the 
appointment  of  such  inferior  officers  as  they  think  proper,  in 
the  president  alone,  in  the  courts  of  law,  or  in  the  heads  of 
departments. 

The  president  shall  have  power  to  fill  up  all  vacancies  that 
may  happen  during  the  recess  of  the  senate,  by  granting  com- 
missions which  shall  expire  at  the  end  of  their  next  session. 

Sect.  3.  He  shall,  from  time  to  time,  give  to  the  congress 
information  of  the  state  of  the  Union,  and  recommend  to  their 
consideration  such  measures  as  he  shall  judge  necessary  and 
expedient ;  he  may,  on  extraordinary  occasions,  convene  both 
houses,  or  either  of  them,  and  in  case  of  disagreement  between 
them,  with  respect  to, the  time  of  adjournment,  he  may  adjourn 
them  to  such  time  as  he  shall  think  proper ;  he  shall  receive 
ambassadors  and  other  public  ministers ;  he  shall  take  care 
that  the  laws  be  faithfully  executed,  and  shall  commission  all 
the  officers  of  the  United  States. 

Sect.  4.  The  president,  vice-president,  and  all  civili  officers 
of  the  United  States,  shall  be  removed  from  office  on  impeach- 
ment for,  and  conviction  of,  treason,  bribery,  or  other  high 
crimes  and  misdemeanors. 


1787.]  PROPOSED    CONSTITUTION.  11 


ARTICLE  III. 

JUDICIARY     POWER. 

Sect.  1..  The  judicial  power  of  the  United  States  shall  be 
vested  in  one  supreme  court,  and  in  such  inferior  courts  as  the 
congress  may,  from  time  to  time,  ordain  and  establish.  The 
judges,  both  of  the  supreme  and  inferior  courts,  shall  hold 
their  offices  during  good  behavior,  and  shall  at  stated  times, 
receive  for  their  services  a  compensation,  which  shall  not  be 
diminished  during  their  continuance  in  office. 

Sect.  2.  The  judicial  power  shall  extend  to  all  cases,  in 
law  and  equity,  arising  under  this  constitution,  the  laws  of  the 
United  States,  and  treaties  made,  or  which  shall  be  made, 
under  their  authority ;  to  all  cases  affecting  ambassadors,  other 
public  ministers  and  consuls ;  to  all  cases  of  admiralty  and 
maritime  jurisdiction ;  to  controversies  to  which  the  United 
States  shall  be  a  party  ;  to  controversies  between  two  or  more 
states  ;  between  a  state  and  citizens  of  another  state  ;  between 
citizens  of  different  states,  between  citizens  of  the  same  state 
claiming  lands  under  grants  of  different  states,  and  between 
a  state,  or  the  citizens  thereof,  and  foreign  states,  citizens,  or 
subjects. 

In  all  cases  affecting  ambassadors,  other  public  ministers  and 
consuls,  and  those  in  which  a  state  shall  be  party,  the  supreme 
court  shall  have  original  jurisdiction.  In  all  the  other  cases 
before  mentioned,  the  supreme  court  shall  have  appellate  juris- 
diction, both  as  to  law  and  fact,  with  such  exceptions  and 
under  such  regulations,  as  the  congress  shall  make. 

The  trial  of  all  crimes,  except  in  cases  of  impeachment, 
shall  be  by  jury;  and  such  trial  shall  be  held  in  the  state 
where  the  said  crimes  shall  have  been  committed ;  but  when 
not  committed  within  any  state,  the  trial  shall  be  at  such  place 
or  places  as  the  congress  may  by  law  have  directed. 

Sect.  3.  Treason  against  the  United  States  shall  consist 
only  in  levying  war  against  them,  or  in  adhering  to  their  ene- 
mies, giving  them  aid  and  comfort.     No  person  shall  be  con- 


12  PROPOSED    CONSTITUTION.  [1787. 

victed  of  treason,  unless  on  the  testimony  of  two  witnesses  to 
the  same  overt  act,  or  on  confession  in  open  court. 

The  congress  shall  have  power  to  declare  the  punishment 
of  treason ;  but  no  attainder  of  treason  shall  work  corruption 
of  blood,  or  forfeiture,  except  during  the  life  of  the  person 
attainted. 


ARTICLE  IV. 

Sect.  1.  Full  faith  and  credit  shall  be  given  in  each 
state  to  the  public  acts,  records,  and  judicial  proceedings  of 
every  other  state :  and  the  congress  may,  by  general  laws, 
prescribe  the  manner  in  which  such  acts,  records  and  proceed- 
ings shall  be  proved,  and  the  effect  thereof. 

Sect.  2.  The  citizens  of  each  state  shall  be  entitled  to  all 
the  privileges  and  immunities  of  citizens  in  the  several  states. 

A  person  charged  in  any  state  with  treason,  felony,  or  other 
crime,  who  shall  flee  from  justice,  and  be  found  in  another 
state,  shall,  on  demand  of  the  executive  authority  of  the  state 
from  which  he  fled,  be  delivered  up,  to  be  removed  to  the  state 
having  jurisdiction  of  the  crime. 

No  person  held  to  service  or  labor  in  one  state,  under  the 
laws  thereof,  escaping  into  another,  shall,  in  consequence  of 
any  law  or  regulation  therein,  be  discharged  from  such  service 
or  labor ;  but  shall  be  delivered  up  on  claim  of  the  party  to 
whom  such  service  or  labor  may  be  due. 

GENERAL  REGULATIONS. 

Sect.  3.  New  states  may  be  admitted  by  the  congress  into 
this  Union ;  but  no  new  state  shall  be  formed  or  erected  within 
the  jurisdiction  of  any  other  state,  nor  any  state  be  formed  by 
the  junction  of  two  or  more  states  or  parts  of  states,  without 
the  consent  of  the  legislatures  of  the  states  concerned,  as  well 
as  of  the  congress. 

The  congress  shall  have  power  to  dispose  of,  and  make  all 
needful  rules  and  regulations  respecting  the  territory  or  other 


1787.] 


PROPOSED    CONSTITUTION.  13 


property  belonging  to  the  United  States ;  and  nothing  in  this 
constitution  shall  be  so  construed  as  to  prejudice  any  claims  of 
the  United  States,  or  any  particular  state. 

Sect.  4.  The  United  States  shall  guarantee  to  every  state 
in  this  Union,  a  republican  form  of  government ;  and  shall 
protect  each  of  them  against  invasion  :  and,  on  application  of 
the  legislature,  or  of  the  executive,  (when  the  legislature  can- 
not be  convened,)  against  domestic  violence. 

ARTICLE '  V. 

PROVISION   FOR   AMENDMENTS. 

The  congress,  whenever  two-thirds  of  both  houses  shall  deem 
it  necessary,  shall  propose  amendments  to  this  constitution : 
or,  on  the  application  of  the  legislatures  of  two-thirds  of  the 
several  states,  shall  call  a  convention  for  proposing  amend- 
ments, which,  in  either  case,  shall  be  valid  to  all  intents  and 
purposes,  as  part  of  this  constitution,  when  ratified  by  the 
legislatures  of  three-fourths  of  the  several  states,  or  by  conven- 
tions in  three-fourths  thereof,  as  the  one  or  the  other  mode  of 
ratification  may  be  proposed  by  the  congress  ;  provided,  that  no 
amendment  which  may  be  made  prior  to  the  year  one  thou- 
sand eight  hundred  and  eight,  shall,  in  any  manner  affect  the 
first  and  fourth  clauses  in  the  ninth  section  of  the  first  article  ; 
and  that  no  state,  without  its  consent,  shall  be  deprived  of  its 
equal  suffrage  in  the  senate. 

ARTICLE  VI. 

GENERAL   REGULATIONS. 

All  debts  contracted,  and  engagements  entered  into,  be- 
fore the  adoption  of  this  constitution,  shall  be  as  valid  against 
the  United  States,  under  this  constitution,  as  under  the  con- 
federation. 

This  constitution,  and  the  laws  of  the  United  States  which 
shall  be  made  in  pursuance  thereof,  and  all  treaties  made,  or 


14  PROPOSED    CONSTITUTION.  [1787. 

which  shall  be  made,  under  the  authority  of  the  United  States, 
shall  be  the  supreme  law  of  the  land  ;  and  the  judges  in  every 
state  shall  be  bound  thereby,  any  thing  in  the  constitution  or 
laws  of  any  state  to  the  contrary  notwithstanding. 

The  senators  and  representatives  before  mentioned,  and  the 
members  of  the  several  state  legislatures,  and  all  executive 
and  judicial  officers,  both  of  the  United  States  and  of  the 
several  states,  shall  be  bound,  by  oath  or  affirmation,  to  support 
this  constitution ;  but  no  religious  test  shall  ever  be  required  as 
a  qualification  to.  any  office  or  public  trust  under  the  United 
States. 


ARTICLE  VII. 

The  ratification  of  the  conventions  of  nine  states  shall  be 
sufficient  for  the  establishment  of  this  constitution,  between  the 
states  so  ratifying  the  same. 

Done  in  convention,  by  the  unanimous  consent  of  the  states 
present,  the  seventh  day  of  September,  in  the  year  of  our 
Lord  one  thousand  seven  hundred  and  eighty-seven,  and  of  the 
Independence  of  the  United  States  of  America,  the  twelfth. 

In  witness  whereof,  we  have  hereunto  subscribed  our  names. 

GEORGE  WASHINGTON, 

President  and  Deputy  from  Virginia. 


tit      tt        i  •      (  John  Langdon. 
New  Hampshire.  ]  mnxjnjka  arrAI 

Massachusetts. 


Connecticut, 


Nicholas  Gilman. 

Nathaniel  Gorham. 
Rufus  King. 

William  Samuel  Johnson. 
Roger  Sherman. 

New  York.  Alexander  Hamilton. 

(  William  Livingston. 
,r      7  J  David  Brearly. 

New  Jersey.         {  WlLLIAM  Patterson. 

^  Jonathan  Dayton. 


1787.] 


PROPOSED    CONSTITUTION. 


15 


Pennsylvania. 


Delaware. 

Maryland. 
Virginia. 
North  Carolina. 

South  Carolina. 


Georgia. 


(  Benjamin  Franklin. 
Thomas  Mifflin. 
Robert  Morris. 
George  Clymer. 
Thomas  Fitzsimons. 
Jared  Ingersoll. 
James  Wilson. 
Gouveneur  Morris. 

(  George  Read. 

Gunning  Bedford,  Jr. 
<  John  Dickinson. 

Richard  Basset. 

Jacob  Broom. 

James  M'Henry. 

Daniel  of  St.  Thomas  Jenifer. 

Daniel  Carrol. 


John  Blair. 
James  Madison. 


Jr 


William  Blount. 
Richard  Dobbs  Spaight. 
Hugh  Williamson. 

John  Rutledge. 

Charles  Cotesworth  Pinckney. 

Charles  Pinckney. 

Pierce  Butler. 

William  Few. 
Abraham  Baldwin. 


Attest.         William  Jackson,  Secretary. 


In  Convention,  Monday,  September  17,  1787. 

Present — The  States  of  New  Hampshire,  Massachusetts,  Con- 
necticut, Mr.  Hamilton,  from  New  York,  New  Jersey,  Penn- 
sylvania, Delaware,  Maryland,  Virginia,  North  Carolina, 
South  Carolina  and  Georgia. 

Resolved,  That  the  preceding  constitution  be  laid  before  the 
United  States  in  congress  assembled,  and  that  it  is  the  opinion 
of  this  convention  that  it  should  afterwards  be  submitted  to  a 
convention  of  delegates,  chosen  in  each  state,  by  the  people 


16  PROPOSED    CONSTITUTION.  [1787. 

thereof,  under  the  recommendation  of  its  legislature,  for  their 
assent  and  ratification ;  and  that  each  convention  assenting 
to,  and  ratifying  the  same,  should  give  notice  thereof  to  the 
United  States  in  congress  assembled. 

Resolved,  That  it  is  the  opinion  of  this  convention,  that  as 
soon  as  the  conventions  of  nine  states  shall  have  ratified  this 
constitution,  the  United  States,  in  congress  assembled,  should 
fix  a  day  on  which  electors  should  be  appointed  by  the  states 
which  shall  have  ratified  the  same,  and  a  day  on  which  the 
electors  should  assemble  to  vote  for  the  president,  and  the  time 
and  place  for  commencing  proceedings  under  this  constitution. 
That  after  such  publication  the  electors  should  be  appointed, 
and  the  senators  and  representatives  elected :  That  the  electors 
should  meet  on  the  day  fixed  for  the  election  of  the  president, 
and  should  transmit  their  votes,  certified,  signed,  sealed  and 
directed,  as  the  constitution  requires,  to  the  secretary  of  the 
United  States,  in  congress  assembled,  that  the  senators  and 
representatives  should  convene  at  the  time  and  place  assigned  ; 
that  the  senators  should  appoint  a  president  of  the  senate  for 
the  sole  purpose  of  receiving,  opening  and  counting  the  votes 
for  president ;  and  that  after  he  shall  be  chosen,  the  congress, 
together  with  the  president,  should,  without  delay,  proceed  to 
execute  this  constitution. 

By  the  unanimous  order  of  the  convention. 

GEORGE  WASHINGTON,  President, 
William  Jackson,  Secretary. 


In  Convention,  September  17,  1787. 

Sir, — We  have  now  the  honor  to  submit  to  the  consideration 
of  the  United  States,  in  congress  assembled,  that  constitution 
which  has  appeared  to  us  the  most  advisable.  The  friends  of 
our  country  have  long  seen  and  desired  that  the  power  of 
making  war,  peace  and  treaties,  that  of  levying  money  and 
regulating  commerce,  and  the  correspondent  executive  and 
judicial  authorities,  should  be  fully  and  effectually  vested  in 
the  general  government  of  the  Union  ;  but  the  impropriety  of 


1787.]  PROPOSED    CONSTITUTION.  17 

delegating  such  extensive  trust  to  one  body  of  men  is  evident, 
hence  results  the  necessity  of  a  different  organization. 

It  is  obviousjy  impracticable  in  the  federal  government  of 
these  states  to  secure  all  rights  of  independent  sovereignty  to 
each,  and  yet  provide  for  the  interest  and  safety  of  all.  ''Indi- 
viduals entering  into  society  must  give  up  a  share  of  liberty  to 
preserve  the  rest.  The  magnitude  of  the  sacrifice  must  depend 
as  well  on  situation  and  circumstance, *as  on  the  object  to  be 
obtained.  'It  is  at  all  times  difficult  to  draw  with  precision  the 
line  between  those  rights  which  must  be  surrendered  and  those 
which  may  be  reserved  fand  on  the  present  occasion  this  diffi- 
culty was  increased  by  a  difference  among  the  several  states  as 
to  their  situation,  extent,  habits,  and  particular  interests.    ^ 

In  all  our  deliberations  on  this  subject,  we  kept  steadily  in 
our  view,  that  which  appears  to  us  the  greatest  interest  of  every 
true  American,  the  consolidation  of  our  Union,  in  which  is 
involved  our  prosperity,  felicity,  safety,  perhaps  our  national 
existence.  This  important  consideration,  seriously  and  deeply 
impressed  on  our  minds,  led  each  state  in  the  convention  to  be 
less  rigid  on  points  of  inferior  magnitude  than  might  have  been 
otherwise  expected  ;  and  thus  the  constitution  which  we  now 
present,  is  the  result  of  a  spirit  of  amity,  and  of  that  mutual 
deference  and  concession  which  the  peculiarity  of  our  political 
situation  rendered  indispensible. 

That  it  will  meet  the  full  and  entire  approbation  of  every 
state,  is  not,  perhaps,  to  be  expected ;  but  each  will  doubtless 
consider  that  had  her  interests  been  alone  consulted,  the  conse- 
quences might  have  been  particularly  disagreeable  or  injurious 
to  others  ;  that  it  is  liable  to  as  few  exceptions  as  could  reason- 
ably have  been  expected,  we  hope  and  believe ;  that  it  may 
promote  the  lasting  welfare  of  that  country  so  dear  to  us  all, 
and  secure  her  freedom  and  happiness,  is  our  most  ardent  wish. 
With  great  respect,  we  have  the  honor  to  be, 
Sir,  your  Excellency's  most  obedient 
and  humble  servants. 

GEORGE  WASHINGTON,  President. 

By  unanimous  order  of  the  convention. 

His  Excellency  the  President  of  iJongress. 

3 


18  PROPOSED    CONSTITUTION.  [178' 


MESSAGE  OF  GOVERNOR  HANCOCK. 

[Extract  from  the  Message  of  His  Excellency  John  Hancock,  to 
the  Legislature  of  Massachusetts,  relating  to  the  Federal  Constitu- 
tion, as  published  in    the    Independent    Chronicle,    October   25, 

1787.] 

Boston,  October  25. 
Thursday  last,  His   Excellency  the  Governor  went   to   the 
State  House,  where,  in  presence  of  the  two  branches  of  the 
legislature,  who  had  met  in  the  representatives'  chamber  for 
the  purpose,  he  addressed  them  in  a  speech,  as  follows : — 

Gentlemen  of  the  Senate,  and 

Gentlemen  of  the  House  of  Representatives  : 

*         *         *        *         *         ***** 

The  general  convention  having  completed  the  business  of 
their  appointment,  and  having  reported  to  congress,  "  a  con- 
stitution for  the  United  States  of  America,' 9  I  have  received 
the  same  from  that  honorable  body,  and  have  directed  the  Sec- 
retary to  lay  it,  together  with  the  letter  accompanying  it,  before 
the  legislature,  that  measures  may  be  adopted  for  calling  a  con- 
vention in  this  Commonwealth,  to  take  the  same  into  considera- 
tion. It  not  being  within  the  duties  of  my  office  to  decide 
upon  this  momentous  affair,  I  shall  only  say,  that  the  charac- 
ters of  the  gentlemen  who  have  compiled  this  system,  are  so 
truly  respectable,  and  the  object  of  their  deliberations  so  vastly 
important,  that  I  conceive  every  mark  of  attention  will  be  paid 
to  the  report.  Their  unanimity  in  deciding  those  questions 
wherein  the  general  prosperity  of  the  nation  is  so  deeply  in- 
volved, and  the  complicated  rights  of  each  separate  state  are  so 
intimately  concerned,  is  very  remarkable ;  and  I  persuade 
myself  that  the  delegates  of  this  state,  when  assembled  in  con- 
vention, will  be  able  to  discern  that  which  will  tend  to  the 
future  happiness  and  security  of  all  the  people  in  this  extensive 
country. 


1787.]  PROPOSED    CONSTITUTION.  19 


THE  ACTION  OF  THE  LEGISLATURE. 

[Report  of  a  Discussion  upon  the  Report  of  a  Joint  Committee 
appointed  to  consider  that  part  of  the  Governor's  Message  relating 
to  the  Constitution,  from  the  Independent   Chronicle,  October  25, 

1787.] 

Boston,  October  25. 

Last  Friday  a  committee  of  the  two  branches  of  the  legisla- 
ture, appointed  to  consider  that  part  of  his  Excellency's  com- 
munication which  related  to  the  constitution  proposed  by  the  late 
convention  of  the  states,  laid  their  report  before  the  honorable 
senate  ;  who,  after  debating  thereon,  with  that  freedom,  good 
humor  and  candor,  which  forever  does  honor  to  a  republican 
assembly,  agreed  to  the  report,  with  some  amendments,  and 
sent  it,  the  day  following,  to  the  honorable  house  of  represen- 
tatives for  their  concurrence.  The  substance  of  the  resolu- 
tions of  the  senate,  as  we  are  informed,  is  a  reccommendation 
to  the  several  towns  and  districts  within  the  Commonwealth, 
to  elect  delegates  not  exceeding  the  numbers  they  are  em- 
powered respectively  by  law,  to  send  as  members  to  the  house 
of  representatives,  and  an  order  to  the  secretary  to  transmit 
printed  copies  of  the  papers  received  from  congress  relating  to 
the  subject,  together  with  the  resolutions,  to  the  sheriffs  of  the 
counties,  by  express,  with  positive  directions  to  them,  by  them- 
selves, or  their  deputies,  personally,  to  deliver  them  to  the 
selectmen  of  every  town  and  district  within  their  respective 
counties. 

Ten  o'clock,  yesterday,  being  the  time  assigned  by  the  hon- 
orable house  of  representatives,  for  considering  the  question, 
whether  the  house  would  concur  with  the  senate  in  a  resolve 
to  call  a  convention  according  to  reccommendation  of  con- 
gress for  the  acceptance  of  the  newly  proposed  plan  of  federal 
government,  Mr.  Parsons  moved  for  the  orders  of  the  day, 
when  the  resolve  which  was  sent  down  from  the  senate,  was 
opened  and  debated.  Dr.  Kilham  rose  and  argued  very  warmly 
upon  the  impropriety  of  being  in  a  hurry  about  a  measure  of  so 
much  consequence  to  the  community  ;  and  said  that  he  under- 
stood, many  people  thought  the  new  system  would  not  go  down, 


20  PROPOSED    CONSTITUTION.  [1787. 

if  not  suddenly  pushed,  which  was  one  reason  why  lie  was 
against  the  measure.  He  observed  upon  the  right  the  legisla- 
tures had  to  appoint  the  late  convention,  upon  the  commission 
under  which  our  members  went  to  the  convention,  and  upon 
the  question,  how  far  they  had  abided  by  that  commission.  Dr. 
Kilham  dwelt  some  time,  also,  upon  the  right  of  either  conven- 
tion or  people,  to  absolve  the  old  Confederation,  unless  in  the 
way  stated  in  the  articles  themselves.  Mr.  Parsons  and  Dr. 
Jarvis,  in  what  they  observed,  appeared  to  express  the  sense  of 
the  house,  that  so  far  as  Dr.  Kilham  slid  into  the  merits  of  the 
proposed  government,  so  far  he  was  out  of  the  question,  which 
was  in  fact,  only  whether  the  house  would  concur  with  the 
senate,  to  call  the  convention.  General  Brooks  made  a  more 
particular  reply  to  Dr.  Kilham's  observations,  and  pointed  out 
clearly  that  what  the  Dr.  had  said,  was  matter  much  better  to 
be  before  the  convention  than  before  that  house  ;  and  that  the 
Dr.  was  premature  as  he  was  zealous  in  his  reflections  upon  the 
subject.  Mr.  Dawes  rose  and  said,  that  he  should  not  have 
arisen,  but  to  combat  one  idea  of  Dr.  Kilham  which,  he  thought, 
had  not  been  observed  upon  by  the  other  gentlemen,  which  was, 
"  that  an  adoption  of  the  new  constitution  would  be  an  unjust 
breach  of  tlie  old  compact."  Mr.  Dawes  remarked,  that  he 
was  sorry  Dr.  Kilham  disputed  the  people's  rights  so  warmly ; 
and  that  the  Dr.  was  so  much  against  the  people's  being  per- 
mitted to  think  for  themselves.  Mr.  Dawes  said,  that  as  to 
the  clause  in  the  old  Confederation,  that  it  could  not  be  an- 
nulled or  altered  but  in  a  certain  way  ;  he  thought  it  not 
unlike  that  law  of  the  Romans,  which  contained  a  clause  pro- 
hibiting any  future  repeal, — but  which  succeeding  legislatures 
soon  found  a  way  to  annul,  by  repealing  that  very  prohibitory 
clause.  Mr.  Dawes  ridiculed  Dr.  Kilham's  expectation  of  civil 
war  and  misery  being  the  consequence  of  only  nine  states 
acceding  to  the  new  measures ;  and  said  that  some  writers  had 
thought  that  the  house  of  Hanover  was  brought  to  the  English 
throne  by  not  more  than  a  third  of  the  people,  and  yet  that  civil 
liberty  never  flourished  higher  than  in  the  administration  of 
that  house ;  whereas,  he  said,  "  the  probability  was,  that  the 
proposed  government  would  take  place,  if  at  all,  by  the  wishes 
of  almost  all  the  people  of  all  or  most  of  the  states."     Many 


1787.]    .  PROPOSED    CONSTITUTION.  21 

other  observations  were  made  by  the  above  and  other  gentle- 
men, but  we  have  neither  recollection  nor  opportunity  to  add 
further,  only  that  the  question  for  a  concurrence  being  put,  it 
passed  in  the  affirmative,  by  a  majority  of  129  out  of  161 
voters. 

By  this  resolution,  the  convention  is  to  meet  at  the  Court 
House,  in  Boston,  the  second  Wednesday  in  January.  The 
senate  had  determined  the  meeting  at  an  earlier  period,  but 
this  was  overruled  in  the  house,  in  consideration  of  the  neces- 
sity of  sufficient  time  being  allowed  to  the  people  to  consider 
and  digest  a  system  of  government  with  which  the  prosperity 
and  happiness  of  the  people  of  this  country  is  so  ultimately  con- 
nected. The  members  of  the  convention  are  to  be  chosen  in 
the  same  manner,  by  the  same  description  of  persons,  and  to 
receive  the  same  pay  as  representatives,  with  this  difference, 
that  the  sums  due  to  them  in  consequence  of  their  services,  are 
to  be  defrayed  from  the  public  treasury,  out  of  any  money  that 
shall  be  there  anterior  to  the  sitting  of  the  convention,  from 
any  unappropriated  funds  under  the  control  of  government. 
The  words  of  this  resolution  correspond  exactly  with  the  words 
of  the  resolution  of  the  federal  convention,  and  of  congress, 
empowering  the  respective  legislatures  to  call  a  convention ; 
and  this  mode  of  expression,  we  suppose,  is  wisely  calculated 
to  prevent  those  difficulties  that  might  otherwise  have  arisen. 

We  have  the  pleasure  of  assuring  our  readers,  that  the 
utmost  candor  and  good  humor  subsisted  on  this  interesting 
occasion.  The  galleries  were  crowded,  and  hundreds  of  spec- 
tators were  admitted  on  the  floor,  and  on  the  unoccupied  seats 
of  the  house,  drawn  thither  by  their  extreme  curiosity  and 
impatience  to  know  the  result  of  this  novel  and  extraordinary 
debate.  On  the  whole,  every  thing  terminated  to  the  entire 
satisfaction  of  this  numerous  concourse  of  citizens  ;  and  we 
can  only  hope  and  believe  from  the  unanimity  on  this,  that  the 
same  liberality  and  candor  will  prevail,  when  this  town  will  be 
honored  by  its  being  the  seat  of  as  august  a  body,  as  ever  sat 
in  this  Commonwealth,  to  amend  the  defects  and  imperfections 
which  have  so  long  been  complained  of  in  the  former  Confeder- 
ation, and  to  secure  peace,  liberty  and  safety  to  this  extensive 
continent. 


22 


PROPOSED    CONSTITUTION.  [178' 

RESOLUTIONS  FOR  THE  ASSEMBLING  OF  THE 
CONVENTION. 


COMMONWEALTH   OP  MASSACHUSETTS. 

In  Senate,  October  20,  1787. 

Whereas,  the  convention  lately  assembled  at  Philadelphia, 
have  reported  to  congress  a  constitution  for  the  United  States 
of  America,  in  which  convention  were  represented  the  states 
of  New  Hampshire,  Massachusetts,  Connecticut,  New  York, 
New  Jersey,  Pennsylvania,  Maryland,  Virginia,  North  Carolina, 
South  Carolina  and  Georgia;  which  constitution  was  unani- 
mously approved  by  the  said  states  in  convention  assembled : 
And  whereas,  that  convention  resolved  that  the  said  constitu- 
tion should  be  laid  before  the  United  States  in  congress  assem- 
bled, and  that  it  was  their  opinion  that  it  should  be  submitted 
to  a  convention  of  delegates  chosen  in  each  state  by  the  people 
thereof,  under  the  reccommendation  of  its  legislature,  for 
their  assent  and  ratification  ;  and  that  each  convention  assent- 
ing to,  and  ratifying  the  same,  should  give  notice  thereof  to 
the  United  States  in  congress  assembled. 

And  whereas,  the  United  States,  in  congress  assembled,  by 
their  resolution  of  the  28th  of  September  last,  unanimously 
resolved,  "  That  the  constitution  so  reported,  be  transmitted 
to  the  several  legislatures  in  order  to  be  submitted  to  a  con- 
vention of  delegates  chosen  in  each  state  by  the  people  thereof, 
in  conformity  to  the  resolves  of  the  said  convention,  in  that 
case  made  and  provided."  And  whereas,  the  said  constitution 
has  been  transmitted  to  the  legislature  of  this  Commonwealth 
accordingly : 

It  is,  therefore,  Resolved,  That  it  be,  and  it  is  hereby  recom- 
mended to  the  people  of  this  Commonwealth,  that  a  conven- 
tion of  delegates  be  chosen  agreeably  to,  -and  for  the  purposes 
mentioned  in  the  resolution  of  congress,  aforesaid,  to  meet  at 
the  State  House  in  Boston,  on  the  second  Wednesday  of  Janu- 
ary next,  and  that  the  constitution  so  reported,  be  submitted 
to  the  said  convention  for  their  assent  and  ratification  ;  and 


1787.]  PROPOSED    CONSTITUTION.  23 

that  the  said  convention  assenting  to,  and  ratifying  the  same, 
give  notice  thereof  to  the  United  States  in  congress  assembled, 
in  conformity  to  the  resolves  of  the  said  convention,  in  that  case 
made  and  provided. 

And  it  is  further  Resolved,  That  the  selectmen  of  the  several 
towns  and  districts  within  this  Commonwealth,  be,  and  they 
are  hereby,  directed  to  convene  as  soon  as  may  be,  the  inhabi- 
tants of  their  several  towns  and  districts,  qualified  by  law  to 
vote  in  the  election  of  representatives,  for  the  purpose  of  choos- 
ing delegates  to  represent  them  in  said  convention. 

And  to  preserve  an  equality  to  the  people  in  their  represen- 
tation in  the  said  convention,  that  the  several  towns  and  dis- 
tricts elect  respectively,  by  ballot,  not  exceeding  the  same 
number  of  delegates  as  by  law  they  are  entitled  to  send  repre- 
sentatives to  the  general  court. 

And  it  is  further  Resolved,  That  the  secretary  immediately 
procure  to  be  printed  a  sufficient  number  of  copies  of  these 
resolutions,  as  also  of  the  said  constitution,  with  the  resolu- 
tions of  the  convention,  and  their  letter  to  the  president  6.f 
congress,  accompanying  the  same ;  and  also  of  the  resolution 
of  the  United  States  in  convention  assembled,  thereupon ;  and 
that  he  may  transmit  three  copies  of  the  same,  as  soon  as  may 
be,  by  expresses,  to  the  sheriffs  of  the  several  counties  within 
this  Commonwealth,  with  positive  directions  to  be  by  them,  or 
their  deputies,  without  delay,  personally  delivered  to  the 
selectmen  of  each  town  and  district  within  their  respective 
counties. 

And  it  is  further  Resolved,  That  the  several  delegates  of  the 
said  convention,  be  allowed  for  their  travel  and  attendance, 
out  of  the  public  treasury,  the  same  pay  as  will  be  allowed  to 
the  representatives  therefor,  this  present  session,  and  that  the 
same  be  defrayed  at  the  public  expense.  * 

And  it  is  further  Resolved,  That  his  excellency  the  govern- 
or, be,  and  he  hereby,  is  requested,  with  advice  of  the  council,  to 
issue  his  warrant  upon  the  treasurer,  directing  him  to  dis- 
charge the  pay  roll  of  the  said  convention,  out  of  any  moneys 
which  will  then  be  in  the  treasury,  not  appropriated. 

And  it  is  further  Resolved,  That  if  there  shall  not  be  suffi- 
cient moneys  then  in  the  treasury  for  that  purpose,  the  treasurer 


24  PROPOSED    CONSTITUTION.  [1787. 

is  hereby  authorized  and  directed  to  borrow  sufficient  moneys 
therefor,  on  such  funds  of  the  government  as  are  not  appropri- 
ated. 

Sent  down  for  concurrence. 

Samuel  Adams,  President. 

In  the  House  of  Representatives,  October  25,  1787. 
Read  and  concurred. 

James  Warren,  Speaker. 

Approved,        John  Hancock. 
A  true  copy.     Attest : 

John  Avery,  Jun.,  Secretary, 


LETTER  OF  HON.  ELBRIDGE  GERRY. 

*  The  following  letter  on  the  subject  of  the  American  Consti- 
tution, from  the  Hon.  Elbridge  Gerry,  Esq.,  one  of  the  dele- 
gates representing  this  Commonwealth  in  the  late  Federal 
Convention,  to  the  legislature,  was,  on  Wednesday  of  last  week, 
read  in  the  senate  and  sent  down  to  the  house  of  representa- 
tives, where  it  was,  on  Thursday,  read  and  sent  up. — Independ- 
ent Chronicle,  November  8,  1787. 

New  York,  18th  October,  1787. 

Gentlemen, — I  have  the  honor  to  enclose,  pursuant  to  my 
commission,  the  constitution  proposed  by  the  federal  conven- 
tion. 

To  this  system  I  gave  my  dissent,  and  shall  submit  my  objec- 
tions to  the  honorable  legislature. 

It  was  painful  for  me,  on  a  subject  of  such  national  impor- 
tance, to  differ  from  the  respectable  members  who  signed  the 
constitution  ;  but,  conceiving  as  I  did,  that  the  liberties  of 
America  were  not  secured  by  the  system,  it  was  my  duty  to 
oppose  it. 

My  principal  objections  to  the  plan  are,  that  there  is  no 
adequate  provision   for  a  representation  of  the   people — that 


1787]  PROPOSED    CONSTITUTION.  25 

they  have  no  security  for  the  right  of  election — that  some  of 
the  powers  of  the  legislature  are  ambiguous,  and  others  indefi- 
nite and  dangerous — that  the  executive  is  blended  with,  and 
will  have  an  undue  influence  over  the  legislature — that  the 
judicial  department  will  be  oppressive — that  treaties  of  the 
highest  importance  may  be  formed  by  the  president  with  the 
advice  of  two  thirds  of  a  quorum  of  the  senate — and  that  the 
system  is  without  the  security  of  a  bill  of  rights.  These  are 
objections  which  are  not  local,  but  apply  equally  to  all  the 
states. 

As  the  convention  was  called  for  "  the  sole  and  express 
purpose  of  revising  the  Articles  of  Confederation,  and  reporting 
to  congress  and  the  several  legislatures  such  alterations  and 
provisions  as  shall  render  the  federal  constitution  adequate  to 
the  exigencies  of  government  and  the  preservation  of  the 
Union, "  I  did  not  conceive  that  these  powers  extended  to  the 
formation  of  the  plan  proposed,  but  the  convention  being  of  a 
different  opinion,  I  acquiesced  in  it,  being  fully  convinced  that 
to  preserve  the  Union,  an  efficient  government  was  indispensably 
necessary  ;  and  that  it  would  be  difficult  to  make  proper  amend- 
ments to  the  Articles  of  Confederation. 

The  constitution  proposed  has  few  federal  features,  but  is 
rather  a  system  of  national  government.  Nevertheless,  in  many 
respects,  I  think  it  has  great  merit,  and  by  proper  amendments, 
may  be  adapted  to  the  "  exigencies  of  government,"  and  pre- 
servation of  liberty. 

The  question  on  this  plan  involves  others  of  the  highest  im- 
portance :  1st.  Whether  there  shall  be  a  dissolution  of  the  fed- 
eral government  ?  2dly.  Whether  the  several  state  governments 
shall  be  so  altered,  as  in  effect  to  be  dissolved  ?  and  3dly. 
Whether  in  lieu  of  the  federal  and  state  governments,  the 
national  constitution  now  proposed  shall  be  substituted,  with- 
out amendments?  Never,  perhaps,  were  a  people  called  on 
to  decide  a  question  of  greater  magnitude.  Should  the  citi- 
zens of  America  adopt  the  plan  as  it  now  stands,  their  liberties 
may  be  lost ;  or,  should  they  reject  it  altogether,  anarchy  may 
ensue.  It  is  evident,  therefore,  that  they  should  not  be  precipi- 
tate in  their  decisions ;  that  the  subject  should  be  well  under- 


26  PROPOSED    CONSTITUTION.  [1787. 

stood,  lest  they  should  refuse  to  support  the  government,  after 
having  hastily  accepted  it. 

If  those  who  are  in  favor  of  the  constitution,  as  well  as  those 
who  are  against  it,  should  preserve  moderation,  their  discus- 
sions may  afford  much  information,  and  finally  direct  to  a 
happy  issue. 

It  may  be  urged  by  some  that  an  implicit  confidence  should 
be  placed  in  the  convention.  But,  however  respectable  the 
members  may  be  who  signed  the  constitution,  it  must  be 
admitted  that  a  free  people  are  the  proper  guardians  of  their 
rights  and  liberties — that  the  greatest  men  may  err — and  that 
their  errors  are  sometimes  of  the  greatest  magnitude. 

Others  may  suppose  that  the  constitution  may  be  safely 
adopted,  because  therein  provision  is  made  to  amend  it.  But 
cannot  this  object  be  better  attained  before  a  ratification  than 
after  it  ?  And  should  a  free  people  adopt  a  form  of  government 
under  conviction  that  it  wants  amendment  ? 

And  some  may  conceive  that  if  the  plan  is  not  accepted  by 
the  people,  they  will  not  unite  in  another.  But  surely,  whilst 
they  have  the  power  to  amend,  they  are  not  under  the  neces- 
sity of  rejecting  it. 

I  have  been  detained  here  longer  than  I  expected,  but  shall 
leave  this  place  in  a  day  or  two  for  Massachusetts,  and  on  my 
arrival  shall  submit  the  reasons  (if  required  by  the  legislature) 
on  which  my  objections  are  grounded. 

I  shall  only  add  that  as  the  welfare  of  the  Union  requires  a 
better  constitution  than  the  Confederation,  I  shall  think  it  my 
duty  as  a  citizen  of  Massachusetts,  to  support  that  which  shall 
be  finally  adopted,  sincerely  hoping  it  will  secure  the  liberty 
and  happiness  of  America. 

I  have  the  honor  to  be,  gentlemen,  with  the  highest  respect 
for  the  honorable  legislature  and  yourselves,  your  most  obedi- 
ent, and  very  humble  servant, 

E.  GERRY' 
The  Hon.  Samuel  Adams,  Esq., 

President  of  the  Senate,  and 
The  Hon.  James  Warren,  Esq., 

Speaker  of  the  House  of  Representatives  of  Massachusetts 


OFFICIAL   JOURNAL. 


A    JOURNAL 


OP  A 


CONVENTION  OF  DELEGATES, 

Chosen  by  the  people  of  the  Commonwealth  of  Massachu- 
setts, FOB,   THE    PUBPOSE    OF   CONSIDEBING   A  CONSTITUTION    OB 

Fbame  of  Govebnment,  bepobted  by  a  Convention  of  Dele- 
gates, held  at  Philadelphia,  on  the  fibst  Monday  of  May, 

1787. 

Begun  and  held  at  Boston,  on  the  second  Wednesday  of 
Januaby,  Anno  Domini  1788,  pubsuant  to  a  Resolve  of  the 
Geneeal  Coubt  of  the  said  Commonwealth,  passed  the 
25th  day  of  Octobeb,  1787. 


JOURNAL. 


Wednesday,  January  9, 1788. 

On  motion, 

Ordered,  That  Mr.  Gorham,  Mr.  Carries,  Dr.  Jarvis,  Mr. 
Dalton,  Mr.  Spooner  and  Mr.  Davis,  be  a  Committee  to  receive 
the  returns  of  the  several  towns. 

By  the  returns  from  the  several  towns,  it  appeared  that  the 
following  gentlemen  were  chosen  to  represent  them  in  Conven- 
tion, viz. : — 


COUNTY  OF  SUFFOLK. 

Boston,     ....  His  Excellency  John  Hancock,  Esq. 

Hon.  James  Bowdoin,  Esq. 

Hon.  Samuel  Adams,  Esq. 

Hon.  William  Phillips,  Esq.  ^ 

Hon.  Caleb  Davis,  Esq. 

Charles  Jarvis,  Esq. 

John  Coffin  Jones,  Esq. 

John  Winthrop,  Esq. 

Thomas  Dawes,  Jr.,  Esq.  # 

Rev.  Samuel  Stillman. 

Thomas  Russell,  Esq. 

Christopher  Gore,  Esq. 
Roxbury,  ....  Hon.  William  Heath,  Esq. 

Hon.  Increase  Sumner,  Esq. 
Dorchester,    .     .     .  James  Bowdoin,  Jr.,  Esq. 

Ebenezer  Wales,  Esq. 
Milton,     ....  Rev.  Nathaniel  Robbins. 
Weymouth,    .     .     .  Hon.  Cotton  Tufts,  Esq. 
Hingham, ....  Hon.  Benjamin  Lincoln,  Esq. 

Rev.  Daniel  Shute. 


32 


JOURNAL    OF    CONVENTION. 


[1788. 


Braintree, 

Brookline, 
Dedham,  . 

Needham, . 
Medfield,  . 
Stoughton, 

Wrentham, 

Walpole,  . 
Sharon,  . 
Cohasset,  . 
Franklin,  . 
Medway,  . 
Bellingham, 
Hull,  .  . 
Chelsea,  . 
Foxborough, 


Hon.  Richard  Cranch,  Esq. 
Rev.  Anthony  Wibird. 
Rev.  Joseph  Jackson. 
Rev.  Thomas  Thacher. 
Fisher  Ames,  Esq. 
Col.  William  Mcintosh. 
Capt.  John  Baxter,  Jr. 
Hon.  Elijah  Dunbar,  Esq. 
Capt.  Jedidiah  South  worth. 
Mr.  Thomas  Mann. 
Mr.  Nathan  Comstock. 
Mr.  George  Payson. 
Mr.  Benjamin  Randall. 

Hon.  Jabez  Fisher,  Esq. 
Mr.  Moses  Richardson,  Jr. 
Rev.  Noah  Alden. 
Mr.  Thomas  Jones. 
Rev.  Phillips  Payson. 
Mr.  Ebenezer  Warren. 


COUNTY  OF   ESSEX. 


Salem, 


Danvers,  .     .  . 

Newbury, .     .  . 

Newbury  Port,  . 

Beverly,    .     .  . 


.  Richard  Manning,  Esq. 

Edward  Pulling,  Esq. 

Mr.  William  Gray,  Esq. 

Mr.  Francis  Cabot. 
.  Hon.  Samuel  Hoi  ten,  Esq. 

Hon.  Israel  Hutchinson,  Esq. 
.  Hon.  Tristram  Dalton,  Esq. 

Enoch  Sawyer,  Esq. 

Ebenezer  March,  Esq. 
.  Hon.  Rufus  King,  Esq. 

Hon.  Benjamin  Greenleaf,  Esq. 

Theophilus  Parsons,  Esq. 

Hon.  Jonathan  Titcomb,  Esq. 
.  Hon.  George  Cabot,  Esq. 

Mr.  Joseph  Wood. 

Capt.  Israel  Thorndike. 


1788.] 


JOURNAL    OF    CONVENTION. 


33 


Ipswich,    . 


Marblehead. 


Gloucester, 


Lynn  and 
Lynnfield, 
Andover,  . 


Rowley;  . 
Haverhill, 

Topsfield, . 
Salisbury, 

Almsbury, 

Boxford,  . 
Bradford, . 
Methuen,  . 
Wenham,  . 
Manchester 
Middleton, 


.  Hon.  Michael  Farley,  Esq. 

John  Choate,  Esq. 

Daniel  Noyes,  Esq. 

Col.  Jonathan  Cogswell. 
.  Isaac  Mansfield,  Esq. 

Jonathan  Glover,  Esq. 

Hon.  Azor  Orne,  Esq. 

John  Glover,  Esq. 
.  Daniel  Rogers,  Esq. 

John  Low,  Esq. 

Capt.  William  Pearson. 
(  John  Carnes,  Esq. 
I  Capt.  John  Burnham. 
.  Capt.  Peter  Osgood,  Jr. 

Dr.  Thomas  Kittridge.    • 

Mr.  William  Symmes,  Jr. 
.  Capt.  Thomas  Mighill. 
.  Bailey  Bartlett,  Esq.  S 

Capt.  Nathaniel  Marsh. 
.  Mr.  Israel  Clark. 
.  Dr.  Samuel  Nye. 

Mr.  Enoch  Jackman. 
.  Capt.  Benjamin  Lurvey. 

Mr.  Willis  Patten. 
.  Hon.  Aaron  Wood,  Esq. 
.  Daniel  Thurston,  Esq. 
.  Capt.  Ebene.zer  Carlton. 
.  Mr.  Jacob  Herrick. 
.  Mr.  Simeon  Miller. 


COUNTY   OF  MIDDLESEX. 

Cambridge,    .     .     .  Hon.  Francis  Dana,  Esq. 

Stephen  Dana,  Esq. 
Charlestown,       .     .  Hon.  Nathaniel  Gorham,  Esq. 
Watertown,    .     .     .  Dr.  Marshall  Spring. 
Woburn,    ....  Capt.  Timothy  Winn. 

Mr.  James  Fowle,  Jr. 
Concord,  ....  Hon.  Joseph  Hosmer,  Esq. 


34 


JOURNAL    OF    CONVENTION. 


[1788. 


Newton,    .     .     . 

.  Hon.  Abraham  Fuller,  Esq. 

Reading,  .     .     . 

.  Mr.  William  Flint, 

Mr.  Peter  Emerson. 

Marlborough,     . 

.  Mr.  Jonas  Morse. 

Maj.  Benjamin  Sawin. 

Billerica,  .     .     . 

.  William  TonipsQn,  Esq. 

Framingham, 

.  Capt.  Lawson  Buckminster. 

Lexington,     .     . 

.  Benjamin  Brown,  Esq. 

Chelmsford,  .     . 

.  Maj.  John  Minot. 

Sherburne,     .     . 

.  Daniel  Whitney,  Esq. 

Sudbury,  .     .     . 

.  Capt.  Asahel  Wheeler. 

Maiden,    .     .     . 

.  Capt.  Benjamin  Blaney. 

'Weston,    .     .     . 

.  Capt.  Abraham  Bigelow. 

Medford,  .     .     . 

.  Maj.  Gen.  John  Brooks. 

Hopkinton,     .     . 

.  Capt.  Gilbert  Dench. 

Westford, .     .     . 

.  Mr.  Jonathan  Keep.                      „ 

Stow,   .... 

.  Dr.  Charles  Whitman. 

Groton,     .     .     . 

,  Dr.  Benjamin  Morse. 

Joseph  Sheple,  Esq. 

Shirley,     .     .     . 

.  Mr.  Obadiah  Sawtell. 

Pepper  ell,      .     . 

.  Mr.  Daniel  Fisk. 

Waltham, .     .     . 

.  Leonard  Williams,  Esq. 

Townsheud,  .     . 

.  Capt.  Daniel  Adams. 

Dracut,     .     .     . 

.  Hon.  Joseph  Bradley  Varnum,  Esq 

Bedford,   .     .     . 

.  Capt.  John  Webber. 

Holliston, . 

.  Capt.  Staples  Chamberlin. 

Acton  and  Carlisle,  Mr.  Asa  Parlin. 

Dunstable,     .     . 

.  Hon.  John  Pitts,  Esq. 

Lincoln,    .     .     . 

.  Hon.  Eleazer  Brooks,  Esq. 

Wilmington,  .     . 

.  Capt.  John  Harnden. 

Tewksbury,    .     . 

.  Mr.  Newman  Scarlett, 

Littleton,  .     .     . 

.  Mr.  Samuel  Reed. 

Ashby, .... 

.  Mr.  Benjamin  Adams. 

Natick,      .     .     . 

.  Maj.  Hezekiah  Broad. 

Stoneham,      .     . 

.  Capt.  Jonathan  Green. 

ifosZ  Sudbury,    . 

.  Mr.  Phineas  Gleazen. 

Boxborough, .     . 

• 

1788.] 


JOURNAL   OF    CONVENTION. 


35 


COUNTY  OF  HAMPSHIRE. 


Springfield,    .     . 
West  Springfield, 

Wilbraham,  .     . 
Northampton   and 
Easthampton, 
Southampton, 
Hadley,     .     . 
Southadley,    . 
Amherst,  .     . 
Granby,    .     . 
Hatfield,    . 
Whateley, .     . 
Williamsburg , 
Westfield,.     . 

Deerfield, .  . 

Greenfield,  . 
Shelburne, 

Conway,    .  . 

Sunderland,  . 
Montague, 
Northfield, 

Brimfield, .  . 
South  BrimfieM, 

Monson,    .  . 

Pelham,    .  . 

Greenwich,  . 

Blanford,  .  . 

Palmer,     .  . 
Granville, 

New  Salem  %  . 


.  William  Pynchon,  Esq. 
.  Col.  Benjamin  Ely. 

Capt.  John  Williston. 
.  Capt.  Phinehas  Stebbins. 
\  Hon.  Caleb  Strong,  Esq. 
(  Mr.  Benjamin  Sheldon. 
.  Capt.  Lemuel  Pomeroy. 
.  Brig.  Gen.  Elisha  Porter. 
.  Hon.  Noah  Goodman,  Esq. 
.  Mr.  Daniel  Cooley. 
.  Mr.  Benjamin  Eastman. 
.  Hon.  John  Hastings,  Esq. 
.  Mr.  Josiah  Allis. 
.  Mr.  William  Bodman. 
.  John  Ingersoll,  Esq. 

Mr.  John  Phelps. 
.  Mr.  Samuel  Field. 
.  Mr.  Moses  Bascom. 
.  Mr.  Robert  Wilson. 
.  Capt.  Consider  Arms. 

Mr.  Malachi  Maynard. 
.  Capt.  Zacheus  Crocker. 
.  Mr.  Moses  Severance. 
.  Mr.  Ebenezer  Janes. 
.  Abner  Morgan,  Esq. 
.  Capt.  Asa  Fisk. 
.  Mr.  Phinehas  Merrick. 
.  Mr.  Adam  Clark. 
.  Capt.  Nathaniel  Whitcomb. 
.  Mr.  Timothy  Blair. 
.  Mr.  Aaron  Merrick. 
.  Mr.  John  Hamilton. 

Mr.  Clark  Cooley.     • 
.  Mr.  John  Chamberlin. 


1  [Hampshire  County,  in  1788,  included  the  present  counties  of  Hampshire, 
Hampden  and  Franklin.] 


36 


JOURNAL   OF    CONVENTION. 


[1788. 


Belchertown, 

.     .  Mr.  Justus  Dwight. 

Colrain,    . 

.     .  Mr.  Samuel  Eddy. 

Ware,  .     .     . 

.     .  Mr.  Isaac  Pepper. 

Warwick  anc 
Orange, 

j  .     .  Capt.  John  Goldsbury. 

Bernardston, 

.     .  Capt.  Agrippa  Wells. 

Chester,    .     . 

.     .  Capt.  David  Shepard. 

Charlemont, 

.     .  Mr.  Jesse  Eeed. 

Ashfield,   .     . 

.     .  Mr.  Ephraim  William. 

Worthington, 

.     .  Nahum  Eager,  Esq. 

Shutesbury, 

.     .  Mr.  Asa  Powers. 

Chesterfield,  . 

.     .  Col.  Benjamin  Bonney. 

Goshen,    . 

. 

Southivick, 

.     .  Capt  Silas  Fowler. 

Norwich,  .     . 

.  Maj.  Thomas  James  Douglass 

Ludlow,    .     . 

.     .  Mr.  John  Jennings. 

Leverett,  .     . 

.     .  Mr.  Jonathan  Hubbard. 

Westhampton. 

.     .  Mr.  Aaron  Fisher. 

Montgomery, 

. 

Cummington 

and   I  Mr.  Edmund  Lazell. 

Plainfield, 

Buckland, 

.     .  Capt.  Thompson  Maxwell. 

Longmeadow. 

.     .  Mr.  Elihu  Colton. 

Middlefield,  . 

. 

Wendell,  . 

•     i- 

COUNTY   OF   PLYMOUTH. 

Plymouth, 

.     .  Joshua  Thomas,  Esq. 

Mr.  Thomas  Davis. 

Mr.  John  Davis. 

Scituate,    . 

.     .     .  Hon.  William  Cushing,  Esq. 

Hon.  Nathan  dishing,  Esq. 

Hon.  Charles  Turner,  Esq.  *- 

Duxborongh, 

.     .     .  Hon.  George  Partridge,  Esq. 

Marshfield, 

.     .     .  Rev.  William  Shaw.. 

Bridgwater', 

.     .     .  Daniel  Howard,  Esq.  -» 

Mr.  Hezekiah  Hooper. 
Capt.  Elisha  Mitchell. 
Mr.  Daniel  Howard,  Jr. 


1788.] 


JOURNAL    OF    CONVENTION. 


37 


Middleborough,  . 

.  Rev.  Isaac  Backus. 

Mr.  Benjamin  Thomas. 

Isaac  Tomson,  Esq. 

Mr.  Isaac  Soul. 

Rochester,     .     . 

.  Mr.  Nathaniel  Hammond. 

Mr.  Abraham  Holmes.  - 

Plympton, .     .     . 

.  Capt.  Francis  Shurtliff. 

Mr.  Elijah  Bisbee,  Jr. 

Pembroke,      .     . 

.  Capt.  John  Turner. 

Mr.  Josiah  Smith. 

Kingston, .     .     . 

.  William  Sever,  Jr.,  Esq. 

Hanover,  .     .     . 

.  Hon.. Joseph  dishing,  Esq 

Abington, .     .     . 

.  Rev.  Samuel  Niles. 

Halifax,    .     .     . 

.  Mr.  Freman  Waterman. 

Wareham,      .     . 

.  Col.  Israel  Fearing. 

COUNTY   OF   BARNSTABLE. 

Barnstable,    .     . 

.  Nymphas  Mars  ton,  Esq.    » 

Shearjashub  Bourn,  Esq. 

Sandwich,      .     . 

.  Dr.  Thomas  Smith. 

Mr.  Thomas  Nye. 

Yarmouth,      .     . 

.  David  Thacher,  Esq. 

Capt.  Jonathan  Howes. 

Eastham,  .     .     . 

Harwich,  .     .     . 

.  Hon.  Solomon  Freeman,  E 

• 

Capt.  Kimbal  Clark. 

Welfleet,   .     .     . 

.  Rev.  Levi  Whitman. 

Falmouth,.     .     . 

.  Capt.  Joseph  Palmer. 

Truro, .... 

Chatham,  .     .     . 

. 

Province  Town,. 

• 

COUNTY   OF  BRISTOL. 

Taunton,  .     .     . 

.  James  Williams,  Esq. 

Col.  Nathaniel  Leonard. 

Mr.  Aaron  Pratt. 

Rehoboth,. 

.  Capt.  Phanuel  Bishop. 

Maj.  Frederick  Drown. 


38 


JOURNAL    OF    CONVENTION. 


[1788, 


Rehoboth, ....  William  Winsor,  Esq. 
Swanzey, .     .     .     .  Mr.  Christopher  Mason. 

Mr.  David  Brown. 
Dartmouth,    .     .     .  Hon.  Holder  Slocum,  Esq. 

Mr.  Meletiah  Hathaway. 
Norton,      ....  Hon.  Abraham  White,  Esq. 
Attleborough,      .     .  Hon.  Elisha  May,  Esq. 

Capt.  Moses  Willmarth. 
Digkton,   ....  Col.  Sylvester  Richmond, 

Hon  William  Baylies,  Esq. 
Freetown,      .     .     .  Hon.  Thomas  Durfee,  Esq. 

Mr.  Richard  Bordon. 
Rainham, ....  Israel  Washburn,  Esq. 
Easton,     ....  Capt.  Ebenezer  Tisdell. 
Mansfield,      .     .     .  Capt.  John  Pratt. 
Berkley,    ....  Samuel  Tobey,  Esq. 
New  Bedford,     .     .  Hon.  Walter  Spooner,  Esq. 

Rev.  Samuel  West. 
Westport, ....  Mr.  William  Almy. 


York,    .  . 

Kittery,  . 

Wells,  .  . 

Berwick,  . 


Arundell,  . 
Biddeford, 
Pepperellboro 
Lebanon,  . 
Sanford,  . 
Buxton,  . 
Fryeburg, 


COUNTY   OF   YORK/ 

.  Capt.  Esaias  Preble. 

Nathaniel  Barrell,  Esq. 
.  Mr.  Mark  Adams. 

Mr.  James  Neal. 
.  Rev.  Dr.  Moses  Henimenway. 

Hon.  Nathaniel  Wells,  Esq. 
.  Capt.  Elijah  Thayer.  - 

Dr.  Nathaniel  Low. 

Mr.  Richard  Fox  Cutts. 


.  Thomas  Cutts,  Esq. 

.  Mr.  Thomas  M.  Wentworth. 

.  Maj.  Samuel  Nasson. 

.  Jacob  Bradbury,  Esq. 

.  Mr.  Moses  Ames. 


[In  the  present  State  of  Maine.] 


1788.] 


Coxhall,    . 
Massabeseck. 
Limerick, . 
Broivnfteld, 
Little  Falls, 
Shapleigh, 
Pearsonfield, 
Waterborough 


JOURNAL   OF    CONVENTION. 

Capt.  John  Low. 


39 


Mr.  Jeremiah  Emery. 
Rev.  Pelatiah  Tingley 


Edgartown, 
Chilmark, . 
Tisbury,    • 


Sherburne, 


COUNTY  OF  DUKES  COUNTY. 

.     .     .  Mr.  William  Mayhew. 
.     .     .  Mr.  Cornelius  Dunham. 

COUNTY  OF  NANTUCKET. 


COUNTY  OF  WORCESTER. 


Worcester,     .     . 

.  Hon.  Samuel  Curtis,  Esq. 

Mr.  David  Bigelow. 

Lancaster,     .     . 

.  Hon.  John  Sprague,  Esq. 

Mendon,    .     .     . 

.  Edward  Thompson,  Esq. 

Brookfield,     .     . 

.  Mr.  James  Nichols. 

Mr.  Daniel  Forbes. 

Mr.  Nathaniel  Jenks. 

Oxford,    .  '  .     . 

.  Capt.  Jeremiah  Learned. 

Charlton,  .     .     . 

.  Mr.  Caleb  Curtis. 

Mr.  Ezra  Mclntier. 

Sutton,      .     .     . 

.  Mr.  David  Harwood. 

Hon.  Amos  Singletary,  Esq 

Leicester, .     .     . 

.  Col.  Samuel  Denny. 

Spencer,    .     .     .' 

.  Mr.  James  Hathaway. 

Rutland,   .     .     . 

.  Mr.  Asaph  Sherman. 

Paxton,     .     .     . 

.  Mr.  Abraham  Smith. 

Oakham,  .     .     . 

.  Capt.  Jonathan  Bullard. 

Barre, .... 

.  Capt.  John  Black. 

Hubbardston, 

.  Capt.  John  Woods. 

New  Braintree, . 

.  Capt.  Benjamin  Josselyn. 

40 


JOURNAL    OF    CONVENTION. 


[1788. 


Southborough, 

Westborough, 

Northborough, 

Shrewsbury, 

Lunenburgh, 

Fitchburgh, 

Uxbridge,. 

Harvard,  . 

Dudley,     . 

Bolton, 

Upton,  .     . 

Sturbridge, 

Leominster, 

Hardwick, 

Holden,     . 

Western,   . 

Douglass,. 

Grafton,    . 

Petersham, 

Royalston, 
Westminster, 
Templeton, 
Princeton, 
Ashburnham, 
Winchendon, 
Northbridge, 
Ward, .     . 
Athol,  .     . 
Milford,    . 
Sterling,   . 
Boylston,  . 


.  Capt.  Seth  Newton. 
.  Capt.  Stephen  Maynard. 
.  Mr.  Artemas  Brigham. 
.  Capt.  Isaac  Harrington. 
.  Capt.  John  Fuller. 
.  Mr.  Daniel  Putnam. 
.  Dr.  Samuel  Willard. 
.  Josiah  Whitney,  Esq. 
.  Mr.  Jonathan  Day. 
.  Hon.  Samuel  Baker,  Esq. 
.  Capt.  Thomas  M.  Baker. 
.  Capt.  Timothy  Parker. 
.  Maj.  David  Wilder. 
.  Maj.  Martin  Kinsley. 
.  Rev.  Joseph  Davis. 
.  Mr.  Matthew  Patrick. 
.  Hon.  John  Taylor,  Esq. 
.  Dr.  Joseph  Wood. 
.  Jonathan  Grout,  Esq. 

Capt.  Samuel  Peckham. 
.  John  Frye,  Esq. 
.  Mr.  Stephen  Holden. 
.  Capt.  Joel  Fletcher. 
.  Mr.  Timothy  Fuller. 
.  Mr.  Jacob  Willard. 
.  Mr.  Moses  Hale. 
.  Capt.  Josiah  Wood. 
.  Mr.  Joseph  Stone. 
.  Mr.  Josiah  Goddard. 
.  Mr.  David  Stearns. 
.  Capt.  Ephraim  Wilder. 
.  Mr.  Jonas  Temple. 


COUNTY   OF   CUMBERLAND. 

Falmouth,      .     .     .  Daniel  Ilsley,  Esq. 

John  K.  Smith,  Esq. 
Portland,  ....  Mr.  John  Fox. 


[In  the  present  State  of  Maine.] 


1788.] 


JOURNAL    OF    CONVENTION. 


41 


Portland,  .     .     . 
North  Yarmouth, 

Scarborough, 
Brunswick,    .     . 
Harpswell,     .     . 
Cape  Elizabeth,. 
Gorham,   . 
New  Gloucester, 
Gray,  .     .     .     . 
Windham,      .     . 
Standish,  . 
Royalsborough,  . 
Raymondstoivn,  . 
Bakerstoivn,  .     . 
Sylvester, .     .     . 
Bridgtown,    . 
Shepardstown,    . 


.  Capt.  Joseph  McLellan. 
.  David  Mitchell,  Esq. 
Samuel  Merrill,  Esq. 
.  William  Thompson,  Esq. 
.  Capt.  John  Dunlap. 
.  Capt.  Isaac  Snow. 
.  Mr.  Joshua  Dyer. 
.  Mr.  Stephen  Longfellow,  Jr 
.  Mr.  William  Wedgery. 
.  Rev.  Samuel  Perley. 


Poivnalborough, 

Georgetown, 
Newcastle, 
Woolwich, 
Waldoborough , 
Top  sham, . 
Winslow, . 
Bowdoinham, 
Boothbay, . 
Vassalborough, 
Bristol, 
Edgcomb, . 
Halloicell, 
St.  George's, 
Warren,    . 
Thomaston, 


COUNTY   OF  LINCOLN. 

Thomas  Eice,  Esq. 
Mr.  David  Sylvester. 
Mr.  Nathaniel  Wyman. 
Mr.  David  Murray. 
Mr.  David  Gilmore. 

Hon.  Samuel  Thompson,  Esq. 
Mr.  Jonah  Crosby. 
Mr.  Zacheus  Beal. 
William  McCobb,  Esq. 
Capt.  Samuel  Grant. 
William  Jones,  Esq. 
Moses  Davis,  Esq. 
Capt.  James  Carr. 


David  Fales,  Esq. 


4  [In  the  present  State  of  Maine.] 


42 


JOURNAL    OF    CONVENTION. 


[1788. 


Bath ,    . 
Winthrop, 
Lewistown, 
Ballstown, 
Walpole,  . 
Wales, .     . 
Canaan,    . 
Pittston,    . 
Medumcook, 
Norridgwalk 
Sterling-ton, 
Belfast,     . 
Machias,  . 
Camden,   . 
Hancock*  . 


Dummer  Sewall,  Esq. 
Mr.  Joshua  Bean. 


COUNTY   OF   BERKSHIRE. 


Sheffield  and         ) 
Mt.  Washington,  ) 
Great  Barrington, 
Stockbridge,  .     . 
Pittsfield,  .     .     . 
Richmond,     .     . 


Lenox,.     .     .  . 

Lanesborongh,  . 

Williamstown,  . 

Adams,      .     .  . 

Egremont,      .  . 

Becket,      .     .  . 
IF<?s£  Stockbridge, 

Dalton,     .     .  . 

Alford,      .     .  . 

iVew  Ashford,  . 
iVcw?  Marlborough, 

Tyringham,   .  . 
Loudon,     . 

Windsor,  .     .  . 

Partridgefield,  . 


John  Ashley,  Jr.,  Esq. 

Hon.  Elijah  D wight,  Esq. 

Hon.  Theodore  Sedgwick,  Esq. 

Capt.  David  Bush. 

Mr.  Valentine  Rathbun. 

Mr.  Comstock  Betts. 

Mr.  Lemuel  Collins. 

Hon.  Jonathan  Smith,  Esq. 

Hon.  Tompson  J.  Skinner,  Esq. 

Capt.  Jeremiah  Pierce. 

Ephraim  Fitch,  Esq. 

Mr.  Elisha  Carpenter. 

Maj.  Thomas  Lusk. 

Mr.  John  Hurlbert. 

Capt.  Daniel  Taylor. 
Capt.  Ezekiel  Herrick. 
Mr.  Joshua  Lawton. 
Mr.  Timothy  Mason. 
Ebenezer  Peirce,  Esq. 


1788.] 


JOURNAL    OF    CONVENTION.  43 


Hancock,  ....  Mr.  David  Vaaghan. 

Lee, Capt.  Jesse  Bradley. 

Washington, .     .     .  Mr.  Zenos  Noble. 

Sandisfield,    .     .     .  Mr.  John  Picket,  Jr. 

On  motion, 

Ordered,  That  Mr.  Gorham,  Mr.  Carnes,  Dr.  Jarvis,  Mr. 
Dalton,  Mr.  Spooner,  Mr.  Davis  and  Dr.  Taylor,  be  a  Commit- 
tee to  receive  the  returns  of  the  several  towns. 

Ordered,  That  a  Committee  of  five  persons  be  appointed  to 
collect,  count  and  sort  the  votes  for  Secretary. 

Mr.  Davis,  Mr..  Dalton,  Mr.  Wood,  Mr.  Brooks  and  Mr. 
Turner,  were  appointed  on  the  said  committee. 

The  Convention  then  proceeded  to  the  choice  of  a  Secretary, 
by  ballot,  and  the  votes  being  taken,  it  appeared  that  George 
Richards  Minot,  Esquire,  was  chosen,  who  accepted  of  the 
choice,  and  was  duly  sworn,  to  qualify  him  for  exercising  the 
duties  of  that  office. 

Voted,  That  Mr.  Jacob  Kuhn,  the  Messenger  of  the  General 
Court,  be  appointed  Messenger  to  this  Convention. 

Voted,  That  4  o'clock,  P.  M.,  be  assigned  for  coming  to  the 
choice  of  a  President. 

Voted,  That  five  Monitors  be  chosen. 

The  following  gentlemen  were  then  elected,  viz.  :  Hon. 
Noah  Goodman,  Esq.,  Mr.  Phanuel  Bishop,  Mr.  Daniel  Cooley, 
Hon.  Azor  Orne,  Esq.,  and  Mr.  Thomas  Davis. 

Voted,  That  a  Committee  of  seven  be  appointed  to  prepare 
Rules  and  Orders  for  the  regulation  of  the  Convention. 

Mr.  Gorham,  Dr.  Jarvis,  Dr.  Taylor,  Mr.  Wedgery,  Mr.  Dal- 
ton, Mr.  Sedgwick,  and  Mr.  BoAvdoin,  of  Dorchester,  were 
appointed  on  the  said  committee. 

Ordered,  That  the  Committee  who  were  appointed  to  receive 
the  returns  of  the  members,  be  instructed  to  examine  them, 
and  report. 

Adjourned  to  4  o'clock,  P.  M. 


44  JOURNAL   OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 


AFTERNOON. 

Met  according  to  adjournment. 

The  Convention  proceeded  to  the  choice  of  a  President,  by 
ballot,  according  to  assignment,  and  a  Committee  of  five  being- 
appointed  to  collect,  count  and  sort  the  votes,  it  appeared  that 
His  Excellency  John  Hancock,  Esquire,  was  chosen. 

Voted,  That  the  Convention  proceed  to  the  choice  of  a  Vice- 
President. 

The  Convention  then  proceeded  to  the  choice  of  a  Vice-Pres- 
ident accordingly,  by  ballot,  and  a  Committee  being  appointed 
to  collect,  count  and  sort  the  votes,  it  appeared  that  the  Hon. 
William  Cushing,  Esquire,  was  chosen. 

Voted,  That  the  Vice-President  be  requested  to  take  the 
chair,  who  took  the  chair  accordingly. 

Voted,  That  a  Committee  of  five  be  appointed  to  wait  upon 
His  Excellency  John  Hancock,  Esq.,  and  acquaint  him  that 
this  Convention  have  made  choice  of  him  for  their  President, 
and  to  request  his  Excellency's  acceptance  of  that  appointment. 

Mr.  Russell,  Dr.  Holten,  Mr.  Sedgwick,  Mr.  Turner  and  Mr. 
Dalton  were  then  appointed  on  the  said  committee. 

Voted,  That  the  Convention  will  attend  morning  prayers 
daily,  and  that  the  gentlemen  of  the  clergy  in  Boston,  of  every 
denomination,  be  requested  to  officiate  in  turn. 

The  members  from  Boston  were  appointed  to  wait  upon  them 
and  acquaint  them  thereof. 

A  vote  of  the  Church  in  Brattle  Street,  in  Boston,  offering 
the  use  of  their  meeting-house  to  the  Convention,  having  been 
communicated,5 

Voted,  That  a  Committee  of  nine  be  appointed  to  view  the 
accommodations  in  the  said  meeting-house,  and  report. 

5  [The  proprietors  of  the  Church  sent  the  following  communication  to  the 
Convention. 

"  At  a  meeting  of  the  Proprietors  of  the  Meeting-house  in  Brattle  Street. 
Boston,  Jan.  6th,  1788  :— 

Whereas,  The  State  Convention  appointed  to  consider  the  reported  Federal 
Constitution  are  to  meet  at  the  State  House,  in  Boston  on  the  9th  instant,  and 
the  said  house  being  unsuitable  for  the  convenient  reception  of  so  large  a  body. 


1788.]  JOURNAL    OF    CONVENTION.  45 

Mr.  Sedgwick,  Gen.  Lincoln,  Dr.  Taylor,  Gen.  Brooks,  of 
Lincoln,  Dr.  Jarvis,  Dr.  Holten,  Mr.  Strong,  Mr.  Nasson  and 
Mr.  Thacher,  were  then  appointed  on  the  said  committee. 

Adjourned  to  Thursday  morning,  10  o'clock. 


Thursday,  January  10, 1788. 

Met  according  to  adjournment. 

The  Committee  appointed  to  wait  upon  his  Excellency  the 
Governor,  to  inform  him  of  his  being  chosen  President  of  the 
Convention,  &c,  reported  verbally,  that  his  Excellency  signified 
his  acceptance  of  that  appointment,  and  expressed  his  expecta- 
tion of  soon  attending  to  the  duties  of  the  office.0 

Ordered,  That  Gen.  Heath,  Gen.  Titcomb,  Mr.  Fuller  and 
Dr.  Spring,  be  on  the  Committee  for  examining  the  returns  of 
the  members,  in  the  room  of  Mr.  Gorham,  Dr.  Jarvis,  Mr.  Dal- 
ton  and  Dr.  Taylor,  excused. 

The  Committee  appointed  to  examine  the  accommodations  in 

and  this  Society  being  desirous  of  accommodating  them  in  the  fed^manner 
they  are  able, 

Voted,  unanimously,  That  the  meeting-house  in  Brattle  Street,  belonging  to 
this  Society,  shall  be  for  the  use  of  that  honorable  body,  for  holding  their 
meetings  on  the  said  business,  whenever  they  shall  signify  their  pleasure  for 
that  purpose  to  the  Committee  of  this  Society ;  and  that  a  copy  of  this  vote  be 
communicated  to  them  as  soon  as  they  shall  be  convened. 
A  true  copy  from  the  Records. 

Attest:  Danl.  Bell,  Clerk."] 

0  [The  following  is  the  note  of  acceptance  addressed  by  Governor  Hancock 
to  the  Committee. 

"  The  Governor  presents  his  respectful  compliments  to  Mr.  Russell,  and  the 
other  gentlemen  of  the  Committee  of  the  Convention,  from  whom  he  had  the 
honor  of  receiving  a  message  this  evening,  and  begs  the  fevor  of  their  report- 
ing to  the  honorable  Convention  that  he  has* -a  lively  sense  of  the  honor  done 
him,  by  their  electing  him  President,  and  that  he  hopes  soon  to  attend  his  duty, . 
and  afford  his  feeble  assistance  in  the  important  business  before  them. 

Wednesday  Evening,  9th  January,  1788."] 


46  JOURNAL    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

the  meeting-house  in  Brattle  Street/  reported  verbally,  that  it 
would  be  convenient  for  the  Convention  to  sit  in  that  place,  and 
that  the  galleries  only  should  be  assigned  for  the  spectators, 
which  report  was  accepted,  and  it  was 

Ordered,  That  the  Sexton  usually  attending  at  the-  said 
meeting-house,  be  appointed  to  assist  the  Messenger. 

Ordered,  That  the  Messenger  prepare  the  said  meeting-house 
for  the  reception  of  the  Convention  this  afternoon. 

Voted,  That  the  thanks  of  this  Convention  be  given  to  the 
proprietors  of  the  meeting-house\  in  Brattle  Street,  in  Boston, 
for  their  offer  of  the  use  of  the  said  house  to  the  Convention, 
and  that  Mr.  Turner,  Mr.  Nasson  anci  Mr.  Carnes,  be  a  Com- 
mittee to  communicate  this  vote  to  the  said  proprietors,  and  to 
acquaint  them  that  the  Convention  have  agreed  to  sit  therein. 

The  Committee  appointed  to  examine  the  returns  of  the 
members,  requested  the  sense  of  the  Convention  as  to  the  rule 
of  examining  the  said  returns.  Whereupon,  it  was  made  a 
question  whether  the  Convention  will  give  a  rule  to  the  said 
committee,  and,  the  same  being  put,  it  passed  in  the  affirma- 
tive, and  it  was 

Ordered,  That,  if  the  said  committee  find  that  any  town 
hath  deputed  more  delegates  than  by  the  last  valuation  such 
town  was  entitled  to  send  representatives  to  the  general  court, 
according  to  the  return  of  the  said  valuation,  they  report  a 
state  of  the  facts  relative  to  such  town,  to  the  Convention. 

The  Committee  appointed  to  prepare  Rules  and  Orders  for 
the  regulation  of  the  Convention,  made  report,  and  the  same 
being  debated  in  part,  the  further  consideration  thereof  was 
postponed  to  the  afternoon. 

Voted,  That,  after  the  next  adjournment,  the  Convention  will 
assemble  at  the  meeting-house,  in  Brattle  Street,  in  this  town. 
Adjourned  to  3  o'clock,  P.  M. 

AFTERNOON. 

Met  according  to  adjournment. 

Voted,  That  another  Monitor  be  chosen,  and  that  the  several 
Monitors  take  their  divisions  in  the  meeting-house. 

7  [This  was  the  building  marked  with  the  cannon  ball,  still  standing  in 
Brattle  Square.] 


1788.]  JOURNAL    OF    CONVENTION.  47 

The  House  then  proceeded  to  the  choice  of  a  Monitor,  by 
nomination,  and  the  Hon.  Abraham  White,  Esq.,  was  chosen. 

Voted,  That  seats  be  assigned  for  the  gentlemen  of  the  clergy 
who  may  attend  the  debates,  upon  the  lower  floor,  without  the 
seats  occupied  by  the  members. 

The  Convention  resumed  the  consideration  of  the  report  of 
the  Committee  appointed  to  prepare  Rules  and  Orders  for  their 
regulation,  which  being  amended  to  read  as  follows,  was  ac- 
cepted, and  ordered  to  be  put  up  in  a  conspicuous  place. 

RULES   AND    ORDERS. 

1st.  No  person  shall  sit  at  the  table  except  the  President 
and  Secretary. 

2d.  No  person  shall  speak  without  first  rising  and  addressing 
the  President,  and  he  shall  sit  down  as  soon  as  lie  lias  done 
speaking. 

3d.  No  person  shall  be  interrupted  while  speaking,  but  by 
being  called  to  order,  or  to  correct  a  mistake. 

4th.  No  member  shall  speak  more  than  once  to  any  one 
question  until  any  other  member  who  has  not  spoken  shall  speak, 
if  he  desire  it,  nor  more  than  twice  until  any  other  has  spoken 
twice  that  desires  to  speak. 

5th.  When  any  member  shall  make  a  motion,  and  such  mo- 
tion shall  be  seconded  by  another,  the  same  shall  be  considered 
by  the  Convention,  and  not  otherwise. 

6th.  No  member  shall  declare  a  question  a  vote,  until  the 
President  has  declared  it  to  be  a  vote  or  not. 

7th.  No  member  shall  nominate  more  than  one  person  for 
one  committee,  provided  the  person  by  him  nominated  shall  be 
chosen. 

8th.  No  vote  shall  be  reconsidered  unless  there  be  as  many 
members  in  the  house  at  the  time  of  the  motion  for  a  reconsid- 
eration, as  there  were  when  it  passed,  provided  a  return  of  the 
house  shall  be  called  for  at  the  time  such  motion  is  made,  and 
in  all  such  cases  there  shall  be  an  injunction  upon  the  members 
to  attend  until  the  question  shall  be  determined,  and  no  other 
question  shall  be  previously  determined,  excepting  for  an  ad- 
journment. 

9th.     No  member  shall  be  permitted  to  stand  up  to  the  inter- 


48  JOURNAL    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

ruption  of  another  while  any  member  is  speaking,  or  pass 
between  the  President  and  the  person  speaking. 

10th.  When  a  vote  is  declared  by  the  President,  and  any 
member  rises  to  doubt  the  vote,  the  house  shall  be  returned, 
and  the  vote  made  certain  without  any  further  debate  upon  the 
question. 

11th.  The  Monitors  who  are  or  shall  be  appointed,  shall  see 
the  due  observance  of  the  foregoing  orders,  one  to  be  set  in 
each  division  of  the  house,  and,  if  required  by  the  President, 
to  return  the  number  of  votes  and  members  in  their  respective 
quarters. 

12th.  No  member  shall  be  considered  at  liberty  to  leave  the 
Convention  without  the  permission  of  the  same,  unless  by  con- 
sent of  his  constituents. 

Voted,  That  Mr.  Goodman  and  Dr.  Tufts,  be  on  the  Commit- 
tee for  examining  the  returns,  in  the  room  of  Gen.  Heath  and 
Gen.  Titcomb,  excused. 

Adjourned  to  Friday  morning,  10  o'clock. 


Friday,  January  11,  1788. 

Met  according  to  adjournment. 

A  remonstrance  from  certain  inhabitants  of  Sheffield,  against 
the  election  of  Col.  John  Ashley,  Jr.,  as  a  delegate  to  this  Con- 
vention. Read  and  committed  to  Dr.  Taylor,  Mr.  Sumner,  Mr. 
Strong,  Mr.  Tufts,  MiO  Rice,  Gen.  Brooks,  of  Lincoln,  and  Mr. 
Adams. 

A  remonstrance  from  certain  inhabitants  of  Great  Barring- 
ton,  against  the  election  of  the  Hon.  Elijah  Dwight,  Esq.  Read 
and  committed  to  Mr.  Cabot,  Mr.  Nasson,  Gen.  Whitney,  Mr. 
Phelps,  Mr.  Fisher,  Mr.  Bourn  and  Mr.  dishing. 

A  remonstrance  from  certain  inhabitants  of  Williamstown, 
against  the  election  of  the  Hon.  Tompson  J.  Skinner,  Esq. 
Read  and  committed  to  Mr.  Varnum,  Mr.  Wales,  Mr.  West, 
Mr.  Wedgcry,  Mr.  Sylvester,  Mr.  Dunbar  and  Mr.  Sprague. 

Ordered,  That  the  Committees  be  enjoined  to  sit. 

Adjourned  to  3  o'clock,  P.  M. 


1788.]  JOURNAL    OF    CONVENTION.  49 

AFTERNOON. 

Met  according  to  adjournment. 

The  Committee  appointed  to  wait  upon  the  proprietors  of  the 
meeting-house  in  Brattle  Street,  &c,  reported  that  they  had 
attended  that  service,  agreeably  to  their  commission. 

The  Committee  on  the  remonstrance  of  certain  inhabitants  of 
Sheffield,  made  report  that  there  was  no  evidence  to  support 
the  said  remonstrance.     Ordered  that  the  same  lie  on  file. 

The  Committee  appointed  to  examine  the  returns  of  the 
members,  made  report,  whereupon,  it  was 

Voted,  That  the  returns  certified  by  the  selectmen  be  consid- 
ered as  valid,  except  in  the  disputed  cases  specially  committed. 

There  being  two  returns  from  the  town  of  Taunton, 

Voted,  That  the  return  of  the  last  date,  which  was  not  at- 
tested by  the  selectmen,  be  committed  to  a  Committee  of  five. 

Mr.  Davis,  Mr.  Nasson,  Mr  A  Thompson,  of  Topsham,  Dr. 
Taylor  and  Mr.  Winthrop,  were  appointed  on  the  committee. 

Voted,  That  a  Committee  be  appointed  to  consider  of  the 
expediency  of  the  Convention  removing  to  another  place  in 
Boston,  and  to  ascertain  whether  a  more  convenient  house  can- 
not be  obtained  for  their  use. 

Gen.  Brooks,  Gen.  Lincoln,  Mr.  Bowdoin,  of  Dorchester,  Mr. 
Sedgwick,  Dr.  Spring,  Mr.  Nasson  and  Mr.  Wedgery,  were 
appointed  on  the 'said  committee. 

Dr.  Tufts  and  Mr.  White  had  leave  of  absence. 

Voted,  That  when  the  Convention  are  adjourned  they  be 
adjourned  to  meet  in  the  Representatives'  Chamber. 

Voted,  That  the  Convention  be  adjourned  to  10  o'clock  in  the 
morning. 

Adjourned  accordingly. 


Saturday,  January  12,  1788. 

Met  according  to  adjournment. 

The  Committee  appointed  to  consider  of  the  expediency  of 
the  Convention's  removing  to  another  place,  &c,  being  called 

7 


50  JOURNAL    OF    CONVENTION.  [1878. 

upon  to  report,  a  motion  was  made  that  the  said  committee  be 
enjoined  to  proceed  in  the  business  of  their  commission,  and 
the  question  being  put,  passed  in  the  negative. 

The  Committee  on  the  return  from  the  town  of  Taunton,8 
made  a  report  of  a  state  of  facts,  whereupon  it  was  moved  that 
the  sense  of  the  House  be  taken  whether  the  two  members  mcn- 

8  [The  following  remonstrance  was  received  from  Taunton. 

*  To  the  Honorable  the  Convention  of  the  Commonwealth  of  Massachusetts,  to  be 
holden  at  Boston,  on  the  second  Wednesday  of  January,  A.  D.  1 788  : — 

The  Memorial  of  the  subscribers,  Selectmen,  Freeholders  and  Inhabitants  of 
the  Town  of  Taunton,  in  the  County  of  Bristol,  humbly  represents, 

That  at  a  meeting  of  the  inhabitants  of  said  town  of  Taunton,  qualified  to 
vote  for  representatives  to  the  General  Court,  on  the  twenty-sixth  day  of 
November  last  past,  duly  warned  and  assembled  agreeably  to  a  Resolve  of  the 
Legislature,  passed  on  the  twenty-fifth  day  of  October  last  past,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  choosing  a  Convention  to  consider  of  the  proposed  Federal  Constitution, 
the  said  inhabitants  made  choice  of  James  Williams,  Esq.,  to  represent  lliem 
in  said  Convention,  agreeably  to  the  copy  No.  1,  hereto  annexed,  and  also 
voted  they  would  choose  no  other  person  for  that  purpose,  and  thereupon  the 
said  meeting  was  dissolved.  That  afterwards,  a  number  of  the  inhabitants  of 
the  town  aforesaid,  petitioned  the  Selectmen  thereof  to  call  a  meeting  of  the 
inhabitants  of  the  same  town,  qualified  to  vote  in  town  affairs,  for  the  purpose 
of  choosing  one  or  more  persons  in  addition  to  the  one  already  chosen,  to  rep- 
resent them  in  said  Convention.  That  in  compliance  with  said  request,  the 
Selectmen  aforesaid  called  a  meeting  of  the  said  inhabitants  qualified  to  vote 
in  town  affairs,  to  be  held  on  the  day  of  the  date  hereof;  that  the  same  inhabi- 
tants have  on  this  day  assembled,  and  upon  the  question  whether  they  would 
proceed  to  choose  one  or  more  members,  agreeably'  to  the  request  aforesaid, 
there  appeared  in  favor  of  the  question,  156,  against  it,  140  ;  and  thereupon, 
Capt.  Nathaniel  Leonard  and  Mr.  Aaron  Pratt  were  chosen  to  join  with  the 
said  James  Williams,  Esq.,  to  represent  the  inhabitants  of  said  town  in  the 
Convention  aforesaid.  The  subscribers,  part  of  the  140  aforesaid,  and  who 
are  fully  convinced  that  the  rest  of  them  are  clearly  of  the  same  opinion, 
humbly  conceive  that  the  elections  aforesaid,  of  the  said  Leonard  and  Pratt, 
were  wholly  illegal,  and  not  supported  by  the  Resolve  of  the  Legislature  afore- 
said. Wherefore  they  pray  that  they  may  not  be  admitted  as  members  of  said 
Convention,  being  not  properly  authorized  for  that  purpose.  And  as  in  fluty 
bound  will  pray. 

Taunton,  January  7th,  1 788." 

Signed  by  five  Selectmen  and  others.] 


1788.]  JOURNAL    OF    CONVENTION.  51 

tioned  in  the  last  return  from  the  said  town  be  entitled  to  their 
seats  ?  and  the  question  being  put,  passed  in  the  affirmative.3 

The  Committee  on  the  remonstrance  from  certain  inhabitants 
of  Williamstown,10  reported  that  they  did  not  find  any  evidence 

9  [The  Committee  made  the  following  report. 

"  Commonwealth  of  Massachusetts.  In  Convention,  Jan.  12th,  1788. 
The  Committee  to  whom  was  committed  the  two  returns  from  the  town  of 
Taunton,  report  the  following  state  of  facts,  which  is  humbly  submitted : — 

That  the  first  return,  dated  on  the  26th  November,  is  certified  by  the  Select- 
men agreeable  to  the  order  of  the  General  Court,  and  is  legal. 

That  on  the  1 7th  December,  about  one  hundred  and  thirty  of  the  inhabi- 
tants of  said  town  petitioned  the  Selectmen  for  another  meeting,  to  make  a 
further  choice,  which  meeting  was  called  on  the  7th  January  inst,  and  appears 
to  have  been  legal ;  but  before  they  proceeded  to  the  election,  the  Selectmen 
withdrew,  saying  they  had  done  their  duty  in  certifying  the  person  chosen  at 
first  meeting,  and  should  not  certify  any  more.  The  town  then  proceeded 
to  the  election  of  two  more  delegates,  in  addition  to  the  first  person  chosen, 
which  two  persons  last  chosen  are  certified  by  the  Moderator  and  Town  Clerk. 
It  further  appears  to  your  Committee  that  the  town  of  Taunton  have  sufficient 
number  of  polls  to  entitle  them  to  three  delegates. 

Per  order :  Caleb  Davis."] 

10  [The  following,  with  other  remonstrances,  was  received  from  Williamstown. 

"  To  the  Honorable  Chairman  and  Convention  of  the  Commonwealth  of  Massa- 
chusetts, assembled  on  the  second  Wednesday  in  January,  1788,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  ratifying  or  rejecting  the  Federal  Constitution : — 
May  it  please  your  Honors  :  We,  whose  names  are  hereunder  written, 
freeholders  of  Williamstown,  in  the  County  of  Berkshire,  beg  leave  to  repre- 
sent to  your  honors,  the  pointed  partial  election  of  Capt.  Tompson  J.  Skinner, 
as  a  member  of  your  honoraoie  body. 

Agreeable  to  the  order  or  recommendation  of  the  Legislature,  in  their  last 
session,  a  meeting  was  warned,  and  the  inhabitants,  qualified  to  vote,  elected 
Mr.  William  Young  to  be  their  delegate,  by  a  great  majority.  It  was  then 
motioned  to  dissolve  the  meeting.  The  Moderator  then  replied  that  the  meet- 
ing was  dissolved.  The  people  then  began  to  draw  off,  and  in  the  evening, 
when  but  few  people  were  present,  they  proceeded  to  adjourn  the  meeting  to  a 
future  day,  and  on  the  day  of  the  adjournment,  precisely  at  the  time,  a  small 
riumber  only  being  present,  the  meeting  was  opened,  a  number  of  persons 
present  put  in  their  votes,  and  the  Moderator  turned  the  hat,  before  the  people 
from  the  remote  parts  of  the*  town  could  come  in,  and  the  Moderator  declared 
Col.  Tompson  J.  Skinner  to  be  chosen. 

The  town  generally  being  dissatisfied  with  the  proceedings,  they  voted  the 
adjourned  meeting  was  illegal,  and  immediately  proceeded,  as  the  law  directs, 


52  JOURNAL    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

to  support  the  facts  stated  by  the  remonstrants,  or  that  the  elec- 
tion of  the  Hon.  Tompson  J.  Skinner,  Esq.,  was  illegal.  Which 
report  was  accepted. 

A  paper  called  a  remonstrance11  of  seven  inhabitants  of  the 

to  call  a  new  meeting,  which  was  held  on  the  first  day  of  January  instant, 
when  Mr.  William  Young  was  elected  by  a  majority  of  ninety-one  votes.  We 
have,  therefore,  thought  proper  to  state  to  your  honors,  the  particular  circum- 
stances attending  the  choice  of  Capt.  Skinner,  and  remonstrate  against  such 
illegal  proceedings,  judging  the  adoption  or  rejection  of  the  Federal  Constitu- 
tion to  be  a  matter  of  too  much  consequence  to  be  thus  trifled  with. 
Williamstowx,  Jan.  3d,  1 788."] 

11  [The  following  is  a  copy  of  said  remonstrance 

"  To  the  Honorable  Convention  of  Delegates,  to  be  convened  at  Boston,  on  the 
second  Wednesday  in  January,  1788,  for  the  purpose  of  taking  into  consider- 
ation the  new  Federal  Constitution  : — 

We,  the  subscribers,  inhabitants  of  the  town  of  Sheffield,  in  the  County  of 
Berkshire,  being  freeholders,  think  it  our  indispensable  duty  to  remonstrate 
against  John  Ashley,  Jr.,  Esq.,  being  admitted  to  a  seat  in  your  honorable 
Convention,  as  he  has  not  been  elected  by  the  said  town  of  Sheffield  for  that 
purpose.  Your  remonstrants  have  applied  to  Lemuel  Barnard,  Esq.,  in  Shef- 
field, a  Justice  of  Peace  for  said  county,  who  obstinately  refuses  to  take  our 
depositions  respecting  the  illegal  conduct  of  the  Selectmen  who  presided 
at  the  said  election.  We,  therefore,  severally  and  solemnly,  declare  as  follows, 
viz. : — I,  David  Clark,  and  I,  Augustin  Austin,  saw  Elias  Ransom  and  Stephen 
Stevens  put  in  their  votes  for  a  delegate,  at  a  meeting  of  the  inhabitants  of 
said  town,  on  the  seventeenth  day  of  December  last,  for  the  purpose  of  choos- 
ing a  delegate,  neither  of  which  persons  had  resided  in  said  town  more  than 
seven  months.  I,  Zadok  Loomis,  do  solemnly  affirm  and  declare,  that  I  saw. 
clearly  and  plainly,  a  certain  person  put  two  votes  into  the  hat  at  the  meeting 
before  mentioned.  I,  Isaac  Salsburgh,  saw  a  certain  other  person  than  that 
which  Zadok  Loomis  saw,  put  two  votes  into  the  hat  at  the  said  meeting.  And 
I,  Anthony  Austin,  saw  Jacob  Johnson  put  a  vote  into  the  hat  at  the  said  meet- 
ing, which  said  Jacob  Johnson  had  not  been  an  inhabitant  of  the  town  of 
Sheffield  more  than  eight  months.  And  furthermore,  we,  the  subscribers,  sol- 
emnly affirm  and  declare,  that  there  were  nine  other  persons  which  voted  at 
the  forementioned  meeting,  for  a  delegate  to  the  said  Convention,  which 
said  several  persons,  we,  for  several  years,  have  been  well  acquainted  witli, 
and  their  several  circumstances,  and  that  they  were  not  qualified  to  vote  in 
said  meeting,  unless  they  were  put  into  possession  of  property  fraudulently, 
with  a  view  solely  to  qualify  them  to  vote  in  the  said  meeting. 

We  think  it  our  duty  further  to  inform  your  honors,  that  the  said  John 
Ashley,  Jr.,  Esq.,  being  one  of  the  Selectmen,  presided  in  the  meeting,  and 


1788.]  JOURNAL    OF    CONVENTION.  53 

town  of  Sheffield,  having  been  read  and  committed,  and  there 
appearing  no  evidence,  nor  any  person  in  support  of  the  allega- 
tions therein  contained, 

Ordered,  That  the  said  remonstrance  be  dismissed. 

On  motion,  that  the  vote  for  not  enjoining  the  Committee 
appointed  to  consider  of  the  expediency  of  the  Convention's 
removing  to  another  place,  <fcc,  to  proceed  in  the  business  of 
their  commission,  be  reconsidered,  and  that  the  said  committee 
be  directed  to  sit  again  for  further  inquiry,  the  question  of  re- 
consideration was  put  and  passed  in  the  negative. 

The  Committee  on  the  remonstrance12  of  certain  inhabitants  of 
Great  Barrington,  reported,  unanimously,  that  it  was  not  sup- 
held  the  hat  for  receiving  the  votes.  But  instead  of  sitting  it  fair  and  open  on 
the  table,  as  usual,  held  it  in  his  left  hand,  pressed  close  to  his  breast,  receiving 
the  votes  from  the  voters,  in  general,  in  his  right  hand,  and  putting  (or  pre- 
tending to  put)  them  into  the  hat  himself,  at  the  same  time,  suffering  others 
to  put  their  hand,  shut,  into  the  crown  of  the  hat,  so  that  it  could  not  be 
known  whether  they  put  in  one  vote  or  ten. 

Your  remonstrants  can  truly  say  that  we  wish  for  nothing  more  than  to  have 
a  firm,  stable,  energetic  government,  both  Federal  and  State,  and  that  these 
are  heartily  willing  to  invest  Congress  with  all  those  powers  which  are  neces- 
sary to  enable  them  to  order,  direct,  protect,  secure  and  defend  the  United 
States ;  but  when  we  see  a  certain  set  of  men  among  "us  not  only  ravenously 
greedy  to  swallow  the  new  Federal  Constitution  themselves,  but  making  the 
greatest  exertions  to  ram  it  down  the  throats  of  others,  without  giving  them 
time  to  taste  it — men,  too,  who  we  have  reason  to  imagine  expect  to  have  a 
share  in  administering  the  new  Federal  government — when  we  see  such  men 
fraudulently  and  basely  depriving  the  people  of  their  right  of  election,  threat- 
ening, awing,  deceiving,  cheating  and  defrauding  the  majority  in  the  manner 
above-mentioned,  it  is  to  us  truly  alarming. 

We,  therefore,  beg  leave  to  protest  against  the  pretended  election  of  John 
Ashley,  Jr.,  Esq.,  as  a  delegate  for  the  town  of  Sheffield,  as  he  has  not  been 
elected  by  the  said  town  for  that  purpose,  and  we  humbly  trust  he  will  not  be 
permitted  to  a  seat. 

Sheffield,  4th  January,  A.  D.  1788."] 

12  [The  following  is  a  copy  of  the  remonstrance. 

"  To  the  Honorable  Convention  of  Delegates,  to  sit  at  Boston,  on  the  second 
Wednesday  in  January,  A.  D.  1788,  for  the  purpose  of  talcing  into  consider- 
ation the  new  Federal  Constitution : — 

We,  the  subscribers,  inhabitants  of  the  town  of  Great  Barrington,  in  the 
County  of  Berkshire,  and  freeholders,  beg  leave  to  remonstrate  to  your  honors 


54  JOURNAL    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

ported,  and  that  the  remonstrants  have  liberty  to  withdraw  the 
same.     Report  accepted,  and  ordered  accordingly. 
Adjourned  to  Monday  morning,  10  o'clock. 


Monday,  January  14,  1788. 

Met  according  to  adjournment. 

The  Constitution  or  Frame  of  Government  for  the  United 
States  of  America,  as  reported  by  the  Convention  of  Delegates, 
from  the  United  States,  begun  and  held  at  Philadelphia,  on  the 

against  the  partial  and  illegal  conduct  of  the  Selectmen  of  said  town,  at  a  late 
meeting  for  choosing  a  delegate  to  represent  the  said  town  in  said  Convention, 
viz. : — The  inhabitants  of  said  town,  being  convened  in  town  meeting,  on  the 
twenty-sixth  day  of  November  last,  for  that  purpose,  the  said  Selectmen  made 
proclamation  to  the  people  to  bring  in  their  votes  for  a  delegate.  We  soon  ob- 
served that  only  two  persons  were  voted  for,  viz.:  William  Whiting  and  Elijah 
Dwight,  Esq.  In  receiving  the  votes  the  Selectmen  discovered  a  strong  par- 
tiality in  favor  of  the  last  mentioned  candidate,  particularly  in  permitting  persons 
of  their  own  party  to  vote,  who,  we  presume,  were  by  no  means  legally  quali- 
fied, and  refusing  several  of  the  other  party  who  possessed  those  qualifications 
required  by  the  Constitution.  Notwithstanding  wTiich,  after  sorting  and  count- 
ing the  votes,  the  said  Selectmen  made  proclamation  to  the  town,  that  they 
had  chosen  Dr.  William  Whiting  to  be  their  delegate,  and  directed  him  to  be 
called,  that  it  might  be  known  whether  he  accepted  the  office  ;  upon  which  the 
said  Dr.  Whiting  publicly  declared  his  acceptance.  A  Committee  was  then 
chosen  to  draw  instructions  for  his  conduct  at  said  Convention,  and  after 
withdrawing  for  some  time  they  returned  and  offered  to  report  their  draft,  and 
although  this  motion  was  seconded,  and  strongly  urged  by  a  number  of  the 
members,  yet  no  regard  was  paid  to  it  by  the  said  Selectmen ;  and  at  this  time 
it  was  abundantly  evident  that  the  Selectmen  had  a  design  to  embarrass  the 
meeting,  and  to  nullify  their  former  proceedings,  although  there  was  a  much 
larger  number  of  voters  collected  at  this  meeting  than  had  been  known  to 
attend  a  town  meeting  in  this  town  for  many  years,  and  although  no  person 
pretended  to  make  the  least  objection  to  the  regularity  and  legality  of  the  elec- 
tion. And  to  this  end,  after  deciding  several  votes  by  their  own  authority  when 
they  were  objected  to  by  a  number  of  the  members  as  not  being  votes,  who 
urged  to  have  them  made  certain  to  no  purpose,  some  time  late  in  the  evening, 
when  they  imagined  so  many  of  their  opposers  to  be  gone  home  that  they 
could  carry  a  majority,  a  motion  was  made  by  their  partisans,  and  immediately 
put,  for  adjourning  the  meeting  for  one  week,  and  although  we  presume  to 
say  there  was  not  a  majority  of  the  voters,  then  present,  in  the  affirmative,  and 


1788.]  JOURNAL    OF    CONVENTION.  55 

first  Monday  of  May,  1787,  <fcc,  together  with  the  Resolution  of 
Congress,  of  the  28th  of  September,  1787,  for  transmitting  the 
same  to  the  several  Legislatures  ;  and  the  Resolution  of  the 
General  Court  of  this  Commonwealth,  of  the  25th  day  of  Octo- 
ber, 1787,  for  calling  a  Convention,  agreeably  to  the  said  reso- 
lution of  Congress,  were  ordered  to  be  read. 

On  motion, 

Voted,  That  the  Convention,  sensible  how  important  it  is  that 
the  great  subject  submitted  to  their  determination  should  be 
discussed  and* considered  with  moderation,  candor  and  deliber- 
ation, will  enter  into  a  free  conversation  on  the  several  parts 
thereof,  by  paragraphs,  until  every  member  shall  have  had 
opportunity  fully  to  express  his  sentiments  on  the  same,  after 
which  the  Convention  will  consider  and  debate  at  large  the 
(jiiestion,  whether  this  Convention  will  adopt  and  ratify  the 
proposed  Constitution,  before  any  vote  is  taken  expressive  of 
the  sense  of  the  Convention,  upon  the  whole  or  any  part  thereof.15 

Resolve  of  the  General  Court  of  this  Commonwealth,  of  the 
10th  of  March,  1787,  appointing  Delegates  for  the  Convention 
of  the  States,  held  at  Philadelphia,  ordered  to  be  read. 

A  motion  was  made  and  seconded  that  the  Hon.  Elbridge 

■ 

although  a  number  of  the  members  cried  out,  l  No  vote  ! '  and  moved  to  have 
it  made  certain,  yet  no  regard  was  paid  thereto,  but  after  declaring  it  to  be  a 
vote,  and  that  the  meeting  was  adjourned,  the  Selectmen  and  Town  Clerk  took 
up  the  papers  and  left  the  house. 

As  we  presume  this  to  all  intents  and  purposes  to  be  a  dissolution  of  the 
meeting,  we  will  not  trouble  your  honors  with  a  detail  of  the  irregular  and 
illegal  proceedings  of  the  pretended  adjourned  meeting,  but  will  refer  your 
honors  to  the  depositions  herewith  exhibited.  Therefore,  as  the  said  William 
Whiting  was  regularly  and  legally  elected  by  a  considerable  majority,  in  a  very 
full  meeting,  legally  warned  and  convened  for  that  purpose,  and  was  declared 
so  by  the  Selectmen  who  there  presided,  and  as  he  there  (being  called  upon 
by  the  Selectmen)  publicly  declared  his  acceptance,  and  as  no  objection  has, 
or  ever  could  be,  made  to  the  legality  of  his  election,  and  as  the  pretended 
election  of  his  competitor  is  the  reverse  in  almost  every  circumstance,  Ave  ap- 
peal to  your  honors,  who  doubtless  have  a  right  to  determine  the  legality  of  the 
election  of  your  own  members,  and  humbly  request  that  he  may  be  admitted 
to  his  seat  in  the  Convention,  the  refusal  of  the  Selectmen  to  give  him  a  cer- 
tificate, and  the  pretended  election  of  Elijah  Dwight,  Esq.,  notwithstanding. 
Great  Barrixgton,  December,  1787."] 

13  [See  reconsideration  and  addition,  next  day,  page  57.] 


/ 


56  JOURNAL    OF    CONVENTION.  .  [1788. 

Gerry,  Esq.,  be  requested  to  take  a  seat  in  the  House,  to 
answer  any  question  of  fact,  from  time  to  time,  that  the 
Convention  may  want  to  ask  respecting  the  passing  of  the  Con- 
stitution. 

A  motion  was  then  made  and  seconded  that  the  consideration 
of  the  said  motion  subside,  to  give  place  to  the  follow- 
ing, viz.  :— 

That,  whereas,  the  Hon.  Elbridge  Gerry,  Esq.,  was  a  dele- 
gate from  this  Commonwealth  in  the  Convention  held  at  Phila 
delphia,  and  whereas,  he  did  not  sign  the  Constitution  reported 
by  the  said  Convention, 

Voted,  That  the  said  Elbridge  Gerry,  Esq.,  be  requested  to 
attend  this  Convention  to  state  the  facts  and  reasons  which  in- 
duced him  to  decline  signing  the  same. 

A  motion  was  then  made  and  seconded,  that  the  consideration 
of  both  questions  should  subside,  and  the  question  being  put, 
passed  in  the  negative.  The  motion  that  the  first  question 
should  subside  to  give  place  to  the  second,  was  then  put,  and 
passed  in  the  negative  also. 

The  first  motion  was  then  put,  and  passed  in  the  affirma- 
tive. 

Adjourned  to  3  o'clock,  P.  M. 

AFTERNOON. 

Met  according  to  adjournment. 

Ordered,  That  a  Committee  of  three  be  appointed  to  wait 
upon  the  Hon.  Elbridge  Gerry,  Esq.,  and  acquaint  him  with 
the  vote  of  this  morning,  requesting  him  to  take  a  seat  in  the 
House,  to  answer  any  question  of  fact,  from  time  to  time,  that 
the  Convention  may  want  to  ask  respecting  the  passing  of  the 
Constitution. 

Mr.  Bishop,  Mr.  Wedgery  and  Dr.  Spring,  were  appointed  on 
the  said  committee. 

Ordered,  That  the  Secretary  be  permitted  to  furnish  any 
printer  with  the  proceedings  of  the  Convention,  who  may  apply 
for  the  same  for  the  press. 

On  the  petition  of  Benjamin  Russell  and  Messrs.  Adams  and 


1788.]  JOURNAL   OF    CONVENTION.  57 

Nourse,  printers,  praying  to  be  allowed  a  place  for  the  purpose 
of  taking  minutes  of  the  debates,14 

Ordered,  That  the  Monitors  assign  a  place  for  the  purpose 
requested. 

The  Convention  entered  upon  the  consideration  of  the  Con- 
stitution or  Frame  of  Government  reported  by  the  Convention 
held  at  Philadelphia,  and  having  debated  thereon,  postponed 
the  further  consideration  of  the  same  to  the  morning. 

Adjourned  to  Tuesday  morning,  10  o'clock. 


Tuesday,  January  15, 1788. 

Met  according  to  adjournment. 

The  Committee  appointed  to  wait  upon  the  Hon.  Elbridge 
Gerry,  Esq.,  reported  that  they  had  attended  the  service 
assigned  them. 

A  motion  was  made  and  seconded,  that  the  vote  of  yesterday 
prescribing  the  manner  of  proceeding  in  the  consideration  of 
the  Constitution  under  debate,  should  be  reconsidered,  for  the 
purpose  of  making  the  following  addition  thereto,  viz. :  "  It  is, 
nevertheless,  the  opinion  of  this  Convention,  that  if  any  mem- 
ber conceives  any  other  clause  or  paragraph  of  the  Constitution 
to  be  connected  with  the  one  immediately  under  consideration, 
that  he  have  full  liberty  to  take  up  such  other  clause  or  para- 
graph for  that  purpose,"  and  the  question  of  reconsideration 
being  put,  passed  in  the  affirmative. 

14  [The  following  petition  was  sent  to  the  Convention  by  the  printers. 

*'  To  the  Honorable  Convention : —  t 

The  utility,  to  the  public  at  large,  of  a  faithful  account  of  the  proceedings, 
debates,  &c,  of  the  honorable  Convention,  being  taken  and  published,  being 
generally  acknowledged,  and  the  subscribers  wishing  to  furnish,  as  far  as 
possible,  such  an  account,  (and  being  prevented,  by  the  great  numbers  who 
attend  in  the  gallery,  from  making  minutes  in  that  place,)  pray  this  honorable 
Convention  to  allow  them  a  place  within  the  walls  for  that  purpose.  And,  as- 
in  duty,  shall  pray.  Benj.  Russell. 

Adams  &  Nourse. 
Boston,  January  14,  1788."] 

8 


58  JOURNAL    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

On  the  question  whether  the  addition  should  be  made,  it  was 
determined  in  the  affirmative. 

A  letter15  from  the  Hon.  Elbridge  Gerry,  Esq.,  informing  that 
he  would  attend  the  Convention  agreeably  to  their  request  of 
yesterday.     Read. 

The  Convention  proceeded  in  the  consideration  of  the  Con 
stitution  or  Frame  of  Government  reported  by  the  Convention 
held  at  Philadelphia,  and  having  debated  thereon,  postponed  the 
further  consideration  of  the  same  to  the  afternoon. 

Adjourned  to  3  o'clock,  P.  JL 

AFTERNOON. 

Met  according  to  adjournment. 

Ordered,  That  the  Messenger  exclude  from  the  floor  of  the 
House  all  persons  not  belonging  to  the  Convention,  except  such 
as  are  admitted  by  special  order. 

The  Convention  proceeded  in  the  consideration  of  the  Con- 
stitution or  Frame  of  Government  reported  by  the  Convention 
held  at  Philadelphia,  and  having  debated  thereon,  postponed 
the  further  consideration  thereof  to  the  morning. 

Ordered,  That  a  Committee  be  appointed  to  provide  a  more 
convenient  place  for  the  Convention  to  sit  in. 

Mr.  Dalton,  Mr.  Field,  Mr.  Nasson,  Mr.  Spooner,  Dr.  Jarvis, 
Mr.  Dawes  and  Dr.  Taylor,  were  appointed  on  the  said  com- 
mittee. 

Adjourned  to  Wednesday  morning,  10  o'clock. 

ls  [Mr.  Gerry  accepted  the  request  of  the  Convention,  in  the  following  note. 

"Cambridge,  15th  January,  1788. 
Sir  : — I  was  honored,  last  evening,  with  a  vote  of  the  honorable  Convention, 
by  Jfre  hands  of  their  Committee,  requesting  me  '  to  take  a  seat  in  the  house, 
to  answer  any  question  of  facts,  from  time  to  time,  that  the  Convention  may 
want  to  ask  respecting  the  passing  of  the  Constitution/  and  I  shall,  in  compli- 
ance with  their  request,  wait  on  that  honorable  body,  this  afternoon,  if  possi- 
ble, and  continue  with  them  during  their  session. 
I  have  the  honor  to  be,  Sir, 

With  the  highest  respect  for  the  Convention  and  yourself, 
Your  most  obedient  and  very  humble  servant, 

E.  Gerry. 
His  Excellency j  the  President  of  the  Convention  of  Massachusetts."'] 


1788.]  JOURNAL    OF    CONVENTION.  59 

Wednesday,  January  16, 1788. 

Met  according  to  adjournment. 

The  Convention  proceeded  in  the  consideration  of  the  Con- 
stitution or  Frame  of  Government  reported  by  the  Convention 
held  at  Philadelphia,  and  -having  debated  thereon,  postponed 
the  further  consideration  thereof  to  the  afternoon. 

Adjourned  to  3  o'clock,  P.  M. 

AFTERNOON. 

Met  according  to  adjournment. 

The  Convention  proceeded  in  the  consideration  of  the  Con- 
stitution or  Frame  of  Government  reported  by  the  Convention 
held  at  Philadelphia,  and  having  debated  thereon,  postponed 
the  further  consideration  of  the  same  to  the  morning. 

Adjourned  to  Thursday  morning,  10  o'clock. 


Thursday,  January  17, 1788. lfi 
Met  according  to  adjournment. 

Ordered,   That  Mr.   Carnes,    Mr.  Shurtliff,  Mr.  Neal,  Mr. 
Hosmer  and  Mr.  Webber,  be  a  Committee  to  prepare  a  pay  roll 

16  [We  find  the  following  letter  to  the  Convention  sent  in,  this  morning, 
from  Gen.  Heath. 

"  Roxbury,  January  1 7th,  1 788. 
Honored  Sir  : — Having  been  absent  from  my  duty  since  yesterday  morn- 
ing, I  conceive  it  to  be  incumbent  on  me,  to  acquaint  the  honorable  Conven- 
tion, that  great  indisposition  of  body  has  been  the  only  cause  of  my  absence, 
and  that  my  indisposition  is  increased  by  my  anxiety  to  be  present  on  the  all- 
important  business  now  before  the  Convention.  I  shall  attend  the  moment  my 
health  will  permit ;  but  should  Providence  forbid  what  I  so  ardently  wish,  may 
the  great  Counsellor  direct  the  honorable  Convention  in  all  their  deliberations, 
and  to  such  a  decision  on  the  ultimate  question,  as  shall  tend  to  secure  the 
invaluable  rights  and  privileges  of  these  States,  redound  to  their  honor  abroad, 
their  safety,  prosperity  and  happiness  at  home,  to  the  latest  generations. 
I  have  the  honor  to  be,  with  great  respect, 

Your  Honor's,  and  the  honorable  Convention's, 
Most  obedient,  humble  servant, 

W.  Heath. 
Hon.  "William  Cushixg,  Esquire,  Vice-President,  §-c."] 


60  JOURNAL   OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

for  the  travel  and  attendance  of  the  members  of  the  Conven- 
tion, and  report. 

A  letter  from  his  Excellency  Samuel  Huntington,  Esq.,  Gov- 
ernor of  Connecticut,  enclosing  a  copy  of  the  doings  of  the 
Convention  of  that  State,  dated  January  9, 1788.     Read. 

The  Convention  proceeded  in  the  consideration  of  the  Con 
stitution  or  Frame  of  Government  reported  by  the  Convention 
held  at  Philadelphia,  and  having  debated  thereon,  postponed  the 
further  consideration  of  the  same  to  the  afternoon. 

The  Committee  appointed  to  provide  a  more  suitable  place 
for  the  Convention  to  sit  in,  made  report,17  that  the  meeting- 
house in  Long  Lane,  in  Boston,  was  prepared  for  that  purpose, 
whereupon, 

Voted,  That  when  the  Convention  adjourn  they  will  adjourn 
to  that  place. 

Voted,  That  the  said  committee  return  the  thanks  of  the 
Convention  to  the  said  proprietors,  for  their  offer  of  the  use  of 
the  said  meeting-house. 

Adjourned  to  3  o'clock,  P.  M. 

17  [The  Committee  made  the  following  report. 

"  The  Committee  appointed  to  '  provide  a  more  convenient  place  for  the  sit- 
ting of  the  Convention,'  have  attended  to  that  service,  and  ask  leave  to 
report : — 

That  they  have  examined  the  meeting-house  in  Long  Lane,  wherein  the 
Rev.  Mr.  Belknap  officiates,  and  are  unanimously  of  opinion  that  the  members 
of  the  Convention  can  all  be  commodiously  disposed  so  as  to  hear  and  be 
heard,  by  having  the  pews  on  the  ground  floor  assigned  for  that  purpose. 

That  the  galleries  will  well  accommodate  the  spectators. 

That  gentlemen  have  offered  to  put  up,  at  their  own  expense,  a  stove,  tem- 
porary stairs,  a  temporary  porch,  and  to  make  other  dispositions  for  the  accom- 
modating of  the  Convention. 

And  that  the  "Committee  of  the  proprietors  of  said  meeting-house  have 
offered  the  use  of  the  same  during  the  sitting  of  the  Convention. 

That  the  Committee  of  the  Convention  have  given  directions  for  the  neces- 
sary preparations  to  be  made  for  their  reception. 

Per  order:  Tristram  Daltox. 

January  1G,  1788." 

"  The  meeting-house  in  Long  Lane,"  to  which  the  Convention  adjourned  on 
the  recommendation  of  the  Committee,  is  the  building  still  standing,  where, 
since  Dr.  Jeremy  Belknap's  time,  the  pulpit  has  been  filled  Ify  Dr.  John  8. 


1788.]  JOURNAL    OF    CONVENTION.  61 

AFTERNOON. 

Met  according  to  adjournment. 

Voted,  That  the  pulpit  be  assigned  for  the  gentlemen  of  the 
clergy  who  may  be  in  town,  and  that  the  Monitors  provide  seats 
for  such  as  cannot  be  accommodated  there. 

Voted,  That  the  stairs  under  the  galleries  be  assigned  for  the 
printers. 

The  Convention  proceeded  in  the  consideration  of  the  Con 
stitution  or  Frame  of  Government  reported  by  the  Convention 
held  at  Philadelphia,  and  after  debate  thereon,  postponed  the 
further  consideration  of  the  same  to  the  morning. 

Adjourned  to  Friday  morning,  10  o'clock. 


Friday,  January  18,  1788. 

Met  according  to  adjournment. 

The  Convention  proceeded  in  the  consideration  of  the  Con- 
stitution or  Frame  of  Government  reported  by  the  Convention 

Popkin,  the  celebrated  Dr.  William  E.  Charming,  and  his  colleague,  Dr.  Ezra 
S.  Gannett,  who  is  the  present  minister.  '>  Long  Lane  "  took  its  present  name 
of  Federal  Street,  from  the  circumstance  of  the  meeting  of  the  Convention 
here.  In  the  Massachusetts  Centinel,  of  February  13, 1788,  the  place,  time  and 
authority  of  this  change  are  given.  It  appears  to  have  taken  place  during  the 
progress  of  the  "  grand  procession  "  which  was  called  forth  in  honor  of  the 
ratification  of  the  Federal  Constitution  by  the  Convention  : — 

"  The  following  is  the  form  of  the  ordinance  by  which  the  People,  on  Friday 
last,  altered  the  name  of  the  avenue  called  Long  Lane,  to  Federal  Street ; 
and  which  we  have  obtained  from  the  records,  to  gratify  the  curious.  It  is 
verbatim  as  read  by  the  Chairman  of  the  Committee  that  day,  in  the  proces- 
sion : — 

To  all  persons  unto  whom  these  Presents  shall  come, 

Greeting. 

BE  IT  KNOWN— That  upon  this  eighth  day  of  the  month  of  February, 
in  the  year  of  our  Lord,  one  thousand  seven  hundred  eighty-eight, 
and  in  the  twelfth  year  of  the  Independence  of  the  United  States  of  America, 
WE,  THE  PEOPLE,  in  GRAND  PROCESSION  moving,  have  ordained, 
resolved  and  declared,  and  by  these  presents,  DO  ordain,  resolve  and  declare, 
THAT  for,  and  in  consideration,  that  the  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION 


62  JOURNAL    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

held  at  Philadelphia,  and  after  debate  thereon,  postponed  the 
further  consideration  of  the  same  to  the  afternoon. 
Adjourned  to  3  o'clock,  P.  M. 

AFTERNOON. 

Met  according  to  adjournment. 

Upon  an  invitation  from  the  Hon.  Samuel  Adams,  Esq.,  to 
the  delegates  in  convention,  to  attend  the  funeral  of  his  son, 
to-morrow  afternoon,  precisely  at  four  o'clock, 

Voted,  That  the  Convention  will  adjourn  to-morrow  to  attend 
the  funeral  accordingly. 

The  Convention  proceeded  in  the  consideration  of  the  Con- 
stitution or  Frame  of  Government  reported  by  the  Convention 
held  at  Philadelphia,  and  after  debate, 

Avas  by  the  CONVENTION  of  the  Commonwealth  of  Massachusetts. 
ASSENTED  to,  RATIFIED,  fully  CONFIRMED  and  ADOPTED  in  the 
Me e ting-House,  situated  and  being  in  the  avenue  leading  from  Milk  Street  to 
Purchase  Street,  and  commonly  called  LONG  LANE,  the  said  avenue,  BE, 
and  it  hereby  IS,  denominated,  appellated  and  christened 
FEDERAL  STREET. 
And  we,  the  PEOPLE  aforesaid,  do  enjoin  that  all  our  loving  fathers,  friends 
and  fellow  citizens,  observe,  duly  adhere,  and  attend  to,  this  our  ordinance, 
resolution  or  declaration,  as  they  wish  to  promote  justice,  preserve  our  friend- 
ship, insure  domestic  tranquillity,  and  provide  for  the  diffusion  of  federal 
sentiments. 

GIVEN  under  our  auspices,  this  eighth  day  of  February,  Anno  Domini  one 
thousand  seven  hundred  and  eighty-eight,  of  American  sovereignty  the  twelfth, 
and  the  FIRST  YEAR  of  OUR  real,  political,  federal  existence. 

THE  PEOPLE. 
God  speed  the  Constitution  !  " 

The  following  ditty,  originating  at  the  time  of  the  change  of  the  name  of 
the  street,  is  still  remembered  : — 

"  Convention  did  in  State  House  meet— 
And,  when  it  would  not  hold  them, 
They  all  went  down  to  Federal  Street, 
And  there  the  truth  was  told  them." 

It  must  be  remembered  that  the  State  House  in  1 788,  which  was  insufficient 
for  the  accommodation  of  an  assembly  of  three  hundred  delegates,  was  not 
the  present  State  House  on  Beacon  Hill,  with  its  spacious  Representatives' 
Chamber,  which  has  accommodated  a  House  of  seven  hundred — but  the  "  Old 

State  House,"  the  ancient  building  still  standing  in  the  centre  of  State  Street.] 


1788.]  JOURNAL    OF    CONVENTION.  63 

Voted,  That  the  following  question  be  put  to  the  Hon.  E. 
Gerry,  Esq.,  viz. :  u  Why,  in  the  last  requisition  of  Congress, 
the  portion  required  of  this  State  was  thirteen  times  as  much 
as  of  Georgia,  and  yet  we  have  but  eight  representatives  in  the 
general  government,  and  Georgia  has  three?"  and  that  he  be 
requested  to  put  his  answer  in  writing. 

The  further  consideration  of  the  said  Constitution  was  post- 
poned to  the  morning. 

Adjourned  to  Saturday  morning,  10  o'clock. 


Saturday,  January  19,  1788. 

Met  according  to  adjournment. 

The  Hon.  E.  Gerry,  Esq.,  answered  the  question  proposed  to 
him  yesterday,  as  follows,  viz.  : — 

Saturday  Morning-,  19th  January. 
Sir  : — I  have  no  documents  in  Boston,  and  am  uncertain 
whether  I  have  any  at  home,  to  assist  me  in  answering  the 
question,  "  Why,  in  the  last  requisition  of  Congress,  the  pof- 
tion  required  of  this  State  was  thirteen  times  as  much  as  of 
Georgia,  and  yet  we  have  but  eight  representatives  in  the  gen- 
eral government,  and  Georgia  has  three  ?"  but  if  my  memory 
serves  me,  the  reason  assigned  by  the  committee  who  made  the 
apportionment  for  giving  such  a  number  to  Georgia,  was,  that 
that  State  had  of  late  greatly  increased  its  numbers  by  migra- 
tion, and  if  not  then,  would  soon  be  entitled  to  the  proportion 
assigned  her.  1  think  it  was  also  said,  that  the  apportion- 
ment was  made,  not  by  any  fixed  principle,  but  by  a  compro- 
mise. These  reasons  not  being  satisfactory,  a  motion  was  made 
on  the  part  of  Massachusetts,  for  increasing  her  number  of 
representatives,  but  it  did  not  take  effect. 
I  have  the  honor  to  be,  Sir, 

With  the  highest  respect, 

Your  most  obedient,  and 

Very  humble  servant, 

E.  Gerry. 
Hon.  Mr.  Cushing,  Vice-President  of  the  Convention. 


64  JOURNAL   OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

The  Convention  proceeded  in  the  consideration  of  the  Con- 
stitution or  Frame  of  Government  reported  by  the  Convention 
held  at  Philadelphia,  and,  after  debate,  a  motion  was  made  and 
seconded  that  the  Hon.  E.  Gerry,  Esq.,  be  requested  to  give  what 
information  he  may  have  in  his  mind  respecting  the  Senate. 

A  motion  was  then  made  and  seconded,  that  the  Convention 
adjourn,  and  on  the  question  for  ^journment,  it  was  deter- 
mined in  the  affirmative. 

Adjourned  to  Monday  morning,  10  o'clock. 


Monday,  January  21, 1788. 

Met  according  to  adjournment. 

On  motion, 

Resolved,  as  follows,  viz. : — Whereas,  there  is  a  publication 
in  the  Boston  Gazette  and  the  Country  Journal,  of  this  day,  as 
follows,  viz. : — 

"Bribery  and  Corruption!!!  The  most  diabolical  plan 
is  on  foot  to  corrupt  the  members  of  the  Convention  who 
oppose  the  adoption  of  the  new  Constitution.  Large  sums 
■  of  money  have  been  brought  from  a  neighboring  State  for  that 
purpose,  contributed  by  the  wealthy  ;  if  so,  is  it  not  probable 
there  may  be  collections  for  the  same  accursed  purpose  nearer 
home  ?  Ckntinel." 

Resolved,  That  this  Convention  will  take  measures  for  inquir- 
ing into  the  subject  of  the  said  publication,  and  for  ascertaining 
the  truth  or  falsehood  of  the  suggestion  therein  contained. 

Ordered,  That  the  Messenger  be  directed  to  request  the 
printers  of  the  said  Gazette  to  appear  before  this  Convention 
forthwith,  to  give  information  respecting  the  said  publication. 

The  Convention  proceeded  in  the  consideration  of  the  Con- 
stitution or  Frame  of  Government  reported  by  the  Convention 
held  at  Philadelphia,  and  having  debated  thereon,  postponed  the 
further  consideration  of  the  same  to  the  afternoon. 

Adjourned  to  3  o'clock,  P.  M. 


1788.]  JOURNAL   OF    CONVENTION.  65 

AFTERNOON. 

Met  according  to  adjournment. 

The  Messenger  informed  the  Convention  that  he  had  acquaint- 
ed the  printers  of  the  Boston  Gazette,  &c,  of  the  Order  of  this 
morning,  respecting  them,  and  was  answered  that  one  of  them 
would  attend  the  Convention  this  afternoon. 

The  Convention  proceeded  in  the  consideration  of  the  Consti- 
tution or  Frame  of  Government  reported  by  the  Convention 
held  at  Philadelphia,  and  having  debated  thereon,  postponed 
the  further  consideration  of  the  same  to  the  morning. 

A  letter  from  Benjamin  Edes  and  Son,  printers  of  the  Boston 
Gazette,  &c,  relative  to  the  publication  entered  this  morning. 
Read,  and  committed  to  Mr.  Parsons,  Mr.  Nasson,  Mr.  Gorham, 
Mr.  Wedgery,»Mr.  Porter,  Mr.  Gore,  and  Mr.  Thomas,  of  Ply- 
mouth. 

Adjourned  to  Tuesday  morning,  10  o'clock. 


Tuesday,  January  22, 1788. 

Met  according  to  adjournment. 

The  Convention  proceeded  in  the  consideration  of  the  Con- 
stitution or  Frame  of  Government  reported  by  the  Convention 
held  at  Philadelphia,  and,  after  debate,  postponed  the  further 
consideration  of  the  same  to  the  afternoon. 

A  letter  from  the  Hon.  E.  Gerry,  Esq.,  referred  to  the  after- 
noon. 

Adjourned  to  3  o'clock,  P.  M. 

AFTERNOON. 

Met  according  to  adjournment. 

A  letter18  from  the  Hon.  E.  Gerry,  Esq.,  with  a  state  of  facts* 

18  [The  communication  of  Mr.  Gerry,  which  we  copy  in  this  note,  will  be 
read  with  interest. 

"Cambridge,  21st January,  1788. 
Sir  : — It  is  with  great  reluctance  that  I  trespass  a  moment  on  the  time  of 
the  honorable  Convention,  employed  as  it  is,  on  a  subject  of  the  highest  im- 
9 


66  JOURNAL   OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

relative  to  the  construction  of  the  Federal  Senate.  Read,  and 
after  debate, 

Voted,  That  the  further  consideration  of  the  said  letter  sub- 
side. 

portance  to  this  country,  but  I  am  under  the  necessity  of  stating  some  facts, 
and  their  consequences,  as  they  relate  to  myself. 

On  the  14th  of  this  month,  the  Convention  passed  a  vote,  requesting  me 
*  to  take  a  seat  in  the  house,  to  answer  any  question  of  fact,  from  time  to 
time,  that  the  Convention  may  want  to  ask,  respecting  the  passing  of  the  Con- 
stitution.' This  request  was  unexpected,  and  I  complied  with  it,  contrary  to 
my  inclination,  not  doubting  in  the  least,  that  I  should  be  treated  with  deli- 
cacy and  candor. 

Every  gentleman  who  will  reflect  but  a  moment,  must  be  sensible  that  my 
situation  on  the  floor  of  the  Convention  was  not  eligible  :  that  it  was  a  humil- 
iating condition,  to  which  nothing  could  have  produced  my  submission,  but  the 
respect  I  entertained  for  the  honorable  Convention,  and  the  desire  I  had  of 
complying  with  their  wishes. 

After  having,  on  Saturday  morning,  stated  an  answer  to  the  question  pro- 
posed the  preceding  evening,  I  perceived  that  your  honorable  body  were  con- 
sidering a  paragraph  which  respected  an  equal  representation  of  the  States  in 
the  Senate,  and  one  of  my  honorable  colleagues  observed,  that  this  was  agreed 
to  by  a  committee  consisting  of  a  member  from  each  State,  and  that  I  was 
one  of  the  number.  This  was  a  partial  narrative  of  facts,  which  I  conceived 
placed  my  conduct  in  an  unfavorable  point  of  light,  probably  without  any  such 
intention  on  the  part  of  my  colleague. 

I  was  thus  reduced  to  the  disagreeable  alternative  of  addressing  a  letter  to 
your  honor,  for  correcting  this  error,  or  of  sustaining  the  injuries  resulting 
from  its  unfavorable  impressions  :  not  in  the  least  suspecting,  that  when  I  had 
committed  myself  to  the  Convention  without  the  right  of  speaking  in  my  own 
defence,  any  gentleman  would  take  an  undue  advantage  from  being  a  member 
of  the  house,  to  continue  the  misrepresentation,  by  suppressing  every  attempt 
on  my  part  to  state  the  facts.  I  accordingly  informed  your  honor,  that  I  was 
preparing  a  letter  to  throw  light  on  the  subject,  and  at  my  request  you  was  so 
obliging  as  to  make  this  communication  to  the  house.  My  sole  object  was,  to 
state  the  matter  as  it  respected  my  conduct,  but  I  soon  perceived  that  it  was 
misunderstood  by  the  honorable  Judge  Dana,  who  rose  with  an  appearance  of 
party  virulence  which  I  did  not  expect,  and  followed  one  misrepresentation 
with  another,  by  impressing  the  house  with  the  idea  that  I  was  entering  into 
their  debates.  I  requested  leave  repeatedly  to  explain  the  matter,  but  he  be- 
came more  vehement,  and  I  was  subject  to  strictures  from  several  parts  of  the 
house,  till  it  adjourned,  without  being  even  permitted  to  declare  that  I  dis- 
dained such  an  intention,  and  did  not  merit  such  unworthy  treatment. 

I  confess  to  you,  Sir,  that  the  indelicacy  and  disingenuity  of  this  procedure, 
distressed  my  feelings  beyond  any  thing  I  had  ever  before  experienced  :  for, 
had  every  member  of  the  honorable  house  requested  me  by  a  vote  to  partake 


1788.]  JOURNAL   OF    CONVENTION.  67 

The  Convention  proceeded  in  the  consideration  of  the  Con- 
stitution or  Frame  of  Government  reported  by  the  Convention 
held  at  Philadelphia,  and,  after  debate  thereon,  postponed  the 
further  consideration  of  the  same  to  the  morning. 

Adjourned  to  Wednesday  morning,  10  o'clock. 


in  their  debates,  I  should  have  considered  it  as  improper  and  unconstitutional, 
and  from  principles  of  decency  and  propriety,  should  have  declined  their 
request :  and  Judge  Dana  has  been  too  long  in  public  life,  with  me,  not  to 
know  that  it  has  never  been  my  practice  to  attain  objects  by  improper  means. 
Indeed,  Sir,  so  remote  were  my  wishes  from  entering  into  your  debates,  that 
after  having  passed  a  judgment  on  the  Constitution,  in  the  Federal  Convention, 
I  would  not  have  taken  a  seat  in  the  State  Convention,  with  the  unanimous 
suffrages  of  the  citizens  of  Massachusetts,  because,  in  a  matter  of  such  impor- 
tant consequence,  it  was  my  wish  that  the  final  decision  should  be  made  by 
themselves.  This  was  a  fact  early  known  to  my  particular  friends,  and  I  do 
not  mention  it  to  suggest  an  impropriety  in  accepting  a  seat  in  both  conven- 
tions, but  merely  to  show  the  injustice  done  me  on  this  occasion. 

If  Judge  Dana  was  apprehensive  that  the  facts  which  I  should  state  would 
eventually  prejudice  the  cause  he  so  ardently  advocated,  still,  I  conceive,  he 
could  not  be  justified  in  precluding  those  facts  which  were  necessary  to  do  me 
justice ;  for  bad  indeed  must  be  that  cause  which  will  not  bear  the  light  of  truth. 

Judge  Dana  took  sanctuary  under  the  rules  of  the  house,  but  I  never  yet 
heard  of  a  rule  that  was  intended  to  prevent  an  injured  person  from  addressing 
.a  letter  to  the  body  who  should  redress  his  wrongs,  or  from  giving  information 
of  such  an  intention  :  and  I  conceive,  Sir,  that  neither  the  honorable  Conven- 
tion, or  any  republican  body  on  earth,  who  had  requested  an  individual  to  attend 
them  for  the  purpose  of  giving  information,  would  have  had  any  objection  to 
granting  him  leave  to  speak,  much  less  to  address  to  them  a  letter,  merely  for 
the  purpose  of  setting  a  matter  right,  which,  in  the  progress  of  debates,  had, 
by  an  erroneous  statement,  tended  to  his  injur}-. 

It  is  true,  Sir,  I  differ  in  opinion  from  a  number  of  respectable  members  of 
your  honorable  house,  on  the  subject  of  the  proposed  Constitution,  but,  I  flat- 
tered myself  that  not  a  member  could  be  found  so  deficient  in  liberality  as  to 
bear  animosity  towards  me  on  this  account.  The  strong  impressions  which  I 
felt,  and  which  I  still  feel,  that  this  system,  without  amendment,  will  destroy 
the  liberties  of  America,  inferred  on  me  an  indispensable  obligation  to  give  it 
my  negative :  and  having  done  this,  I  feel  the  approbation  of  my  own  mind, 
which  is  infinitely  preferable  to  universal  applauses  without  it  If,  neverthe- 
less, my  conduct  in  this  instance  has  given  offence ;  if  there  is  at  this  time  so 
little  freedom  in  America,  as  that  a  person  in  discharging  a  most  important 
public  trust,  cannot  conduct  according  to  the  obligations  of  honor  and  dictates 
of  his  conscience,  it  appears  to  me  of  little  consequence  what  form  of  govern- 
ment we  adopt,  for  we  are  not  far  removed  from  a  state  of  slavery. 

I  shall  only  add,  Sir,  that  I  have  subjoined  a  state  of  facts,  founded  on  doc- 


68  JOURNAL   OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

Wednesday,  January  23, 1788. 

Met  according^  to  adjournment. 

A  motion  was  made  and  seconded,  that  his  Honor  the  Lieu- 
tenant-Governor, the  members  of  the  honorable  Council,  the 

nments  relative  to  my  consent  that  the  lesser  States  should  have  an  equal 
representation  in  the  Senate — that  I  still  entertain  the  highest  respect  for  the 
honorable  Convention,  who,  I  am  sure,  will  never  countenance  unfair  pro- 
ceedings— but  that  I  cannot  again  place  myself  in  a  situation  where  I  must 
hear  my  conduct  misrepresented  without  the  privilege  of  requesting  leave  of 
your  honorable  body  to  establish  facts  and  promote  justice. 
I  have  the  honor  to  be,  Sir, 

With  the  highest  respect  for  the 

Honorable  Convention  and  yourself, 

Your  most  obedient  and  very  humble  servant, 

E.  Gerry. 
His  Honor  Judge  Cushing, 

Vice-President  of  the  Convention  of  Massachusetts. 

A    STATE    OF    FACTS,   REFERRED    TO    IN    THE    PRECEDING   LETTER. 

The  business  of  the  Federal  Convention  having  been  opened  by  Governor 
Randolph,  of  Virginia,  and  the  outlines  of  a  plan  of  government  having  been 
proposed  by  him,  they  were  referred  to  a  Committee  of  the  whole  house,  and 
4after  several  weeks'  debate,  the  committee  reported  general  principles  for 
forming  a  Constitution,  amongst  which  were  the  following  : — 

'  7th.  That  the  right  of  suffrage  in  the  first  branch  of  the  National  Legis- 
lature '  (by  which  was  intended  the  House  of  Representatives)  '  ought  not  to  be 
according  to  the  rule  established  in  the  Articles  of  Confederation,  but  accord- 
ing to  some  equitable  ratio  of  representation,  viz. :  in  proportion  to  the  whole 
number  of  white  and  other  free  citizens  and  inhabitants,  of  every  age,  sex  and 
condition,  including  those  bound  to  servitude  for  a  term  of  years,  and  three- 
fifths  of  all  other  persons  not  comprehended  in  the  foregoing  description, 
except  Indians,  not  paying  taxes,  in  each  State. 

'  8th.  That  the  right  of  suffrage  in  the  second  branch  of  the  National 
Legislature '  (meaning  the  Senate)  '  ought  to  be  according  to  the  rule  estab- 
lished for  the  first.' 

In  the  Committee  of  the  Whole,  the  eighth  article  above  recited,  for  which 
I  voted,  was  carried,  if  my  memory  serves  me,  by  six  States  against  five ;  and 
when  under  consideration  of  the  Convention,  it  produced  a  ferment,  and  a 
separate  meeting,  as  I  was  informed,  of  most  of  the  delegates  of  those  five 
States,  the  result  of  which  was,  a  firm  determination  on  their  part  not  to  relin- 
quish the  right  of  an  equal  representation  in  the  Senate,  confirmed,  as  it  was, 
to  those  States,  by  the  Articles  of  Confederation.  The  matter  at  length  be- 
came so  serious  as  to  threaten  a  dissolution  of  the  Convention,  and  a  Commit- 


1788.]  JOURNAL    OF    CONVENTION.  69 

Speaker  of  the  House  of  Representatives,  and  the  Secretary  of 
the  Commonwealth,  be  admitted  to  seats  on  the  floor  of  the 
house,  to  hear  the  debates. 

A  motion  was  then  made  and  seconded,  that  the  considera- 

tee,  consisting  of  a  member  from  each  State,  was  appointed,  to  meet  (if  possible) 
on  the  ground  of  accommodation.  The  members  from  the  three  large  States  of 
Virginia,  Pennsylvania  and  Massachusetts,  were  Mr.  Mason,  Doctor  Franklin 
and  myself,  and  after  debating  the  subject  several  days,  during  which  time  the 
Convention  adjourned,  the  Committee  agreed  to  the  following  Report : — 

'  That  the  subsequent  propositions  be  recommended  to  the  Convention,  on 
condition  that  both  shall  be  generally  adopted  : — 

'  First.  That  in  the  first  branch  of  the  Legislature,  each  of  the  States  now 
in  the  Union  be  allowed  one  member  for  every  forty  thousand  inhabitants,  of 
the  description  reported  in  the  seventh  resolution  of  the  Committee  of  the 
whole  House — that  each  State  not  containing  that  number  shall  be  allowed 
one  member — that  all  writs  for  raising  or  appropriating  money,  and  for  fixing 
the  salaries  of  the  officers  of  government  of  the  United  States,  shall  originate 
in  the  first  branch  of  the  Legislature,  and  shall  not  be  altered  or  amended  bv^ 
the  second  branch — and  that  no  money  shall  be  drawn  from  the  treasury  of 
the  United  States,  but  in  pursuance  of  appropriations  to  be  originated  by  the 
first  branch. 

'  Secondly.     That  in  the  second  branch  of  the  Legislature  each  State  shall 

have  an  equal  vote.' 

i 

The  number  of  forty  thousand  inhabitants  to  every  member  in  the  House  of 
Representatives,  was  not  a  subject  of  much  debate,  or  an  object  insisted  on,  as 
some  of  the  Committee  were  opposed  to  it.  Accordingly,  on  the  10th  of  July, 
a  motion  was  made  '  to  double  the  number  of  representatives,  being  sixty-five,' 
and  it  passed  in  the  negative. 

The  admission,  however,  of  the  smaller  States  to  an  equal  representation  in 
the  Senate,  never  would  have  been  agreed  to  by  the  Committee,  or  by  myself, 
as  a  member  of  it,  without  the  provision  '  that  all  bills  for  raising  or  appro- 
priating money,  and  for  fixing  the  salaries  of  the  officers  of  government,' 
should  originate  in  the  House  of  Representatives,  and  '  not  be  altered  or 
amended '  by  the  Senate,  '  and  that  no  money  should  be  drawn  from  the  trea- 
sury '  '  but  in  pursuance  of  such  appropriations.' 

This  provision  was  agreed  to  by  the  Convention,  at  the  same  time  and  by 
the  same  vote,  as  that  which  allows  to  each  State  an  equal  voice  in  the  Senate, 
and  was  afterwards  referred  to  the  Committee  of  Detail,  and  reported  by  them 
as  part  of  the  Constitution,  as  will  appear  by  documents  in  my  possession. 
Nevertheless,  the  smaller  States  having  attained  their  object  of  an  equal  voice 
in  the  Senate,  a  new  provision,  now  in  the  Constitution,  was  substituted,  where- 
by the  Senate  have  a  right  to  propose  amendments  to  revenue  bills,  and  the 
provision  reported  by  the  Committee  was  effectually  destroyed. 

It  was  conceived  by  the  Committee  to  be  highly  unreasonable  and  unjust 


70  JOURNAL   OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

tion  of  the  said  motion  subside,  and  the  question  for  subsiding 
being  put,  passed  in  the  affirmative. 

The  Convention  proceeded  in  the  consideration  of  the  Con- 
stitution or  Frame  of  Government  reported  by  the  Convention 

that  a  small  State,  which  would  contribute  but  one  sixty-fifth  part  of  any  tax, 
should,  nevertheless,  have  an  equal  right  with  a  large  State,  which  would  con- 
tribute eight  or  ten  sixty-fifths  of  the  same  tax,  to  take  money  from  the  pock- 
ets of  the  latter,  more  especially  as  it  was  intended  that  the  powers  of  the  new 
legislature  should  extend  to  internal  taxation.  It  was  likewise  conceived,  that 
the  right  of  expending  should  be  in  proportion  to  the  ability  of  raising  money 
— that  the  larger  States  would  not  have  the  least  security  for  their  property  if 
they  had  not  the  due  command  of  their  own  purses — that  they  would  not  have 
such  command,  if  the  lesser  States  in  either  branch  had  an  equal  right  with 
the  larger  to  originate,  or  even  to  alter,  money  bills — that  if  the  Senate  should 
have  the  power  of  proposing  amendments,  they  may  propose  that  a  bill,  origi- 
nated by  the  House,  to  raise  one  thousand,  should  be  increased  to  one  hundred 
thousand  pounds — that  although  the  House  may  negative  amendments  proposed 
by  the  Senate,  yet  the  giving  them  power  to  propose  amendments,  would  ena- 
ble them  to  increase  the  grants  of  the  House,  because  the  Senate  (as  well  as 
the  House)  would  have  a  right  to  adhere  to  their  votes,  and  would  oblige  the 
House  to  consent  to  such  an  increase,  on  the  principle  of  accommodation — that 
the  lesser  States  would  thus  have  nearly  as  much  command  of  the  property  of 
the  greater,  as  they  themselves — that  even  if  the  representation  in  the  Senate 
had  been  according  to  numbers,  in  each  State,  money  bills  should  not  be  origi- 
nated or  altered  by  that  branch,  because,  by  their  appointments,  the  members 
would  be  farther  removed  from  the  people,  would  have  a  greater  and  more 
independent  property  in  their  offices,  would  be  more  extravagant,  and  not 
being  so  easily  removed,  would  be  ever  in  favor  of  higher  salaries  than  mem- 
bers of  the  House — that  it  was  not  reasonable  to  suppose  the  aristocratical  branch 
would  be  as  saving  of  the  public  money  as  the  democratical  branch : — but 
that,  on  the  other  hand,  should  the  Senate  have  only  the  power  of  concurrence 
or  non-concurrence  of  such  bills,  they  would  pass  them,  although  the  grants 
should  not  equal  their  wishes,  whilst,  with  the  power  of  amendment,  they  would 
never  be  satisfied  with  the  grants  of  the  House — that  the  Commons  of  Great 
Britain  had  ever  strenuously  and  successfully  contended  for  this  important 
right,  which  the  Lords  had  often,  but  in  vain,  endeavored  to  exercise — that 
the  preservation  of  this  right,  the  right  of  holding  the  purse-strings,  was  essen- 
tial to  the  preservation  of  liberty — and  that  to  this  right,  perhaps,  was  princi- 
pally owing  the  liberty  that  still  remains  in  Great  Britain. 

These  are  the  facts  and  reasons  whereon  was  grounded  the  admission  of  the 
smaller  States  to  an  equal  representation  in  the  Senate,  and  it  must  appear 
that  there  is  an  essential  difference  between  an  unqualified  admission  of  them 
to  an  equal  representation  in  the  Senate,  and  admitting  them  from  necessity, 
on  the  express  condition  provided  in  the  recited  report  of  the  Committee ;  and 
it  must  also  appear,  that  had  that  provision  been  preserved  in  the  Constitution, 


1788.]  JOURNAL   OP    CONVENTION.    x  71 

held  at  Philadelphia,  and,  having  debated  thereon,  postponed 
the  further  consideration  of  the  same  to  the  afternoon. 
Adjourned  to  3  o'clock,  P.  M. 

and  the  Senate  precluded  from  a  right  to  alter  or  amend  money  or  revenue 
bills,  agreeably  to  the  said  report,  the  lesser  States  would  not  have  that  undue 
command  of  the  property  of  the  larger  States  which  they  are  now  to  have  by 
the  Constitution,  and  that  I  never  consented  to  an  equal  representation  of  the 
States  in  the  Senate,  as  it  now  stands,  in  the  new  system." 

In  the  Massachusetts  Centinel  of  February  2,  1788,  we  find  the  following 
spirited  account  of  the  excitement  produced  in  the  Convention  by  the 
announcement  of  Mr.  Gerry,  that  he  was  preparing  a  letter  for  the  Conven- 
tion : — 

"  A  SHORT  HISTORY  OF  A  RECENT  FREAK. 

Mr.  Russell  :  You  seem  to  apologize  for  the  publication  of  the  very  extra- 
ordinary letter  of  the  Hon.  Mr.  Gerry,  to  the  Vice-President  of  the  State 
Convention,  occasioned  by  a  debate  upon  a  question  of  mere  order,  in  that 
body,  by  saying,  '  The  public  being  desirous  to  know  the  result  of  the  conver- 
sation in  Convention,  on  Saturday  last,  on  the  propriety  of  Mr.  Gerry  being 
permitted  to  give  any  other  information  than  of  facts  particularly  asked  for, 
and  which  it  appears  has  given  Mr.  Gerry  offence,  we  lay  before  our  readers  a 
copy  of  that  gentleman's  letter,  as  read  yesterday  afternoon.' 

If,  Sir,  the  desire  of  the  public  is  only  to  be  informed  of  the  propriety  or 
impropriety  of  that  honorable  gentleman's  giving  any  other  information  than 
of  facts  '  particularly  asked  after,'  I  think  that  gentleman  has  said  enough  in 
his  letter  to  convince  them  of  the  impropriety  of  his  attempting  to  do  more. 
For,  says  he,  '  on  the  14th  of  this  month,  the  Convention  passed  a  vote,  re- 
questing me ' '  to  take  a  seat  in  the  house,  to  answer  any  question  of  fact,  from 
time  to  time,  that  the  Convention  may  want  to  ask,  respecting  the  passing  the ' 
Constitution.'  Now,  Sir,  let  the  public  judge  (for  to  them  has  he  appealed 
from  the  judgment  of  the  Convention)  whether  the  honorable  gentleman  could 
with  propriety  give  any  other  information  than  of  facts,  particularly  asked 
after,  by  some  member  of  the  Convention,  or  even  then,  before  the  Convention 
itself  had  approved  of  the  inquiry,  or,  in  the  language  of  their  vote,  had  sig- 
nified their  '  want '  of  such  an  information  from  him.  He,  indeed,  seems  dis- 
posed not  only  to  give  information,  in  point  of  fact,  before  it  is  asked  after,  but 
also  to  obtrude  upon  the  Convention  his  opinion  respecting  the  Constitution, 
provided  such  opinion  has  a  tendency  to  obstruct  the  acceptance  of  it.  In 
proof  of  this,  we  find  that  honorable  gentleman  declaring  in  this  very  letter, 
thus :  '  The  strong  impressions  which  I  felt,  and  which  I  still  feel,  that  this  sys- 
tem, without  amendments,  will  destroy  the  liberties  of  America,  inferred  on 
me  an  indispensible  obligation  to  give  it  my  negative.'  Had  the  honorable 
gentleman  been  requested  to  give  his  opinion  of  the  consequences  of  accept- 
ing the  Constitution  without  amendments  ?     If  not,  was  it  not  indecent,  not  to 


72  JOURNAL    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 


AFTERNOON. 

Met  according  to  adjournment. 

A  motion  was  made  and  seconded,  that  the  vote  for  consider- 
ing the  new  Constitution  by  paragraphs,  be  reconsidered,  and 

say  impertinent,  in  him  to  do  it  ?  Does  that  honorable  gentleman  think  the 
Convention  deficient  in  point  of  sagacity,  to  discern  the  probable  effects  and 
consequences  of  the  system  submitted  to  their  consideration,  and  that  they  need 
a  portion  of  his  wisdom,  and  public  virtue,  to  point  them  out,  and  to  prevent 
their  sacrificing  the  liberties  of  America  ?  Was  he  accountable  to  that  honor- 
able body  for  having  given  his  negative  to  the  system  ?  On  what  other  suppo- 
sition, than  that  above-mentioned,  can  we  then  account  for  his  very  extraor- 
dinary conduct  ?  But  slightly  to  pass  over  his  officious  letter  to  the  legislature 
of  this  State,  endeavoring  to  vindicate  himself,  before  he  had  been  called  upon 
by  them,  for  giving  his  negative  to  the  proposed  system  of  government,  I 
would  state  a  few  facts,  necessary  for  the  information  of  the  public,  to  enable 
them  to  make  up  a  right  judgment  in  the  present  case. 

The  Convention,  as  Mr.  E.  Gerry  says,  were  considering  that  part  of  the 
Constitution  which  relates  to  the  equal  representation  of  the  States  in  the 
Senate,  when  Mr.  Strong,  one  of  his  honorable  colleagues  in  tne  Continental 
Convention,  rose,  and  informed  the  house,  that  this  was  agreed  to  by  a  Com- 
mittee consisting  of  a  member  from  each  State,  and  that  Mr.  Gerry  was  one 
of  the  number.  This  information,  however  harmless  in  itself,  roused  the  very 
irritable  passions  of  Mr.  E.  Gerry ;  he  changed  his  seat  instantly  to  the  table 
before  the  President,  pulled  forth  his  budget  of  peccadilloes,  displayed  them  in 
order  before  him,  took  pen,  ink  and  paper,  and,  as  he  now  informs  us,  set  about 
writing  '  a  letter  to  the  President  for  correcting  this  error '  of  his  honorable 
colleague.  Rkum  teneatis  amici?  But  stop,  what  may  be  sport  to  us,  might 
.  be  death  to  hjm — I  mean  political  death.  What,  shall  it  be  understood  in  that 
honorable  body,  that  Mr.  E.  Gerry  had  reported  in  favor  of  an  equal  repre- 
sentation of  the  States  in  the  Senate  ?  For  this  is  the  utmost  extent  of  the 
information  of  his  honorable  colleague.  Yet  is  he  greatly  alarmed  at  it,  and 
determines,  in  a  rage,  to  wipe  away  '  the  injuries  resulting  from  its  unfavora- 
ble impressions.'  He  writes,  then  strikes  out,  writes  on,  strikes  out  again,  until 
at  last,  no  longer  able  to  keep  his  seat,  (where  he  was  left  to  go  on  without 
molestation  from  any  mortal,)  he  rises  in  the  midst  of  the  debates  on  that  par- 
agraph, to  use  his  own  words,  '  to  inform  the  President  that  he  was  preparing 
a  letter '  (for  the  gentleman  has  chosen  that  mode  of  opposition  to  the  federal 
government)  •  to  throw  light  on  the  subject,'  and  request  him  to  make  this 
communication  to  the  house.  He  did  so.  But  what  was  to  be  done ?  Were 
all  the  debates  to  be  suspended  until  Mr.  E.  Gerry  had  finished  his  very  im- 
portant letter  to  the  President  upon  the  subject  ?  Were  the  honorable  Con- 
vention so  benighted,  in  the  opinion  of  Mr.  E.  Gerry,  that  it  was  not  safe  to 
leave  them  to  go  on  in  their  debates,  until  he  should  have  an  opportunity  '  to 


1788.]  JOURNAL    OF    CONVENTION.  73 

that  the  Convention  take  the  whole  Constitution  into  consider- 
ation and  mature  deliberation. 

A  motion  was  made  and  seconded,  that  the  consideration  of 
the  said  motion  be  referred  to  to-morrow  morning,  10  o'clock, 
and  the  question  of  reference  being  put,  passed  in  the  negative. 


throw  light  *  in  their  path  ?  Mr.  E.  Gerry  well  knew  that  no  question  was  to 
be  taken  upon  separate  paragraphs,  had  he  been  capable  of  a  moment's  reflec- 
tion ;  therefore,  he  must  have  seen  that  by  waiting  until  the  irritation  of  his 
spirits  had  subsided,  even  to  the  next  week,  he  would  not  have  lost  an  oppor- 
tunity to  have  done  his  utmost  to  rescue  '  the  liberties  of  America  from  destruc- 
tion,' of  which  he  seems  to  conceive  himself  to  be  the  great  champion.  But 
so  it  was,  friend  Russell,  Mr.  E.  Gerry  could  not  rest  quiet  a  moment  under 
such  atrocious  imputations  as  his  honorable  colleague  had  cast  upon  him. 

Thus  matters  stood,  when  the  honorable  gentleman  with  whose  name  and 
character  Mr.  E.  Gerry  has  taken  such  indecent  liberties,  and  who  had  but 
just  before  come  into  the  house,  rose,  and  asked  the  President,  whether  there 
was  any  question  in  writing  laid  on  the  table  for  that  gentleman  to  answer ; 
being  told  that  there  was  not,  he  added,  that  it  seemed  to  be  the  sense  of  the 
house  that  the  question  should  be  reduced  to  writing,  and  the  answer  also. 
This  idea  was  questioned  by  some,  and  a  debate  ensued.  The  same  gentleman 
arose  again,  and  said,  he  did  not  wish  to  exclude  light  from  the  house  by  his 
inquiry,  but  that  it  ought  to  come  in  an  orderly  manner  :  the  reason  why  he 
supposed  it  to  be  the  sense  of  the  house,  that  both  question  and  answer  should 
be  in  writing,  was,  that  the  day  before,  one,  and  the  first,  too,  was  proposed  to 
that  gentleman  verbally ;  it  was  so  done,  and  the  answer  also.  Further,  that 
the  honorable  gentleman  had  applied  to  him  the  evening  before,  and  proposed 
that  every  question  to  be  asked  him,  should  be  reduced  to  writing  and  laid  on 
the  table,  that  he  might  consider  them  deliberately,  and  give  his  answer  in 
writing  also ;  that  he  then  told  the  gentleman  he  approved  of  his  proposal,  as 
well  for  the  sake  of  preventing  unnecessary  discussion  in  the  house,  as  a  mis- 
representation to  his  disadvantage.  That  for  these  reasons,  he  had  been 
induced  to  make  the  inquiry.  A  motion  was  then  made  by  Mr.  Wedgery,  that 
the  house  should  depart  from  their  vote,  and  leave  the  honorable  gentleman 
(Mr.  Gerry)  at  full  liberty  to  give  his  reasons  at  large,  respecting  the  Consti- 
tution, without  waiting  for  any  question  whatever  to  be  put  to  him.  This 
changed  the  nature  of  the  debate,  and  brought  up  a  gentleman  from  Newbury 
Port,  who  said  to  this  effect :  If  this  house  should  signify  their  wishes  to  have 
the  honorable  gentleman  admitted  to  enter  fully  into  their  debates,  as  a  mem- 
ber of  it,  he  was  so  far  from  wishing  to  exclude  any  light  from  this  house,  that 
he  would  not  oppose  it,  but  would  acquiesce  in  their  decision,  however  humil- 
iating and  mortifying  it  might  be  to  him.  Hereupon  the  subject  of  debate  was 
again  changed,  by  a  motion  from  another  part  of  the  house,  by  Gen.  Thomp- 
son, that  the  honorable  gentleman  should  be  admitted  into  the  debates,  as  a 
member  of  it.  This  made  the  debate  still  more  serious,  when  the  honorable 
10 


74  JOURNAL    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

A  motion  was  made  and  seconded,  that  the  Convention  adjourn 
till  to-morrow  morning,  10  o'clock,  and  the  question  of  adjourn- 
ment being  put,  passed  in  the  negative.     The  first  motion  was 
then  withdrawn  by  the  leave  of  the  Convention. 
Adjourned  to  Thursday  morning,  9  o'clock. 

member  from  Dracut,  arose,  and  said,  that  he  considered  this  a  violation  of  the 
right  of  election  of  the  inhabitants  of  Cambridge,  (the  residence  of  the  letter- 
writer,)  who  had  not  thought  fit  to  send  him  as  their  delegate — they  certainly 
well  knew,  he  said,  the  gentleman's  sentiments  upon  the  subject,  and  they  had 
chosen  others  to  represent  them — this  motion  would  make  him  a  member  of 
the  house,  to  every  purpose  but  that  of  voting.  He  said  he  was  therefore 
against  it.  The  gentleman  who  is  the  principal  subject  of  Mr.  E.  Gerry's  let- 
ter, said  :  To  admit  the  honorable  gentlemen,  agreeably  to  this  motion,  would 
be  going  further  under  the  idea  of  obtaining  light,  than  this  house  had  a  right 
to  go.  To-day,  one  gentleman  would  wish  to  introduce  his  friend  in  support  of 
his  own  sentiments,  and  to-morrow,  a  member  of  opposite  sentiments  would 
expect  the  same  indulgence,  with  the  same  view,  for  his  friend ;  and  thus,  in- 
stead of  our  being  the  representatives  of  the  people,  we  should  convert  our- 
selves, in  effect,  into  electors  of  their  representatives.  The  motion  was  then 
called  for  in  writing.  Mr.  Wedgery  reduced  it  into  writing,  to  the  following 
effect :  '  That  the  honorable  gentleman  should  have  liberty  to  give  any  infor- 
mation to  the  house  he  should  have  to  communicate,  respecting  the  passing  of 
the  Constitution,'  or,  (for  I  am  not  certain  which,)  '  respecting  the  subject  in 
debate.'  The  Hon.  Gen.  Brooks,  of  Lincoln,  then  observed,  the  motion  was 
ambiguous — the  word  information,  might  mean  either  information  in  matters  of 
fact,  or  information  resulting  from  reasoning  upon  facts.  He  wished,  there- 
fore, to  be  informed  which  was  the  gentleman's  meaning.  Mr.  Wedgery  cried 
out,  '  both.'  The  debates  were  then  continued  on  this  explanation,  until  an 
adjournment  was  called  for,  which  took  place,  without  any  decision  of  the 
house  upon  the  foregoing  matters. 

Thus  have  I  gone  through  a  state  of  facts  relative  to  the  transaction 
alluded  to  in  Mr.  E.  Gerry's  letter,  and  which  is  all  the  foundation  he 
could  have  had  in  support  of  the  very  bitter  and  indelicate  assertions  or 
charges  against  the  Hon.  Judge  Dana.  Nothing  more  personal,  that  I 
recollect,  fell  from  that  gentleman,  than  is  mentioned.  The  only  cause  of 
offence  against  him,  seems  to  be,  that  his  first  inquiry  led  on  to  all  the 
debates  which  ensued,  for  which  he  cannot  justly  be  made  responsible.  His 
motion,  or  inquiry,  was  as  certainly  in  order,  as  Mr.  E.  Gerry's  conduct  was 
out  of  order  and  improper.  He  must  therefore  thank  himself  for  all  the  con- 
sequences of  it.  If  his  '  situation  was  not  eligible,'  or  his  '  condition  was 
humiliating,'  he  had  consented  to  be  placed  there  ;  and  had  he  kept  up  to  the 
terms  of  his  invitation,  nothing  of  the  sort  which  did  happen,  could  have  hap- 
pened, to  mortify  his  feelings. 

The  gentleman  conceives  that  he  was  denied  ' leave  to  speak'  and  even  '  to 


1788.]  JOURNAL   OF    CONVENTION.  75 


Thursday,  January  24, 1788. 

Met  according  to  adjournment. 

A  motion  was  made  and  seconded,  that  the  vote  for  consider- 
ing the  new  Constitution  by  paragraphs,  be  reconsidered,  and 
that  the  Convention  take  the  whole  Constitution  into  consider- 
ation and  mature  deliberation,  and  the  question  being  put, 
passed  in  the  negative. 

The  Convention  proceeded  in  the  consideration  of  the  Con- 
stitution or  Frame  of  Government  reported  by  the  Convention 
held  at  Philadelphia,  and  after  debate  thereon,  postponed  the 
further  consideration  of  the  same  to  the  afternoon. 

Adjourned  to  3  o'clock,  P.  M. 

address  a  letter  merely  for  the  purpose  of  setting  a  matter  right,  which,  in  the 
progress  of  debates,  had,  by  an  erroneous  statement,  tended  to  his  injury.' 
Was  this  the  case  ?  How  easy  would  it  have  been  for  him  to  have  desired 
leave  to  set  his  honorable  colleague  right  in  point  of  fact,  and  to  have  done  it 
instantaneously.  Surely  no  member  would  have  opposed  so  reasonable  a  re- 
quest. But,  instead  of  this,  the  gentleman  rose  only  to  request  the  President 
to  inform  the  house  '  he  was  preparing  a  letter  to  throw  light  on  the  subject ' 
generally ;  and  not  with  any  design  to  clear  himself  from  any  imputations 
which  he  had  conceived  affected  his  character.  If,  therefore,  '  he  was  misun- 
derstood by  the  Hon.  Judge  Dana,'  as  he  says  '  he  soon  perceived  he  was,' 
ought  not  Mr.  Gerry  to  have  reflected  that  he  himself  had  led  that  gentleman 
into  the  error  (if  any  there  was)  of  suggesting  '  that  he  was  entering  into  their 
debates.'  In  short,  it  is  questionable,  in  any  view  of  this  matter,  whether  Mr. 
E.  *Gerry  can  justify  the  indecent,  illiberal  treatment  of  that  gentleman,  he  has 
so  acrimoniously  dealt  out  in  his  letter ;  apparently  written  before  he  had  given 
time  for  his  passions  to  subside,  and  his  reason  to  dictate  his  pen.  Besides,  if 
his  charges  were  in  fact  true,  does  it  not  follow  that  the  honorable  Convention 
themselves  must  bear  their  portion  of  them,  for  permitting  one  of  their  mem- 
bers to  persist  (according  to  his  representation)  in  a  course  of  conduct  disor- 
derly in  the  extreme.  Certainly,  every  one  will  suppose,  had  they  viewed  it 
in  that  light,  they  would  soon  have  reminded  that  gentleman  of  his  duty,  and 
set  him  down  in  his  turn.  But  I  believe  no  member  of  the  house  thought 
Judge  Dana's  conduct  in  the  least  disorderly  or  reprehensible.  If  it  had  been, 
Mr.  Gerry  not  being  destitute  of  friends  in  that  house,  some  of  them  would 
have  been  ready  enough  to  have  called  Judge  Dana  to  order,  and  have  given 
Mr.  Gerry  complete  protection  from  the  abuse  of  any  man. 

A  Spectator. 
Boston,  Jan.  29,  1788."] 


76  JOURNAL   OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 


AFTERNOON. 

Met  according  to  adjournment. 

The  Convention  proceeded  in  the  consideration  of  the  Con- 
stitution or  Frame  of  Government  reported  by  the  Convention 
held  at  Philadelphia,  and,  after  debate  thereon,  postponed  the 
further  consideration  of  the  same  to  the  morning. 

Adjourned  to  Friday  morning,  10  o'clock. 


Friday,  January  25,  1788. 

Met  according  to  adjournment. 

The  Convention  proceeded  in  the  consideration  of  the  Con- 
stitution or  Frame  of  Government  reported  by  the  Convention 
held  at  Philadelphia,  and,  after  debate  thereon,  postponed  the 
further  consideration  of  the  same  to  the  afternoon. 

Adjourned  to  3  o'clock,  P.  M. 

AFTERNOON. 

Met  according  to  adjournment. 

The  Convention  proceeded  in  the  consideration  of  the  Con- 
stitution or  Frame  of  Government  reported  by  the  Convention 
held  at  Philadelphia,  and,  after  debate  thereon,  postponed  the 
further  consideration  of  the  same  to  the  morning. 

Adjourned  to  Saturday  morning,  10  o'clock. 


Saturday,  January  26, 1788. 

Met  according  to  adjournment. 

The  Convention  proceeded  in  the  consideration  of  the  Con- 
stitution or  Frame  of  Government  reported  by  the  Convention 
held  at  Philadelphia,  and,  after  debate  thereon,  postponed 
the  further  consideration  of  the  same  to  Monday  morning. 

Adjourned  to  Monday  morning,  10  o'clock. 


1788.]  JOURNAL    OF    CONVENTION.  77 

Monday,  January  28, 1788. 

Met  according  to  adjournment. 

The  Convention  proceeded  in  the  consideration  of  the  Con- 
stitution or  Frame  of  Government,  reported  by  the  Convention 
held  at  Philadelphia,  and,  after  debate  thereon,  postponed  the 
further  consideration  of  the  same  to  the  afternoon. 

Adjourned  to  3  o'clock,  P.  M. 

AFTERNOON. 

Met  according  to  adjournment. 

The  Convention  proceeded  in  the  consideration  of  the  Con- 
stitution or  Frame  of  Government  reported  by  the  Convention 
held  at  Philadelphia,  and,  after  debate,  postponed  the  further 
consideration  thereof  to  the  morning. 

Adjourned  to  Tuesday  morning,  10  o'clock. 


Tuesday,  January  29,  1788. 

Met  according  to  adjournment. 

The  Convention  proceeded  in  the  consideration  .of  the  Con- 
stitution or  Frame  of  Government  reported  by  the  Convention 
held  at  Philadelphia,  and,  after  debate  thereon,  postponed 
the  further  consideration  of  the  same  to  the  afternoon. 


AFTERNOON. 

Met  according  to  adjournment. 

The  Convention  proceeded  in  the  consideration  of  the  Con- 
stitution or  Frame  of  Government  reported  by  the  Convention 
held  at  Philadelphia,  and,  after  debate  thereon,  postponed 
the  further  consideration  of  the  same  to  the  morning. 

Adjourned  to  Wednesday  morning,  10  o'clock. 


78  JOURNAL    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 


Wednesday,  January  30, 1788. 

Met  according  to  adjournment. 

The  Convention  proceeded  in  the  consideration  of  the  Con- 
stitution or  Frame  of  Government  reported  by  the  Convention 
held  at  Philadelphia,  and,  after  debate,  postponed  the  further 
consideration  of  the  same  to  the  afternoon. 

Adjourned  to  3  o'clock,  P.  M. 


AFTERNOON. 

Met  according  to  adjournment. 

The  Convention  proceeded  in  the  consideration  of  the  Con- 
stitution or  Frame  of  Government  reported  by  the  Convention 
held  at  Philadelphia,  and,  after  debate,  postponed  the  further 
consideration  thereof  to  the  morning. 

Adjourned  to  Thursday  morning,  10  o'clock. 


Thursday,  January  31, 1788. 

Met  according  to  adjournment. 

The  Convention  proceeded  in  the  consideration  of  the  Con- 
stitution or  Frame  of  Government  reported  by  the  Convention 
held  at  Philadelphia,  and,  having  debated  upon  all  the  para- 
graphs thereof,  a  motion  was  made  and  seconded,  that  this  Con- 
vention assent  to  and  ratify  the  Constitution  agreed  upon  by 
the  Convention  of  Delegates  from  the  United  States,  at  Phil- 
adelphia, on  the  17th  day  of  September,  1787,  and,  after  debate 
on  the  said  motion, 

Adjourned  to  3  o'clock,  P.  M. 


AFTERNOON. 

Met  according  to  adjournment. 

Ordered,  That  the  Committee  on  the  Pay  Roll  make  the  same 
up  including  Tuesday  next. 

The  Convention  proceeded  in  the  consideration  of  the  motion 


1788.]  JOURNAL   OF    CONVENTION.  79 

that  this  Convention  do  assent  to  and  ratify  the  Constitution 
agreed  upon  by  the  Convention  of  Delegates  from  the  United 
States,  at  Philadelphia,  on  the  17th  day  of  September,  1787. 

The  following  was  proposed  to  the  Convention  by  his  Excel- 
lency the  President,  viz. : — 


COMMONWEALTH   OF  MASSACHUSETTS. 

In  Convention  of  the  Delegates  of  the  People  of  the  Common- 
wealth of  Massachusetts,  1788  : — 

The  Convention  having  impartially  discussed  and  fully  con- 
sidered the  Constitution  for  the  United  States  of  America, 
reported  to  Congress  by  the  Convention  of  Delegates  from  the 
United  States  of  America,  and  submitted  to  us  by  a  Resolution 
of  the  General  Court  of  the  said  Commonwealth,  passed  the 
twenty-fifth  day  of  October  last  past ;  and  acknowledging,  with 
grateful  hearts,  the  goodness  of  the  Supreme  Ruler  of  the  Uni- 
verse, in  affording  the  people  of  the  United  States,  in  the  course 
of  his  providence,  an  opportunity,  deliberately  and  peaceably, 
without  fraud  or  surprise,  of  entering  into  an  explicit  and  sol- 
emn compact  with  each  other,  by  assenting  to  and  ratifying  a 
new  constitution,  in  order  to  form  a  more  perfect  union,  estab- 
lish justice,  insure  domestic  tranquillity,  provide  for  the  com- 
mon defence,  promote  the  general  welfare,  and  secure  the  bles- 
sings of  liberty  to  themselves  and  their  posterity  ;  do,  in  the 
name,  and  in  behalf  of  the  people  of  the  Commonwealth  of 
Massachusetts,  assent  to  and  ratify  the  said  Constitution  for 
the  United  States  of  America. 

And  as  it  is  the  opinion  of  this  Convention  that  certain 
amendments  and  alterations  in  the  said  Constitution  would 
remove  the  fears  and  quiet  the  apprehensions  of  many  of  the 
good  people  of  this  Commonwealth,  and  more  effectually  guard 
against  an  undue  administration  of  the  federal  government ; 
the  Convention  do  therefore  recommend  that  the  following 
alterations  and  provisions  be  introduced  into  the  said  Constitu- 
tion : — 

First.  That  it  be  explicitly  declared  that  all  powers  not 
expressly  delegated  to  Congress,  are  reserved  to  the  several 
States,  to  be  by  them  exercised. 


80  JOURNAL    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

Secondly.  That  there  shall  be  one  representative  to  every 
thirty  thousand  persons,  until  the  whole  number  of  representa- 
tive's amount  to . 

Thirdly.  That  Congress  do  not  exercise  the  powers  vested  in 
them  by  the  fourth  section  of  the  first  article,  but  in  cases  where 
a  State  shall  neglect  or  refuse  to  make  adequate  provision  for 
an  equal  representation  of  the  people,  agreeably  to  this  Consti- 
tution. 

Fourthly.  That  Congress  do  not  lay  direct  taxes,  but  when 
the  moneys  arising  from  the  impost  and  excise  are  insufficient 
for  the  public  exigencies. 

Fifthly.  That  Congress  erect  no  company  of  merchants  with 
exclusive  advantages  of  commerce. 

Sixthly.  That  no  person  shall  be  tried  for  any  crime,  by 
which  he  may  incur  an  infamous  punishment,  or  loss  of  life, 
until  he  be  first  indicted  by  a  grand  jury,  except  in  such  cases 
as  may  arise  in  the  government  and  regulation  of  the  land  and 
naval  forces. 

Seventhly.  The  Supreme  Judicial  Federal  Court  shall  have 
no  jurisdiction  of  causes  between  citizens  of  different  States, 

unless  the  matter  in  dispute  be  of  the  value  of dollars, 

at  the  least. 

Eighthly.  In  civil  actions  between  citizens  of  different  States, 
every  issue  of  fact  arising  in  actions  at  common  law,  shall  be 
tried  by  a  jury,  if  the  parties,  or  either  of  them,  request  it. 

Ninthly.  That  the  words,  "  without  the  consent  of  the  Con- 
gress," in  the  last  paragraph  of  the  ninth  section  of  the  first 
article,  be  stricken  out. 

And  the  Convention  do,  in  the  name  and  in  behalf  of  the 
people  of  this  Commonwealth,  enjoin  it  upon  their  Representa- 
tives in  Congress,  at  all  times,  until  the  alterations  and  provis- 
ions aforesaid  have  been  considered,  agreeably  to  the  fifth  article 
of  the  said  Constitution,  to  exert  all  their  influence,  and  use 
all  reasonable  and  legal  methods  to  obtain  a  ratification  of  the 
said  alterations  and  provisions,  in  such  manner  as  is  provided 
in  the  said  article. 

And  that  the  United  States,  in  Congress  assembled,  may  have 
due  notice  of  the  assent  and  ratification  of  the  said  Constitu- 
tion, by  this  Convention,  it  is 


1788.]  JOURNAL    OF    CONVENTION.  81 

Resolved,  That  the  assent  and  ratification  aforesaid  be 
engrossed  on  parchment,  together  with  the  recommendation  and 
injunction  aforesaid,  and  with  this  Resolution,  and  that  his 
Excellency  John  Hancock,  Esquire,  President,  and  the  Honor- 
able William  Cushing,  Esquire,  Vice-President  of  this  Conven- 
tion, transmit  the  same,  countersigned  by  the  Secretary  of  the 
Convention,  under  their  hands  and  seals,  to  the  United  States, 
in  Congress  assembled. 

After  debate, 

Adjourned  to  Friday  morning,  10  o'clock. 


Friday,  February  1, 1788. 

Met  according  to  adjournment. 

The  Convention  proceeded  in  the  consideration  of  the  motion 
that  this  Convention  do  assent  to  and  ratify  the  Constitution 
agreed  upon  by  the  Convention  of  Delegates  from  the  United 
States,  at  Philadelphia,  on  the  17th  day  of  September,  1787, 
and  of  the  propositions  made  by  his  Excellency  the  President 
yesterday. 

Adjourned  to  3  o'clock,  P.  M. 

AFTERNOON. 

Met  according  to  adjournment. 

On  motion, 

Voted,  That  the  decision  with  respect  to  the  final  adoption 
or  rejection  of  the  proposed  Federal  Constitution  be  not  taken 
before  Tuesday  next. 

Mr.  Varnum  had  leave  of  absence  till  Tuesday  next. 

The  Convention  proceeded  in  the  consideration  of  the  motion 
that  this  Convention  assent  to  and  ratify  the  Constitution 
agreed  upon  by  the  Convention  of  Delegates  from  the  United 
States,  at  Philadelphia,  on  the  17th  day  of  September,  1787, 
and  of  the  propositions  made  by  his  Excellency  the  President, 
yesterday. 

Adjourned  to  Saturday  morning,  10  o'clock. 
11 


82  JOURNAL    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

Saturday,  February  2, 1788. 

Met  according  to  adjournment. 

The  Convention  proceeded  in  the  consideration  of  the  motion 
that  this  Convention  do  assent  to  and  ratify  the  Constitution 
agreed  upon  by  the  Convention  of  Delegates  from  the  United 
States,  at  Philadelphia,  on  the  17th  day  of  September,  1787, 
and  of  the  propositions  made  by  his  Excellency  the  President, 
the  31st  ultimo.     After  debate, 

Voted,  That  a  Committee,  consisting  of  members  from  each 
county,  be  appointed  to  take  into  consideration  the  subject  of 
the  propositions  of  his  Excellency  the  President,  of  the  31st 
ultimo,  at  large,  and  report. 

The  following  gentlemen  were  then  appointed  on  the  said 
committee,  viz. : — 

Hon.  Mr.  Bowdoin,  Mr.  Southworth,  Mr.  Parsons,  Hon. 
Mr.  Hutchinson,  Hon.  Mr.  Dana,  Mr.  Winn,  Hon.  Mr.  Strong, 
Mr.  Bodman,  Hon.  Mr.  Turner,  Mr.  Thomas,  of  Plymouth, 
Dr.  Smith,  Mr.  Bourn,  Hon.  Mr.  Spooner,  Mr.  Bishop,  Rev. 
Dr.  Hemmenway,  Mr.  Barrell,  Mr.  Mayhew,  Hon.  Mr.  Taylor, 
Hon.  Mr.  Sprague,  Mr.  Fox,  Mr.  Longfellow,  Mr.  Sewall,  Mr. 
Sylvester,  Mr.  Lusk,  Hon.  Mr.  Sedgwick. 

Adjourned  to  Monday  next.  3  o'clock,  P.  M. 


Monday,  February  4,  1788. 

Met  according  to  adjournment. 

The  Committee  appointed  on  the  subject  of  the  propositions 
of  his  Excellency  the  President,  on  Saturday  last,  reported  as 
follows,  viz. : — 

The  Committee  appointed  by  the  Convention  to  take  into 
consideration  the  subject  of  the  propositions  of  his  Excellency 
the  President,  of  the  31st  ultimo,  at  large,  and  report,  beg  leave 
to  report  the  alterations  hereafter  mentioned,  to  the  said  propo- 
sitions, and  that  the  whole  of  the  said  propositions,  so  altered, 
be  accepted  and  passed  by  the  Convention,  viz. : — 


1788.]  JOURNAL    OF    CONVENTION.  83 

COMMONWEALTH   OF  MASSACHUSETTS. 

In  Convention  of  the  Delegates  of  the  People  of  the  Common- 
wealth of  Massachusetts,  1788  : — 

The  Convention  having  impartially  discussed  and  fully  con- 
sidered the  Constitution  for  the  United  States  of  America, 
reported  to  Congress  by  the  Convention  of  Delegates  from  the 
United  States  of  America,  and  submitted  to  us  by  a  Resolution 
of  the  General  Court  of  the  said  Commonwealth,  passed  the 
twenty-fifth  day  of  October  last  past ;  and  acknowledging  with 
grateful  hearts  the  goodness  of  the  Supreme  Ruler  of  the  Uni- 
verse, in  affording  the  people  of  the  United  States,  in  the  course 
of  his  providence,  an  opportunity,  deliberately  and  peaceably, 
without  fraud  or  surprise,  of  entering  into  an  explicit  and  sol- 
emn compact  with  each  other,  by  assenting  to  and  ratifying  a 
new  Constitution,  in  order  to  form  a  more  perfect  union,  estab- 
lish justice,  insure  domestic  tranquillity,  provide  for  the  com- 
mon defence,  promote  the  general  welfare,  and  secure  the  bles- 
sings of  liberty  to  themselves  and  their  posterity  ;  do,  in  the 
name  and  in  behalf  of  the  people  of  the  Commonwealth  of 
Massachusetts,  assent  to  and  ratify  the  said  Constitution  for 
the  United  States  of  America. 

And  as  it  is  the  opinion  of  this  Convention,  that  certain 
amendments  and  alterations  in  the  said  Constitution  would  re- 
move the  fears  and  quiet  the  apprehensions  of  many  of  the 
good  people  of  this  Commonwealth,  and  more  effectually  guard 
against  an  undue  administration  of  the  federal  government,  the 
Convention  do  therefore  recommend  that  the  following  altera- 
tions and  provisions  be  introduced  into  the  said  Constitution. 

First.  That  it  be  explicitly  declared,  that  all  powers  not 
expressly  delegated  by  the  aforesaid  Constitution,  are  reserved 
to  the  several  States,  to  be  by  them  exercised. 

Secondly.  That  there  shall  be  one  representative  to  evety 
thirty  thousand  persons,  according  to  the  census  mentioned  in 
the  Constitution,  until  the  whole  number  of  representatives 
amounts  to  two  hundred. 

Thirdly.  That  Congress  do  not  exercise  the  power  vested  in 
them  by  the  fourth  section  of  the  first  article,  but  in  cases  when 
a  State  shall  neglect  or  refuse  to  make  the  regulations  therein 


84  JOURNAL    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

mentioned,  or  shall  make  regulations  subversive  of  the  rights 
of  the  people  to  a  free  and  equal  representation  in  Congress, 
agreeably  to  the  Constitution. 

Fourthly.  That  Congress  do  not  lay  direct  taxes  but  when 
the  moneys  arising  from  the  impost  and  excise  are  insufficient 
for  the  public  exigencies,  nor  then,  until  Congress  shall  have 
first  made  a  requisition  upon  the  States,  to  assess,  levy  and  pay 
their  respective  proportions  of  such  requisition,  agreeably  to 
the  census  jixed  in  the  said  constitution,  in  such  way  and  man- 
ner as  the  legislatures  of  the  States  shall  think  best ;  and,  in 
such  case,  if  any  State  shall  neglect  or  refuse  to  pay  its  propor- 
tion, pursuant  to  such  requisition,  then  Congress  may  assess 
and  levy  such  State's  proportion,  together  with  interest  thereon, 
at  the  rate  of  six  per  cent,  per  annum,  from  the  time  of  pay- 
ment prescribed  in  such  requisition. 

Fifthly.  That  Congress  erect  no  company  with  exclusive 
advantages  of  commerce. 

Sixthly.  That  no  person  shall  be  tried  for  any  crime,  by 
which  he  may  incur  an  infamous  punishment,  or  loss  of  life, 
until  he  be  first  indicted  by  a  grand  jury,  except  in  such  cases 
as  may  arise  in  the  government  and  regulation  of  the  land  and 
naval  forces. 

Seventhly.  The  supreme  judicial  federal  court  shall  have  no 
jurisdiction  of  causes  between  citizens  of  different  States,  unless 
the  matter  in  dispute,  whether  it  concern  the  realty  or  person- 
alty, be  of  the  value  of  three  thousand  dollars,  at  the  least ; 
nor  shall  the  federal  judicial  powers  extend  to  any  actions  be- 
tween citizens  of  different  States,  where  the  matter  in  dispute, 
whether  it  concerns  the  realty  or  personalty,  is  not  of  the  value 
of  fifteen  hundred  dollars,  at  the  least. 

Eighthly.  In  civil  actions  between  citizens  of  different  States, 
every  issue  of  fact  arising  in  actions  at  common  law,  shall  be 
tried  by  a  jury,  if  the  parties,  or  either  of  them,  request  it. 

Ninthly.  Congress  shall  at  no  time  consent  that  any  person 
holding  an  office  of  trust  or  profit  under  the  United  States, 
shall  accept  of  a  title  of  nobility,  or  any  other  title  or  office, 
from  any  king,  prince,  or  foreign  state. 

And  the  Convention  do,  in  the  name  and  in  behalf  of  the 
people  of  this  Commonwealth,  enjoin  it  upon  their  representa- 


1788.]  JOURNAL   OF    CONVENTION.  85 

tives  in  Congress,  at  all  times,  until  the  alterations  and  provis- 
ions aforesaid  have  been  considered,  agreeably  to  the  fifth  article 
of  the  said  Constitution ;  to  exert  all  their  influence,  and  use 
all  reasonable  and  legal  methods  to  obtain  a  ratification  of  the 
said  alterations  and  provisions,  in  such  manner  as  is  provided 
in  the  said  article. 

And  that  the  United  States,  in  Congress  assembled,  may  have 
due  notice  of  the  assent  and  ratification  of  the  said  constitution, 
by  this  Convention,  it  is 

Resolved,  That  the  assent  and  ratification  aforesaid  be  en- 
grossed on  parchment,  together  with  the  recommendation  and 
injunction  aforesaid,  and  with  this  Kesolution ;  and  that  his 
Excellency  John  Hancock,  Esquire,  President,  and  the  Honor- 
able William  Cushing,  Esquire,  Vice-President  of  this  Conven- 
tion, transmit  the  same,  countersigned  by  the  Secretary  of  the 
Convention,  under  their  hands  and  seals,  to  the  United  States, 
in  Congress  assembled. 

Adjourned  to  Tuesday  morning,  10  o'clock. 


Tuesday,  February  5, 1788. 

Met  according  to  adjournment. 

The  report  of  the  Committee  on  the  propositions  of  his  Ex- 
cellency the  President,  of  the  31st  ultimo,  read  again.  It  was 
then  moved  and  seconded, 

That  to-morrow,  11  o'clock,  A.  M.,  be  assigned  to  take  the 
question,  by  yeas  and  nays,  whether  the  Convention  will  accept 
of  the  said  report. 

A  motion  was  then  made  and  seconded,  that,  for  the  purpose 
of  informing  the  good  people  of  this  Commonwealth  of  the 
principles  of  the  proposed  Federal  Constitution,  and  the  amend- 
ments offered  by  his  Excellency  the  President,  and  reported  by 
the  Committee,  and  of  uniting  their  opinions  respecting  the 
same,  this  Convention  do  adjourn  to  a  future  day.  After 
debate, 

Adjourned  to  3  o'clock,  P.  M. 


86  JOURNAL    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 


AFTERNOON. 

Met  according  to  adjournment. 

The  Convention  proceeded  in  the  consideration  of  the  motion, 
that,  for  the  purpose  of  informing  the  good  people  of  this  Com- 
monwealth of  the  principles  of  the  proposed  Federal  Constitu- 
tion, and  the  amendments  offered  by  his  Excellency  the  Presi- 
dent, and  reported  by  the  Committee,  and  of  uniting  their 
opinions  respecting  the  same,  this  Convention  do  adjourn  to  a 
future  day,  and,  after  debate,  the  question  being  put,  was  deter- 
mined in  the  negative,  329  members  being  present,  and  115 
only  voting  in  the  affirmative. 

Adjourned  to  Wednesday  morning,  10  o'clock. 


Wednesday,  February  6, 1788. 

Met  according  to  adjournment. 

The  Convention  proceeded  in  the  consideration  of  the  motion 
that  to-morrow,  11  o'clock,  A.  M.,  be  assigned  to  take  the  ques- 
tion, by  yeas  and  nays,  whether  this  Convention  will  accept  of 
the  report  of  the  Committee  made  on  Monday  last ;  and,  the 
question  being  put,  passed  in  the  negative. 

It  was  then  voted  that  4  o'clock,  P.  M.,  be  assigned  for  that 
purpose. 

A  motion  was  made  and  seconded,  that  the  report  of  the 
Committee  made  on  Monday  last,  be  amended,  so  far  as  to  add 
the  following  to  the  first  article  therein  mentioned,  viz. :  "  And 
that  the  said  Constitution  be  never  construed  to  authorize  Con- 
gress to  infringe  the  just  liberty  of  the  press,  or  the  rights  of 
conscience  ;  or  to  prevent  the  people  of  the  United  States,  who 
are  peaceable  citizens,  from  keeping  their  own  arms  ;  or  to  raise 
standing  armies,  unless  when  necessary  for  the  defence  of  the 
United  States,  or  of  some  one  or  more  of  them ;  or  to  prevent 
the  people  from  petitioning,  in  a  peaceable  and  orderly  manner, 
the  federal  legislature,  for  a  redress  of  grievances  ;  or  to  sub- 
ject the  people  to  unreasonable  searches  and  seizures  of  their 


1788.] 


JOURNAL    OF    CONVENTION. 


87 


persons,  papers  or  possessions, 
was  determined  in  the  negative. 
Adjourned  to  3  o'clock,  P.  M. 


And  the  question  being  put, 


AFTERNOON. 

Met  according  to  adjournment. 

The  Convention  proceeded  to  the  consideration  of  the  report 
of  the  Committee  on  the  subject  of  the  propositions  of  his 
Excellency  the  President,  of  the  31st  ultimo,  made  on  Monday 
last,  and  the  question,  whether  this  Convention  will  accept  of 
the  said  report,  being  put,  was  determined  by  yeas  and  nays, 
as  follows,  viz.  : — 


YEAS. 


His  Excellency  John  Hancock, 

Esq. 
Hon.  James  Bowdoin,  Esq. 
Hon.  Samuel  Adams,  Esq. 
Hon.  William  Phillips,  Esq. 
Hon.  Caleb  Davis,  Esq. 
Charles  Jarvis,  Esq. 
John  Coffin  Jones,  Esq. 
John  Winthrop,  Esq. 
Thomas  Dawes,  Jr.,  Esq. 
Rev.  Samuel  Stillman. 
Thomas  Russell,  Esq. 
Christopher  Gore,  Esq. 
Hon.  William  Heath,  Esq. 
Hon.  Increase  Sumner,  Esq. 
James  Bowdoin,  Jr.,  Esq. 
Ebenezer  Wales,  Esq. 
Rev.  Nathaniel  Robbins. 
Hon.  Richard  Cranch,  Esq. 
Rev.  Anthony  Wibird. 
Hon.  Cotton  Tufts,  Esq. 
Hon.  Benjamin  Lincoln,  Esq. 
Rev.  Daniel  Shute. 
Rev.  Joseph  Jackson. 


Rev.  Thomas  Thacher. 

Fisher  Ames,  Esq. 

Col.  William  Mcintosh. 

Capt.  John  Baxter,  Jr. 

Hon.  Elijah  Dunbar,  Esq. 

Mr.  Thomas  Mann. 

Mr.  George  Payson. 

Hon.  Jabez  Fisher,  Esq. 

Mr.  Thomas  Jones. 

Rev.  Phillips  Payson. 

Mr.  Ebenezer  Warren. 

Richard  Manning,  Esq. 

Edward  Pulling,  Esq. 

Mr.  William  Gray,  Jr. 

Mr.  Francis  Cabot. 

Hon.  Michael  Farley,  Esq. 

John  Choate,  Esq. 

Daniel  Noyes,  Esq. 

Col.  Jonathan  Cogswell. 

Hon.  Tristram  Dalton,  Esq. 

Enoch  Sawyer,  Esq. 

Ebenezer  March,  Esq. 

Hon.  Rufus  King,  Esq. 

Hon.  Benjamin  Greenleaf,  Esq. 


88 


JOURNAL    OF    CONVENTION. 


[1788. 


Theophilus  Parsons,  Esq. 
Hon.  Jonathan  Titcomb,  Esq. 
Hon.  George  Cabot,  Esq. 
Mr.  Joseph  Wood. 
Capt.  Israel  Thorndike. 
Isaac  Mansfield,  Esq. 
Jonathan  Glover,  Esq. 
Hon.  Azor  Orne,  Esq. 
John  Glover,  Esq. 
Daniel  Rogers,  Esq. 
John  Low,  Esq. 
Capt.  William  Pearson. 
John  Carnes,  Esq. 
Capt.  John  Burnham. 
Mr.  William  Symmes,  Jr. 
Bailey  Bartlett,  Esq. 
Capt.  Nathaniel  Marsh. 
Mr.  Israel  Clark. 
Dr.  Samuel  Nye. 
Mr.  Enoch  Jackman. 
Capt.  Benjamin  Lurvey. 
Mr.  Willis  Patten. 
Daniel  Thurston,  Esq. 
Mr.  Jacob  Herrick. 
Mr.  Simeon  Miller. 
Hon.  Francis  Dana,  Esq. 
Stephen  Dana,  Esq. 
Hon.  Nathaniel  Gorham,  Esq. 
Hon.  Joseph  Hosmer,  Esq. 
Hon.  Abraham  Fuller,  Esq. 
Capt.  Lawson  Buckminster. 
Benjamin  Brown,  Esq. 
Daniel  Whitney,  Esq. 
Capt.  Asahel  Wheeler. 
Capt.  Benjamin  Blaney. 
Capt.  Abraham  Bigelow, 
Maj.  Gen.  John  Brooks. 
Dr.  Charles  Whitman. 
Leonard  Williams,  Esq. 


Hon.  Joseph  Bradley  Varnum, 

Esq. 
Hon.  John  Pitts,  Esq. 
Hon.  Eleazer  Brooks,  Esq. 
William  Pynchon,  Esq. 
Hon.  Caleb  Strong,  Esq. 
Mr.  Benjamin  Sheldon. 
Capt.  Lemuel  Pomeroy. 
Brig.  Gen.  Elisha  Porter. 
Hon.  Noah  Goodman,  Esq. 
Hon.  John  Hastings,  Esq. 
John  Ingersoll,  Esq. 
Mr.  Ebenezer  Janes. 
Abner  Morgan,  Esq. 
Capt.  David  Shepard. 
Mr.  Jesse  Reed. 
Nahum  Eager,  Esq. 
Col.  Benjamin  Bonney. 
Maj.  Thomas  James  Douglass. 
Mr.  Aaron  Fisher. 
Mr.  Edmund  Lazell. 
Capt.  Thompson  Maxwell. 
Mr.  Elihu  Colton. 
Joshua  Thomas,  Esq. 
Mr.  Thomas  Davis. 
Mr.  John  Davis. 
Hon.  William  Cushing,  Esq. 
Hon.  Nathan  Cushing,  Esq. 
Hon.  Charles  Turner,  Esq. 
Hon.  George  Partridge,  Esq. 
Rev.  William  Shaw. 
Daniel  Howard,  Esq. 
Mr.  Hezekiah  Hooper. 
Capt.  Elisha  Mitchell. 
Mr.  Daniel  Howard,  Jr. 
Rev.  Isaac  Backus. 
Isaac  Thomson,  Esq. 
Capt.  John  Turner. 
Mr.  Josiah  Smith. 


1788.] 


JOURNAL   OF    CONVENTION. 


89 


William  Sever,  Jr.,  Esq. 
Hon.  Joseph  Cushing,  Esq. 
Rev.  Samuel  Niles. 
Mr.  Fr eman  Waterman. 
Col.  Israel  Fearing. 
Shearjashub  Bourn,  Esq. 
David  Thatcher,  Esq. 
Capt.  Jonathan  Howes. 
Hon.  Solomon  Freeman,  Esq. 
Capt.  Kimball  Clark. 
Rev.  Levi  Whitman. 
Capt.  Joseph  Palmer. 
James  Williams,  Esq. 
Hon.  Elisha  May,  Esq. 
Capt.  Moses  Willmarth. 
Col.  Sylvester  Richmond. 
Hon.  William  Baylies,  Esq. 
Hon.  Thomas  Durfee,  Esq. 
Israel  Washburn,  Esq. 
Hon.  Walter  Spooner,  Esq. 
Rev.  Samuel  West. 
Mr.  William  Almy. 
Nathaniel  Barrell,  Esq. 
Rev.  Dr.  Moses  Hemmenway. 
Hon.  Nathaniel  Wells,  Esq. 
Thomas  Cutts,  Esq. 
Jacob  Bradbury,  Esq. 
Capt.  John  Low. 
Mr.  William  Mayhew. 
Mr.  Cornelius  Dunham. 
Hon.  John  Sprague,  Esq. 
Capt.  Seth  Newton. 


Hon.  Samuel  Baker,  Esq. 

Maj.  David  Wilder. 

Mr.  Matthew  Patrick. 

Mr.  Josiah  Goddard. 

Capt.  Ephraim  Wilder. 

John  K.  Smith,  Esq. 

Mr.  John  Fox. 

Capt.  Joseph  McLellan. 

David  Mitchell,  Esq. 

Samuel  Merrill,  Esq. 

William  Thompson,  Esq. 

Capt.  John  Dunlap. 

Capt.  Isaac  Snow. 

Mr.  Joshua  Dyer. 

Rev.  Samuel  Perley. 

Thomas  Rice,  Esq. 

Mr.  David  Sylvester. 

Mr.  Nathaniel  Wyman. 

Mr.  David  Gilmore. 

William  McCobb,  Esq. 

Capt.  Samuel  Grant. 

Moses  Davis,  Esq. 

David  Fales,  Esq. 

Dummer  Sewall,  Esq. 

John  Ashley,  Jr.,  Esq. 

Hon.  Elijah  Dwight,  Esq. 

Hon.  Theodore  Sedgwick,  Esq. 

Hon.  Jonathan  Smith,  Esq. 

Hon.  Thompson  J.  Skinner,  Esq. 

Mr.  Elisha  Carpenter. 

Capt.  Daniel  Taylor.— 18T. 


Capt.  Jedidiah  Southworth, 
Mr.  Nathan  Comstock. 
Mr.  Benjamin  Randall. 

12 


NAYS. 

Mr.  Moses  Richardson,  Jr. 

Rev.  Noah  Alden. 

Hon.  Israel  Hutchinson,  Esq. 


90 


JOURNAL   OF    CONVENTION. 


[1788. 


Capt.  Peter  Osgood,  Jr. 
Dr.  Thomas  Kittridge. 
Capt.  Thomas  Mighill. 
Hon.  Aaron  Wood,  Esq. 
Capt.  Ebenezer  Carlton. 
Dr.  Marshall  Spring. 
Capt.  Timothy  Winn. 
Mr.  William  Flint. 
Mr.  Peter  Emerson. 
Mr.  Jonas  Morse. 
Maj.  Benjamin  Sawin. 
William  Thompson,  Esq. 
Maj.  John  Minot. 
Capt.  Gilbert  Dench. 
Mr.  Jonathan  Keep. 
Dr.  Benjamin  Morse. 
Joseph  Sheple,  Esq. 
Mr.  Obadiah  Sawtell. 
Mr.  Daniel  Fisk. 
Capt.  Daniel  Adams. 
Capt.  John  Webber. 
Capt.  Staples  Chamberlin. 
Mr.  Asa  Parlin. 
Capt.  John  Harnden. 
Mr.  Newman  Scarlett. 
Mr.  Samuel  Reed. 
Mr.  Benjamin  Adams. 
Maj.  Hezekiah  Broad. 
Capt.  Jonathan  Green. 
Mr.  Phineas  Gleazen. 
Col.  Benjamin  Ely. 
Capt.  John  Williston. 
Capt.  Phinehas  Stebbins. 
Mr.  Daniel  Cooley. 
Mr.  Benjamin  Eastman. 
Mr.  Josiah  Allis. 
Mr.  William  Bodman. 
Mr.  Samuel  Field. 


Mr.  Moses  Bascom. 

Mr.  Robert  Wilson. 

Capt.  Consider  Arms. 

Mr.  Malachi  Maynard. 

Capt.  Zacheus  Crocker. 

Mr.  Moses  Severance. 

Capt.  Asa  Fisk. 

Mr.  Phinehas  Merrick. 

Mr.  Adam  Clark. 

Capt.  Nathaniel  Whitcomb. 

Mr.  Timothy  Blair. 

Mr.  Aaron  Merrick. 

Mr.  John  Hamilton. 

Mr.  Clark  Cooley. 

Mr.  John  Chamberlin. 

Mr.  Justus  Dwight. 

Mr.  Samuel  Eddy. 

Mr.  Isaac  Pepper. 

Capt.  John  Goldsbury. 

Capt.  Agrippa  Wells. 

Mr.  Ephraim  William. 

Mr.  Asa  Powers. 

Capt  Silas  Fowler. 

Mr.  John  Jennings. 

Mr.  Jonathan  Hubbard. 

Mr.  Benjamin  Thomas. 

Mr.  Isaac  Soul. 

Mr.  Nathaniel  Hammond. 

Mr.  Abraham  Holmes. 

Capt.  Francis  Shurtliff. 

Mr.  Elijah  Bisbee,  Jr. 

Dr.  Thomas  Smith. 

Mr.  Thomas  Nye. 

Col.  Nathaniel  Leonard. 

Mr.  Aaron  Pratt. 

Capt.  Phanuel  Bishop. 

Maj.  Frederick  Drown. 

William  Winsor,  Esq. 


1788.] 


JOURNAL   OF    CONVENTION. 


91 


Mr.  Christopher  Mason. 
Mr.  David  Brown. 
Hon.  Holder  Slocum,  Esq. 
Mr.  Meletiah  Hathaway. 
Hon.  Abraham  White,  Esq. 
Capt.  Ebenezer  Tisdell. 
Capt.  John  Pratt. 
Capt.  Esaias  Preble. 
Mr.  Mark  Adams. 
Mr.  James  Neal. 
Capt.  Elijah  Thayer. 
Dr.  Nathaniel  Low. 
Mr.  Richard  Fox  Cntts. 
Mr.  Thomas  M.  Wentworth. 
Maj.  Samuel  Nasson. 
Mr.  Moses  Ames. 
Mr.  Jeremiah  Emery. 
Rev.  Pelatiah  Tingley. 
Mr.  David  Bigelow. 
Edward  Thompson,  Esq. 
Mr.  Daniel  Forbes. 
Mr.  Nathaniel  Jenks. 
Capt.  Jeremiah  Learned. 
Mr.  Caleb  Curtis. 
Mr.  Ezra  Mclntier. 
Mr.  David  Harwood. 
Hon.  Amos  Singletary,  Esq. 
Col.  Samuel  Denny. 
Mr.  James  Hathaway. 
Mr.  Asaph  Sherman. 
Mr.  Abraham  Smith. 
Capt.  Jonathan  Bullard. 
Capt.  John  Black. 
Capt.  John  Woods. 
Capt.  Benjamin  Josselyn. 
Capt.  Stephen  Maynard. 
Mr.  Artemas  Brigham. 
Capt.  Isaac  Harrington. 


Capt.  John  Fuller. 

Mr.  Daniel  Putnam. 

Dr.  Samuel  Willard. 

Josiah  Whitney,  Esq. 

Mr.  Jonathan  Day% 

Capt.  Thomas  Marshall  Baker. 

Capt.  Timothy  Parker. 

Maj.  Martin  Kinsley. 

Rev.  Joseph  Davis. 

Hon.  John  Taylor,  Esq. 

Dr.  Joseph  Wood. 

Jonathan  Grout,  Esq. 

Capt.  Samuel  Peckham. 

John  Frye,  Esq. 

Mr.  Stephen  Holden. 

Capt.  Joel  Fletcher. 

Mr.  Timothy  Fuller. 

Mr.  Jacob  Willard. 

Mr.  Moses  Hale. 

Capt.  Josiah  Wood. 

Mr.  Joseph  Stone. 

Mr.  David  Stearns. 

Mr.  Jonas  Temple. 

Daniel  Ilsley,  Esq. 

Mr.  Stephen  Longfellow,  Jr. 

Mr.  William  Wedgery. 

Capt.  David  Murray. 

Hon.  Samuel  Thompson,  Esq. 

Mr.  Jonah  Crosby. 

Mr.  Zacheus  Beal. 

William  Jones,  Esq. 

Capt.  James  Carr. 

Mr.  Joshua  Bean. 

Mr.  Valentine  Rathbun. 

Mr.  Comstock  Betts. 

Mr.  Lemuel  Collins. 

Capt.  Jeremiah  Pierce. 

Ephraim  Fitch,  Esq. 


92  JOURNAL   OF  CONVENTION.  [1788. 

Maj.  Thomas  Lusk.  Ebenezer  Peirce,  Esq. 

Mr.  John  Hurlbert.    .  Mr.  David  Vaughan. 

Capt.  Ezekiel  Herrick.  Capt.  Jesse  Bradley. 

Mr.  Joshua  Lawton.  Mr.  Zenos  Noble. 

Mr.  Timothy  Mason.  Mr.  John  Picket,  Jr. — 168. 

Adjourned  to  Thursday  morning,  10  o'clock. 


Thursday,  February  7, 1788. 

Met  according  to  adjournment. 

The  Committee  on  the  Pay  Roll  reported  the  same,  amount- 
ing to  four  thousand  four  hundred  and  ninety-nine  pounds  two 
shillings.     Read  and  accepted,  and 

Voted,  That  his  Excellency  the  Governor  be,  and  he  hereby 
is  requested,  by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  Council,  to 
draw  his  warrant  on  the  treasury  of  this  Commonwealth  for 
the  aforegoing  sum  of  <£4,499  2s.,  to  be  paid  to  the  members 
of  the  Convention,  in  the  proportion  mentioned  in  the  said  roll. 

Voted,  That  when  the  business  of  the  Convention  shall  be 
completed,  the  members  will  proceed  to  the  State  House,  to 
proclaim  the  ratification  of  the  Federal  Constitution,  and  to 
take  an  affectionate  leave  of  each  other. 

Whereas,  It  is  of  importance  that  the  good  people  of  this 
Commonwealth  should  be  informed  of  the  reasons  which  in- 
duced the  Convention  to  assent  to  and  ratify  the  Constitution 
for  the  United  States  of  America,  it  is  therefore 

Resolved,  That  the  Hon.  George  Cabot,  Esq.,  Theophilus 
Parsons,  Esq.,  Ebenezer  Peirce,  Esq.,  and  the  Hon.  Caleb 
Strong,  Esq.,  together  with  the  Secretary  of  the  Convention,  be 
a  Committee  to  prepare  an  Address  to  the  People,  stating  the 
principles  of  the  said  Constitution,  the  various  objections  which 
were  made  against  it,  and  the  answers  they  received ;  and  ex- 
plaining the  absolute  necessity  of  adopting  some  energetic  sys- 
tem of  federal  government  for  the  preservation  of  the  Union. 
And  that  the  same  be  published  and  transmitted  to  every  town 


1788.]  JOURNAL   OF    CONVENTION.  93 

within  this  Commonwealth,  one  copy  thereof  to  be  for  the  use 
of  each  member  of  this  Convention.  And  that  the  Convention 
do  recommend  to  the  General  Court  that  they  make  provision 
for  the  publication  of  the  said  address,  a'nd  give  such  directions 
for  the  distribution  thereof  as  that  court  shall  judge  proper. 

Ordered,  That  the  Secretary  of  this  Convention  lodge  the 
journals  thereof  in  the  office  of  the  Secretary  of  this  Common- 
wealth. 

Voted,  unanimously,  That  the  thanks  of  this  Convention  be 
given  to  his  Excellency  the  President,  for  his  generous  and 
patriotic  efforts,  during  a  painful  illness,  to  unite  the  members 
of  this  body  in  such  a  decision  upon  the  subject  of  their  de- 
liberation, as,  in  his  opinion,  was  essential  to  the  safety  and 
happiness  of  the  people  of  the  United  States ;  and  also  for  the 
patient  attention  and  perfect  impartiality  with  which  his  Excel- 
lency has  presided,  while  his  health  permitted  him,  to  regulate 
their  debates. 

Voted,  unanimously,  That  his  Honor  the  Vice-President  be 
requested  to  accept  the  united  thanks  of  this  Convention  for 
the  uniform  candor  and  impartiality  exhibited  by  his  Honor 
while  presiding  in  the  absence  of  the  President. 

Voted,  unanimously,  That  the  thanks  of  this  Convention  be 
presented  to  the  reverend  clergymen  of  the  town  of  Boston, 
who  have  kindly  officiated  as  Chaplains  to  this  Convention 
during  their  session. 

Voted,  unanimously,  That  the  thanks  of  this  Convention  be 
given  to  the  proprietors  of  the  meeting-house  in  Long  Lane,  in 
Boston,  for  the  accommodation  the  Convention  have  received  in 
their  house. 

Voted,  That  a  Committee  of  five  be  chosen  to  wait  upon 
his  Excellency  the  President,  and  the  honorable  Vice-President, 
with  the  votes  giving  the  thanks  of  the  Convention  to  them 
respectively. 

The  Hon.  Mr.  Phillips,  the  Hon.  Mr.  Turner,  Mr.  Ames,  the 
Hon.  Mr.  Adams,  and  the  Hon.  Mr.  King,  were  appointed  on 
the  said  committee. 

Ordered,  That  the  Secretary  acquaint  the  reverend  clergymen 
of  Boston,  and  the  proprietors  of  the  meeting-house,  in  Long 
Lane,  of  the  votes  passed  respecting  them. 


94  JOURNAL   OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

An  invitation  from  certain  inhabitants  of  Boston,  requesting 
the  members  of  the  Convention  to  take  refreshment  at  the  Sen- 
ate Chamber,  when  the  ratification  of  the  Constitution  should 
be  declared.     Read,  and 

Voted,  That  the  thanks  of  the  Convention  be  given  to  the 
inhabitants  of  Boston  for  their  polite  invitation,  and  that  the 
Convention  will  attend  as  requested. 

The  business  which  was  before  the  Convention  being  finished, 
on  motion  that  the  Convention  adjourn  to  the  State  House,  for 
the  purpose  of  declaring  the  ratification  of  the  Constitution  for 
the  United  States  of  America, 

Adjourned  accordingly. 

The  Convention  assembled  again  at  the  State  House,  where 
the  ratification  of  the  Constitution  aforesaid  was  publicly 
declared,  after  which, 

This  Convention  was  dissolved. 


REPORT  OF  THE  DEBATES 


CONVENTION    OF    1788, 


RATIFYING  THE  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION. 


DEBATES. 


In  Convention,  January  9, 1788. 

On  motion, 

Ordered,  That  the  Hon.  Nathaniel  Gorham,  Esq.,  John 
Carnes,  Esq.,  Dr.  Charles  Jarvis,  Hon.  Tristram  Dalton,  Esq., 
Hon.  Walter  Spooner,  Esq.,  Hon.  Caleb  Davis,  Esq.,  and  Hon. 
John  Taylor,  Esq.,  be  a  Committee  to  receive  the  returns  of  the 
several  towns. 

Ordered,  That  a  Committee  of  five  persons  be  appointed  to 
collect,  count  and  sort  the  votes  for  a  Secretary. 

And  the  Hon.  Caleb  Davis,  Tristram  Dalton,  Aaron  Wood, 
Eleazer  Brooks  and  Charles  Turner,  Esquires,  were  appointed. 

The  Convention  then  proceeded  to  the  choice  of  a  Secretary 
by  ballot,  and  the  votes  being  taken,  it  appeared  that  George 
Richards  Minot,  Esquire,  was  chosen,  who  accepted  of  the 
choice,  and  was  duly  sworn,  to  qualify  him  for  exercising  the 
duties  of  that  office. 

Voted,  That  Mr.  Jacob  Kuhn,  the  Messenger  of  the  General 
Court,  be  appointed  Messenger  to  this  Convention. 

Voted,  That  five  Monitors  be  chosen. 

The  following  gentlemen  were  elected,  viz. :  the  Hon.  Noah 
Goodman,  Esq.,  Mr.  Phanuel  Bishop,  Mr.  Daniel  Cooley,  Hon. 
Azor  Orne,  Esq.,  and  Mr.  Thomas  Davis. 

Voted,  That  a  Committee  of  seven  be  appointed  to  prepare 
rules  and  orders  for  the  regulation  of  the  Convention. 

The  Hon.  Nathaniel  Gorham,  Esq.,  Dr.  Charles  Jarvis,  Hon. 
John  Taylor,  Esq.,  Mr.  William  Wedgery,  Hon.  Tristram  Dal- 
ton, Esq.,  Hon.  Theodore  Sedgwick,  Esq.,  and  James  Bowdoin, 
Jr.,  Esq.,  were  then  appointed  on  the  said  committee. 

13 


98  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 


AFTERNOON. 

The  Convention  proceeded  to  the  choice  of  a  President,  by 
ballot,  according  to  assignment,  and  a  Committee  of  five  being 
appointed  to  collect,  count  and  sort  the  votes,  it  appeared  that 
his  Excellency  John  Hancock,  Esquire,  was  chosen. 

Voted,  That  the  Convention  proceed  to  the  choice  of  a  Vice 
President. 

The  Convention  then  proceeded  to  the  choice  of  a  Vice-Pres- 
ident accordingly,  by  ballot,  and  a  Committee  being  appointed 
to  collect,  count  and  sort  the  votes,  it  appeared  that  the  Hon. 
William  Cushing,  Esquire,  was  chosen,  who  by  request  took 
the  chair. 

Voted,  That  a  Committee  of  five  be  appointed  to  wait  upon 
his  Excellency  John  Hancock,  Esq.,  and  acquaint  him  that  this 
Convention  have  made  choice  of  him  for  their  President,  and 
to  request  his  Excellency's  acceptance  of  that  appointment. 

On  motion  of  the  Hon.  Mr.  Adams, 

Voted,  That  the  Convention  will  attend  morning  prayers 
daily,  and  that  the  gentlemen  of  the  clergy  of  every  denomina- 
tion, be  requested  to  officiate  in  turn. 

The  members  from  Boston  were  appointed  to  wait  upon  them 
and  acquaint  them  thereof. 

A  vote  of  the  Church  in  Brattle  Street,  in  Boston,  offering 
the  use  of  their  meeting-house  to  the  Convention,  being  com- 
municated by  the  Hon.  Mr.  Bowdoin, 

Voted,  That  a  Committee  of  nine  be  appointed  to  view  the 
accommodations  of  the  said  meeting-house,  and  report. 

Mr.  Sedgwick,  Mr.  Lincoln,  Dr.  Taylor,  Gen.  Brooks,  of 
Lincoln,  Dr.  Jarvis,  Dr.  Holten,  Mr.  Strong,  Mr.  Nasson,  and 
Mr.  Thacher,  were  then  appointed  on  said  committee. 


Thursday,  January  10, 1788. 

The  Committee  appointed  to  examine  the  returns  of  delegates 
desired  a  rule,  whereby  they  might  determine  whether  the  towns 
had  exceeded  their  privilege  to  send  members.      After  a  long 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  99 

debate,  a  motion  was  made,  that  the  valuation  of  the  different 
towns  returned  in  1784,  should  be  the  rule  to  determine  the 
number. 

An  offer  having  been  made  by  the  Church  in  Brattle  Street, 
of  that  meeting-house,  for  the  use  of  the  Convention,  and  a 
Committee  having  viewed  the  accommodations,  it  was 

Voted,  That  when  the  Convention  do  adjourn,  that  it  adjourn 
to  meet  at  3  o'clock  at  the  meeting-house,  in  Brattle  Street. 


Friday,  January  11,  1788. 

Committees  were  raised  to  inquire  respecting  the  contested 
elections  and  enjoined  to  sit  immediately. 

AFTERNOON. 

The  house  in  which  the  Convention  were  sitting,  on  account 
of  the  difficulty  of  hearing,  being  found  inconvenient,  a  Com- 
mittee was  raised  to  provide  one  more  suitable — after  which  it 
was  voted  to  adjourn  to  Saturday  morning,  then  to  meet  in  the 
Representatives'  Chamber. 


Saturday,  January  12, 1788. 

The  honorable  Convention  met  again  in,  the  Representatives, 
Chamber,  where  they  decided  all  the  disputed  elections  in  favor 
of  the  members  returned.  The  sense  of  the  Convention  was 
twice  taken  against  removing  to  any  other  place. 


Monday,  January  14, 1788. 

The  Constitution  for  the  United  States  of  America,  as  report- 
ed by  the  Convention  of  Delegates,  held  at  Philadelphia,  in 
May  last,  together  with  the  resolutions  of  the  General  Court  of 


100  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

this  Commonwealth,  for  calling  a  Convention,  agreeably  to  the 
recommendation  of  Congress,  were  ordered  to  be  read. 

On  motion  of  Mr.  Strong, 

Voted,  That  this  Convention,  sensible  how  important  it  is 
that  the  great  subject  submitted  to  their  determination  should 
be  discussed  and  considered  with  moderation,  candor  and  delib- 
eration, will  enter  into  a  free  conversation  on  the  several  parts 
thereof,  by  paragraphs,  until  every  member  shall  have  had  op- 
portunity to  express  his  sentiments  on  the  same  ;  after  which 
the  Convention  will  consider  and  debate  at  large  the  question, 
whether  this  Convention  will  adopt  and  ratify  the  proposed 
Constitution,  before  any  vote  is  taken  expressive  of  the  sense  of 
the  Convention  upon  the  whole  or  any  part  thereof. 

The  resolve  of  the  General  Court  of  this  Commonwealth,  of 
March,  1787,  appointing  Delegates  for  the  Convention  of  the 
States,  held  at  Philadelphia,  was  ordered  to  be  read. 

A  motion  was  made  and  passed,  that  the  Hon.  Elbridge 
Gerry,  Esq.,  be  requested  to  take  a  seat  in  the  Convention,  to 
answer  any  questions  of  fact,  from  time  to  time,  that  the  Con- 
vention may  ask,  respecting  the  passing  of  the  Constitution. 


AFTERNOON. 

Ordered,  That  a  Committee  of  three  be  appointed  to  wait 
upon  the  Hon.  Elbridge  Gerry,  Esq.,  and  acquaint  him  with 
the  vote  of  this  morning,  requesting  him  to  take  a  seat  in  the 
Convention,  to  answer  to  any  questions  of  fact,  from  time  to 
time,  that  the  Convention  may  ask,  respecting  the  passing 
the  Constitution. 

Agreeably  to  the  resolution  passed  in  the  forenoon,  the  Con- 
vention proceeded  to  consider  the  first  section  of  the  Consti- 
tution, and  after  a  short  conversation,  entered  upon  the  discus- 
sion of  the  second  section,  the  first  paragraph  of  which  caused 
a  lengthy  debate. 

The  Convention  entered  upon  the  consideration  of  the  pro- 
posed Constitution,  and  having  debated  thereon,  through  the 
day,  postponed  the  further  consideration  thereof  to  the  next 
morning. 

It  had  been  mentioned  by  some  gentlemen,  that  the  introduc- 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  101 

tion  of  tyranny  into  several  nations  had  been  by  lengthening 
the  duration  of  their  parliaments,  or  legislative  bodies ;  and  the 
fate  of  those  nations  was  urged  as  a  caution  against  lengthen- 
ing the  period  for  which  Congress  is  to  be  chosen.  The  Hon. 
Mr.  Sedgwick  wished  to  know  what  were  the  nations  which  had 
been  thus  deprived  of  their  liberties  ;  he  believed  they  were  few 
in  number — in  fact,  he  did  not  recollect  any.  After  showing 
by  several  examples  how  nations  had  been  deprived  of  their 
liberties,  he  continued :  Is  it  not  necessary,  Mr.  President,  that 
the  Federal  Representatives  should  be  chosen  for  two  years  ? 
Annual  elections  in  a  single  State  may  be  the  best  for  a  variety 
of  reasons  ;  but  when  the  great  affairs  of  thirteen  States — where 
their  commerce  may  be  extended,  and  where  it  is  necessary  to 
be  restricted — what  measure  may  be  most  expedient,  and  best 
adapted  to  promote  the  general  prosperity  thereof,  are  to  be  the 
objects  of  deliberation — is  not  such  a  period  too  short  ?  Can  a 
man  called  into  public  life  divest  himself  of  local  concerns,  and 
instantly  initiate  himself  in  a  general  knowledge  of  such  exten- 
sive and  weighty  matters  ?  After  several  other  arguments  in 
favor  of  the  section,  he  begged  the  indulgence  of  the  Conven- 
tion while  he  made  a  personal  observation :  "  It  has  been  given 
out,  Sir,  by  several  persons,  that  I  have  said  the  Constitution 
must  go  down,  right  or  wrong.  I  beg  leave  to  declare,  Sir,  on 
my  honor,  that,  so  far  from  having  made  such  a  declaration,  the 
idea  of  it  has  not  ever  entered  my  mind.,, 

Mr.  Gr.  Dench  wished  to  know  how  the  representation  was 
secured  ;  as,  by  the  fourth  section,  Congress  were  empowered  to 
make  or  alter  the  regulation  of  the  times,  places  and  manner 
of  holding  elections.  Mr.  Dench  was  continuing,  but  was  called 
to  order  by  Mr.  Parsons,  who  said  the  subject  in  debate  was  the 
expediency  of  biennial  elections,  and  that  an  answer  to  the  gen- 
tleman from  Hopkinton  would  more  properly  be  given  when  the 
fourth  section  was  under  consideration. 

Dr.  Taylor.  Mr.  President,  I  am  opposed  to  biennial,  and 
am  in  favor  of  annual  elections.  Annual  elections  have  been 
the  practice  of  this  State  ever  since  its  settlement,  and  no  ob- 
jection to  such  a  mode  of  electing  has  ever  been  made.  It  has, 
indeed,  Sir,  been  considered  as  the  safeguard  of  the  liberties  of 
the  people  ;   and  the  annihilation  of  it,  the  avenue  through 


102  debates  OF   CONVENTION.  [1788. 

which  tyranny  will  enter.  By  the  articles  of  confederation, 
annual  elections  are  provided  for,  though  we  have  additional 
securities  in  a  right  to  recall  any,  or  all  of  our  members  from 
Congress,  and  a  provision  for  rotation.  In  the  proposed  Constitu- 
tion there  is  no  provision  for  rotation  ;  we  have  no  right  by  it 
to  recall  our  delegates.  In  answer  to  the  observation,  that,  by 
frequency  of  elections,  good  men  will  be  excluded,  I  answer,  if 
they  behave  well,  it  is  probable  they  will  be  continued  ;  but  if 
they  behave  ill,  how  shall  we  remedy  the  evil  ?  It  is  possible 
that  rulers  may  be  appointed  who  may  wish  to  root  out  the  lib- 
erties of  the  people.  Is  it  not,  Mr.  President,  better,  if  such  a 
case  should  occur,  that  at  a  short  period  they  should  politically 
die,  than  that  they  should  be  proceeded  against  by  impeach- 
ment ?  These  considerations,  and  others,  said  the  Doctor,  make 
me  in  favor  of  annual  elections ;  and  the  further  we  deviate 
therefrom,  the  greater  is  the  evil. 

The  Hon.  Mr.  Sprague  was  in  favor  of  the  section  as  it  stood. 
He  thought  the  same  principles  ought  not  to  guide  us,  when 
considering  the  election  of  a  body  whose  jurisdiction  was  coexten- 
sive with  a  great  continent,  as  when  regulating  that  of  one 
whose  concerns  are  only  those  of  a  single  State. 

Mr.  T.  Dawes,  after  a  short  exordium,  said,  he  had  not  heard 
it  mentioned  by  any  gentleman  who  had  spoken  in  the  debate, 
that  the  right  of  electing  representatives  in  the  Congress,  as 
provided  for  in  the  proposed  Constitution,  will  be  the  acquisi- 
tion of  a  new  privilege  by  the  people,  as  it  really  will  be.  The 
people  will  then  be  immediately  represented  in  the  Federal  Gov- 
ernment ;  at  present  they  are  not ;  therefore  it  will  be  in  favor 
of  the  people,  if  they  are  even  chosen  for  forty  instead  of  two 
years :  and  he  adduced  many  reasons  to  show  that  it  would 
not  conduce  to  the  interest  of  the  United  States  or  the  secu- 
rity of  the  people,  to  have  them  for  a  shorter  period  than  two 
years. 

The  Hon.  Mr.  White  said  he  was  opposed  to  the  section.  He 
thought  the  security  of  the  people  lay  in  frequent  elections. 
For  his  part,  he  would  rather  they  should  be  for  six  months 
than  for  two  years :  and  concluded  by  saying,  he  was  in  favor 
of  annual  elections. 

Dr.  Jarvis,  Gen.  Brooks,  Gen.  Heath,  and  Hon.  Mr.  Turner, 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  103 

each  spoke  a  few  words  on  the  subject,  when  a  motion  was  made 
to  postpone  the  consideration  of  the  second  section  until  the 
next  morning,  which  passing,  the  Convention  adjourned. 


Tuesday,  January  15, 1788. 

A  motion  was  made  by  Mr.  Dana,  that  the  vote  of  yesterday, 
prescribing  the  manner  of  proceeding  in  the  consideration  of 
the  Constitution,  should  be  reconsidered,  for  the  purpose  of 
making  the  following  addition  thereto,  viz. : — 

"  It  is,  nevertheless,  the  opinion  of  this  Convention,  that  if 
any  member  conceives  any  other  clause  or  paragraph  of  the 
Constitution  to  be  connected  with  the  one  immediately  under 
consideration,  that  he  have  full  liberty  to  take  up  such  other 
clause  or  paragraph,  for  that  purpose." 

And  the  question  <5f  reconsideration  being  put,  passed  in  the 
affirmative. 

On  the  question,  whether  the  addition  should  be  made,  it  was 
determined  in  the  affirmative. 

The  Hon.  Mr.  Strong  rose  to  reply  to  the  inquiry  of  the  Hon. 
Mr.  Adams,  why  the  alteration  of  elections  from  annual  to  bien- 
nial was  made,  and  to  correct  an  inaccuracy  of  the  Hon.  Mr. 
Grorham,  who,  the  day  before,  had  said  that  that  alteration  was 
made  to  gratify  South  Carolina.  He  said  he  should  then  have 
arisen  to  put  his  worthy  colleague  right;  but  his  memory  was 
not  sufficiently  retentive  to  enable  him  immediately  to  collect 
every  circumstance.  He  had  since  recurred  to  the  original 
plan.  When  the  subject  was  at  first  discussed  in  convention, 
some  gentlemen  were  for  having  the  term  extended  to  a  consid- 
erable length  of  time  ;  others  were  opposed  to  it,  as  it  was  con- 
trary to  the  ideas  and  customs  of  the  Eastern  States  ;  but  a 
majority  were  in  favor  of  three  years,  and  it  was,  he  said,  urged 
by  the  Southern  States,  which  are  not  so  populous  as  the  East- 
ern, that  the  expense  of  more  frequent  elections  would  be  great. 
He  concluded  by  saying  that  a  general  concession  produced  the 


104  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

term  as  it  stood  in  the  section,  although  it  was  agreeable  to  the 
practice  of  South  Carolina. 

Mr.  Ames.  I  do  not  regret,  Mr.  President,  that  we  are  not 
unanimous  upon  this  question.  I  do  not  consider  the  diversity 
of  sentiment  which  prevails,  as  an  impediment  in  our  way  to 
the  discovery  of  truth.  In  order  that  we  may  think  alike  upon 
this  subject  at  last,  we  shall  be  compelled  to  discuss  it,  by 
ascending  to  the  principles  upon  which  the  doctrine  of  repre- 
sentation is  grounded. 

Without  premeditation,  in  a  situation  so  novel,  and  awed  by 
the  respect  which  I  feel  for  this  venerable  assembly,  I  distrust 
extremely  my  own  feelings,  as  well  as  my  competency  to  prose- 
cute this  inquiry.  With  the  hope  of  an  indulgent  hearing,  I 
will  attempt  to  proceed.  I  am  sensible,  Sir,  that  the  doctrine 
of  frequent  elections  has  been  sanctified  by  antiquity ;  and  is 
still  more  endeared  to  us  by  our  recent  experience,  and  uniform 
habits  of  thinking.  Gentlemen  have  expressed  their  zealous 
partiality  for  it.  They  consider  this  as  a  leading  question  in 
the  debate,  and  that  the  merits  of  many  other  parts  of  the 
Constitution  are  involved  in  the  decision.  '  I  confess,  Sir,  and  I 
declare,  that  my  zeal  for  frequent  elections  is  not  inferior  to 
their  own.  I  consider  it  as  one  of  the  first  securities  for  popu- 
lar liberty,  in  which  its  very  essence  maybe  supposed  to  reside. 
But  how  shall  we  make  the  best  use  of  this  pledge  and  instru- 
ment of  our  safety  ?  A  right  principle,  carried  to  an  extreme, 
becomes  useless.  It  is  apparent  that  a  delegation  for  a  very 
short  term,  as  for  a  single  day,  would  defeat  the  design  of  rep- 
resentation. The  election  in  that  case  would  not  seem  to  the 
people  to  be  of  any  importance,  and  the  person  elected  would 
think  as  lightly  of  his  appointment.  The  other  extreme  is 
equally  to  be  avoided.  An  election  for  a  very  long  term  of 
years,  or  for  life,  would  remove  the  member  too  far  from  the 
control  of  the  people,  would  be  dangerous  to  liberty,  and,  in 
fact,  repugnant  to  the  purposes  of  the  delegation.  The  truth, 
as  usual,  is  placed  somewhere  between  the  extremes,  and  I  be- 
lieve is  included  in  this  proposition  :  The  term  of  election  must 
be  so  long,  that  the  representative  may  understand  the  interests 
of  .the  people,  and  yet  so  limited,  that  his  fidelity  may  be  secured 
by  a  dependence  upon  their  approbation. 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  105 

Before  I  proceed  to  the  application  of  this  rule,  I  cannot  for- 
bear to  premise  some  remarks  upon  two  opinions  which  have 
been  suggested. 

Much  has  been  said  about  the  people  divesting  themselves  of 
power,  when  they  delegate  it  to  representatives ;  and  that  all 
representation  is  to  their  disadvantage,  because  it  is  but  an  im- 
age, a  copy,  fainter  and  more  imperfect  than  the  original,  the 
people,  in  whom  the  right  of  power  is  primary  and  unborrowed, 
which  is  only  reflected  by  their  delegates.  I  cannot  agree  to 
either  of  these  opinions.  The  representation  of  the  people  is 
something  more  than  the  people.  1  know,  Sir,  but  one  purpose 
which  the  people  can  effect  without  delegation,  and  that  is,  to 
destroy  a  government.  That  they  cannot  erect  a  government 
is  evinced  by  our  being  thus  assembled  on  their  behalf.  The 
people  must  govern  by  a  majority,  with  whom  all  power  resides. 
But  how  is  the  sense  of  this  majority  to  be  obtained  ?  It  has 
been  said  that  a  pure  democracy  is  the  best  government  for  a 
small  people,  who  may  assemble  in  person.  It  is  of  small  con- 
sequence to  discuss  it,  as  it  would  be  inapplicable  to  the  great 
country  we  inhabit.  It  may  be  of  some  use  in  this  argument, 
however,  to  consider,  that  it  would  be  very  burdensome,  subje'ct 
to  faction  and  violence  ;  decisions  would  often  be  made  by  sur- 
prise, in  the  precipitancy  of  passion,  by  men  who  either  under- 
stand nothing,  or  care  nothing  about  the  subject,  or  by  inter- 
ested men,  or  those  who  vote  for  their  own  indemnity.  It  would 
be  a  government,  not  by  laws,  but  by  men.  Such  were  the 
paltry  democracies  of  Greece  and  Asia  Minor,  so  much  extolled, 
and  so  often  proposed  as  a  model  for  our  imitation.  I  desire  to 
be  thankful  that  our  people  are  not  under  any  temptation  to 
adopt  the  advice.  I  think  it  will  not  be  denied,  that  the  people 
are  gainers  by  the  election  of  representatives.  They  may  de- 
stroy, but  they  cannot  exercise  the  powers  of  government,  in 
person ;  but  by  their  servants  they  govern.  They  do  not  re- 
nounce their  power ;  they  do  not  sacrifice  their  rights ;  they 
become  the  true  sovereigns  of  the  country,  when  they  delegate 
that  power,  which  they  cannot  use  themselves,  to  their  trustees. 

I  know,  Sir,  that  the  people  talk  about  the  liberty  of  nature, 
and  assert  that  we  divest  ourselves  of  a  portion  of  it  when  we 
enter  into  society.     This  is  declamation  against  matter  of  fact, 
n 


106  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

We  cannot  live  without  society  ;  and  as  to  liberty,  how  can  I  be 
said  to  'enjoy  that  which  another  may  take  from  me  when 
he  pleases  ?  The  liberty  of  one  depends  not  s«  much  on  the 
removal  of  all  restraint  from  him,  as  on  the  due/  restraint  upon 
the  liberty  of  others.  Without  such  restraint,  there  can  be  no 
liberty.  Liberty  is  so  far  from  being  endangered  or  destroyed 
by  this,  that  it  is  extended  and  secured.  For  I  said,  that  we 
do  not  enjoy  that  which  another  may  take  from  us.  But  civil 
liberty  cannot  be  taken  from  us,  when  any  one  may  please  to 
invade  it ;  for  we  have  the  strength  of  the  society  of  our  side. 

I  hope,  Sir,  that  these  reflections  will  have  some  tendency  to 
remove  the  ill  impressions  which  are  made  by  proposing  to 
divest  the  people  of  their  power. 

That  they  may  never  be  divested  of  it,  I  repeat  that  I  am  in 
favor  of  frequent  elections.  They  who  commend  annual  elec- 
tions, are  desired  to  consider,  that  the  question  is,  whether 
biennial  elections  are  a  defect  in  the  Constitution  ;  for  it  does 
not  follow,  because  annual  elections  are  safe,  that  biennial  are 
dangerous.  Both  may  be  good.  Nor  is  there  any  foundation 
for  the  fears  of  those  who  say  that  if  we,  who  have  been  accus- 
tomed to  choose  for  one  year  only,  now  extend  it  to  two,  the 
next  stride  will  be  to  five,  or  seven  years,  and  the  next  for  term 
of  life :  for  this  article,  with  all  its  supposed  defects,  is  in  favor 
of  liberty.  Being  inserted  in  the  Constitution,  it  is  not  subject 
to  be  repealed  by  law.  We  are  sure  that  it  is  the  worst  of  the 
case. 

It  is  a  fence  against  ambitious  encroachments,  too  high  and 
too  strong  to  be  passed.  In  this  respect,  we  have  greatly  the 
advantage  of  the  people  of  England,  and  of  all  the  world. 
The  law  which  limits  their  parliaments  is  liable  to  be  repealed. 

I  will  not  defend  this  article  by  saying  that  it  was  a  matter 
of  compromise  in  the  Federal  Convention :  it  has  my  entire  ap- 
probation as  it  stands.  I  think  that  we  ought  to  prefer,  in  this 
article,  biennial  elections  to  annual,  and  my  reasons  for  this 
opinion  are  drawn  from  these  sources  : — 

From  the  extent  of  the  country  to  be  governed, 

The  objects  of  their  legislation, 

And  the  more  perfect  security  of  our  liberty. 

It  seems  obvious,  that  men  who  are  to  collect  in  Congress 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  107 

from  this  great  territory,  perhaps  from  the  Bay  of  Fundy,  or 
from  the  banks  of  the  Ohio,  and  the  shore  of  Lake  Superior, 
ought  to  have  a  longer  term  in  office,  than  the  delegates  of  a 
single  State,  in  their  own  legislature.  It  is  not  by  riding  post 
to  and  from  Congress,  that  a  man  can  acquire  a  just  knowledge 
of  the  true  interests  of  the  Union.  This  term  of  election  is 
inapplicable  to  the  state  of  a  country  as  large  as  Germany,  or 
as  the  Roman  Empire  in  the  zenith  of  its  power. 

If  we  consider  the  objects  of  their  delegation,  little  doubt  will 
remain.  It  is  admitted  that  annual  elections  may  be  highly  fit 
for  the  State  legislature.  Every  citizen  grows  up  with  a  knowl- 
edge of  the  local  circumstances  of  the  State.  But  the  business 
of  the  Federal  Government  will  be  very  different.  The  objects 
of  their  power  are  few  and  national.  At  least  two  years  in 
office  will  be  necessary  to  enable  a  man  to  judge  of  the  trade 
and  interests  of  States  which  he  never  saw.  The  time,  I  hope, 
will  come,  when  this  excellent  country  will  furnish  food,  and 
freedom  (which  is  better  than  food,  which  is  the  food  of  the 
soul)  for  fifty  millions  of  happy  people.  Will  any  man  say  that 
the  national  business  can  be  understood  in  one  year  ? 

Biennial  elections  appear  to  me,  Sir,  an  essential  security  to 
liberty.     These  are  my  reasons  : — 

Faction  and  enthusiasm  are  the  instruments  by  which  popu- 
lar governments  are  destroyed.  We  need  not  talk  of  the  power 
of  an  aristocracy.  The  people,  when  they  lose  their  liberties, 
are  cheated  out  of  them.  They  nourish  factions  in  their  bosoms, 
which  will  subsist  so  long  as  abusing  their  honest  credulity  shall 
be  the  means  of  acquiring  power.  A  democracy  is  a  volcano, 
which  conceals  the  fiery  materials  of  its  own  destruction.  These 
will  produce  an  eruption,  and  carry  desolation  in  their  way. 
The  people  always  mean  right,  and  if  time  is  allowed  for  reflec- 
tion and  information,  they  will  do  right.  I  would  not  have  the 
first  wish,  the  momentary  impulse  of  the  public  mind,  become 
law.  For  it  is  not  always  the  sense  of  the  people,  with  whom  I 
admit  that  all  power  resides.  On  great  questions,  we  first  hear 
,  the  lQud  clamors  of  passion,  artifice  and  faction.  I  consider 
biennial  elections  as  a  security  that  the  sober  second  thought  of 
the  people  shall  be  law.  There  is  a  calm  review  of  public 
transactions,  which  is  made  by  the  citizens  who  have  families 


108  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

and  children,  the  pledges  of  their  fidelity.  To  provide  for  pop- 
ular liberty,  we  must  take  care  that  measures  shall  not  be 
adopted  without  due  deliberation.  The  member  chosen  for  two 
years  will  feel  some  independence  in  his  seat.  The  factions  of 
the  day  will  expire  before  the  end  of  his  term. 

The  people  will  be  proportionally  attentive  to  the  merits  of  a 
candidate.  Two  years  will  afford  opportunity  to  the  member  to 
deserve  well  of  them,  and  they  will  require  evidence  that  he 
has  done  it. 

But,  Sir,  the  representatives  are  the  grand  inquisition  of  the 
Union.  They  are,  by  impeachment,  to  bring  great  offenders  to 
justice.  One  year  will  not  suffice  to  detect  guilt,  and  to  pursue 
it  to  conviction ;  therefore,  they  will  escape,  and  the  balance  of 
the  two  branches  will  be  destroyed,  and  the  people  oppressed 
with  impunity.  The  senators  will  represent  the  sovereignty  of 
the  States.  The  representatives  are  to  represent  the  people. 
The  offices  ought  to  bear  some  proportion  in  point  of  impor- 
tance. This  will  be  impossible  if  they  are  chosen  for  one  year 
only. 

Will  the  people  then  blind  the  eyes  of  their  own  watchmen  ? 
Will  they  bind  the  hands  which  are  to  hold  the  sword  for  their 
defence  ?  Will  they  impair  their  own  power,  by  an  unreasona- 
ble jealousy  of  themselves  ? 

For  these  reasons,  I  am  clearly  of  opinion  that  the  article  is 
entitled  to  our  approbation  as  it  stands ;  and  as  it  has  been  de- 
manded, why  annual  elections  were  not  preferred  to  biennial, 
permit  me  to  retort  the  question,  and  to  inquire,  in  my  turn, 
what  reason  can  be  given,  why,  if  annual  elections  are  good, 
biennial  elections  are  not  better  ? 

The  inquiry  in  the  latter  part  of  Mr.  Ames's  speech  being 
directed  to  the  Hon.  Mr.  Adams,  that  gentleman  said,  he  only 
made  the  inquiry  for  information,  and  that  he  had  heard  suffi- 
cient to  satisfy  himself  of  its  propriety. 

Mr.  Dench  said  his  objections  to  biennial  elections  were  re- 
moved. But  he  wished  to  recur  to  the  fourth  section,  and  to 
inquire,  whether  that  election  was  secured,  as,  by  this  section, 
Congress  has  power  to  regulate  the  time,  place  and  manner  of 
holding  it. 

[A  question  now  arose,  whether  the  consideration  of  the 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  109 

fourth  section  was  in  order,  and  much  debate  was  had  thereon 
— but  the  propriety,  as  expressed  by  a  worthy  member,  of  "  elu- 
cidating scripture  by  scripture,"  being  generally  admitted,  the 
motion  made  by  the  Hon.  Mr.  Dana,  passed,  which  put  an  end  * 
to  the  conversation.] 

The  Hon.  Mr.  Bowdoin  remarked  on  the  idea  suggested  by 
the  honorable  gentleman  from  Scituate,  [Mr.  Turner,]  who  had 
said  that  nature  pointed  out  the  propriety  of  annual  elections, 
by  its  annual  renewal,  and  observed,  that  if  the  revolution  of 
the  heavenly  bodies  is  to  be  the  principle  to  regulate  elections, 
it  was  not  fixed  to  any  period ;  as  in  some  of  the  systems  it 
would  be  very  short ;  and  in  the  last  discovered  planet  it  would 
be  eighty  of  our  years.  Gentlemen,  he  said,  who  had  gone  be- 
fore him  in  the  debate,  had  clearly  pointed  out  the  alteration  of 
the  election  of  our  federal  representatives,  from  annual  to  bien- 
nial, to  be  justifiable.  Annual  elections  may  be  necessary  in 
this  State  ;  but  in  the  choice  of  representatives  for  the  conti- 
nent, it  ought  to  be  longer  ;  nor  did  he  see  any  danger  in  its 
being  so.  Who,  he  asked,  are  the  men  to  be  elected  ?  Are 
they  not  to  be  from  among  us  ?  If  they  were  to  be  a  distinct 
body,  then  the  doctrine  of  precaution,  which  gentlemen  use, 
would  be  necessary.  But,  Sir,  they  can  make  no  laws,  nor  levy 
any  taxes,  but  those  to  which  they  themselves  must  be  subser- 
vient— they  themselves  must  bear  a  part ;  therefore,  our  secu- 
rity is  guaranteed,  by  their  being  thus  subject  to  the  laws,  if  by 
nothing  else. 

Gen.  Heath.  Mr.  President,  I  consider  myself  not  as  an  in- 
habitant of  Massachusetts,  but  as  a  citizen  of  the  United  States. 
My  ideas  and  views  are  commensurate  with  the  continent ;  they 
extend  in  length  from  the  St.  Croix  to  the  St.  Maria,  and  in 
breadth  from  the  Atlantic  to  the  Lake  of  the  Woods ;  for  over 
all  this  extensive  territory  is  the  Federal  Government  to  be 
extended. 

I  should  not  have  risen  on  this  paragraph,  had  it  not  been  for 
some  arguments  which  gentlemen  have  advanced,  respecting 
elections,  and  which  I  think  tend  to  make  dangerous  impres- 
sions on  the  minds  of  the  rising  generation.  It  has  been  the 
general  opinion  that  the  liberties  of  the  people  are  principally 
secured  by  the  frequency  of  elections,  and  power  returning 


110  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

again  into  their  hands.  The  first  parliament  ever  called  in 
Europe,  was  called  by  Constantine  the  Third,  and  to  continue 
for  one  year.  The  worthy  gentleman  from  Boston,  [Mr.  Dawes,] 
♦  has  mentioned  a  writer  as  a  good  authority,  and  who,  he  says, 
was  twenty  years  compiling  his  works.  I  will  produce  one  ob- 
servation from  this  celebrated  writer  (Baron  Montesquieu)  ; 
it  is  as  follows  :  "  The  greatness  of  power  must  be  compensated 
by  the  brevity  of  the  duration :  most  legislators  have  fixed  it  to 
a  year  ;  a  longer  space  would  be  dangerous."  Here,  Sir,  we 
have  not  only  the  opinion  of  this  celebrated  writer,  but  he  has 
also  mentioned  that  most  legislators  were  of  the  like  opinion. 
But  I  shall  come  to  our  own  country,  where  we  shall  find  in 
what  respect  annual  elections  have  always  been  held.  This  was 
the  wisdom  of  our  ancestors  ;  it  has  been  confirmed  by  time  : 
therefore,  Sir,  before  we  change  it,  we  should  carefully  examine 
whether  it  be  for  the  better.  Local  circumstances  may  render 
it  expedient,  but  we  should  take  care  not  to  hold  up  to  the  ris- 
ing generation  that  it  is  a  matter  of  indifference  whether  elec- 
tions are  annual  or  not ;  and  this  is  what  induced  me  to  rise. 

It  is  a  novel  idea  that  representatives  should  be  chosen  for  a 
considerable  time,  in  order  that  they  may  learn  their  duty.  The 
representative  is  one  who  appears  in  behalf  of,  and  acts  for, 
others ;  he  ought,  therefore,  to  be  fully  acquainted  with  the 
feelings,  circumstances  and  interests  of  the  persons  whom  he 
represents,  and  this  is  learnt  among  them,  not  at  a  distant  court. 
How  frequently,  on  momentary  occasions,  do  the  members  of 
the  British  Parliament  wish  to  go  home  and  consult  their  con- 
stituents, before  they  come  to  a  decision.  This  shows  from  what 
quarter  they  wish  to  obtain  information.  With  respect  to  the 
obtaining  a  knowledge  of  the  circumstances  and  abilities  of  the 
other  States,  in  order  to  an  equal  taxation,  this  must  be  acquired 
from  the  returns  of  the  number  of  inhabitants,  <fcc,  which  are 
to  be  found  on  the  files  of  Congress  ;  for  I  know  not  how  length 
of  time  could  furnish  other  information,  unless  the  members 
should  go  from  State  to  State,  in  order  to  find  out  the  circum- 
stances of  the  different  States.  I  think  representatives  ought 
always  to  have  a  general  knowledge  of  the  interests  of  their 
constituents,  as  this  alone  can  enable  them  properly  to  represent 
them. 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  Ill 

But,  Sir,  if  there  be  charms  in  the  paragraph  now  under  con- 
sideration, they  are  these  :  Congress  at  present  are  continually 
sitting,  but  under  the  new  Constitution  it  is  intended  that  Con- 
gress shall  sit  but  once  annually,  for  such  time  as  may  be  neces- 
sary, and  then  adjourn  ;  in  this  view,  every  gentleman  acquaint- 
ed with  the  tmsiness  of  legislation,  knows  that  there  is  much 
business  in  every  session,  which  is  taken  up  and  partly  con- 
sidered, but  not  finished  ;  an  adjournment  keeps  all  this  business 
alive,  and  at  the  next  session  it  is  taken  up  and  completed,  to 
the  benefit  of  the  people,  in  great  saving  of  expense,  which 
would  otherwise  be  lost ;  for  a  new  legislature  would  not  see 
through  the  eyes  of  those  who  went  before  them,  consequently 
all  business  partly  finished  would  be  time  lost,  to  the  injury  of 
the  public.  Therefore,  as  it  seems  to  be  intended  that  Congress 
shall  have  but  two  sessions  in  the  two  years  for  which  the  rep- 
resentatives are  to  be  chosen,  this  consideration  has  reconciled 
me  to  the  paragraph,  and  I  am  in  favor  of  biennial  elections. 

The  Hon.  Mr.  Turner,  in  reply  to  the  Hon.  Mr.  Bowdoin, 
said  he  thought  it  an  important  consideration  whether  the  elec- 
tions were  to  be  for  one  year  or  for  two  years  ;  he  was,  he  said, 
greatly  in  favor  of  annual  elections,  and  he  thought,  in  the 
present  instance,  it  would  be  establishing  a  dangerous  precedent 
to  adopt  a  change  ;  for,  says  he,  the  principle  may  so  operate, 
as,  in  time,  our  elections  will  be  as  seldom  as  the  revolution  of 
the  star  the  honorable  gentleman  talks  of. 

Mr.  Dawes,  in  answer  to  Gen.  Heath,  said,  that  the  passage 
quoted  from  Montesquieu,  applied  to  single  governments,  and 
not  to  confederate  ones. 

Gen.  Brooks,  (of  Medford,)  in  reply  to  Gen.  Heath,  said,  he 
recollected  the  passage  of  Montesquieu,  but  he  also  recollected 
that  that  writer  had  spoken  highly  of  the  British  government. 
He  then  adverted  to  the  objection  to  this  section  of  Gen.  Thomp- 
son and  others,  that  biennial  elections  were  a  novelty,  and  said, 
we  were  not  to  consider  whether  a  measure  was  new,  but  wheth- 
er it  was  proper.  Gentlemen  had  said  that  it  had  been  the  es- 
tablished custom  of  this  country  to  elect  annually :  but,  he 
asked,  have  we  not  gone  from  a  colonial  to  an  independent  sit- 
uation ?  We  were  then  provinces,  we  are  now  an  independent 
empire ;  our  measures,  therefore,  says  lie,  must  change  with 


112  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

our  situation.  Under  our  old  government,  the  objects  of  legis- 
lation were  few,  and  divided  ;  under  our  present,  they  are  many, 
and  must  be  united ;  and  it  appears  necessary  that,  according 
to  the  magnitude  and  multiplicity  of  the  business,  the  duration 
should  be  extended — he  did  not,  he,  said,  undertake  to  say  how 
far.  He  then  went  into  a  view  of  the  history  of  Parliaments. 
The  modern  northern  nations,  he  said,  had  parliaments,  but 
they  were  called  by  their  kings,  and  the  time,  business,  &c,  of 
them,  depended  wholly  on  their  wills.  We  can,  therefore,  says 
he,  establish  nothing  from  these.  One  general  remark  was, 
that  in  the  reigns  of  weak  princes,  the  power  and  importance  of 
parliaments  increased  ;  in  the  reigns  of  strong  and  arbitrary 
kings,  they  have  always  declined ;  and,  says  he,  they  have  been 
triennial,  and  they  have  been  septennial.  The  General  com- 
bated the  idea,  that  the  liberties  of  the  people  depended  on  the 
duration  of  parliament,  with  much  ability.  Do  we  hear,  asked 
he,  that  the  people  of  England  are  deprived  of  their  liberties — 
or  that  they  are  not  as  free  now  as  when  they  had  short  parlia- 
ments ?  On  the  contrary,  do  not  writers  agree  that  life,  liberty 
and  property  are  no  where  better  secured  than  in  Great  Britain 
— and  that  this  security  arises  from  their  parliaments  being 
chosen  for  seven  years.  As  such  is  the  situation  of  the  people 
of  England,  and  as  no  instance  can  be  given  wherein  biennial 
elections  have  been  destructive  to  the  liberties  of  the  people,  he 
concluded  by  asking,  whether  so  much  danger  is  to  be  appre- 
hended from  such  elections  as  gentlemen  imagined  ? 

Gen.  Thompson.  Sir,  gentlemen  have  said  a  great  deal  about 
the  history  of  old  times.  I  confess,  I  am  not  acquainted  with 
such  history — but  I  am,  Sir,  acquainted  with  the  history  of  my 
own  country.  I  had  the  honor  to  be  in  the  general  court  last 
year,  and  am  in  it  this  year.  I  think,  Sir,  that  had  the  last 
administration  continued  one  year  longer,  our  liberties  would 
have  been  lost;  and  the  country  involved  in  blood :  not  so  much, 
Sir,  from  their  bad  conduct,  but  from  the  suspicions  of  the  peo- 
ple of  them.  But,  Sir,  a  change  took  place  ;  from  this  change 
pardons  have  been  granted  to  the  people,  and  peace  is  restored. 
This,  Sir,  I  say,  is  in  favor  of  frequent  elections. 

[Gen.  Thompson  was  called  to  order,  on  the  idea  that  he 
reflected  on  the  last  administration.     A  debate  ensued,  which 


1788.]  DEBATES   OF    CONVENTION.  113 

ended  on  the  Hon.  Mr.  White's  saying  he  wished  to  put  out 
every  spark  of  the  fire  that  appeared  to  be  kindling — there- 
fore moved  to  adjourn.] 


AFTERNOON. 

Dr.  Taylor  opened  the  conversation  of  the  afternoon,  by 
calling  upon  Gen.  Thompson  to  proceed. 

Gen.  Thompson  accordingly  said,  that,  however  just,  however 
good,  and  however  upright,  the  administration  may  be,  there 
was  still  a  great  necessity  for  annual  elections. 

He  thought  a  change  of  election  was  for  the  best,  even  if  the 
administration  pleased  the  people.  Do  the  members  of  Con- 
gress, says  he,  displease  us,  we  call  them  home,  and  they  obey. 
Now  where  is  the  difference  of  their  having  been  elected  for  one 
or  two  years  ?  It  is  said  that  the  members  cannot  learn  suffi- 
ciently in  that  time.  Sir,  I  hope  we  shall  never  send  men  who 
are  not  learned.  Let  these  members  know  their  dependence  upon 
the  people,  and  I  say  it  will  be  a  check  on  them,  even  if  they 
were  not  good  men.  Here  the  General  broke  out  in  the  follow- 
ing pathetic  apostrophe  :  "  0  my  country !  never  give  up  your 
annual  elections  ;  young  men,  never  give  up  your  jewel ! "  He 
apologized  for  his  zeal.  He  then  drew  a  comparison  between 
the  judges,  <fcc,  of  this  country,  before  the  Revolution,  who  were 
dependent  on  Great  Britain  for  their  salaries,  and  those  repre- 
sentatives dependent  on  the  continent.  He  concluded  by  hop- 
ing that  these  representatives  would  be  annually  elected,  and 
thereby  feel  a  greater  dependence  on  the  people. 

Mr.  Gore.  It  has  been  observed,  that  in  considering  this 
great  and  momentous  question,  we  ought  to  consult  the  senti- 
ments of  wise  men,  who  have  written  on  the  subject  of  govern- 
ment, and  thereby  regulate  our  decision  on  this  business.  A 
passage  is  adduced  from  Montesquieu,  stating,  that  where  the 
people  delegate  great  power,  it  ought  to  be  compensated  for  by 
the  shortness  of  the  duration.  Though  strictly  agreeing  with 
the  author,  I  do  not  see  that  it  applies  to  the  subject  under  con- 
sideration. This  might  be  perfectly  applicable  to  the  ancient 
governments,  where  they  had  no  idea  of  representation,  or  dif- 
ferent checks  in  the  legislature  or  administration  of  govern- 

15 


114  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

ment ;  but  in  the  proposed  Constitution,  the  powers  of  the 
whole  government  are  limited  to  "certain  national  objects,  and 
are  accurately  defined ;  the  House  of  Representatives  is  but 
one  branch  of  the  system,  and  can  do  nothing  of  itself;  Mon- 
tesquieu, in  the  sentiment  alluded  to,  must  have  had  in  his  mind 
the  Epistates  of  Athens,  or  the  Dictators  of  Rome,  but  certain- 
ly observations  drawn  from  such  sources  can  have  no  weight  in 
considering  things  so  essentially  different.  Again,  Sir,  gentle- 
men have  said,  that  annual  elections  were  necessary  to  the  pres- 
ervation of  liberty,  and  that  in  proportion  as  the  people  of  dif- 
ferent nations  have  lengthened,  beyond  the  term  of  a  year,  the 
duration  of  their  representatives,  they  have  lost  their  liberties, 
and  that  all  writers  have  agreed  in  this.  I  may  mistake,  but  I 
know  no  such  thing  as  a  representation  of  the  people  in  any  of 
the  ancient  republics.  In  England,  from  whence  we  receive 
many  of  our  ideas  on  this  subject,  King  John  covenanted  with 
his  people  to  summons  certain  classes ,  of  men  to  parliament. 
By  the  constitution  of  that  country,  the  king  alone  can  convoke, 
and  he  alone,  previous  to  the  revolution,  could  dissolve,  the 
parliament ;  but  in  the  reign  of  William  III.  the  patriots  ob- 
tained an  act  limiting  the  duration  of  parliaments  to  three 
years.  Soon  after,  a  parliament  then  sitting  and  near  expiring, 
a  rebellion  broke  out,  and  the  tories  and  Jacobites  were  gaining 
strength  to  support  the  Pretender's  claim  to  the  crown.  Had 
they  dissolved  themselves,  and  a  new  parliament  been  convoked, 
probably  many  of  the  very  opponents  to  the  government  might 
have  been  elected.  In  that  case,  they  might  have  effected  by 
law,  what  they  in  vain  attempted  by  arms. 

The  parliament,  therefore,  extended  their  duration  from  tri- 
ennial to  septennial ;  this  was  acquiesced  in  by  the  people,  and 
the  next  parliament  sanctified  the  act.  No  evil,  but  great  good, 
has  been  supposed  to  follow  from  their  duration  being  thus  ex- 
tended ;  and  if  Montesquieu  and  Doctor  Adams  think  the  Brit- 
ish Constitution  so  perfect,  how  much  greater  must  be  our  secu- 
rity, when  we  reflect  that  our  representation  is  equal ;  that  the 
powers  of  the  government  are  so  limited,  and  the  checks  so 
nicely  appointed.  If  there  be  a  representation  of  the  people  in 
any  other  countries,  and  annual  elections  therein  have  been 
considered  as  the  basis  of  their  freedom,  I  pray  gentlemen  to 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  115 

mention  the  instances  ;  I  confess  I  know  none.  People  adopt  a 
position  which  is  certainly  true,  viz.  :  that  elections  ought  to  be 
frequent ;  but  then,  as  we  have  been  in  the  custom  of  choosing 
our  representatives  annually,  we  have  determined  annually  to 
be  frequent,  and  that  biennially,  or  any  longer  term  than  annual, 
is  not  frequent.  But  if  gentlemen  will  only  consider  the  ob- 
jects over  which  this  government  is  to  have  rule  and  authority, 
and  the  immense  and  wide  extended  tracts  of  country  over 
which  the  representatives  are  to  pass  before  they  reach  the  seat 
of  government,  I  think  they  will  be  convinced  that  two  years  is 
a  short  time  for  the  representatives  to  hold  their  office.  Fur- 
ther, Sir,  we  must  consider  this  subject  with  respect  to  the  gen- 
eral structure  of  the  Constitution.  The  Senate  represents  the 
sovereignty  of  the  States ;  the  House  of  Representatives  the 
people  of  the  United  States.  The  former  have  a  longer  term  in 
their  office  ;  it  is  then  necessary  that  that  body  which  represents 
the  people  should  have  a  permanence  in  their  office  to  resist  any 
operations  of  the  Senate  which  might  be  injurious  to  the  peo- 
ple. If  they  were  annual,  I  submit  it  to  the  good  sense  of  this 
house,  whether  they  would  be  able  to  preserve  that  weight  in 
the  system,  which  the  Constitution  intended  they  should  have, 
and  which  is  absolutely  necessary  for  the  security  of  the  rights 
of  the  people. 

The  Hon.  Mr.  King  said,  he  would  not  detain  the  Convention 
by  any  exordium,  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  their  attention. 
He  declared,  however,  that  he  thought  the  subject  might  be 
freed  from  certain  prejudices  connected  with  its  examination, 
and  that  thereby  the  question  might  receive  a  fairer  decision. 
This  should  be  the  object  of  his  address. 

The  honorable  gentleman  observed,  that  the  Convention  would 
do  well  to  lay  aside  the  terms  annual  or  biennial,  and  consider 
the  subject  as  it  could  be  supported  by  principles.  Much  has 
been  said  of  the  instruction  to  be  derived  from  history  on  this 
point;  he  said,  he  presumed  to  doubt  whether  this  was  the 
case.  From  the  continent  of  Europe  he  believed  that  we  could 
receive  no  instruction ;  their  parliaments,  after  the  overthrow 
of  the  Roman  empire,  were  not  constructed  upon  the  principle 
of  a  representation  of  the  people.  The  conqueror  of  a  given 
district  of  country  was,  by  the  feudal  system,  the  prince  or  king 


116  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

of  the  people  within  his  conquered  territories :  when  he  wished 
the  advice  of  any  persons,  he  summoned  usually  a  number  of 
his  principal  officers,  or  the  barons  of  his  kingdom,  to  give  him 
their  counsel ;  but  the  people,  or,  as  they  were  degradingly 
called,  the  vassals,  were  never  consulted.  This  certainly  cannot 
be  considered  as  a  representation  of  the  people.  This  mode  of 
assembling  a  parliament  probably  obtained  in  the  early  stages 
of  the  English  history  ;  but  those  who  have  written  on  this  sub- 
ject agree  that  their  information  is  very  imperfect  relative  to 
the  origin  of  English  parliaments ;  they  are  not  certain  who 
composed  the  parliament,  how  long  they  held  their  office,  or 
concerning  what  points  they  were  consulted. 

Nothing  clear  on  this  subject  appears  before  the  twelfth  cen- 
tury. Magna  Charta  is  the  foundation  of  the  imperfect  repre- 
sentation of  England.  Improvements  have  since  been  made  in 
favor  of  the  more  equal  and  certain  representation  of  the  peo- 
ple ;  but  it  is  still  extremely  imperfect  and  insecure.  Perhaps 
the  people  of  America  are  the  first,  who,  by  the  social  compact, 
ever  obtained  a  right  to  a  full  and  fair  representation  in  making 
the  laws  of  their  country. 

If,  then,  continued  Mr.  King,  history  can  afford  little  or  no 
instruction  on  the  subject,  the  Convention  must  determine  the 
question  upon  its  own  principles.  It  seems  proper  that  the  rep- 
resentatives should  be  in  office  time  enough  to  acquire  that  in- 
formation which  is  necessary  to  form  a  right  judgment ;  but  that 
the  time  should  not  be  so  long  as  to  remove  from  his  mind  the 
powerful  check  upon  his  conduct  that  arises  from  the  frequency 
of  elections,  whereby  the  people  are  enabled  to  remove  an  un- 
faithful representative,  or  to  continue  a  faithful  one.  If  the 
question  is  examined  by  this  standard,  perhaps  it  will  appear 
that  an  election  for  two  years  is  short  enough  for  a  representa- 
tive in  Congress.  If  one  year  is  necessary  for  a  representative 
to  be  useful  in  the  State  legislature,  where  the  objects  of  his 
deliberations  are  local,  and  within  his  constant  observation  ; 
two  years  does  not  appear  too  long,  where  the  objects  of  delib- 
eration are  not  confined  to  one  State,  but  extend  to  thirteen 
States ;  where  the  complicated  interests  of  united  America  are 
mingled  with  those  of  foreign  nations,  and  where  the  great  du- 
ties of  national  sovereignty  will  require  his  constant  attention. 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  117 

When  the  representatives  of  the  colony  of  Massachusetts  were 
first  chosen,  the  country  was  not  settled  more  than  fifteen  or 
twenty  miles  from  Boston.  They  then  held  their  offices  for  one 
year.  The  emigrants  from  Massachusetts,  who  settled  on  Con- 
necticut River,  appointed  the  Representatives  to  meet  in  the 
General  Court  of  that  Colony,  for  only  six  months.  Massachu- 
setts, although  her  settlements  have  extended  over  almost  her 
whole  territory,  has  continued  to  depute  representatives  for  only 
one  year,  and  Connecticut  for  only  six  months  ;  but  as  in  each 
of  these  colonies,  when  under  the  British  government,  the  du- 
ties of  the  representatives  were  merely  local,  the  great  duties 
of  sovereignty  being  vested  in  their  king,  so  since  the  Revolution 
their  duties  have  continued  local,  many  of  the  authorities  of 
sovereignty  being  vested  in  Congress.  It  is  now  proposed  to 
increase  the  powers  of  Congress.  This  will  increase  the  duties 
of  the  representatives,  and  they  must  have  a  reasonable  time 
to  obtain  the  information  necessary  to  a  right  discharge  of 
their  office. 

It  has  been  said,  that  our  ancestors  never  relinquished  the 
idea  of  annual  elections.  This  is  an  error.  In  1643,  the  colo- 
nies of  Plymouth,  Massachusetts,  Connecticut  and  New  Haven, 
united  in  a  confederacy,  which  continued  for  about  forty  years  : 
each  colony  sent  two  commissioners  as  their  representatives,  and 
by  the  articles  they  were  to  be  annually  elected.  About  the  year 
1650,  the  General  Court  of  Massachusetts  instructed  their  com- 
missioners to  propose  that  the  elections,  instead  of  being  an- 
nual, should  be  only  once  in  three  years.  The  alteration  did 
not  take  place,  but  the  anecdote  proves  that  our  ancestors  have 
not  had  an  uniform  predilection  for  annual  elections. 

Mr.  King  concluded  by  observing,  that  on  a  candid  examina- 
tion of  this  question,  he  presumed  that  the  Constitution  would 
not  be  objected  to  on  account  of  the  biennial  election  of  the 
House  of  Representatives. 

Judge  Dana.  Mr.  President :  The  feeble  state  of  my  health 
will  not  permit  me  to  enter  so  largely  into  the  debates  of  this 
house,  as  I  should  otherwise  be  inclined  to  do.  The  intention 
of  my  rising,  at  present,  is  to  express  my  perfect  acquiescence 
in  the  sentiments  advanced  by  the  honorable  gentleman  from 
Newburyport,  (Mr.  King,)  in  favor  of  the  expediency  of  bien- 


118  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

nial  elections  of  our  federal  representatives.  From  my  own 
experience,  I  think  them  preferable  to  annual  elections.  I  have, 
Sir,  seen  gentlemen  in  Congress,  and  delegates  from  this  State, 
too,  sitting  in  that  honorable  body  without  a  voice — without 
power  to  open  their  mouths,  or  lift  up  their  hands — when  mat- 
ters of  the  highest  importance  to  their  State  have  been  under 
consideration.  I  have  seen  members  in  Congress,  for  the  space 
of  three  months,  without  power,  Sir,  waiting  for  evidence  of 
their  reelection.  Besides,  Sir,  the  more  frequent  elections 
are,  the  oftener  States  will  be  exposed  to  be  deprived  of  their 
voice  and  influence  in  the  national  councils.  I  think  annual 
elections  are  too  short  for  so  extensive  an  empire.  They  keep 
the  members  always  travelling  about ;  and  I  am  of  opinion  that 
elections  for  two  years  are  in  no  way  subversive  of  the  liberties 
of  the  people.  I,  Sir,  am  one  of  the  people,  thank  God  !  and 
am  happy  in  having  an  opportunity  of  expressing  my  personal 
satisfaction  of  such  elections.  For  these,  and  a  variety  of  other 
reasons,  Mr.  Dana  suggested  that  he  thought  this  State  ought  to 
be  the  first  to  adopt  this  method  of  election. 

The  Hon.  Mr.  White  still  thought  that  Congress  might  per- 
petuate themselves,  and  so  reign  emperors  over  us. 

Hon.  Mr.  Gorham  observed,  (iii  continuation  of  Mr.  Dana's 
observation,)  that  there  was  not  now  a  Congress,  although  the 
time  of  their  meeting  had  considerably  elapsed.  Rhode  Island, 
Connecticut,  and  several  other  States,  had  not  gone  on  ;  that 
there  were  now  only  five  States  in  Congress,  when  there  ought 
to  have  been  thirteen  two  months  ago. 

Mr.  Carnes  rose  to  confirm  it,  and  accordingly  read  part  of 
a  letter  from  the  Hon.  Mr.  Otis,  the  purport  of  which  was,  that 
there  was  much  business  to  do — that  only  five  States  were  rep- 
resented, and  that  the  probability  of  an  Indian  war,  &c,  evinced 
the  great  necessity  of  the  establishment  of  an  efficient  federal 
government,  which  will  be  the  result  of  the  adoption  of  the 
proposed  Constitution. 

Dr.  Taylor  rose  to  answer  two  objections  which  *had  been 
made  against  annual  elections.  The  distance  of  place  was  not 
so  great  but  the  delegates  might  reach  Philadelphia  in  a  fort- 
night ;  and  as  they  were  answerable  to  the  people  for  their  con- 
duct, he  thought  it  would  prevent  a  vacancy ;  and  concluded  by 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  119 

saying  he  did  not  conceive  the  arguments  in  favor  of  biennial 
elections  well  founded. 

A  letter  from  the  Hon.  Elbridge  Gerry,  Esq.,  informing  them 
that  he  would  attend  the  Convention,  agreeably  to  their  vote  of 
yesterday,  was  received  and  read. 

On  motion  of  Mr.  Nasson, 

Ordered,  That  a  Committee  be  appointed  to  provide  a  more 
convenient  place  for  the  Convention  to  sit  in. 


Wednesday,  January  16, 1788. 

The  second  paragraph  of  the  second  section  of  the  first  arti- 
cle, was  read  at  the  table.  A  desultory  conversation  ensued  on 
the  mode  of  conducting  the  discussion.  It  was  again  agreed, 
that  in  the  debate  on  any  paragraph,  genllemen  might  discuss 
any  other  part  they  might  suppose  had  relation  to  that  under 
consideration. 

Mr.  Pierce,  (from  Partridgefield,)  after  reading  the  fourth 
section  wished  to  know  the  opinion  of  gentlemen  on  it ;  as  Con- 
gress appeared  thereby  to  have  a  power  to  regulate  the  time, 
place  and  manner  of  holding  elections.  In  respect  to  the  man- 
ner, said  Mr.  Pierce,  suppose  the  legislature  of  this  State  should 
prescribe  that  the  choice  of  the  Federal  Representatives  should 
be  in  the  same  manner  as  that  of  Governor — a  majority  of  all 
the  votes  in  the  State  being  necessary  to  make  it  such — and 
Congress  should  deem  it  an  improper  manner,  and  should  order 
that  it  be  as  practiced  in  several  of  the  Southern  States,  where 
the  highest  number  of  votes  makes  a  choice — have  they  not 
power  by  this  section  so  to  do  ?  Again,  as  to  the  place,  contin- 
ues Mr.  Pierce,  may  not  Congress  direct  that  the  election  for  Mas- 
sachusetts shall  be  held  in  Boston  ?  And  if  so,  it  is  possible 
that  previous  to  the  election,  a  number  of  electors  may  meet, 
agree  upon  the  eight  delegates,  and  propose  the  same  to  a  few 
towns  in  the  vicinity,  who,  agreeing  in  sentiment,  may  meet  on 
the  day  of  election,  and  carry  their  list  by  a  major  vote.  He 
did  not,  he  said,  say  that  this  would  be  the  case  ;  but  he  wished 


120  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

to  know  if  it  was  not  a  possible  one.  As  the  Federal  Represen- 
tatives, who'  are  to  form  the  democratical  part  of  the  general 
government,  are  to  be  a  check  on  the  representatives  of  the 
sovereignty,  the  Senate,  he  thought  the  utmost  caution  ought 
to  be  used,  to  have  their  elections  as  free  as  possible.  He  ob- 
served, that  as  men  have  been  ever  fond  of  power,  we  must  sup- 
pose they  ever  will  continue  so  ;  and  concluded  by  observing, 
that  our  caution  ought  in  the  present  case  to  be  greater,  as  by 
the  proposed  Constitution  no  qualification  of  property  was  re- 
quired in  a  representative  ;  and  it  might  be  in  the  power  of 
some  people  thereby  to  choose  a  bankrupt  for  their  representa- 
tive, in  order  to  give  such  representative  employment,  or  that 
he  might  make  laws  favorable  to  such  a  description  of  people. 

Gen.  Porter  (from  Hadley)  endeavored  to  obviate  the  objec- 
tions of  Mr.  Pierce,  by  showing  the  almost  impossibility  of  Con- 
gress making  a  law  whereby  eight  men  could  be  elected  as  Mr. 
Pierce  had  supposed  ;  and  he  thought  it  equally  impossible  for 
the  people  to  choose  a  person  to  take  care  of  their  property,  who 
had  none  himself. 

Mr.  Bishop  rose  and  observed,  that  by  the  fourth  section  Con- 
gress would  be  enabled  to  control  the  elections  of  representa- 
tives. It  has  been  said,  says  he,  that  this  power  was  given  in 
order  that  refractory  States  may  be  made  to  do  their  duty  ;  but 
if  so,  Sir,  why  was  it  not  so  mentioned?  If  that  was  the  inten- 
tion, he  asked  why  the  clause  did  not  run  thus  :  "  The  times, 
places  and  manner  of  holding  elections  for  Senators  and  Repre- 
sentatives, shall  be  prescribed  in  each  State  by  the  legislature 
thereof;  but"  if  any  State  shall  refuse  or  neglect  so  to  do, 
"  Congress  may,"  &c.  This,  he  said,  would  admit  of  no  pre- 
varication. I  am,  says  Mr.  Bishop,  for  giving  Congress  as  much 
power  to  do  good  as  possible.  It  has  been  said,  Mr.  President, 
that  the  conduct  of  Rhode  Island,  in  recalling  its  delegates 
from  Congress,  has  demonstrated  the  necessity  of  such  a  power 
being  lodged  in  Congress.  I  have  been  informed  by  the  people 
belonging  to  Rhode  Island,  Sir,  that  that  State  never  has  recalled 
its  delegates  from  Congress.  I  do  not  believe  it  has.  And  I 
call  upon  the  gentleman  who  mentioned  it,  to  authenticate  the 
fact. 

The  Hon.  Mr.  King  rose,  and  assured  the  Convention  .that 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  121 

the  State  of  Rhode  Island  did,  by  a  solemn  resolution,  some 
time  since,  recall  its  delegates  from  Congress. 

The  Hon  Mr.  Gorham  confirmed  what  Mr.  King  had  said, 
and  added,  that  during  the  session  of  the  Federal  Convention, 
when  seven  States  only  were  represented  in  Congress,  applica- 
tion was  made  by  two  companies  for  the  purchase  of  lands,  the 
sale  of  which  would  have  sunk  seven  or  eight  millions  of  dollars 
of  the  continental  debt,  and  that  the  most  pressing  letters  were 
sent  on  to  Rhode  Island  to  send  on  its  delegates,  but  that  State 
refused.  The  consequence  was,  the  contract  could  not  then  be 
made. 

Mr.  Bishop  confessed  himself  convinced  of  the  fact.  He 
proceeded  to  observe,  that  if  the  States  shall  refuse  to  do  their 
duty,  then  let  the  power  be  given  to  Congress  to  oblige  them  to 
doit:  but  i%  they  do  their  duty,  Congress  ought  not  to  have 
a  power  to  control  elections.  In  an  uncontrolled  representation, 
says  Mr.  Bishop,  lies  the  security  of  freedom ;  and  he  thought 
by  these  clauses,  that  freedom  was  sported  with.  In  fact, 
says  he,  the  moment  we  give  Congress  this  power,  the  liberties 
of  the  yeomanry  of  this  country  are  at  an  end.  But  he  trusted 
they  would  never  give  it ;  and  he  felt  a  consolation  from  the 
reflection. 

The  fourth  section,  which  provides  that  the  State  legislatures 
shall  prescribe  the  time,  place  and  manner  of  holding  elections, 
and  that  Congress  may  at  any  time  make  or  alter  them,  except 
in  case  of  Senators,  [though  not  in  regular  order,]  was  now 
under  deliberation. 

The  Hon.  Mr.  Strong  followed  Mr.  Bishop,  and  pointed  out 
the  necessity  there  is  for  the  fourth  section.  The  power,  says 
he,  to  regulate  the  elections  of  our  federal  representatives  must 
be  lodged  somewhere.  I  know  of  but  two  bodies  wherein  it 
can  be  lodged — the  Legislatures  of  the  several  States,  and  the 
General  Congress.  If  the  legislative  bodies  of  the  States,  who 
must  be  supposed  to  know  at  what  time,  and  in  what  place  and 
manner,  the  elections  can  best  be  held,  should  so  appoint  them, 
it  cannot  be  supposed  that  Congress,  by  the  power  granted  by 
this  section,  will  alter  them.  But  if  a  legislature  of  a  State 
should  refuse  to  make  such  regulations,  the  consequence  will 
be,  that  the  representatives  will  not  be  chosen,  and  the  general 

16 


122  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

government  will  be  dissolved.  In  such  case,  can  gentlemen 
say  that  a  power  to  remedy  the  evil  is  not  necessary  to  be  lodged 
somewhere  ?  And  where  can  it  be  lodged  but  in  Congress  ?  I 
will  consider  its  advantage  in  another  respect :  we  know,  Sir, 
that  a  negligence  in  the  appointment  of  rulers  is  the  character- 
istic of  all  nations.  In  this  State,  and  since  the  establishment 
of  our  present  Constitution,  the  first  officers  of  government 
have  been  elected  by  less  than  one-tenth  part  of  the  electors  in 
the  State.  We  also  know  that  our  town  meetings,  for  the 
choice  of  officers,  are  generally  attended  by  an  inconsiderable 
part  of  the  qualified  voters.  People  attend  so  much  to  their 
private  interest,  that  they  are  apt  to  neglect  this  right.  Nations 
have  lost  their  liberties  by  neglecting  their  privileges  ;  conse- 
quently Congress  ought  to  have  an  interposing  power  to  awaken 
the  people,  when  thus  negligent.  Even  supposing!  Sir,  the  pro- 
visional clause  suggested  by  the  worthy  gentleman  from  Norton, 
should  be  added — would  not  Congress  then  be  the  judges 
whether  the  elections  in  the  several  States  were  constitutional 
,and  proper  ?  If  so,  it  will  then  stand  on  the  same  ground  it 
now  does.  It  appears  evident  that  there  must  be  a  general 
power  to  regulate  general  elections.  Gentlemen  have  said,  the 
proposed  Constitution  was  in  some  places  ambiguous.  I  wish 
they  would  point  out  the  particular  instances  of  ambiguity  ;  for 
my  part  I  think  the  whole  of  it  is  expressed  in  the  plain,  com- 
mon language  of  mankind.  If  any  parts  are  not  so  explicit  as 
they  could  be,  it  cannot  be  attributed  to  any  design  ;  for  I  be- 
lieve a  great  majority  of  the  men  who  formed  it  were  sincere 
and  honest  men. 

Mr.  Bishop  said,  the  great  difficulty  with  him  was,  that  the 
power  given  by  the  fourth  section  was  unlimited  ;  and  he  did 
not  yet  see  that  any  advantage  would  arise  from  its  being  so. 

Mr.  Cabot  (of  Beverly)  not  having  spoke  upon  the  question 
of  biennial  elections  of  representatives,  begged  leave  to  revert 
to  that  subject,  so  far  as  to  add  to  what  had  been  said  by  others, 
ithat  we  should  consider  of  the  particular  business  which  that 
■body  will  be  frequently  called  upon  to  transact,  especially  in 
.the  way  of  revenue.  We  should  consider,  that  on  a  question 
-of  supplies  of  money  to  support  a  war,  or  purchase  a  treaty,  it 
will  be  impossible  for  those  representatives  to  judge  of  the  ex- 


1788.1  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  123 

J  • 

pediency  or  inexpediency  of  such  supplies,  until  they  shall  have 
had  time  to  become  acquainted  with  the  general  system  of  fed- 
eral politics,  in  its  connection  or  relation  to  foreign  powers  ;  be- 
cause upon  the  situation  of  those  must  depend  the  propriety  or 
impropriety  of  granting  supplies.  If  to  this  be  added  a  due 
attention  to  the  easiest  way  of  raising  such  supplies,  it  must 
appear,  that  biennial  elections  are  as  frequent  as  is  consistent 
with  using  the  power  of  the  representatives,  for  the  benefit  of 
their  constituents. 

Mr.  Cabot  then  turned  to  the  fourth  section,  now  under  debate, 
and  said  :  It  gives  me  no  pain  to  see  the  anxiety  of  different 
gentlemen  concerning  the  paragraph  under  consideration,  as  it 
evidences  a  conviction  in  their  minds  of  what  I  believe  to  be 
true,  that  a  free  and  equal  representation  is  the  best,  if  not  the 
only,  foundation  upon  which  a  free  government  can  be  built,  and 
consequently  that  the  greatest  care  should  be  taken  in  laying 
it.  I  am,  Sir,  one  of  the  people ;  such  I  shall  continue,  and 
with  their  feelings  I  hold  "  that  the  right  of  electing  persons 
to  represent  the  people  in  the  federal  government,  is  an  impor- 
tant and  sacred  right."  The  opinions  that  have  been  offered 
upon  the  manner  in  which  the  exercise  of  this  right  is  provided 
for  by  the  fourth  section,  satisfy  me  that  we  are  all  solicitous 
for  the  same  end,  and  that  we  only  differ  as  to  the  means  of  at- 
taining it ;  and  for  my  own  part  I  confess  that  I  prize  the  fourth 
section  as  highly  as  any  in  the  Constitution  ;  because  I  consider 
the  democratic  branch  of  the  National  Government,  the  branch 
chosen  immediately  by  the  people,  as  intended  to  be  a  check  on 
the  federal  branch,  which  latter  is  not  an  immediate  represen- 
tation of  the  people  of  America,  and  is  not  chosen  by  them, 
but  is  a  representation  of  the  sovereignty  of  the  individual 
States,  and  its  members  delegated  by  the  several  State  legisla- 
tures ;  and  if  the  State  legislatures  are  suffered  to  regulate  con- 
clusively the  elections  of  the  democratic  branch,  they  may,  by 
such  an  interference,  first  weaken,  and  at  last  destroy,  that 
check  ;  they  may  at  first  diminish,  and  finally  annihilate,  that 
control  of  the  General  Government  which  the  people  ought 
always  to  have  through  their  immediate  representatives.  As  one 
of  the  people,  therefore,  I  repeat,  that,  in  my  mind,  the  fourth 
section  is  to  be  as  highly  prized  as  any  in  the  Constitution. 


124  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  ["1788. 

Mr.  Parsons  contended  for  the  vesting  in  Congress  the  pow- 
ers contained  in  the  fourth  section,  not  only  as  those  powers 
were  necessary  for  preserving  the  Union,  but  also  for  securing 
to  the  people  their  equal  rights  of  election.  He  considered  the 
subject  very  fully,  but  we  are  able  to  give  our  readers  very  im- 
perfectly the  heads  of  his  speech.  In  the  Congress,  not  only 
the  sovereignty  of  the  States  is  represented  in  the  Senate,  but, 
to  balance  their  power,  and  to  give  the  people  a  suitable  and 
efficient  check  upon  them,  the  Federal  Representatives  are  intro- 
duced into  Congress.  The  legislatures  of  the  several  States  are 
the  constituents  of  the  Senate,  and  the  people  are  the  constitu- 
ents of  the  Representatives.  These  two  branches  therefore,  have 
different  constituents,  and  as  they  are  designed  as  mutual  checks 
upon  each  other,  and  to  balance  the  legislative  powers,  there 
will  be  frequent  struggles  and  contentions  between  them.  The 
Senate  will  wish  to  control,  depress  and  render  inefficient,  the 
Representatives.  The  same  disposition  in  the  Representatives 
towards  the  Senate,  will  produce  the  like  exertions  on  their 
part.  The  Senate  will  call  upon  their  constituents,  the  legisla- 
tures, for  aid.  The  Representatives  will  look  up  to  the  people 
for  support.  If,  therefore,  the  power  of  making  and  altering 
the  regulations  denned  in  this  section,  are  vested  absolutely  in 
the  legislature,  the  Representatives  will  very  soon  be  reduced 
to  an  undue  dependence  upon  the  Senate,  because  the  power  of 
influencing  and  controling  the  election  of  the  representatives  of 
the  people,  will  be  exerted  without  control  by  the  constituents 
of  the  senators.  He  further  observed,  that  there  was  much  less 
danger  in  trusting  these  powers  in  Congress,  than  in  the  State 
legislatures ;  for  if  the  Federal  Representatives  wished  to  intro- 
duce suqfr  regulations  as  would  secure  to  them  their  places,  and 
a  continuance  in  office,  the  Federal  Senate  would  never  consent, 
because  it  would  increase  the  influence  and  check  of  the  Rep- 
resentatives ;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  if  the  Senate  were  aim- 
ing at  regulations  to  increase  their  own  influence  by  depressing 
the  Representatives,  the  consent  of  the  latter  never  would  be 
obtained,  and  no  other  regulations  would  ever  obtain  the  con- 
sent of  both  branches  of  the  legislature,  but  such  as  did  not 
affect  their  mutual  rights  and  the  balance  of  government — and 
those  regulations  will  be  for  the  benefit  of  the  people.     But  a 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  125 

State  legislature,  under  the  influence  of  their  Senators,  who 
would  have  their  fullest  confidence,  or  under  the  influence  of 
ambitious  or  popular  characters,  or  in  times  of  popular  commo- 
tion, and  when  faction  and  party  spirit  run  high,  would  intro- 
duce such  regulations  as  would  render  the  rights  of  the  people 
insecure,  and  of  little  value.  They  might  make  an  unequal 
and  partial  division  of  the  State  into  districts  for  the  election  of 
representatives,  or  they  might  even  disqualify  one-third  of  the 
electors.  Without  these  powers  in  Congress,  the  people  can 
have  no  remedy.  But  the  fourth  section  provides  a  remedy,  a 
controlling  power,  in  a  legislature  composed  of  senators  and 
representatives  of  twelve  States,  without  the  influence  of  our 
commotions  and  factions,  who  will  hear  impartially,  and  pre- 
serve and  restore  to  the  people  their  equal  and  sacred  rights  of 
election.  Perhaps  it  then  will  be  objected,  that,  from  the  sup- 
posed opposition  of  interests  in  the  Federal  legislature,  they 
may  never  agree  upon  any  regulations  ;  but  regulations  neces- 
sary to  the  interests  of  the  people  can  never  be  opposed  to 
the  interests  of  either  of  the  branches  of  the  Federal  legisla- 
ture, because  the  interests  of  the  people  require  that  the  mutual 
powers  of  that  legislature  should  be  preserved  unimpaired,  in 
order  to  balance  the  government.  Indeed,  if  the  Congress 
could  never  agree  on  any  regulations,  then  certainly  no  objec- 
tion to  the  fourth  section  can  remain,  for  the  regulations  intro- 
duced by  the  State  legislatures  will  be  the  governing  rule  of 
elections,  until  Congress  can  agree  upon  alterations. 

Mr.  Wedgery  insisted  that  we  had  a  right  to  be  jealous  of 
our  rulers,  who  ought  never  to  have  a  power  which  they  could 
abuse.  The  fourth  section  ought  to  have  gone  further — it  ought 
to  have  had  the  provision  in  it  mentioned  by  Mr.  Bishop.  There 
would  then  be  a  mutual  check :  and  he  still  wished  it  to  be 
further  explained.  The  worthy  gentleman  contested  the  simil- 
itude made  by  the  honorable  gentleman  from  Newburyport,  be- 
tween the  power  to  be  given  to  Congress  by  the  fourth  section, 
to  compel  the  States  to  send  representatives,  and  the  power 
given  to  the  legislature  by  our  own  Constitution,  to  oblige  towns 
to  send  representatives  to  the  general  court,  by  observing  that 
the  case  was  materially  different ;  as,  in  the  latter,  if  any  town 
refuses  to  send  representatives,  a  power  of  fining  such  town 


126  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

only  is  given.  It  is  in  vain,  says  Mr.  Wedgery,  to  say  that 
rulers  are  not  subject  to  passions  and  prejudices.  In  the  last 
general  court,  of  which  I  was  a  member,  I  would,  willingly  have 
deprived  the  three  western  counties  from  sending  delegates  to 
this  house,  as  I  then  thought  it  unnecessary.  But,  Sir,  what 
would  have  been  the  consequence  ?  A  large  part  of  the  State 
would  have  been  deprived  of  their  dearest  privileges.  I  men- 
tion this,  Sir,  to  show  the  force  of  passion  and  prejudice. 

The  Hon.  Mr.  White  said,  we  ought  to  be  jealous  of  rulers. 
All  the  godly  men  we  read  of  have  failed — nay,  he  would  not 
trust  "  a  flock  of  Moseses."  If  we  give  up  this  section,  says 
he,  there  is  nothing  left.  Suppose  the  Congress  should  say 
that  none  should  be  electors  but  those  worth  50/.  or  an  100/. 
sterling — cannot  they  do  it  ?  Yes,  says  he,  they  can  ;  and  if 
any  lawyer  (alluding  to  Mr.  Parsons)  can  beat  me  out  of  it,  I 
will  give  him  ten  guineas. 

Col.  Jones  (of  Bristol)  thought,  by  this  power  to  regulate 
elections,  Congress  might  keep  themselves  in  to  all  duration. 

The  Rev.  Mr.  Perley  wished  Mr.  Gerry  might  be  asked  some 
questions  on  this  section. 

[But  Mr.  Gerry  was  not  in  the  house.] 

Mr.  J.  C.  Jones  said,  it  was  not  right  to  argue  the  possibility 
of  the  abuse  of  any  measure,  against  its  adoption.  The  power 
granted  to  Congress  by  the  fourth  section,  says  he,  is  a  neces- 
sary power  ;  it  will  provide  against  negligence  and  dangerous 
designs.  The  senators  and  representatives  of  this  State,  Mr. 
President,  are  now  chosen  by  a  small  number  of  electors  ;  and 
it  is  likely  we  shall  grow  equally  negligent  of  our  Federal  elec- 
tions ;  or,  Sir,  a  State  may  refuse  to  send  to  Congress  its  repre- 
sentatives, as  Rhode  Island  has  done.  Thus  we  see  its  neces- 
sity. To  say  that  the  power  may  be  abused,  is  saying  what  will 
apply  to  all  power.  The  Federal  representatives  will  represent 
the  people;  they  will  be  the  people,  and  it  is  not  probable  they 
will  abuse  themselves.  Mr.  Jones  concluded  with  repeating, 
that  the  arguments  against  this  power  could  be  urged  against 
any  power  whatever. 

Dr.  Jarvis.  Many  gentlemen  have  inferred  from  the  right 
of  regulating  elections,  by  the  fourth  section  being  invested  in 
the  federal  head,  that  the  powers  of  wresting  this  essential  priv- 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  127 

ilege  from  the  people  would  be  equally  delegated :  but  it  ap- 
peared to  him,  he  said,  that  there  was  a  very  material  distinc- 
tion in  the  two  cases  :  for,  however  possible  it  may  be  that  this 
controlling  authority  may  be  abused,  it  by  no  means  followed, 
that  Congress  in  any  situation  could  strip  the  people  of  their 
right  to  a  direct  representation.  If  he  could  believe  in  this, 
he  should  readily  join  in  sentiment  with  gentlemen  on  the  other 
side  of  the  house,  that  this  section  alone  would  be  a  sufficient 
objection  to  the  Constitution  itself.  The  right  of  election, 
founded  on  the  principle  of  equality,  was,  he  said,  the  basis  on 
which  the  whole  superstructure  was  erected.  This  right  was 
inherent  in  the  people  ;  it  was  unalienable  in  its  nature,  and  it 
could  not  be  destroyed  without  presuming  a  power  to  subvert 
the  Constitution  of  which  this  was  the  principle  ;  and  by  recur- 
ring to  the  second  section  it  would  appear  that  "  representatives 
and  direct  taxes  shall  be  apportioned  among  the  several  States 
according  to  their  respective  numbers;"  it  equally  appeared 
that  thirty  thousand  inhabitants  were  entitled  to  send  a  repre- 
sentative, and  that  wherever  this  number  was  found  they  would 
have  a  right  to  be  represented  in  the  Federal  legislature.  If  it 
was  argued  that  Congress  might  abuse  their  power,  and,  by 
varying  the  places  of  election,  distress  the  people,  it  could  only 
be  observed,  that  such  a  wanton  abuse  could  not  be  supposed  : 
but  if  it  could  go  to  the  annihilation  of  the  right,  he  contended 
the  people  would  not  submit.  He  considered  the  Constitution 
as  an  elective  democracy,  in  which  the  sovereignty  still  rested 
in  the  people,  and  he  by  no  means  could  believe  that  this  article 
was  so  alarming  in  its  nature,  or  dangerous  in  its  tendency,  as 
many  gentlemen  had  supposed. 

Mr.  Holmes,  in  reply  to  Dr.  Jarvis,  said,  the  worthy  gentle- 
man's superstructure  must  fall  to  the  ground,  for  the  Constitu- 
tion does  not  provide  that  every  thirty  thousand  shall  send  a 
representative,  but  that  it  shall  not  exceed  one  for  every  thirty 
thousand. 


128  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

Thursday,  January  17, 1788. 

The  fourth  section  still  under  deliberation. 

Hon.  Mr.  Turner.  Mr.  President :  I  am  pleased  with  the 
ingenuity  of  some  gentlemen  in  defence  of  this  section.  I  am 
so  impressed  with  the  love  of  liberty  so  dearly  bought,  that  I 
heartily  acquiesce  in  compulsory  laws,  for  the  people  ought  to 
be  obliged  to  attend  to  their  interest.  But  I  do  not  wish  to 
give  Congress  a  power  which  they  can  abuse  ;  and  I  wish  to 
know  whether  such  a  power  is  not  contained  in  this  section.  I 
think  it  is.  I  now  proceed,  Sir,  to  the  consideration  of  an  idea 
that  Congress  may  alter  the  place  of  choosing  representatives 
in  the  General  Congress.  They  may  order  that  it  may  be  at 
the  extremity  of  a  State,  and,  by  their  influence,  may  there 
prevail,  that  persons  may  be  chosen  who  otherwise  would  not ; 
by  reason  that  a  part  of  the  qualified  voters  in  part  of  the  State 
would  be  so  incommoded  thereby,  as  to  be  debarred  from  their 
right,  as  much  as  if  they  were  bound  at  home.  If  so,  such  a 
circumstance  would  militate  against  the  Constitution,  wlwch 
allows  every  man  to  vote.  Altering  the  place,  will  put  it  so  far 
in  the  power  of  Congress  as  that  the  representatives  chosen  will 
not  be  the  true  and  genuine  representatives  of  the  people,  but 
creatures  of  the  Congress  ;  and  so  far  as  they  are  so,  so  far  are 
the  people  deprived  of  their  rights,  and  the  choice  will  be  made 
in  an  irregular  and  unconstitutional  manner.  When  this  alter- 
ation is  made  by  Congress,  may  we  not  suppose  whose  reelec- 
tion will  be  provided  for  ?  Would  it  not  be  for  those  who  were 
chosen  before  ?  The  great  law  of  self-preservation  will  prevail. 
It  is  true,  they  might,  one  time  in  a  hundred,  provide  for  a 
friend,  but  most  commonly  for  themselves.  But,  however  hon- 
orable the  Convention  may  be  who  proposed  this  article,  I  think 
it  is  a  genuine  power  for  Congress  to  perpetuate  themselves  ;  a 
power  that  cannot  be  unexceptionably  exercised  in  any  case 
whatever.  Knowing  the  numerous  arts  that  designing  men  are 
prone  to,  to  secure  their  election,  and  perpetuate  themselves,  it 
is  my  hearty  wish  that  a  rotation  may  be  provided  for.  I  re- 
spect and  revere  the  Convention  who  proposed  this  Constitution. 
In  order  that  the  power  given  to  Congress  may  be  more  palata- 
ble, some  gentlemen  are  pleased  to  hold  up  the  idea  that  we 


1788.]  '        DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  129 

may  be  blessed  with  sober,  solid,  upright  men  in  Congress.  I 
wish  that  we  may  be  favored  with  such  rulers  ;  but  I  fear  they 
will  not  all,  if  most,  be  the  best  moral  or  political  characters. 
It  gives  me  pain,  and  I  believe  it  gives  pain  to  others,  thus  to 
characterize  the  country  in  which  I  was  born.  I  will  endeavor 
to  guard  against  any  injurious  reflections  against  my  fellow- 
citizens.  But  they  must  have  their  true  characters  ;  and  if  I 
represent  them  wrong,  I  am  willing  to  make  concessions.  I 
think  that  the  operation  of  paper  money,  and  the  practice  of 
privateering,  have  produced  a  gradual  decay  of  morals,  intro- 
duced pride,  ambition,  envy,  lust  of  power,  produced  a  decay 
of  patriotism  and  the  love  of  commutative  justice  ;  and  I  am 
apprehensive  these  are  the  invariable  concomitants  of  the  lux- 
ury in  which  we  are  unblessedly  involved,  almost  to  our  total 
destruction.  In  the  lower  ranks  of  people,  luxury  and  avarice 
operate  to  the  want  of  public  duty  and  the  payment  of  debts. 
These  demonstrate  the  necessity  of  an  energetic  government. 
As  people  become  more  luxurious,  they  become  more  incapaci- 
tated for  governing  themselves.  And  are  we  not  so  ?  Alike 
people,  alike  prince.  But  suppose  it  should  so  happen  that  the 
administrators  of  this  Constitution  should  be  preferable  to  the 
corrupt  mass  of  the  people,  in  point  of  manners,  morals  and 
rectitude  ;  power  will  give  a  keen  edge  to  the  principles  I  have 
mentioned.  Ought  we  not,  then,  to  put  all  checks  and  controls 
on  governors,  for  the  public  safety  ?  Therefore,  instead  of  giv- 
ing Congress  powers  they  may  not  abuse,  we  ought  to  withhold 
our  hands  from  granting  such  as  must  be  abused  if  exercised. 
This  is  a  general  observation.  But  to  the  point :  At  the  time 
of  the  Restoration,  the  people  of  England  were  so  vexed,  har- 
rassed  and  worn  down  by  the  anarchical  and  confused  state  of 
the  nation,  owing  to  the  Commonwealth  not  being  well  digested, 
that  they  took  an  opposite  career — they  ran  mad  with  loyalty, 
and  would  have  given  Charles  any  thing  he  could  have  asked. 
Pardon  me,  Sir,  if  I  say  I  feel  the  want  of  an  energetic  govern- 
ment, and  the  dangers  to  which  this  dear  country  is  reduced, 
as  much  as  any  citizen  of  the  United  States ;  but  I  cannot  pre- 
vail on  myself  to  adopt  a  government  which  wears  the  face  of 
power,  without  examining  it.  Relinquishing  an  hair's  breadth 
in  a  Constitution  is  a  great  deal ;  for  by  small  degrees  has  lib- 
17 


130  DEBATES    OF    CONTENTION.       '  [1788. 

erty  in  all  nations  been  wrested  from  the  hands  of  the  people. 
I  know  great  powers  are  necessary  to  be  given  to  Congress,  but 
I  wish  they  may  foe  well  guarded. 

Judge  Sumner,  remarking  on  Gen.  Thompson's  frequent 
exclamation,  of  "  0,  my  country!"  expressed  from  an  appre- 
hension that  the  Constitution  would  be  adopted,  said,  that  ex- 
pression might  be  used  with  greater  propriety  should  this  Con- 
vention reject  it.  The  honorable  gentleman  then  proceeded  to 
demonstrate  the  necessity  of  the  fourth  section  ;  the  absurdity 
of  the  supposition  that  Congress  would  remove  the  places  of 
election  to  remote  parts  of  the  States ;  combated  the  idea  that 
Congress  would,  when  chosen,  act  as  bad  as  possible ;  and  con- 
cluded by  asking,  if  a  war  should  take  place,  (and  it  was  sup- 
posable,)  if  France  and  Holland  should  send  an  army  to  collect 
the  millions  of  livres  they  have  lent  us  in  the  time  of  our  dis- 
tresses, and  that  army  should  be  in  possession  of  the  seat  of 
government  of  any  particular  State,  (as  was  the  case  when  Lord 
Cornwallis  ravaged  Carolina,)  and  the  State  legislature  could 
not  appoint  the  elections,  is  not  a  power  to  provide  for  such 
elections  necessary  to  be  lodged  in  the  general  Congress  ? 

Mr.  Wedgery  denied  the  statement  of  Dr.  Jarvis  (that  every 
thirty  thousand  persons  can  elect  one  representative)  to  be  just, 
as  the  Constitution  provides  that  the  number  shall  not  exceed 
one  to  every  thirty  thousand.  It  did  not  follow,  he  thought, 
that  the  thirty  thousand  shall  elect  one.  But  admitting  that 
they  have  a  right  to  choose  one,  we  will  suppose  Congress  should 
order  an  election  to  be  in  Boston,  in  January,  and  from  the 
scarcity  of  money,  &c,  not  a  fourth  part  could  attend,  would 
not  three-quarters  of  the  people  be  deprived  of  their  right  ? 

Rev.  Mr.  West.  I  rise  to  express  my  astonishment  at  the 
arguments  of  some  gentlemen  against  this  section.  They  have 
only  started  possible  objections  ;  I  wish  the  gentlemen  would 
show  us  that  what  they  so  much  deprecate  is  probable.  Is  it 
probable  that  we  shall  choose  men  to  ruin  us  ?  Are  we  to  ob- 
ject to  all  governments  ?  and  because  power  may  be  abused, 
shall  we  be  reduced  to  anarchy  and  a  state  of  nature  ?  What 
hinders  our  State  legislature  from  abusing  their  power  ?  They 
may  violate  the  Constitution  ;  they  may  levy  taxes,  oppressive 
and  intolerable,  to  the  amount  of  all  our  property.     An  argu- 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  131 

ment  which  proves  too  much,  it  is  said,  proves  nothing.  Some 
say,  Congress  may  remove  the  place  of  elections  to  the  State  of 
South  Carolina.  This  is  inconsistent  with  the  words  of  the 
Constitution,  which  says,  "  that  the  elections  shall  be  prescribed 
in  each  State  by  the  legislature  thereof,"  &c,  and  that  repre- 
sentation shall  be  apportioned  according  to  numbers.  It  will 
frustrate  the  end  of  the  Constitution,  and  is  a  reflection  on  the 
gentlemen  who  formed  it.  Can  we,  Sir,  suppose  them  so  wick- 
ed, so  vile,  as  to  recommend  an  article  so  dangerous  ?  Surely 
gentlemen  who  argue  these  possibilities,  show  they  have  a  very 
weak  cause.  That  we  may  all  be  free  from  passions,  prepos- 
sessions and  party  spirit,  I  sincerely  hope,  otherwise  reason  will 
have  no  effect.  I  hope  there  are  none  here  but  who  are  open 
to  conviction,  as  it  is  the  surest  method  to  gain  the  suffrages  of 
our  consciences.  The  honorable  gentleman  from  Scituate  has 
told  us  that  the  people  of  England,  at  the  Restoration,  on  ac- 
count of  the  inconveniences  of  the  confused  state  of  the  Com- 
monwealth, ran  mad  with  loyalty.  If  the  gentleman  means  to 
apply  this  to  us,  we  ought  to  adopt  this  Constitution  ;  for  if  the 
people  are  running  mad  after  an  energetic  government,  it  is  best 
to  stop  now,  as,  by  his  rule,  they  may  run  further  and  get  a 
worse  one  ;  therefore  the  gentleman's  arguments  turn  right 
against  himself.  Is  it  possible  that  imperfect  man  can  make  a 
perfect  Constitution  ?  Is  it  possible  that  a  frame  of  government 
can  be  devised  by  such  weak  and  frail  creatures,  but  what  must 
savor  of  that  weakness  ?  Though  there  are  some  things 
that  I  do  not  like  in  this  Constitution,  yet  I  think  it  necessary 
that  it  should  be  adopted.  For  may  we  not  rationally  conclude 
that  the  persons  we  shall  choose  to  administer  it,  will  be,  in 
general,  good  men  ? 

Gen.  Thompson.  Mr.  President,  I  have  frequently  heard  of 
the  abilities  and  fame  of  the  learned  and  reverend  gentleman 
last  speaking,  and  now  I  am  witness  to  them.  But,  Sir,  one 
thing  surprises  me  :  It  is,  to  hear  the  worthy  gentleman  insin- 
uate that  our  Federal  rulers  will  undoubtedly  be  good  men, 
and  that,  therefore,  we  have  little  to  fear  from  their  being  in- 
trusted with  all  power.  This,  Sir,  is  quite  contrary  to  the  com- 
mon language  of  the  clergy,  who  are  continually  representing 
mankind  as  reprobate  and  deceitful,  and  that  we  really  grow 


132  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

worse  and  worse  day  after  day.  I  really  believe  we  do,  Sir,  and 
I  make  no  doubt  to  prove  it  before  I  sit  down,  from  the  Old 
Testament.  When  I  consider  the  man  that  slew  the  lion  and 
the  bear,  and  that  he  was  a  man  after  God's  own  heart ;  when 
I  consider  his  son,  blest  with  all  wisdom,  and  the  errors  they 
fell  into,  I  extremely  doubt  the  infallibility  of  human  nature. 
Sir,  I  suspect  my  own  heart,  and  I  shall  suspect  our  rulers. 

Dr.  Holten  thought  this  paragraph  necessary  to  a  complete 
system  of  government. 

[But  the  honorable  gentleman  spoke  so  low  that  we  could  not 
hear  him  distinctly  throughout.] 

Capt.  Snow.  It  has  been  said,  Mr.  President,  that  there  is 
too  much  power  delegated  to  Congress  by  the  section  under  con- 
sideration. I  doubt  it.  I  think  power  the  hinge  on  which  the 
whole  Constitution  turns.  Gentlemen  have  talked  about  Con- 
gress moving  the  place  of  elections  from  Georgia  to  the  Mohawk 
River,  but  I  never  can  believe  it.  I  will  venture  to  conjecture 
we  shall  have  some  honest  men  in  our  Congress.  We  read  that 
there  were  two  who  brought  a  good  report — Caleb  and  Joshua. 
Now,  if  there  are  but  two  in  Congress  who  are  honest  men,  and 
Congress  should  attempt  to  do  what  the  gentlemen  say  they  will, 
(which  will  be  high  treason,)  they  will  bring  a  report  of  it ; 
and  I  stand  ready  to  leave  my  wife  and  family — sling  my  knap- 
sack— travel  westward — to  cut  their  heads  off.  I,  Sir,  since  the 
war,  have  had  commerce  with  six  different  nations  of  the  globe, 
and  I  have  inquired  in  what  estimation  America  is  held;  and, 
if  I  may  believe  good,  honest,  credible  men,  I  find  this  country 
held  in  the  same  light  by  foreign  nations  as  a  well-behaved  negro 
in  a  gentleman's  family.  Suppose,  Mr.  President,  I  had  a 
chance  to  make  a  good  voyage,  but  I  tie  my  captain  up  to  such 
strict  orders  that  he  can  go  to  no  other  island  to  sell  my  vessel, 
although  there  is  a  certainty  of  his  doing  well.  The  conse- 
quence is,  he  returns,  but  makes  a  bad  voyage,  because  he  had 
not  power  enough  to  act  his  judgment  (for  honest  men  do 
right).  Thus,  Sir,  Congress  cannot  save  us  from  destruction, 
because  we  tie  their  hands  and  give  them  no  power ;  (I  think 
people  have  lost  their  privileges  by  not  improving  them ;)  and 
I  like  this  power  being  vested  in  Congress  as  well  as  any  para- 
graph in  the  Constitution — for  as  the  man  is  accountable  for  his 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  133 

conduct,  I  think  there  is  no  danger.  Now,  Mr.  President,  to 
take  all  things  into  consideration,  something  more  must  be  said 
to  convince  me  to  the  contrary. 

[Several  other  gentlemen  went  largely  into  the  debate  on  the 
fourth  section,  which  those  in  favor  of  it  demonstrated  to  be 
necessary :  first,  as  it  may  be  used  to  correct  a  negligence  in 
elections ;  secondly,  as  it  will  prevent  the  dissolution  of  the 
government  by  designing  and  refractory  States  ;  thirdly,  as  it 
will  operate  as  a  check,  in  favor  of  the  people,  against  any  de- 
signs of  the  Federal  Senate,  and  their  constituents,  the  State 
legislatures,  to  deprive  the  people  of  their  right  of  election ; 
and,  fourthly,  as  it  provides  a  remedy  for  the  evil,  should  any 
State,  by  invasion,  or  other  cause,  not  have  it  in  its  power  to 
appoint  a  place  where  the  citizens  thereof  may  meet  to  choose 
their  Federal  representatives.  Those  against  it  urged,  that  the 
power  is  unlimited  and  unnecessary.] 

The  Committee  appointed  to  provide  a  more  suitable  place  for 
the  Convention  to  sit  in,  reported  that  the  meeting-house  in 
Long  Lane,  in  Boston,  was  prepared  for  that  purpose  ;  where- 
upon, 

Voted,  That  when  this  Convention  adjourn  they  will  adjourn 
to  that  place. 


AFTERNOON. 

The  second  paragraph  of  the  second  section  of  the  first  article 
was  reverted  to,  and  some  debate  had  thereon. 

Gen.  Thompson  thought  there  should  have  been  some  quali- 
fication of  property  in  a  representative  ;  for,  says  he,  when  men 
have  nothing  to  lose,  they  have  nothing'  to  fear. 

Hon.  Mr.  Sedgwick  said,  that  this  objection  was  founded  on 
an  anti-democratical  principle ;  and  he  was  surprised  that  gen- 
tlemen who  appeared  so  strenuously  to  advocate  the  rights  of 
the  people,  should  wish  to  exclude  from  the  Federal  government 
a  good  man  because  he  was  not  a  rich  one. 

Mr.  King  said  that  gentlemen  had  made  it  a  question,  why  a 
qualification  of  property  in  a  representative  is  omitted,  and  that 
they  thought  the  provision  of  such  a  qualification  necessary. 
He  thought  otherwise  ;  he  never  knew  that  property  was  an 


134  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

index  to  abilities.  We  often  see  men,  said  he,  who,  though 
destitute  of  property,  are  superior  in  knowledge  and  rectitude. 
The  men  who  have  most  injured  the  country,  have  most  com- 
monly been  rich  men.  Such  a  qualification  was  proposed  in 
Convention,  but  by  the  delegates  of  Massachusetts,  it  was  con- 
tested that  it  should  not  obtain.  He  observed,  that  no  such 
qualification  is  required  by  the  Confederation.  In  reply  to  Gen. 
Thompson's  question,  why  disqualification  of  age  was  not  added, 
the  honorable  gentleman  said  that  it  would  not  extend  to  all 
parts  of  the  continent  alike.  Life,  says  he,  in  a  great  measure 
depends  on  climate.  What  in  the  southern  States  would  be 
accounted  long  life,  would  be  but  the  meridian  in  the  northern  ; 
what  here  is  the  time  of  ripened  judgment,  is  old  age  there. 
Therefore  the  want  of  such  a  disqualification  cannot  be  made 
an  objection  to  the  Constitution. 

The  third  paragraph  of  the  second  section  being  read, 
Mr.  King  rose  to  explain  it.  There  has,  says  he,  been  much 
misconception  on  this  section.  It  is  a  principle  of  this  Consti- 
tution, that  representation  and  taxation  should  go  hand  in  hand. 
This  paragraph  states  that  the  number  of  free  persons  shall  be 
determined,  by  adding  to  the  whole  number  of  free  persons,  in- 
cluding those  bound  to  service  for  a  term  of  years,  and  exclud- 
ing Indians  not  taxed,  three-fifths  of  all  other  persons.  These 
persons  are  the  slaves.  By  this  rule  is  representation  and  tax- 
ation to  be  apportioned.  And  it  was  adopted,  because  it  was 
the  language  of  all  America.  According  to  the  Confederation, 
ratified  in  1781,  the  sums  for  the  general  welfare  and  defence 
should  be  apportioned  according  to  the  surveyed  lands,  and  im- 
provements thereon,  in  the  several  States.  But  it  hath  never 
been  in  the  power  of  Congress  to  follow  that  rule ;  the  returns 
from  the  several  States  being  so  very  imperfect. 

Dr.  Taylor  thought  that  the  number  of  members  to  be  chosen 
for  the  House  of  Representatives,  was  too  small.  The  whole 
Union  was  entitled  to  send  but  sixty-five  ;  whereas,  by  the  old 
Confederation,  they  send  ninety-one ;  a  reduction  of  thirty  per 
cent.  He  had  heard  it  objected,  that  if  a  larger  number  were 
sent,  the  house  would  be  unwieldy.  He  thought  our  House  of 
Representatives,  which  sometimes  consists  of  one  hundred  and 
fifty,  was  not  unwieldy  ;  and  if  the  number  of  the  Federal  repre- 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  135 

sentatives  was  enlarged  to  twice  sixty-five,  he  thought  it  would 
not  be  too  large.  He  then  proceeded  to  answer  another  objec- 
tion, "  that  an  increase  of  numbers  would  be  an  increase  of 
expense,"  and  by  calculation  demonstrated  that  the  salaries  of 
the  full  number  he  wished,  would,  in  a  year,  amount  only  to 
.£2,980 — about  one  penny  on  a  poll ;  and  by  this  increase,  he 
thought  every  part  of  the  Commonwealth  would  be  represented. 
The  distresses  of  the  people  would  thereby  be  more  fully  known 
and  relieved. 

Mr.  Wedgery  asked,  if  a  boy  of  six  years  of  age  was  to  be 
considered  as  a  free  person  ? 

Mr.  King,  in  answer,  said,  all  persons  born  free  were  to  be 
considered  as  freemen ;  and  to  make  the  idea  of  taxation  by 
numbers  more  intelligible,  said,  that  five  negro  children  of  South 
Carolina  are  to  pay  as  much  tax  as  the  three  governors  of  New 
Hampshire,  Massachusetts  and  Connecticut. 

Mr.  Gorham  thought  the  proposed  section  much  in  favor  of 
Massachusetts  ;  and  if  it  operated  against  any  State,  it  was 
Pennsylvania,  because  they  have  more  white  persons  bound  than 
any  other.  Mr.  Gorham  corrected  an  observation  of  Dr.  Tay- 
lor's, that  the  States  now  send  ninety-one  delegates  to  Congress 
— which  was  not  the  case.  The  States  do  not,  he  said,  send 
near  that  number ;  and  instanced  Massachusetts,  which  sends 
but  four.  He  concluded  by  saying,  that  the  Constitution  pro- 
vides for  an  increase  of  members,  as  numbers  increase,  and 
that  in  fifty  years  there  will  be  three  hundred  and  sixty — in  one 
hundred  years,  fourteen  or  fifteen  hundred,  if  the  Constitution 
last  so  long. 

Judge  Dana,  remarking  on  the  assertions  of  Dr.  Taylor,  that 
the  number  of  representatives  'was  too  small,  that  the  whole 
Union  was  now  entitled  to  send  but  sixty-five,  whereas  by  the 
Confederation  they  might  send  ninety-one,  a  reduction  of  thirty 
per  cent.,  said,  if  the  Constitution  under  consideration  was,  in 
fact,  what  its  opposers  had  often  called  it,  a  consolidation  of  the 
States,  he  should  readily  agree  with  that  gentleman  that  the 
representation  of  the  people  was  much  too  small ;  but  this  was 
a  charge  brought  against  it  without  any  foundation  in  truth. 
So  far  from  it,  that  it  must  be  apparent  to  every  one,  that  the 
Federal  government  springs  out  of,  and  can  alone  be  brought 


136  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

into  existence  by,  the  State  governments.     Demolish  the  latter, 
and  there  is  an  end  of  the  former.     Had  the  Continental  Con- 
vention,  then,  doubled  the  representation,  agreeably  to  that 
gentleman's  ideas,  would  not  the  people  of  this  Commonwealth 
have  been  the  first  to  complain  of  it  as  an  unnecessary  burden 
laid  upon  them ;  that,  in  addition  to  their  own  domestic  gov- 
ernment they  had  been  charged  with  the  support  of  so  numer- 
ous a  national  government.     Would  they  not  have  contended 
for  the  demolition  of  the  one  or  the  other,  as  being  unable  to 
support  both.     Would  they  have  been  satisfied  by  being  told 
that  doubling  the  representation  would  yearly  amount  only  "  to 
about  one  penny  upon  a  poll."     Does  not  the  gentleman  know 
that  the  expense  of  our  own  numerous  representation  lias  excit- 
ed much  ill  will  against  the  government  ?     Has  he  never  heard 
it  said  among  the  people  that  our  public  affairs  would  be  as  well 
conducted  by  half  the  number  of  representatives  ?      If  he  has 
not,  I  have,  Sir,  and  believe  it  to  be  true.      BiU  the  gentleman 
says  there  is  a  reduction  of  thirty  per  cent,  in  the  Federal  rep- 
resentation, as  the  whole  Union  can  send  but  sixty-five  mem- 
bers, when  under  the  Confederation  they  may  send  ninety-one. 
The  gentleman  has  not  made  a  fair  calculation.      For  if  to  the 
sixty-five  representatives  under  the  proposed  Constitution  we 
add  two  senators  from  each  State,  amounting  to  twenty-six  in 
all,  we  shall  have  the  same  number,  ninety-one,  so  that  in  this 
respect  there  is  no  difference.     Besides,  this  representation  will 
increase  with  the  population  of  the  States,  and  soon  become 
sufficiently  large  to  meet  that  gentleman's  ideas.     I  would  just 
.observe,  that  by  the  Confederation  this  State  has  a  right  to  send 
seven  members  to  Congress ;  yet  although  the  legislature  hath 
sometimes  chosen  the  wrhole  number,  I  believe  at  no  time  have 
they  had  or  wished  to  have  more  than  four  of  them  actually  in 
Congress.     Have  any  ill  consequences  arisen  from  this  small 
representation  in  the  national  council  ?     Have  our  liberties  been 
endangered  by  it  ?     No  one  will  say  they  have.     The  honorable 
gentleman  drW  a  parallel  between  the  eastern  and  southern 
States,  and  showed  the  injustice  done  the  former,  by  the  present 
mode  of  apportioning  taxes,  according  to  surveyed  land  and 
improvements,  and  the  consequent  advantage  therefrom  to  the 
latter,  their  property  not  lying  in  improvements,  in  buildings,  <fec. 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  137 

In  reply  to  the  remark  of  some  gentlemen,  that  the  southern 
States  were  favored  in  this  mode  of  apportionment,  by  having 
five  of  their  negroes  set  against  three  persons  in  the  eastern, 
the  honorable  judge  observed,  that  the  negroes  of  the  southern 
States  work  no  longer  than  when  the  eye  of  the  driver  is  on 
them.  Can,  asked  he,  that  land  flourish  like  this  which  is  cul- 
tivated by  the  hands  of  freemen  ?  And  are  not  three  of  these 
independent  freemen  of  more  real  advantage  to  a  State,  than 
five  of  those  poor  slaves  ?  As  a  friend  to  equal  taxation,  he 
rejoiced  that  an  opportunity  was  presented  in  this  Constitution, 
to  change  this  unjust  mode  of  apportionment.  Indeed,  con- 
cluded he,  from  a  survey  of  every  part  of  the  Constitution,  I 
think  it  the  best  that  the  wisdom  of  man  could  suggest. 

Mr.  Nasson  remarked  on  the  statement  of  the  Hon.  Mr.  King, 
by  saying,  that  the  honorable  gentleman  should  have  gone  fur- 
ther, and  shown  us  the  other  side  of  the  question.  It  is  a 
good  rule  that  works  both  ways  f  .and  the  gentleman  should 
also  have  told  us,  that  three  of  our  infants  in  the  cradle  are  to 
be  rated  as  high  as  five  of  the  working  negroes  of  Virginia. 
Mr.  Nasson  adverted  to  a  statement  of  Mr.  King,  who  had  said, 
that  five  negro  children  of  South  Carolina  were  equally  rata- 
ble as  three  governors  of  New  England,  and  wished,  he  said, 
the  honorable  gentleman  had  considered  this  question  upon  the 
other  side,  as  it  would  then  appear  that  this  State  will  pay  as 
great  a  tax  for  three  children  in  the  cradle,  as  any  of  the  south- 
ern States  will  for  five  hearty  working  negro  men.  He  hoped, 
he  said,  while  we  were  making  a  new  government,  we  should 
make  it  better  than  the  old  one ;  for  if  we  had  made  a  bad 
bargain  before,  as  had  been  hinted,  it  was  a  reason  why  we 
should  make  a  better  one  now. 

Mr.  Randal  begged  leave  to  answer  a  remark  of  the  Hon. 
Mr.  Dana,  which  he  thought  reflected  on  the  barrenness  of  the 
southern  States.  He  spoke  from  his  own  personal  knowledge, 
he  said,  and  he  could  say,  that  the  land  in  general  in  those 
States  was  preferable  to  any  he  ever  saw. 

Judge  Dana  rose  to  set  the  gentleman  right.  He  said  it  was 
not  the  quality  of  the  lands,  but  the  manner  of  tilling  it,  that 
he  alluded  to. 

18 


138  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

Friday,  January  18,  1788. 

The  third  paragraph  of  the  second  section  of  Article  I.  still 
under  consideration. 

Hon.  Mr.  Dalton  opened  the  conversation  with  some  remarks 
on  Mr.  Randal's  positive  assertions  of  the  fertility  of  the  south- 
ern States  ;  he  said,  from  his  own  observation,  and  from  ac- 
counts he  had  seen,  which  were  better,  he  could  say  that  the 
gentleman's  remark  was  not  perfectly  accurate.  The  honorable 
gentleman  showed  why  it  was  not  so,  by  stating  the  inconsider- 
able product  of  the  land  ;•  which,  though  it  might  in  part  be 
owing  to  the  faithlessness  and  ignorance  of  the  slaves  who  cul- 
tivate it,  he  said,  was  in  a  greater  measure  owing  to  the  want 
of  heart  in  the  soil. 

Mr.  Randal.  Mr.  President,  I  rise  to  make  an  observation 
on  the  suggestion  of  the  honorable  gentleman  from  Newbury. 
I  have,  Sir,  travelled  in  the  southern  States,  and  should  be  glad 
to  compare  our  knowledge  on  the  subject,  together.  In  Caro- 
lina, Mr.  President,  if  they  do  not  get  more  than  twenty  or 
thirty  bushels  of  corn  from  an  acre,  they  think  it  a  small  crop. 
On  the  low  lands  they  sometimes  get  forty.  I  hope,  Sir,  these 
great  men  of  eloquence  and  learning  will  not  try  to  make  argu- 
ments to  make  this  Constitution  go  down,  right  or  wrong. 
An  old  saying,  Sir,  is,  that  a  good  thing-  don't  need  praising; 
but,  Sir,  it  takes  the  best  men  in  the  State  to  gloss  this 
Constitution,  which  they  say  is  the  best  that  human  wisdom 
can  invent.  In  praise  of  it,  we  hear  the  reverend  clergy,  the 
judges  of  the  supreme  court,  and  the  ablest  lawyers,  exerting 
their  utmost  abilities.  Now,  Sir,  suppose  all  this  artillery 
turned  the  other  way,  and  these  great  men  would  speak  half  as 
much  against  it,  we  might  complete  our  business,  and  go  home 
in  forty-eight  hours.  Let  us,  Sir,  consider  we  are  acting  for 
the  people,  and  for  ages  unborn ;  let  us  deal  fairly  and  above- 
board.  Every  one  comes  here  to  discharge  his  duty  to  his  con- 
stituents, and  1  hope  none  will  be  biased  by  the  best  orators ; 
because  we  are  not  acting  for  ourselves.  I  think  Congress 
ought  to  have  power,  such  as  is  for  the  good  of  the  nation,  but 
what  it  is,  let  a  more  able  man  than  I,  tell  us. 

Mr.  Dawes  said,  he  was  sorry  to  hear  so  many  objections 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  139 

raised  against  the  paragraph  under  consideration.  He  thought 
them  wholly  unfounded ;  that  the  black  inhabitants  of  the 
southern  States  must  be  considered  either  as  slaves,  and  as  so 
much  property,  or  in  the  character  of  so  many  free  men  ;  if  the 
former,  why  should  they  not  be  wholly  represented  ?  Our  own 
State  laws  and  Constitution  would  lead  us  to  consider  those 
blacks  as  free  men,  and  so  indeed  would  our  own  ideas  of  nat- 
ural justice.  If  then,  they  are  free  men,  they  might  form  an 
equal  basis  for  representation  as  though  they  were  all  white 
inhabitants.  In  either  view,  therefore,  he  could  not  see  that 
the  northern  States  would  suffer,  but  directly  to  the  contrary. 
He  thought,  however,  that  gentlemen  would  do  well  to  connect 
the  passage  in  dispute  with  another  article  in  the  Constitution, 
that  permits  Congress  in  the  year  1808,  wholly  to  prohibit  the 
importation  of  slaves,  and  in  the  mean  time  to  impose  a  duty 
of  ten  dollars  a  head  on  such  blacks  as  should  be  imported 
before  that  period.  Besides,  by  the  new  Constitution,  every 
particular  State  is  left  to  its  own  option  totally  to  prohibit  the 
introduction  of  slaves  into  its  own  territories.  What  could  the 
Convention  do  more  ?  The  members  of  the  southern  States, 
like  ourselves,  have  their  prejudices.  It  would  not  do  to  abol- 
ish slavery  by  an  act  of  Congress,  in  a  moment,  and  so  destroy 
what  our  southern  brethren  consider  as  property.  But  we 
may  say,  that  although  slavery  is  not  smitten  by  an  apoplexy, 
yet  it  has  received  a  mortal  wound,  and  will  die  of  a  consump- 
tion. 

Mr.  Dawes  said,  the  paragraph  in  debate  related  only  to  the 
rule  of  apportioning  internal  taxes,  but  gentlemen  had  gone 
into  a  consideration  of  the  question,  whether  Congress  should 
have  the  power  of  laying  and  collecting  such  taxes ;  which  he 
thought  would  be  more  properly  discussed  under  the  section 
relative  to  the  powers  of  Congress.  But  as  objections  had  been 
suggested,  the  answers  might  be  hinted  as  we  went  along.  By 
the  old  articles,  said  he,  Congress  have  a  right  to  ascertain 
what  sums  are  necessary  for  the  Union,  and  to  appropriate  the 
same  ;  but  have  no  authority  to  draw  such  moneys  from  the 
States.  The  States  are  under  an  honorary  obligation  to  raise 
the  moneys ;  but  Congress  cannot  compel  a  compliance  with 
the  obligation.     So  long  as  we  withhold  that  authority  from 


140  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

Congress,  so  long  we  may  be  said  to  give  it  to  the  other  nations. 
Let  us  contemplate  the  loan  we  have  negotiated  with  the  Dutch. 
Our  ambassador  has  bound  us  all  jointly  and  severally  to  pay 
the  money  borrowed.  When  pay-day  shall  come,  how  is  the 
money  to  be  raised  ?  Congress  cannot  collect  it.  If  any  one 
State  shall  disobey  a  requisition,  the  Dutch  are  left  in  such  a 
case  to  put  their  own  demand  in  force  for  themselves.  They 
must  raise  by  arms  what  we  are  afraid  Congress  shall  collect  by 
the  law  of  peace.  There  is  a  prejudice,  said  Mr.  Dawes,  against 
direct  taxation,  which  arises  from  the  manner  in  which  it  has 
been  abused  by  the  errors  of  the  old '  Confederation.  Con- 
gress had  it  not  in  their  power  to  draw  a  revenue  from  com- 
merce, and  therefore  multiplied  their  requisitions  on  the  States. 
Massachusetts,  willing  to  pay  her  part,  made  her  own  trade- 
law,  on  which  the  trade  departed  to  such  of  our  neighbors  as 
made  no  such  impositions  on  commerce.  Thus  we  lost  what 
little  revenue  we  had,  and  our  only  recourse  was  to  a  direct 
taxation.  In  addition  to  this,  foreign  nations,  knowing  this 
inability  of  Congress,  have  on  that  account  been  backward  in 
their  negotiations,  and  have  lent  us  money  at  a  premium  which 
bore  some  proportion  to  the  risk  they  had  of  getting  payment ; 
and  this  extraordinary  expense  has  fallen  at  last  on  the  land. 
Some  gentlemen  have  said  that  Congress  may  draw  their  reve- 
nue wholly  by  direct  taxes.  But  they  cannot  be  induced  so  to 
do  ;  it  is  easier  for  them  to  have  resort  to  the  impost  and  excise. 
But  as  it, will  not  do  to  over-burden  the  impost,  (because  that 
would  promote  smuggling,  and  be  dangerous  to  the  revenue,) 
therefore  Congress  should  have  the  power  of  applying,  in 
extraordinary  cases,  to  direct  taxation.  War  may  take  place, 
in  which  case  it  would  not  be  proper  to  alter  those  appro- 
priations of  impost  which  may  be  made  for  peace  estab- 
lishments. It  is  inexpedient  to  divert  the  public  funds ;  the 
power  of  direct  taxation  would  in  such  circumstances  be  a  very 
necessary  power.  As  to  the  rule  of  apportioning  such  taxes, 
it  must  be  by  the  quantity  of  lands,  or  else  in  the  manner  laid 
down  in  the  paragraph  under  debate.  But  the  quantity  of 
lands  is  an  uncertain  rule  of  wealth.  Compare  the  lands  of 
different  nations  of  Europe  :  some  of  them  have  great  compar- 
ative wealth,  and  less  quantities  of  land,  while  others  have 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  141 

more  lands^and  less  wealth.  Compare  Holland  with  Germany. 
The  rule  laid  down  in  the  paragraph  is  the  best  that  can  be 
obtained  for  the  apportionment  of  the  little  direct  taxes  which 
Congress  will  want. 


AFTERNOON. 

Messrs.  King,  Gore,  Parsons  and  Jones  (of  Boston)  spoke 
of  the  advantage  to  the  northern  States,  the  rule  of  apportion- 
ment in  the  third  paragraph  (still  under  debate)  gave  to 
them — as  also  the  Hon.  Judge  Dana,  the  sketch  of  whose 
speech  is  as  follows  : 

The  learned  judge  began  with  answering  some  objections  to 
this  paragraph,  and  urging  the  necessity  of  Congress  being 
vested  with  power  to  levy  direct  taxes  on  the  States  ;  and  it 
was  not  to  be  supposed  that  they  would  levy  such,  unless  the 
impost  and  excise  should  be  found  insufficient  in  case  of  a  war. 
If,  says  he,  a  part  of  the  Union  is  attacked  by  a  foreign  ene- 
my, and  we  are  disunited,  how  is  it  to  defend  itself?  Can  it  by 
its  own  internal  force  ?  In  the  late  war,  this  State  singly  was 
attacked,  and  obliged  to  make  the  first  defence.  What  has 
happened  may  happen  again.  The  State,  oppressed,  must 
exert  its  whole  power,  and  bear  the  whole  charge  of  the 
defence  :  but  common  danger  points  out  for  common  exertion; 
and  this  Constitution  is  excellently  designed  to  make  the  dan- 
ger equal.  Why  should  one  State  expend  its  blood  and  treas- 
ure for  the  whole  ?  Ought  not  a  controlling  authority  to  exist, 
to  call  forth,  if  necessary,  the  whole  force  and  wealth  of  all  the 
States  ?  If  disunited,  the  time  may  come  when  we  may  be 
attacked  by  our  natural  enemies.  Nova  Scotia  and  New  Bruns- 
wick, filled  with  tories  and  refugees,  stand  ready  to  attack  and 
devour  these  States,  one  by  one.  This  will  be  the  case,  if  we 
have  no  power  to  draw  forth  the  wealth  and  strength  of  the 
whole,  for  the  defence  of  a  part.  Then  shall  we,  continues  the 
honorable  gentleman,  see,  but  too  late,  the  necessity  of  a  power 
being  vested  somewhere,  that  could  command  that  wealth  and 
strength  when  wanted.  I  speak  with  earnestness,  said  he,  but 
it  is  for  the  good  of  my  native  country.  By  God  and  nature 
made  equal,  it  is  with  remorse  I  have  heard  it  suggested  by 


142  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

some,  that  those  gentlemen  who  have  had  the  superior  advan- 
tages of  education,  were  enemies  to  the  rights  of  their  country. 
Are  there  any  among  this  honorable  body,  who  are  possessed  of 
minds  capable  of  such  narrow  prejudices  ?  If  there  are,  it  is  in 
vain  to  reason  with  them ;  we  had  better  come  to  a  decision 
and  go  home.  After  dilating  on  this  matter  a  short  time,  the 
learned  judge  begged  gentlemen  to  look  around  them,  and  see 
who  were  the  men  that  composed  the  assembly.  Are  they  not, 
he  asked,  men  who  have  been  foremost  in  the  cause  of  their 
country,  both  in  the  cabinet  and  in  the  field  ?  and  who,  with 
halters  about  their  necks,  boldly  and  intrepidly  advocated  the 
rights  of  America,  and  of  humanity,  at  home  and  in  foreign 
countries  ?  And  are  they  not  to  be  trusted  ?  Direct  taxation 
is  a  tremendous  idea :  but  may  not  necessity  dictate  it  to  be 
unavoidable  ?  We  all  wish  to  invest  Congress  with  more  power. 
We  disagree  only  in  the  quantum,  and  manner  in  which  Con- 
gress shall  levy  taxes  on  the  States.  A  capitation  tax  is  abhor- 
rent to  the  feelings  of  human  nature,  and  I  venture  to  trust 
will  never  be  adopted  by  Congress.  The  learned  judge  pointed 
out,  on  various  grounds,  the  utility  of  the  power  to  be  vested  in 
the  Congress,  and  concluded  by  observing,  that  the  proposed 
Constitution  was  the  best  that  could  be  framed  ;  that,  if  adopted, 
we  shall  be  a  great  and  happy  nation  ;  if  rejected,  a  weak  and 
despised  one  :  we  shall  fall  as  the  nations  of  ancient  times  have 
fallen;  that  this  was  his  firm  belief;  and,  says  he,  I  would 
rather  be  annihilated  than  give  my  voice  for,  or  sign  my  name 
to,  a  Constitution,  which  in  the  least  should  betray  the  liberties 
or  interests  of  my  country. 

Mr.  Wedgery.  I  hope,  Sir,  the  honorable  gentleman  will  not 
think  hard  of  it,  if  we  ignorant  men  cannot  see  as  clear  as  he 
can.  The  strong  must  bear  with  the  infirmities  of  the  weak; 
and  it  must  be  a  weak  mind  indeed  that  could  throw  such  illib- 
eral reflections  against  gentlemen  of  education,  as  the  honorable 
gentleman  complains  of.  To  return  to  the  paragraph.  If  Con- 
gress, continues  Mr.  Wedgery,  have  this  power  of  taxing  directly, 
it  will  be  in  their  power  to  enact  a  poll  tax.  Can  gentlemen 
tell  why  they  will  not  attempt  it,  and  by  this  method  make  the 
poor  pay  as  much  as  the  rich  ? 

Mr.  Dench  was  at  loss  to  know  how  Congress  could  levy  the 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  143 

tax,  in  which  he  thought  the  difficulty  of  many  consisted  ;  yet 
had  no  doubt  but  that  Congress  would  direct  that  these  States 
should  pay  it  in  their  own  way. 

Hon.  Mr.  Fuller  begged  to  ask  Mr.  Gerry — "  Why,  in  the 
last  requisition  of  Congress,  the  portion  required  of  this  State 
was  thirteen  times  as  much  as  of  Georgia,  and  yet  we  have  but 
eight  representatives  in  the  general  government,  and  Georgia 
has  three  ?  "  Until  this  question  was  answered,  he  was  at  a 
loss  to  know  how  taxation  and  representation  went  hand  in 
hand. 

[It  was  then  voted,  that  this  question  be  asked  Mr.  Gerry.  A 
long  and  desultory  debate  ensued  on  the  manner  in  which  the 
answer  should  be  given.  It  was  at  last  voted  that  Mr.  Gerry 
reduce  his  answer  to  writing.] 


Saturday,  January  19,  1788. 

The  Hon.  Mr.  Singletary  thought  we  were  giving  up  all  our 
privileges,  as  there  was  no  provision  that  men  in  power  should 
have  any  religion ;  and  though  he  hoped  to  see  Christians,  yet 
by  the  Constitution,  a  papist  or  an  infidel  were  as  eligible 
as  they.  It  had  been  said  that  men  had  not  degenerated. 
He  did  not  think  men  were  better  now  than  when  men  after 
God's  own  heart  did  wickedly.  He  thought  in  this  instance  we 
were  giving  great  power  to — we  know  not  whom. 

Gen.  Brooks  (of  Medford).  If  good  men  are  appointed, 
government  will  be  administered  well.  But  what  will  prevent 
bad  men  from  mischief,  is  the  question.  If  there  should  be 
such  in  the  Senate,  we  ought  to  be  cautious  of  giving  power  ; 
but  when  that  power  is  given  with  proper  checks,  the  danger  is 
at  an  end.  When  men  are  answerable,  and  within  the  reach  of 
responsibility,  they  cannot  forget  that  their  political  existence 
depends  upon  their  good  behavior.  The  Senate  can  frame  no 
law  but  by  consent  of  the  representatives,  and  is  answerable  to 
to  that  house  for  its  conduct.  If  their  conduct  excites  sus- 
picion, they  are  to  be  impeached — punished  (or  prevented  from 
holding  any  office,  which  is  a  great  punishment.)     If  these 


144  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

checks  are  not  sufficient,  it  is  impossible  to  devise  such  as  will 
be  so. 

[Mr.  Gerry's  answer  to  Mr.  Fuller's  question  was  read.  The 
purport  was,  that  Georgia  had  increased  in  its  numbers  by  mi- 
gration, and  if  it  had  not  then,  would  soon  be  entitled  to  the 
proportion  assigned  her.] 

Hon.  Mr.  King.  It  so  happened  that  I  was  both  of  the  Con- 
vention and  Congress  at  the  same  time,  and  if  I  recollect  right, 
the  answer  of  Mr.  Gerry  does  not  materially  vary.  In  1778, 
Congress  required  the  States  to  make  a  return  of  the  houses 
and  lands  surveyed.  But  one  State  only  complied  therewith — 
New  Hampshire.  Massachusetts  did  not.  Congress  consulted 
no  rule  ;  it  was  resolved  that  the  several  States  should  be  taxed 
according  to  their  ability,  and  if  it  appeared  any  State  had  paid 
more  than  her  just  quota,  it  should  be  passed  to  the  credit  of 
that  State,  with  lawful  interest. 

Mr.  Dalton  said  we  had  obtained  a  great  deal  by  the  new 
Constitution.  By  the  Confederation,  each  State  had  an  equal 
vote.  Georgia  is  now  content  with  three-eighths  of  the  voice 
of  Massachusetts. 

Col.  Jones  (of  Bristol)  objected  to  the  length  of  time.  If 
men  continue  in  office  four  or  six  years,  they  will  forget  their 
dependence  on  the  people,  and  be  loth  to  leave  their  places. 
Men  elevated  so  high  in  power,  they  would  fall  heavy  when  they 
came  down. 

Mr.  Ames  observed,  that  an  objection  was  made  against  the 
Constitution,  because  the  senators  are  to  be  chosen  for  six  years. 
It  has  been  said,  that  they  will  be  removed  too  far  from  the 
control  of  the  people,  and  that,  to  keep  them  in  proper  depend- 
ence, they  should  be  chosen  annually.  It  is  necessary  to  pre- 
mise, that  no  argument  against  the  new  plan  has  made  a  deeper 
impression  than  this,  that  it  will  produce  a  consolidation  of  the 
States.  This  is  an  effect  which  all  good  men  will  deprecate. 
For  it  is  obvious,  that  if  the  State  powers  are  to  be  destroyed, 
the  representation  is  too  small.  The  trust,  in  that  case,  would 
be  too  great  to  be  confided  to  so  few  persons.  The  objects  of 
legislation  would  be  so  multiplied  and  complicated,  that  the 
government  would  be  unwieldy  and  impracticable.  The  State 
governments  are  essential  parts  of  the  system,  and  the  defence 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  145 

of  this  article  is  drawn  from  its  tendency  to  their  preserva- 
tion. 

The  senators  represent  the  sovereignty  of  the  States ;  in  the 
other  house  individuals  are  represented.  The  Senate  may  not 
originate  bills.  It  need  not  be  said,  that  they  are,  principally, 
to  direct  the  affairs  of  war  and  treaties.  They  are  in  the  qual- 
ity of  ambassadors  of  the  States,  and  it  will  not  be  denied  that 
some  permanency  in  their  office  is  necessary  to  a  discharge  of 
their  duty.  Now,  if  they  were  chosen  yearly,  how  could  they 
perform  their  trust  ?  If  they  would  be  brought,  by  that  means, 
more  immediately  under  the  influence  of  the  people,  then  they 
will  represent  the  State  legislatures  less,  and  become  the  rep- 
resentatives of  individuals.  This  belongs  to  the  other  house. 
The  absurdity  of  this,  and  its  repugnancy  to  the  Federal  prin- 
ciples of  the  Constitution,  will  appear  more  fully,  by  supposing 
that  they  are  to  be  chosen  by  the  people  at  large.  If  there 
is  any  force  in  the  objection  to  this  article,  this  would  be  proper. 
But  whom  in  that  case  would  they  represent  ?  Not  the  legis- 
latures of  the  States,  but  the  people.  This  would  totally 
obliterate  the  Federal  features  of  the  Constitution.  What 
would  become  of  the  State  governments,  and  on  whom  would 
devolve  the  duty  of  defending  them  against  the  encroachments 
of  the  Federal  government?  A  consolidation  of  the  States 
would  ensue,  which,  it  is  conceded,  would  subvert  the  new 
Constitution,  and  against  which  this  very  article,  so  much  con- 
demned, is  our  best  security.  Too  much  provision  cannot  be 
made  against  a  consolidation.  The  State  governments  repre- 
sent the  wishes  and  feelings  and  local  interests  of  the  people. 
They  are  the  safeguard  and  ornament  of  the  Constitution — they 
will  protract  the  period  of  our  liberties — they  will  afford  a 
shelter  against  the  abuse  of  power,  and  will  be  the  natural 
avengers  of  our  violated  rights. 

A  very  effectual  check  upon  the  power  of  the  Senate  is  pro- 
vided. A  third  part  is  to  retire  from  office  every  two  years. 
By  this  means,  while  the  senators  are  seated  for  six  years  they 
are  admonished  of  their  responsibility  to  the  State  legislatures. 
If  one-third  new  members  are  introduced,  who  feel  the  senti- 
ments of  their  States,  they  will  awe  that  third  whose  term  will 
be  near  expiring.     This  article  seems  to  be  an  excellence  of 

19 


146  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

the  Constitution,  and  affords  just  ground  to  believe,  that  it 
will  be  in  practice,  as  in  theory,  a  Federal  republic. 


AFTERNOON. 

The  third  section,  respecting  the  construction  of  the  Senate, 
under  debate. 

Col.  Jones  said,  his  objection  still  remained — that  senators 
chosen  for  so  long  a  time  will  forget  their  duty  to  their  con- 
stituents. We  cannot,  says  he,  recall  them.  The  choice  of 
representatives  was  too  long  ;  the  senate  was  much  worse.  It 
is,  says  he,  a  bad  precedent,  and  is  unconstitutional. 

Mr.  King  said,  as  the  Senate  preserved  the  equality  of  the 
States,  their  appointment  is  equal.  To  the  objection  to  this 
branch,  that  it  is  chosen  for  too  long  a  period,  he  observed,  if 
the  principle  of  classing  them  is  considered,  although  it  appears 
long,  it  will  not  be  found  so  long  as  it  appears.  One  class  is 
to  serve  two  years,  another  four,  and  another  six  years ;  the 
average,  therefore,  is  four  years.  The  senators,  said  Mr.  King, 
will  have  a  powerful  check,  in  those  men  who  wish  for  their 
seats,  who  will  watch  their  whole  conduct  in  the  general  gov- 
ernment, and  will  give  the  alarm  in  case  of  misbehavior.  And 
the  State  legislatures,  if  they  find  their  delegates  erring,  can 
and  will  instruct  them.  Will  not  this  be  a  check  ?  When  they 
hear  the  voice  of  the  people  solemnly  dictating  to  them  their 
duty,  they  will  be  bold  men  indeed  to  act  contrary  to  it.  These 
will  not  be  instructions  sent  them  in  a  private  letter,  which  can 
be  put  in  their  pockets ;  they  will  be  public  instructions,  which 
all  the  country  will  see ;  and  they  will  be  hardy  men  indeed  to 
violate  them.  The  honorable  gentleman  said,  the  power  to 
control  the  Senate,  is  as  great  as  ever  was  enjoyed  in  any  gov- 
ernment ;  and  that  the  members,  therefore,  will  be  found  not 
to  be  chosen  for  too  long  a  time.  They  are,  says  he,  to  assist 
the  executive  in  the  designation  and  appointment  of  officers ; 
and  they  ought  to  have  time  to  mature  their  judgment.  If  for 
a  shorter  period,  how  can  they  be  acquainted  with  the  rights 
and  interests  of  nations,  so  as  to  form  advantageous  treaties? 
To  understand  these  rights  is  the  business  of  education.  Their 
business  being  naturally  different,  and  more  extensive  than  the 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  147 

other  branch,  they  ought  to  have  different  qualifications-;  and 
their  duration  is  not  too  long  for  a  right  discharge  of  their 
duty. 

Dr.  Taylor  said,  he  hoped  the  honorable  gentleman  did  not 
mean  to  deceive  us,  by  saying  that  the  Senate  are  not  to  be 
chosen  for  six  years ;  for  they  are  really  to  be  chosen  for  six 
years ;  and  as  to  the  idea  of  classing,  he  did  not  know  who, 
when  chosen  for  that  time,  would  go  out  at  a  shorter.  He  re- 
marked on  Mr.  King's  idea  of  checks,  and  observed,  that  such 
indeed  were  the  Articles  of  Confederation,  which  provides  for 
delegates  being  chosen  annually — for  rotation,  and  the  right 
of  recalling.  But  in  this,  they  are  to  be  chosen  for  six  years  ; 
but  a  shadow  of  rotation  provided  for,  and  no  power  to  recall ; 
and  concluded  by  saying,  that  if  they  are  once  chosen,  they  are 
chosen  forever. 

The  Hon.  Mr.  Strong  mentioned  the  difficulty  which  attended 
the  construction  of  the  Senate  in  the  Convention ;  and  that  a 
committee,  consisting  of  one  delegate  from  each  State,  was 
chosen  to  consider  the  subject,  who  reported  as  it  now  stands ; 
and  that  Mr.  Gerry  was  on  the  committee,  from  Massachusetts. 

[Mr.  Gerry  rose,  and  informed  the  President  that  he  was 
then  preparing  a  letter  on  the  subject  in  debate,  which  would 
set  the  matter  in  its  true  light,  and  which  he  wished  to  com- 
municate ;  this  occasioned  considerable  conversation,  which 
lasted  until  the  Convention  adjourned.] 


Monday,  January  21, 1788. 

Fourth  section  considered  in  its  order. 

Mr.  Ames  rose  to  answer  several  objections.  He  would  for- 
bear, if  possible,  to  go  over  the  ground  which  had  been  already 
well  trodden.  The  fourth  section  had  been,  he  said,  well  dis- 
cussed, and  he  did  not  mean  to  offer  any  formal  argument,  or 
new  observations,  upon  it.  It  had  been  said,  the  power  of 
regulating  elections  was  given  to  Congress.  He  asked,  if  a 
motion  was  brought  forward  in  Congress,  on  that  particular, 
subjecting  the  States  to   any  inconvenience,  whether  it  was 


148  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

probable  such  a  motion  could  obtain.  It  had  been  also  said, 
that  our  Federal  legislature  would  endeavor  to  perpetuate 
themselves  in  office  ;  and  that  the  love  of  power  was  predomi- 
nant. Mr.  Ames  asked  how  the  gentlemen  prevailed  on  them- 
selves to  trust  the  State  legislature.  He  thought  it  was  from  a 
degree  of  confidence  that  was  placed  in  them.  At  present  we 
trust  Congress  with  power — nfty,  we  trust  the  representatives 
of  Rhode  Island  and  Georgia.  He  thought  it  was  better  to 
trust  a  general  government,  than  a  foreign  State.  Mr.  Ames 
acknowledged  he  came  with  doubts  of  the  fourth  section.  Had 
his  objections  remained,  he  would  have  been  obliged  to  vote 
against  the  Constitution :  but  now  he  thought,  if  all  the  Con- 
stitution was  as  clear  as  this  section,  it  would  meet  with  little 
opposition. 

Judge  Dana.  This  section,  Mr.  President,  has  been  subject 
to  much  dispute  and  difficulty.  I  did  not  come  here  deter- 
mined to  vote  for  every  paragraph  of  this  Constitution.  I 
supposed  this  clause  dangerous.  It  has  been  amply  discussed ; 
and  I  am  now  convinced  that  this  paragraph  is  much  better  as 
it  stands,  than  with  the  amendment,  which  is,  that  Congress  be 
restricted  in  the  appointing  of  time,  place,  &c,  unless  when 
the  State  legislatures  refuse  to  make  them.  I  have  altered  my 
opinion  on  this  point.  These  are  my  reasons :  It  is  apparent 
the  intention  of  the  Convention  was,  to  set  Congress  on  a  dif- 
ferent ground — that  a  part  should  proceed  directly  from  the 
people,  and  not  from  their  substitutes  the  legislatures ;  there- 
fore the  legislatures  ought  not  to  control  the  elections.  The 
legislature  of  Rhode  Island  has  lately  formed  a  plan,  to  alter 
their  representation  to  corporations,  which  ought  to  be  by 
numbers.  Look  at  Great  Britain,  where  the  injustice  of  this 
mode  is  apparent:  eight-tenths  of  the  people  there  have  no 
voice  in  the  elections.  A  borough,  of  but  two  or  three  cot- 
tages, has  a  right  to  send  two  representatives  to  parliament, 
while  Birmingham,  a  large  and  populous  manufacturing  town 
lately  sprung  up,  cannot  send  one.  The  legislature  of  Rhode 
Island  are  about  adopting  this  plan,  in  order  to  deprive  the 
towns  of  Newport  and  Providence  of  their  weight ;  and  that, 
thereby,  the  legislature  may  have  a  power  to  counteract  the 
will  of  the  majority  of  the  people. 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  149 

Mr.  Cooley  (of  Amherst)  thought  Congress,  in  the  present 
instance,  would,  from  the  powers  granted  by  the  Constitution, 
have  authority  to  control  elections,  and  thereby  endanger  lib- 
erty. 

Dr.  Taylor  wished  to  ask  the  gentleman  from  Newburyport, 
whether  the  two  branches  of  Congress  could  not  agree  to  play 
into  each  other's  hands,  and,  by  making  the  qualifications  of 
electors  £100,  by  their  power  of  regulating  elections,  fix  the 
matter  of  elections  so  as  to  keep  themselves  in. 

Hon.  Mr.  King  rose  to  pursue  the  inquiry,  why  the  place  and 
manner  of  holding  elections  were  omitted  in  the  section  under 
debate.  It  was  to  be  observed,  he  said,  that  in  the  Constitution 
of  Massachusetts,  and  other  States,  the  manner  and  place  of 
elections  were  provided  for  ;  the  manner  was  by  ballot,  and  the 
places  towns ;  for,  said  he,  we  happened  to  settle  originally  in 
townships.  But  it  was  different  in  the  southern  States.  He 
would  mention  an  instance.  In  Virginia  there  are  but  fifteen 
or  twenty  towns,  and  seventy  or  eighty  counties  ;  therefore  no 
rule  could  be  adopted  to  apply  to  the  whole.  If  it  was  practi- 
cable, he  said,  it  would  be  necessary  to  have  a  district  the  fixed 
place.  But  this  is  liable  to  exceptions  ;  as  a  district  that  may 
now  be  fully  settled,  may  in  time  be  scarcely  inhabited ;  and 
the  back  country,  now  scarcely  inhabited,  may  be  fully  settled. 
Suppose  this  State  thrown  into  eight  districts,  and  a  member 
apportioned  to  each :  if  the  numbers  increase,  the  representa- 
tives and  districts  will  be  increased.  The  matter,  therefore, 
must  be  left  subject  to  the  regulation  of  the  State  legislature, 
or  the  general  government.  Suppose  the  State  legislature,  the 
circumstance  will  be  the  same.  It  is  truly  said,  that  our  repre- 
sentatives are  but  a  part  of  the  Union,  and  that  they  may  be 
subject  to  the  control  of  the  rest ;  but  our  representatives  make 
a  ninth  part  of  the  whole,  and  if  any  authority  is  vested  in 
Congress  it  must  be  in  our  favor.  But  to  the  subject :  in  Con- 
necticut they  do  not  choose  by  numbers,  but  by  corporations. 
Hartford,  one  of  their  largest  towns,  sends  no  more  delegates 
than  one  of  their  smallest  corporations,  each  town  sending  two, 
except  latterly,  when  a  town  was  divided.  The  same  rule  is 
about  to  be  adopted  in  Rhode  Island.  The  inequality  of  such 
representation,  where  every  corporation  would  have  an  equal 


150  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

right  to  send  an  equal  number  of  representatives,  was  apparent. 
In  the  southern  States,  the  inequality  is  greater.  By  the  Consti- 
tution of  South  Carolina,  the  city  of  Charleston  has  a  right  to 
send  thirty  representatives  to  the  General  Assembly,  the  whole 
number  of  which  amounts  to  two  hundred.  The  back  parts  of 
Carolina  have  increased  greatly  since  the  adoption  of  their  Con- 
stitution, and  have  frequently  attempted  an  alteration  of  this  un- 
equal mode  of  representation ;  but  the  members  from  Charleston, 
having  the  balance  so  much  in  their  favor,  will  not  consent  to 
an  alteration  ;  and  we  see  that  the  delegates  from  Carolina  in 
Congress  have  always  been  chosen  from  the  delegates  of  that 
city.  The  representatives,  therefore,  from  that  State,  will  not 
be  chosen  by  the  people,  but  will  be  the  representatives  of  a 
faction  of  that  State.  If  the  general  government  cannot  con- 
trol in  this  case,  how  are  the  people  secure  ?  The  idea  of  the 
honorable  gentleman  from  Douglass,  said  he,  transcends  my 
understanding ;  for  the  power  of  control  given  by  this  section 
extends  to  the  manner  of  election,  not  the  qualifications  of  the 
electors.  The  qualifications  are  age  and  residence,  and  none 
can  be  preferable. 

On  motion, 

Resolved,  as  follows,  viz. :  Whereas,  there  is  a  publication  in 
The  Boston  Gazette  and  the  Country  Journal,  of  this  day,  as 
follows,  viz. : — 

"  Bribery  and  Corruption  ! ! ! — The  most  diabolical  plan  is 
on  foot  to  corrupt  the  members  of  the  Convention  who  oppose 
the  adoption  of  the  new  Constitution.  Large  sums  of  money 
have  been  brought  from  a  neighboring  State  for  that  purpose, 
contributed  by  the  wealthy.  If  so,  is  it  not  probable  there  may 
be  collections  for  the  same  accursed  purpose  nearer  home  ? 

Centinel." 

Resolved,  That  this  Convention  will  take  measures  for  inquir- 
ing into  the  subject  of  the  said  publication,  and  for  ascertain- 
ing the  truth  or  falsehood  of  the  suggestion  therein  contained. 

Ordered,  That  the  Messenger  be  directed  to  request  the 
printers  of  the  said  Gazette  to  appear  before  this  Convention 
forthwith,  to  give  information  respecting  the  said  publication. 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  151 


AFTERNOON. 

The  Messenger  informed!'  the  Convention  that  he  had  ac- 
quainted the  printers  of  the  Boston  Gazette,  &c,  of  the  order 
of  this  forenoon  respecting  them,  and  was  answered  that  one  of 
them  would  attend  the  Convention  this  afternoon. 

A  letter  from  Messrs.  Benjamin  Edes  &  Son,  printers  of  the 
Boston  Gazette,  &c,  relative  to  the  publication  entered  this 
morning.  Read,  and  committed  to  Mr.  Parsons,  Mr.  Nasson, 
Mr.  Gorham,  Mr.  Wedgery,  Mr.  Porter,  Mr.  Gore,  and  Mr. 
Thomas,  of  Plymouth. 

The  fifth  section  being  read, 

Dr.  Taylor  wished  to  know  the  meaning  of  the  words  "  from 
time  to  time,"  in  the  third  paragraph.  Does  it  mean,  said  he, 
from  year  to  year,  from  month  to  month,  or  from  day  to  day. 

The  Hon.  Mr.  King  rose,  and  explained  the  term. 

Mr.  Wedgery  read  the  paragraph,  and.  said,  by  the  words, 
"  except  such  parts  as  may  require  secrecy,"  Congress  might 
withhold  the  whole  journals  under  this  pretence,  and  thereby 
the  people  be  kept  in  ignorance  of  their  doings. 

The  Hon.  Mr.  Gorham  exposed  the  absurdity  of  any  public 
body  publishing  all  their  proceedings.  Many  things  in  great 
bodies  are  to  be  kept  secret,  and  records  must  be  brought  to 
maturity  before  published.  In  case  of  treaties  with  foreign 
nations,  would  it  be  policy  to  inform  the  world  of  the  extent  of 
the  powers  to  be  vested  in  our  ambassador,  and  thus  give  our 
enemies  opportunity  to  defeat  our  negotiations  ?  There  is  no 
provision  in  the  Constitution  of  this  State,  or  of  Great  Britain, 
for  any  publication  of  the  kind  ;  and  yet  the  people  suffer  no 
inconveniency.  The  printers,  no  doubt,  will  be  interested  to 
obtain  the  journals  as  soon  as  possible  for  publication,  and  they 
will  be  published  in  a  book,  by  Congress,  at  the  end  of  every 
session. 

Rev.  Mr.  Perley  described  the  alarms  and  anxiety  of  the 
people  at  the  commencement  of  the  war,  when  the  whole  coun- 
try, he  said,  cried,  with  one  voice,  "  Why  don't  General  Wash- 
ington march  into  Boston,  and  drive  out  the  tyrants?"  But, 
said  he,  Heaven  gave  us  a  commander  who  knew  better  than  to 
do  this.     The  reverend  gentleman  said  he  was  acquainted  with 


152  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

the  Roman  history,  and  the  Grecian,  too,  and  he  believed  there 
never  was,  since  the  creation  of  the  world,  a  greater  general 
than  Washington,  except,  indeed,  Joshua,  who  was  inspired  by 
the  Lord  of  Hosts,  the  God  of  the  armies  of  Israel.  Would  it, 
he  asked,  have  been  prudent  for  that  excellent  man,  General 
Washington,  previous  to  the  American  army's  taking  possession 
of  Dorchester  Heights,  to  have  published  to  the  world* his  in- 
tentions of  so  doing  ?     No,  says  he,  it  would  not. 

The  first  paragraph  of  the  sixth  section  read. 

Dr.  Taylor.  Mr.  President :  It  has  hitherto  been  customary 
for  the  gentlemen  of  Congress  to  be  paid  by  the  several  State 
legislatures,  out  of  the  State  treasury.  As  no  State  has  hith- 
erto failed  paying  its  delegates,  why  should  we  leave  the  good 
old  path  ?  Before  the  Revolution  it  was  considered  as  a  griev- 
ance, that  the  governors,  &c,  received  their  pay  from  Great 
Britain.  They  could  not,  in  that  case,  feel  their  dependence  on 
the  people,  when  they  received  their  appointments  and  salaries 
from  the  crown.  I  know  not  why  we  should  not  pay  them  now, 
as  well  as  heretofore. 

Gen.  Porter.  Have  not  delegates  been  retained  from  Con- 
gress, which  is  virtually  recalling  them,  because  they  have  not 
been  paid  ?  Has  not  Rhode  Island  failed  to  pay  their  delegates? 
Should  there  not  be  an  equal  charge  throughout  the  United 
States,  for  the  payment  of  the  delegates,  as  there  is  in  this 
State  for  the  payment  of  the  members  of  this  Convention,  met 
for  the  general  good  ?  Is  it  not  advantageous  to  the  people  at 
large  that  the  delegates  to  this  Convention  are  paid  out  of  the 
public  treasury  ?  If  any  inconvenience,  however,  can  be  shown 
to  flow  from  this  plan,  I  should  be  glad  to  hear  it. 

Hon.  Mr.  Sedgwick  hoped  gentlemen  would  consider  that 
the  federal  officers  of  government  would  be  responsible  for 
their  conduct ;  and  as  they  would  regard  their  reputations, 
will  not  assess  exorbitant  wages.  In  Massachusetts,  and  in 
every  other  State,  the  legislatures  have  power  to  provide  for 
their  own  payment ;  and,  he  asked,  have  they  ever  established 
it  higher  than  it  ought  to  be  ?  But  on  the  contrary,  have  they 
not  made  it  extremely  inconsiderable  ?  The  Commons  of 
Great  Britain,  he  said,  have  the  power  to  assess  their  own 
wages,   but   for   two   centuries  they  have  never  exercised  it. 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  153 

Can  a  man,  he  asked,  who  has  the  least  respect  for  the  good 
opinion  of  his  fellow-countrymen,  go  home  to  his  constituents 
after  having  robbed  them  by  voting  himself  an  exorbitant  sal- 
ary ?  This  principle  will  be  a  most  powerful  check :  and,  in 
respect  to  economy,  the  power,  lodged  as  it  is  in  this  section, 
will  be  more  advantageous  to  the  people,  than  if  retained  by 
the  State  legislatures.  Let  us  see  what  the  legislature  of  Mas- 
sachusetts have  done.  They  vote  the  salaries  of  the  delegates 
to  Congress,  and  they  have  voted  them  such  as  have  enabled 
them  to  live  in  a  style  suited  to  the  dignity  of  a  respectable 
State  ;  but  these  salaries  have  been  four  times  as  much,  for  the 
same  time,  as  they  ever  voted  themselves.  Therefore,  con- 
cluded the  honorable  gentleman,  if  left  to  themselves  to  pro- 
vide for  their  own  payment,  as  long  as  they  wish  for  the  good 
opinion  of  mankind,  they  will  assess  no  more  than  they  really 
deserve,  as  a  compensation  for  their  services. 

Hon.  Mr.  King  said,  if  the  arguments  on  the  fourth  section 
against  an  undue  control  in  the  State  legislatures  over  the  Fed- 
eral representatives,  were  in  any  degree  satisfactory,  they  are 
so  on  this. 

Gen.  Thompson.  Mr.  President:  The  honorable  gentleman 
means  well,  and  is  honest  in  his  sentiments — it  is  all  alike — 
when  we  see  matters  at  large,  and  what  it  all  is,  [the  Constitu- 
tion taken  as  a  whole,]  we  shall  know  what  to  do  with  it. 

Mr.  Parsons.  In  order  that  the  general  government  should 
preserve  itself,  it  is  necessary  it  should  preserve  justice  between 
the  several  States.  Under  the  Confederation,  the  power  in 
this  section  would  not  be  just,  for  each  State  has  a  right  to 
send  seven  members  to  Congress,  though  some  of  them  do  not 
pay  one-tenth  so  much  of  the  public  expenses  as  others ;  it  is  a 
mere  federal  government  of  States,  neither  equal  or  propor- 
tionate. If  gentlemen  would  use  the  same  candor  that  the 
honorable  gentleman  from  Topsham  (Gen.  Thompson)  does, 
considering  all  the  parts  as  connected  with  others,  the  Consti- 
tution would  receive  a  better  discussion. 

The  second  paragraph  of  the  sixth  section  read. 

Hon.  Mr.  Gorham  said,  that  this  Constitution  contained 
restrictions  which  were  not  to  be  found  in  any  other ;  and  he 
wished  gentlemen  who  had  objected  to  every  paragraph  which 


154  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

had  been  read,  would  give  the  Convention  credit  for  those  parts 
which  must  meet  the  approbation  of  every  man. 

The  eighth  section  of  Article  I.,  containing  the  powers  of 
Congress,  being  read, 

Gen.  Brooks  (of  Lincoln)  said  this  article  contained  more  mat- 
ter than  any  one  yet  read  ;  and  he  wished  to  know  whether  there 
are  not  to  be  some  general  restrictions  to  the  general  articles. 

Hon  Mr.  King.  Mr.  President :  It  is  painful  to  me  to 
obtrude  my  sentiments  on  the  Convention  so  frequently.  How- 
ever, Sir,  I  console  myself  with  the  idea  that  my  motives  are  as 
good  as  those  of  more  able  gentlemen,  who  have  remained 
silent.  Sir,  this  is  a  very  important  clause,  and  of  the  highest 
consequence  to  the  future  fortune  of  the  people  of  America.  It 
is  not  my  intention  to  go  into  any  elaborate  discussion  of  the 
subject.  I  shall  only  offer  those  considerations  which  have 
influenced  my  mind  in  favor  of  the  article,  in  the  hope  that  it 
may  tend  to  reconcile  gentlemen  to  it.  It  shall  not  be  with  a 
view  of  exhibiting  any  particular  knowledge  of  mine,  for  such 
is  not  my  intention.'  Hitherto  we  have  considered  the  con- 
struction of  the  general  government.  We  now  come,  Sir,  to 
the  consideration  of  the  powers  with  which  that  government 
shall  be  clothed.  The  introduction  to  this  Constitution  is  in  these 
words:  "  We,  the  people,"  Sfc.  The  language  of  the  Confed- 
eration is :  "  We,  the  States"  Sfc.  The  latter  is  a  mere  Federal 
government  of  States.  Those,  therefore,  that  assemble  under  it 
have  no  power  to  make  laws  to  apply  to  the  individuals  of  the' 
States  confederated  ;  and  the  attempts  to  make  laws  for  collective 
societies,  necessarily  leave  a  discretion  to  comply  with  them  or 
not.  In  no  instance  have  there  been  so  freque^  deviations  from 
first  principles,  as  in  neglect  or  refusal  to  comply  with  the  requi- 
sitions of  general  governments  for  the  collection  of  moneys.  In 
the  ancient  governments,  this  has  been  a  principal  defect.  In 
the  United  Provinces  of  the  Netherlands,  it  has  been  conspic- 
uously so.  A  celebrated  political  writer,  I  mean  John  deWitt, 
formerly  pensioner  of  Holland,  says,  that  in  the  Confederacy  of 
1570,  though  the  articles  were  declared  equally  binding  on  the 
several  provinces,  yet  any  one  had  it  in  its  power  to  comply  with 
the  requisitions  of  the  generality,  or  not ;  and  some  provinces, 
taking  advantage  of  this   discretionary  power,  never  paid  any 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  155 

thing.  During  forty  years  of  their  war  with  Spain,  the  prov- 
ince of  Holland  paid  fifty-eight  parts  of  an  hundred,  of  all  the 
expenses  thereof.  Two  or  three  of  the  provinces  never  so 
much  as  passed  a  resolution  to  pay  any  thing ;  and  de  Witt 
says,  that  two  of  them  paid  not  a  single  gilder.  What  was  the 
consequence  ?  In  one  instance  Holland  compelled  a  neighbor- 
ing province  to  comply  with  the  requisitions,  by  marching  a 
force  into  it.  This  was  a  great  instance  of  usurpation,  made  in 
the  time  of  a  war.  The  Prince  of  Orange,  and  the  generality, 
found  that  they  would  not  continue  the  war  in  this  manner. 
What  was  to  be  done  ?  They  were  obliged  to  resort  to  the 
expedient  of  doubling  the  ordinary  requisitions  on  the  States. 
Some  of  the  provinces  were  prevailed  upon  to  grant  these  requi- 
sitions fully,  in  order  to  induce  Holland  to  do  the  same.  She, 
seeing  the  other  States  appearing  thus  forward,  not  only  granted 
the  requisitions,  but  paid  them.  The  others  did  not.  Thus 
was  a  single  province  obliged  to  bear  almost  the  whole  burden 
of  the  war ;  and  one  hundred  years  after,  the  accounts  of  this 
war  were  unsettled.  What  was  the  reason  ?  Holland  had  but 
one  voice  in  the  States-General.  That  voice  was  feeble  when 
opposed  by  the  rest.  This  fact  is  true.  The  history  of  our  own 
country  is  a  melancholy  proof  of  a  similar  truth.  Massachu- 
setts has  paid,  while  other  States  have  been  delinquent.  How 
was  the  war  carried  on  with  the  paper  money  ?  Requisitions 
on  the  States  for  that  money  were  made.  Who  paid  them  ? 
Massachusetts,  and  a  few  others.  A  requisition  of  twenty-nine 
millions  of  dollars  was  quotaed  on  Massachusetts,  and  it  was 
paid.  This  State  has  paid  in  her  proportion  of  the  old  money. 
How  comes  it,  then,  that  gentlemen  have  any  of  this  money  by 
them  ?  Because  the  other  States  have  shamefully  neglected  to 
pay  their  quotas.  Do  you  ask  for  redress  ?  you  are  scoffed  at. 
The  next  requisition  was  for  eleven  millions  of  dollars,  six  mil- 
lions of  which  were  to  be  paid  in  facilities,  the  rest  in  silver 
money,  for  discharging  the  interest  of  the  national  debt.  If 
the  legislatures  found  a  difficulty  in  paying  the  hard  money, 
why  did  they  not  pay  the  paper  ?  But  one  million  and  two 
hundred  thousand  dollars  have  been  paid.  And  six  States 
have  not  paid  a  farthing  of  it. 

After  mentioning  another  requisition  equally  disregarded, 


156  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

Mr.  King  said,  two  States  have  not  paid  a  single  farthing,  from 
the  moment  they  signed  the  Confederation,  to  this  day,  if  my 
documents  are  to  be  depended  on ;  and  they  are  open  to  the 
inspection  of  all.  Now,  Sir,  what  faith  is  to  be  put  in  requisi- 
tions on  the  States,  for  moneys  to  pay  our  domestic  creditors, 
and  discharge  our  foreign  debts — for  moneys  lent  us  in  the  day 
of  difficulty  and  distress  ?  Sir,  experience  proves,  as  well  as 
any  thing  can  be  proved,  that  no  dependence  can  be  placed  on 
such  requisitions.  What  method,  then,  can  we  devise  to  compel 
the  delinquent  States  to  pay  their  quotas  ?  Sir,  I  know  of  none. 
Laws,  to  be  effective,  therefore,  must  not  be  laid  on  States,  but 
upon  individuals.  Sir,  it  has  been  objected  to  the  proposed 
Constitution,  that  the  power  is  too  great,  and  by  this  Constitu- 
tion is  to  be  sacred.  But  if  the  want  of  power  is  the  defect  in 
the  old  Confederation,  there  is  a  fitness  and  propriety  in  adopt- 
ing what  is  here  proposed,  which  gives  the  necessary  power 
wanted.  Congress  now  have  power  to  call  for  what  moneys, 
and  in  what  proportion  they  please  ;  but  they  have  no  authority 
to  compel  a  compliance  therewith.  It  is  an  objection  in  some 
gentlemen's  minds,  that  Congress  should  possess  the  power  of 
the  purse  and  the  sword.  But,  Sir,  I  would  ask,  whether  any 
government  can  exist,  or  give  security  to  the  people,  which  is 
not  possessed  of  this  power  ?  The  first  revenue  will  be  raised 
from  the  impost,  to  which  there  is  no  objection ;  the  next  from 
the  excise ;  and  if  these  are  not  sufficient,  direct  taxes  must  be 
laid.  To  conclude,  Sir,  if  we  mean  to  support  an  efficient  Fed- 
eral government,  which  under  the  old  Confederation  can  never 
be  the  case,  the  proposed  Constitution  is,  in  my  opinion,  the 
only  one  that  can  be  substituted. 

Hon.  Mr.  White  said,  in  giving  this  power  we  give  up  every 
thing  ;  and  Congress,  with  the  purse-strings  in  their  hands,  will 
use  the  sword  with  a  witness. 

Mr.  Dawes  said,  he  thought  the  powers  in  the  paragraph 
under  debate  should  be  fully  vested  in  Congress.  We  have 
suffered,  said  he,  for  want  of  such  authority  in  the  Federal 
head.  This  will  be  evident  if  we  take  a  short  view  of  our  agri- 
culture, commerce  and  manufactures.  Our  agriculture  has  not 
been  encouraged  by  the  imposition  of  national  duties  on  rival 
produce ;  nor  can  it  be,  so  long  as  the  several  States  miay  make 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  157 

contradictory  laws.  This  has  induced  our  farmers  to  raise  only 
what  they  wanted  to  consume  in  their  own  families ;  I  mean, 
however,  after  raising  enough  to  pay  their  taxes ;  for  I  insist, 
that  upon  the  old  plan,  the  land  has  borne  the  burden.  For, 
as  Congress  could  not  make  laws  whereby  they  could  obtain  a 
revenue,  in  their  own  way,  from  impost  or  excise,  they  multi- 
plied their  requisitions  on  the  several  States.  When  a  State 
was  thus  called  on,  it  would  perhaps  impose  new  duties  on  its 
own  trade,  to  procure  money  for  paying  its  quota  of  Federal 
demands.  This  would  drive  the  trade  to  such  neighboring 
States  as  made  no  such  new  impositions.  Thus  the  revenue 
would  be  lost  with  the  trade,  and  the  only  resort  would  be  a 
direct  tax. 

As  to  commerce,  it  is  well  known  that  the  different  States 
now  pursue  different  systems  of  duties  in  regard  to  each  other. 
By  this,  and  for  want  of  general  laws  of  prohibition  through  the 
Union,  we  have  not  secured  even  our  own  domestic  traffic,  that 
passes  from  State  to  State.  This  is  contrary  to  the  policy  of 
every  nation  on  earth.  Some  nations  have  no  other  commerce. 
The  great  and  flourishing  empire  of  China  has  but  little  com- 
merce beyond  her  own  territories ;  and  no  country  is  better 
circumstanced  than  we,  for  an  exclusive  traffic  from  State  to 
State.  Yet  even  in  this  we  are  rivalled  by  foreigners — by  those 
foreigners  to  whom  we  are  the  least  indebted.  A  vessel  from 
Roseway  or  Halifax  finds  as  hearty  a  welcome  with  its  fish  and 
whalebone  at  the  southern  ports,  as  though  it  was  built,  navi- 
gated and  freighted  from  Salem  or  Boston.  And  this  must  be 
the  case,  until  we  have  laws  comprehending  and  embracing 
alike  all  the  States  in  the  Union. 

But  it  is  not  only  our  coasting  trade  ;  our  whole  commerce  is 
going  to  ruin.  Congress  has  not  had  power  to  make  even  a 
trade-law  which  shall  confine  the  importation  of  foreign  goods 
to  the  ships  of  the  producing  or  consuming  country :  if  we  had 
such  a  law,  we  should  not  go  to  England  for  the  goods  of  other 
nations  ;  nor  would  British  vessels  be  the  carriers  of  American 
produce  from  our  sister  States.  In  the  States  southward  of  the 
Delaware,  it  is  agreed,  that  three-fourths  of  the  produce  are 
exported,  and  three-fourths  of  the  returns  are  made,  in  British 
bottoms.     It  is  said,  that  for  exporting  timber,  one-half  of  the 


158  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

property  goes  to  the  carrier ;  and  of  the  produce  in  general,  it 
has  been  computed,  that  when  it  is  shipped  for  London  from  a 
southern  State,  to  the  value  of  one  million  of  dollars,  the  Brit- 
ish merchant  draws  from  that  sum  three  hundred  thousand 
dollars,  under  the  names  of  freight  and  charges.  This  is  money 
which  belongs  to  the  New  England  States,  because  we  can  fur- 
nish the  ships  as  well  as,  and  much  better  than,  the  British. 
Our  sister  States  are  willing  we  should  receive  these  benefits, 
and  that  they  should  be  secured  to  us  by  national  laws  ;  but 
until  that  is  done,  their  private  merchants  will,  no  doubt,  for 
the  sake  of  long  credit,  or  some  other  such  temporary  advan- 
tage, prefer  the  ships  of  foreigners.  And  yet  we  have  suffered 
these  ignominious  burdens  rather  than  trust  our  own  repre- 
sentatives with  power  to  help  us,  and  we  call  ourselves  free  and 
independent  states.  We  are  independent  of  each  other,  but  we 
are  slaves  to  Europe.  We  have  no  uniformity  in  duties,  imposts, 
excises  or  prohibitions.  Congress  has  no  authority  to  withhold 
advantages  from  foreigners,  in  order  to  obtain  advantages  from 
them.  By  the  ninth  of  the  old  articles,  Congress  may  enter 
into  treaties  and  alliances  under  certain  provisos,  but  Con-  • 
gress  cannot  pledge  that  a  single  State  shall  not  render  the 
whole  treaty  of  commerce  a  nullity. 

Our  manufactures  are  another  great  subject,  which  has  received 
no  encouragement  by  national  duties  on  foreign  manufactures, 
and  they  never  can  by  any  authority  in  the  Confederation.  It 
has  been  said,  that  no  country  can  produce  manufactures  until 
it  be  overstocked  with  inhabitants.  It  is  true,  the  United  States 
have  employment,  except  in  the  winter,  for  their  citizens,  in 
agriculture — the  most  respectable  employment  under  heaven  ; 
but  it  is  now  to  be  remembered,  that  since  the  old  Confedera- 
tion, there  is  a  great  emigration  of  foreign  artisans  hither,  some 
of  whom  are  left  here  by  the  armies  of  the  last  war,  and  others, 
who  have  more  lately  sought  the  new  world,  from  hopes  of 
mending  their  condition.  These  will  not  change  their  employ- 
ments. Besides  this,  the  very  face  of  our  country  leads  to 
manufactures.  Our  numerous  falls  of  water,  and  places  for 
mills,  where  paper,  snuff,  gunpowder,  iron  works,  and  numerous 
other  articles,  are  prepared — these  will  save  us  immense  sums 
of  money,  that  otherwise  would  go  to  Europe.     The  question 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  159 

is,  have  these  been  encouraged  ?  Has  Congress  been  able,  by- 
national  laws,  to  prevent  the  importation  of  such  foreign  com- 
modities as  are  made  from  such  raw  materials  as  we  ourselves 
raise  ?  It  is  alleged,  that  the  citizens  of  the  United  States  have 
contracted  debts  within  the  last  three  years,  with  the  subjects 
of  Great  Britain,  for  the  amount  of  near  six  millions  of  dollars, 
and  that  consequently  our  lands  are  mortgaged  for  that  sum. 
So  Corsica  was  once  mortgaged  to  the  Genoese  merchants  for 
articles  which  her  inhabitants  did  not  want,  or  which  they  could 
have  made  themselves,  and  she  was  afterwards  sold  to  a  foreign 
power.  If  we  wish  to  encourage  our  own  manufactures — to 
preserve  our  own  commerce — to  raise  the  value  of  our  own 
lands — we  must  give  Congress  the  powers  in  question. 

The  honorable  gentleman  from  Norton,  last  speaking,  says, 
that  if  Congress  have  the  power  of  laying  and  collecting  taxes, 
they  will  use  the  power  of  the  sword.  I  hold  the  reverse  to  be 
true.  The  doctrine  of  requisitions,  or  of  demands  upon  a  whole 
State,  implies  such  a  power ;  for  surely  a  whole  State,  a  whole 
community,  can  be  compelled  only  by  an  army ;  but  taxes  upon 
•  an  individual,  implies  only  the  use  of  a  collector  of  taxes.  That 
Congress,  however,  will  not  apply  to  the  power  6f  direct  taxa- 
tion, unless  in  cases  of  emergency,  is  plain  ;  because,  as  thirty 
thousand  inhabitants  will  elect  a  representative,  eight-tenths  of 
which  electors  perhaps  are  yeomen,  and  holders  of  farms,  it  will 
be  their  own  fault  if  they  are  not  represented  by  such  men  as 
will  never  permit  the  land  to  be  injured  by  unnecessary  taxes. 

Mr.  Bodman  said,  that  the  power  given  to  Congress,  to  lay 
and  collect  duties,  taxes,  &c,  as  contained  in  the  section  under 
consideration,  was  certainly  unlimited,  and  therefore  dangerous ; 
he  wished  to  know  whether  it  was  necessary  to  give  Congress 
power  to  do  harm,  in  order  to  enable  them  to  do  good.  It  had 
been  said,  that  the  sovereignty  of  the  States  remains  with  them ; 
but  if  Congress  has  the  power  to  lay  taxes,  and,  in  cases  of  neg- 
ligence or  non-compliance,  can  send  a  power  to  collect  them,  he 
thought  that  the  idea  of  sovereignty  was  destroyed.  This,  he 
said,  was  an  essential  point,  and  ought  to  be  seriously  consid- 
ered. It  had  been  urged,  that  gentlemen  were  jealous  of  their 
rulers.  He  said  he  thought  they  ought  to  be  so — it  was  just 
they  should  be  so  ;  for  jealousy  was  one  of  the  greatest  securi- 


160  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

ties  of  the  people,  in  a  republic.  The  power  in  the  .eighth 
section,  he  said,  ought  to  have  been  defined  ;  that  he  was  willing 
to  give  power  to  the  Federal  head,  but  he  wished  to  know  what 
that  power  was. 

Hon.  Mr.  Sedgwick,  in  answer  to  the  gentleman  last  speak- 
ing, said,  if  he  believed  the  adoption  of  the  proposed  Constitution 
would  interfere  with  the  State  legislatures,  he  would  be  the  last 
to  vote  for  it ;  but  he  thought  all  the  sources  of  revenue  ought 
to  be  put  into  the  hands  of  government,  who  were  to  protect 
and  secure  us  ;  and  powers  to  effect  this  had  always  been  neces- 
sarily unlimited.  Congress  would  necessarily  take  that  which 
was  easiest  to  the  people ;  the  first  would  be  impost,  the 
next  excise,  and  a  direct  tax  will  be  the  last ;  for,  says  the 
honorable  gentleman,  drawing  money  from  the  people  by  direct 
taxes,  being  difficult  and  uncertain,  it  would  be  the  last  source 
of  revenue  applied  to,  by  a  wise  legislature ;  and  hence,  says 
he,  the  people  may  be  assured,  that  the  delegation  of  a  power 
to  levy  them  would  not  be  abused.  Let  us  suppose — and  we 
shall  not  be  thought  extravagant  in  the  supposition — continued 
Mr.  Sedgwick,  that  we  are  attacked  by  a  foreign  enemy  ;  that' 
in  this  dilemma  our  treasury  was  exhausted,  our  credit  gone,  our 
enemy  on  our  borders  ;  and  that  there  was  no  possible  method  of 
raising  impost  or  excise.  In  this  case,  the  only  remedy  would 
be  a  direct  tax.  Could,  therefore,  this  power  being  vested  in 
Congress,  lessen  the  many  advantages  which  may  be  drawn 
from  it  ? 

Mr.  Singletary  thought  no  more  power  could  be  given  to  a 
despot,  than  to  give  up  the  purse-strings  of  the  people. 

Col.  Porter  asked,  if  a  better  rule  of  yielding  power  could 
be  shown  than  in  the  Constitution ;  for  what  we  do  not  give, 
said  he,  we  retain. 

Gen.  Thompson.  Mr.  President :  I  totally  abhor  this  para- 
graph. Massachusetts  has  ever  been  a  leading  State ;  now  let 
her  give  good  advice  to  her  sister  States.  Suppose  nine  States 
adopt  this  Constitution,  who  shall  touch  the  other  four  ?  Some 
cry  out,  Force  them.  I  say,  Draw  them.  We  love  liberty. 
Britain  never  tried  to  enslave  us  until  she  told  us  we  had  too 
much  liberty.  We  cannot  have  too  much  liberty.  The  Con- 
federation wants  amendments ;  shall  we  not  amend  it  ?     The 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  161 

Convention  were  sent  on  to  Philadelphia  to  amend  this  Confed- 
eration ;  but  they  made  a  new  creature ;  and  the  very  setting 
out  of  it  is  unconstitutional.  In  the  Convention,  Pennsylvania 
had  more  members  than  all  New  England,  and  two  of  our  dele- 
gates only  were  persuaded  to  sign  the  Constitution.  Massachu- 
setts once  shut  up  the  harbors  against  the  British.  There  I 
confess  I  was  taken  in.  Don't  let  us  be  in  a  hurry  again.  Let 
us  wait  to  see  what  our  sister  States  will  do.  What  shall  we 
suffer  if  we  adjourn  the  consideration  of  it  for  five  or  six  months  ? 
It  is  better  to  do  this  than  to  adopt  it  so  hastily.  Take  care 
we  don't  disunite  the  States.  By  uniting  we  stand,  by  dividing 
we  fall. 

Major  Kinsley.  Mr.  President:  After  so  much  has  been 
said  on  the  powers  to  be  given  to  Congress,  I  shall  say  but  a 
few  words  on  the  subject.  By  the  Articles  of  Confederation, 
the  people  have  three  checks  on  their  delegates  in  Congress ; 
the  annual  election  of  them,  their  rotation,  and  the  power  to 
recall  any,  or  all  of  them,  when  they  see  fit.  In  view  of  our 
Federal  rulers,  they  are  the  servants  of  the  people  ;  in  the  new 
Constitution,  we  are  deprived  of  annual  elections,  have  no  rota- 
tion, and  cannot  recall  our  members ;  therefore  our  Federal 
rulers  will  be  masters,  and  not  servants.  I  will  examine  what 
powers  we  have  given  to  our  masters.  They  have  power  to  lay 
and  collect  all  taxes,  duties,  imposts  and  excises  ;  raise  armies, 
fit  out  navies,  to  establish  themselves  in  a  Federal  town  of  ten 
miles  square,  equal  to  four  middling  townships,  erect  forts, 
magazines,  arsenals,  <fcc.  Therefore,  should  the  Congress  be 
chosen  of  designing  and  interested  men,  they  can  perpetuate 
their  existence,  secure  the  resources  of  war ;  and  the  people 
will  have  nothing  left  to  defend  themselves  with.  Let  us  look 
into  ancient  history.  The  Romans,  after  a  war,  thought  them- 
selves safe  in  a  government  of  ten  men,  called  the  Decemviri : 
these  ten  men  were  invested  with  all  powers,  and  were  chosen 
for  three  years.  By  their  arts  and  designs  they  secured  their 
second  election ;  but  finding,  from  the  manner  in  which  they 
had  exercised  their  power,  they  were  not  able  to  secure  their 
third  election,  they  declared  themselves  masters  of  Rome,  im- 
poverished the  city,  and  deprived  the  people  of  their  rights.  It 
has  been  said  that  there  was  no  such  danger  here  ;  I  will  sup- 
21 


162  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

pose  they  were  to  attempt  the  experiment,  after  we  have  given 
them  all  our  money,  established  them  in  a  Federal  town,  given 
them  the  power  of  coining  money,  and  raising  a  standing  army  ; 
and  to  establish  their  arbitrary  government ;  what  resources 
have  the  people  left  ?  I  cannot  see  any.  The  Parliament  of 
England  was  first  chosen  annually  ;  they  afterwards  lengthened 
their  duration  to  three  years ;  and  from  triennial  they  became 
septennial.  The  government  of  England  has  been  represented 
as  a  good  and  happy  government ;  but  some  parts  of  it,  their 
greatest  political  writers  much  condemn  ;  especially  that  of  the 
duration  of  their  Parliaments.  Attempts  are  yearly  made  to 
shorten  their  duration,  from  septennial  to  triennial ;  but  the 
influence  of  the  ministry  is  so  great,  that  it  has  not  yet  been 
accomplished.  From  this  duration,  bribery  and  corruption  are 
introduced.  Notwithstanding  they  receive  no  pay,  they  make 
great  interest  for  a  seat  in  Parliament,  one  or  two  years 
before  its  dissolution,  and  give  from  five  to  twenty  guineas  for 
a  vote ;  and  the  candidates  sometimes  expend  from  ten  thou- 
sand to  thirty  thousand  pounds.  Will  a  person  throw  away 
such  a  fortune,  and  waste  so  much  time,  without  the  probability 
of  replacing  such  a  sum  with  interest  ?  Or  can  there  be  security 
in  such  men  ?  Bribery  may  be  introduced  here,  as  well  as  in 
Great  Britain  ;  and  Congress  may  equally  oppress  the  people ; 
because  we  cannot  call  them  to  an  account,  considering  that 
there  is  no  annual  election — no  rotation — no  power  to  recall 
them,  provided  for. 


Tuesday,  January  22,  1788. 

Section  eighth  still  under  consideration. 

Judge  Sumner.  The  powers  proposed  to  be  delegated  in  this 
section  are  very  important,  as  they  will  in  effect  place  the  purse- 
strings  of  the  citizen  in  the  hands  of  Congress  for  certain  pur- 
poses. In  order  to  know  whether  such  powers  are  necessary, 
we  ought,  Sir,  to  inquire  what  the  design  of  uniting  under  one 
government  is.  It  is,  that  the  national  dignity  may  be  sup- 
ported, its  safety  preserved,  and  necessary  debts  paid.     Is  it 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  163 

not  necessary,  then,  to  afford  the  means  by  which  alone  those 
objects  can  be  attained  ?  Much  better,  it  appears  to  me,  would 
it  be  for  the  States  not  to  unite  under  one  government,  which 
will  be  attended  with  some  expense,  than  to  unite,  and  at  the 
same  time  withhold  the  powers  necessary  to  accomplish  the 
design  of  the  union.  Gentlemen  say,  the  power  to  raise  money 
may  be  abused.  I  grant  it ;  and  the  same  may  be  said  of  any 
other  delegated  power.  Our  general  court  have  the  same 
power ;  but  did  they  ever  dare  abuse  it  ?  Instead  of  voting 
themselves  six  shillings  and  eight  pence,  they  might  vote  them- 
selves twelve  pounds  a  day ;  Imt  there  never  was  a  complaint 
of  their  voting  themselves  more  than  what  was  reasonable.  If 
they  should  make  an  undue  use  of  their  power,  they  know  a  loss 
of  confidence  in  the  people  would  be  the  consequence,  and  they 
would  not  be  reelected ;  and  this  is  one  security  in  the  hands 
of  the  people.  Another  is,  that  all  money-bills  are  to  originate 
with  the  House  of  Representatives ;  and  can  we  suppose  the 
representatives  of  Georgia,  or  any  other  State,  more  disposed  to 
burden  their  constituents  with  taxes,  than  the  representatives  of 
Massachusetts  ?  It  is  not  to  be  supposed  ;  f<&  whatever  is  for 
the  interest  of  one  State,  in  this  particular,  will  be  the  interest 
of  all  the  States,  and  no  doubt  attended  to  by  the  House  of 
Representatives.  But  why  should  we  alarm  ourselves  with 
imaginary  evils  ?  An  impost  will  probably  be  a  principal  source 
of  revenue  ;  but  if  that  should  be  insufficient,  other  taxes, 
especially  in  time  of  war,  ought  to  supply  the  deficiency.  It  is 
said,  that  requisitions  on  the  States  ought  to  be  made  in  cases 
of  emergency ;  but  we  all  know  there  can  be  no  dependence  on 
requisitions.  The  honorable  gentleman  from  Newburyport  gave 
us  an  instance  from  the  history  of  the  United  Provinces  to  prove 
it,  by  which  it  appears  they  would  have  submitted  to  the  arms 
of  Spain,  had  it  not  been  for  the  surprising  exertions  of  one 
Province.  But  there  can  be  no  need  of  recurring  to  ancient 
records,  when  the  history  of  our  own  country  furnishes  an 
instance,  where  requisitions  have  had  no  effect.  But  some 
gentlemen  object  further,  and  say,  the  delegation  of  these  great 
powers  ivill  destroy  the  State  legislatures ;  but  I  trust  this  never 
can  take  place,  for  the  general  government  depends  on  the 
State  legislatures  for  its  very  existence.     The  President  is  to 


164  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

be  chosen  by  electors  under  the  regulation  of  the  State  legisla- 
tures ;  the  Senate  is  to  be  chosen  by  the  State  legislatures  ;  and 
the  representative  body,  by  the  people  ;  under  like  regulations 
of  the  legislative  body  in  the  different  States.  If  gentlemen 
consider  this,  they  will,  I  presume,  alter  their  opinion  ;  for 
nothing  is  clearer,  than  that  the  existence  of  the  legislatures  in 
the  different  States  is  essential  to  the  very  being  of  the  general 
government.  I  hope,  Sir,  we  shall  all  see  the  necessity  of  a 
Federal  government,  and  not  make  objections,  unless  they 
appear  to  us  to  be  of  some  weight. 

Mr.  Gore.  This  section,  Mr.  President,  has  been  the  subject 
of  many  observations,  founded  on  real  or  pretended  jealousies 
of  the  powers  herein  delegated  to  the  general  government ;  and 
by  comparing  the  proposed  Constitution  with  things  in  their 
nature  totally  different,  the  mind  may  be  seduced  from  a  just 
determination  on  the  subject.  Gentlemen  have  compared  the 
authority  of  Congress,  to  levy  and  collect  taxes  from  the  people 
of  America,  to  a  similar  power  assumed  by  the  Parliament  of 
Great  Britain.  If  we  but  state  the  relation  which  these  two 
bodies  bear  to  America,  we  shall  see  that  no  arguments  drawn 
from  one,  can  be  applicable  to  the  other.  The  House  of  Com- 
mons, in  the  British  Parliament,  which  is  the  only  popular 
branch  of  that  assembly,  was  composed  of  men  chosen  exclu- 
sively by  the  inhabitants  of  Great  Britain,  in  no  sort  amenable 
to,  or  dependent  upon,  the  people  of  America,  and  secured,  by 
their  local  situation,  from  every  burden  they  might  lay  on  this 
country.  By  impositions  on  this  part  of  the  empire,  they  might 
be  relieved  from  their  own  taxes,  but  could  in  no  case  be  injured 
themselves.  The  Congress  of  the  United  States  is  to  be  chosen, 
either  mediately  or  immediately,  by  the  people.  They  can  im- 
pose no  burdens  but  what  they  participate  in,  in  common  with 
their  fellow-citizens.  The  senators  and  representatives,  during 
the  time  for  which  they  shall  be  elected,  are  incapable  of  holding 
any  office  which  shall  be  created,  or  the  emolument  of  which 
shall  be  increased,  during  such  time.  This  is  taking  from  can- 
didates every  lure  to  office,  and  from  the  administrators  of  the 
government,  every  temptation  to  create  or  increase  emoluments 
to  such  degree  as  shall  be  burdensome  to  their  constituents. 
Gentlemen,  who  candidly  consider  these  things,  will  not  say 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  165 

that  arguments  against  the  assumption  of  power  by  Great  Brit- 
ain can  apply  to  the  Congress  of  the  United  States.  Again, 
Sir,  it  has  been  said,  that  because  ten  men  of  Rome,  chosen  to 
compile  a  body  of  laws  for  that  people,  remained  in  office  after 
the  time  for  which  they  were  chosen,  therefore  the  Congress  of 
America  will  perpetuate  themselves  in  government.  The  De- 
cemviri, in  their  attainment  to  their  exalted  station,  had  influ- 
ence enough  over  the  people  to  obtain  a  temporary  sovereignty, 
which  superseded  the  authority  of  the  senate  and  the  consuls, 
and  gave  them  unlimited  control  over  the  lives  and  fortunes  of 
their  fellow-citizens.  They  were  chosen  for  a  year  ;  at  the  end 
of  this  period,  under  pretence  of  not  having  completed  their 
business,  they,  with  the  alteration  of  some  few  of  their  mem- 
bers, were  continued  for  another  year  ;  at  the  end  of  the  second 
year,  notwithstanding  the  business  for  which  they  were  chosen 
was  completed,  they  refused  to  withdraw  from  their  station, 
and  still  continued  in  the  exercise  of  their  power.  But  to  what 
was  this  owing  ?  If  history  can  be  credited,  it  was  to  an  idea, 
universally  received  by  the  Roman  people,  that  the  power  of  the 
magistrate  was  supposed  to  determine  by  his  own  resignation, 
and  not  by  expiration  of  the  time  for  which  he  was  chosen. 
This  is  one,  among  many  instances  which  might  be  produced, 
of  the  small  attainments  of  the  Roman  people  in  political  knowl- 
edge ;  and  I  submit  it,  Sir,  to  the  candor  of  this  Convention, 
whether  any  conclusions  can  be  fairly  drawn  against  vesting 
the  proposed  government  with  the  powers  mentioned  in  this 
section,  because  the  magistrates  of  the  ancient  republics  usurped 
power,  and  frequently  attempted  to  perpetuate  themselves  in 
authority. 

Some  gentlemen  suppose  it  is  unsafe  and  unnecessary  to  vest 
the  proposed  government  with  authority  to  "  lay  and  collect 
taxes,  duties,  imposts  and  excises."  Let  us  strip  the  subject 
.of  every  thing  that  is  foreign,  and  refrain  from  likening  it  with 
governments  which  in  their  nature  and  administration  have  no 
affinity ;  and  we  shall  soon  see  that  it  is  not  only  safe,  but 
indispensably  necessary  to  our  peace  and  dignity,  to  vest  the 
Congress  with  the  powers  described  in  this  section.  To  deter- 
mine the  necessity  of  investing  that  body  with  the  authority 
alluded  to,  let  us  inquire  what  duties  are  incumbent  on  them. 


166  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

To  pay  the  debts,  and  provide  for  the  common  defence  and  gen- 
eral welfare  of  the  United  States  ;  to  declare  war,  <fcc. ;  to  raise 
and  support  armies  ;  to  provide  and  maintain  a  navy  :  these  are 
authorities  and  duties  incident  to  every  government.  No  one 
has,  or  I  presume  will,  deny  that  whatever  government  may  be 
established  over  America  ought  to  perform  such  duties.  The 
expense  attending  these  duties  is  not  within  the  power  of  cal- 
culation. The  exigencies  of  government  are  in  their  nature 
illimitable  ;  so  then  must  be  the  authority  which  can  meet  these 
exigencies.  Where  we  demand  an  object,  we  must  afford  the 
means  necessary  to  its  attainment.  Whenever  it  can  be  clearly 
ascertained,  what  will  be  the  future  exigencies  of  government, 
the  expense  attending  them,  and  the  product  of  any  particular 
tax,  duty  or  impost,  then,  and  not  before?  can  the  people  of 
America  limit  their  government  to  amount  and  fund.  Some 
have  said  that  the  impost  and  excise  would  be  sufficient  for  all 
the  purposes  of  government  in  times  of  peace  ;  and  that  in  war, 
requisitions  should  be  made  on  the  several  States  for  sums  to 
supply  the  deficiencies  of  this  fund.  Those  who  are  best  in- 
formed, suppose  this  fund  inadequate  to,  and  none  pretend  that 
it  can  exceed,  the  expenses  of  a  peace  establishment.  What 
then  is  to  be  done  ?  Is  America  to  wait  until  she  is  attacked, 
before  she  attempts  a  preparation  for  defence  ?  This  Avould 
certainly  be  unwise ;  it  would  be  courting  our  enemies  to  make 
war  upon  us.  The  operations  of  war  are  sudden,  and  call  for 
large  sums  of  money.  Collections  from  States  are  at  all  times 
slow  and  uncertain  ;  and  in  case  of  refusal,  the  non-complying 
State  must  be  coerced  by  arms,  which  in  its  consequences  would 
involve  the  innocent  with  the  guilty,  and  introduce  all  the  hor- 
rors of  a  civil  war.  But  it  is  said,  we  need  not  fear  a  war — we 
have  no  enemies.  Let  gentlemen  consider  the  situation  of  our 
country ;  they  will  find  we  are  circumscribed  with  enemies, 
from  Maine  to  Georgia.  I  trust,  therefore,  that  upon  a  fair  and. 
candid  consideration  of  the  subject,  it  will  be  found  indispensa- 
bly requisite  to  the  peace,  dignity  and  happiness  of  America, 
that  the  proposed  government  should  be  vested  with  all  the 
powers  granted  by  the  section  under  debate. 

Hon.  Mr.  Phillips  (of  Boston.)     I  rise  to  make  a  few  obser- 
vations on  this  section,  as  it  contains  powers  absolutely  neces- 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  167 

sary.  If  social  government  did  not  exist,  there  would  be  an 
end  of  individual  government ;  therefore  our  very  being  de- 
pends on  social  government.  On  this  article  is  founded  the 
main  pillar  of  the  building.  Take  away  this  pillar,  and  where 
is  your  government  ?  Therefore,  I  conceive,  in  this  view  of 
the  case,  this  power  is  absolutely  necessary.  There  seems  to 
be  a  suspicion  that  this  power  will  be  abused ;  but  is  not  all 
delegation  of  power  equally  dangerous  ?  If  we  have  a  castle, 
shall  we  delay  to  put  a  commander  into  it,  for  fear  he  will  turn 
his  artillery  against  us  ?  My  concern  is  for  the  majesty  of  the 
people  ;  if  there  is  no  virtue  among  them,  what  will  the  Congress 
do  ?  If  they  had  the  meekness  of  Moses,  the  patience  of  Job,  and 
the  wisdom  of  Solomon,  and  the  people  were  determined  to  be 
slaves,  Sir,  could  the  Congress  prevent  them  ?  If  they  set 
Heaven  at  defiance,  no  arm  of  flesh  can  save  them.  Sir,  I 
shall  have  nothing  to  do  in  this  government.  But  we  see  the 
situation  we  are  in ;  we  are  verging  towards  destruction,  and 
every  one  must  be  sensible  of  it.  I  suppose  the  New  Eng- 
land States  have  a  treasure  offered  to  them  better  than  the 
mines  of  Peru  ;  and  it  cannot  be  to  the  disadvantage  of  the 
southern  States.  Great  Britain  and  France  come  here  with 
their  vessels,  instead  of  our  carrying  our  produce  to  those 
countries  in  American  vessels,  navigated  by  our  own  citizens. 
When  I  consider  the  extensive  sea-coast  there  is  to  this  State 
alone,  so  well  calculated  for  commerce,  viewing  matters  in  this 
light,  1  would  rather  sink  all  this  continent  owes  me,  than  that 
this  power  should  be  withheld  from  Congress.  Mention  is 
made  that  Congrsss  ought  to  be  restricted  of  the  power  to  keep 
an  army  except  in  times  of  war.  I  apprehend  that  great  mis- 
chiefs would  ensue  from  such  a  restriction.  Let  us  take  means 
to  prevent  war,  by  granting  to  Congress  the  power  of  raising  an 
army.  If  a  declaration  of  war  is  made  against  this  country, 
and  the  enemy's  army  is  coming  against  us,  before  Congress 
could  collect  the  means  to  withstand  this  enemy,  they  would 
penetrate  into  the  bowels  of  our  country,  and  every  thing  dear 
to  us  would  be  gone  in  a  moment.  The  honorable  gentleman 
from  Topsham  has  made  use  of  the  expression,  "  0,  my  coun- 
try ! "  from  an  apprehension  that  the  Constitution  should  be 
adopted  ;     I  will  cry  out,  "  0,  my  country  I  "  if  it  is  not  adopt- 


168  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

ed.  I  see  nothing  but  destruction  and  inevitable  ruin,  if  it  is 
not.  The  more  I  peruse  and  study  this  article,  the  more  con- 
vinced am  I  of  the  necessity  of  such  a  power  being  vested  in 
Congress ;  the  more  I  hear  said  against  it,  the  more  I  am  con- 
firmed in  my  sentiments  of  its  expediency :  for  it  is  like  the 
pure  metal ;  the  more  you  rub  it  the  brighter  it  shines.  It  is 
with  concern  I  hear  the  honorable  gentleman  from  Topsham 
make  use  of  language  against  the  gentlemen  of  the  law.  Sir,  I 
look  on  this  order  of  men  to  be  essential  to  the  liberties  and  rights 
of  the  people  ;  and  whoever  speaks  against  them,  as  speaking 
against  an  ordinance'  of  Heaven.  Mr.  President,  I  hope  every 
gentleman  will  offer  his  sentiments  candidly  on  this  momentous 
affair  ;  that  he  will  examine  for  himself,  and  consider  that  he 
has  not  only  the  good  of  his  Commonwealth  under  his  consid- 
eration, but  the  welfare  of  the  United  States. 

Dr.  Willakd  entered  largely  into  the  field  of  ancient  history, 
and  deduced  therefrom,  arguments  to  prove  that  where  power 
had  been  trusted  to  men,  whether  in  great  or  small  bodies, 
they  had  always  abused  it,  and  that  thus  republics  had  soon 
degenerated  into  aristocracies.  He  instanced  Sparta,  Athens, 
and  Rome.  The  Amphictyonic  League,  he  said,  resembled  the 
Confederation  of  the  United  States.  While  thus  united  they 
defeated  Xerxes  ;  but  were  subdued  by  the  gold  of  Phillip, 
who  bought  the  council  to  betray  the  interest  of  their 
country. 

Hon.  Mr.  Gorham  (in  reply  to  the  gentleman  from  Ux- 
bridge)  exposed  the  absurdity  of  conclusions  and  hypotheses 
drawn  from  ancient  governments,  which  bore  no  relation  to 
the  Confederacy  proposed  ;  for  those  governments  had  no  idea 
of  representation,  as  we  have.  He,  however,  warned  us 
against  the  evils  which  had  ruined  those  states,  which  he 
thought  was  the  want  of  an  efficient  Federal  government.  As 
much  as  the  Athenians  rejoiced  in  the  extirpation  of  a  Lacede- 
monian, will,  if  we  are  disunited,  a  citizen  of  a  Massachusetts, 
at  the  death  of  a  Connecticut  man  or  a  Yorker.  With  respect 
to  the  proposed  government  degenerating  into  an  aristocracy, 
the  honorable  gentleman  observed,  that  the  nature  and  situa- 
tion of  our  country  rendered  such  a  circumstance  impossible  ; 
as  from  the  great  preponderance  of  the  agricultural  interest  in 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  169 

the  United  States,  that  interest  would  always  have  it  in  its 
power  to  elect  such  men  as  would,  he  observed,  effectually 
prevent  the  introduction  of  any  other  than  a  perfectly  demo- 
cratical  form  of  government. 

Hon.  Mr.  Cabot  went  fully  into  a  continuation  of  the  argu- 
ments of  the  honorable  gentleman  last  up.  In  a  clear  and 
elegant  manner  he  analyzed  the  ancient  governments  men- 
tioned by  Dr.  Willard,  and,  by  comparing  them  with  the  pro- 
posed system,  fully  demonstrated  the  superiority  of  the  latter, 
and  in  a  particular  manner  the  section  under  debate. 

Mr.  Randal  said,  the  quoting  of  ancient  history  was  no 
more  to  the  purpose,  than  to  tell  how  our  fathers  dug  clams  at 
Plymouth.  He  feared  a  consolidation  of  the  thirteen  States. 
Our  manners,  he  said,  were  widely  different  from  the  southern 
States — their  elections  were  not  so  free  and  unbiassed ;  there- 
fore, if  the  States  were  consolidated,  he  thought  it  would 
introduce  manners  among  us  which  would  set  us  at  continual 
variance. 

Mr.  Bowdoin  pointed  out  other  instances  of  dissimilarity 
between  the  systems  of  the  ancient  republics  and  the  proposed 
Constitution,  than  those  mentioned  by  the  honorable  gentlemen 
from  Charlestown  and  Beverly  ;  in  the  want  of  the  important 
checks  in  the  former,  which  were  to  be  found  in  the  latter ;  to 
the  want  of  which,  in  the  first,  was  owing,  he  said,  the  usurpa- 
tion which  took  place.  He  instanced  the  Decemviri,  who, 
though  chosen  for  a  short  period,  yet,  unchecked,  soon  subvert- 
ed the  liberties  of  the  Romans  ;  "and  concluded  with  a  decided 
opinion  in  favor  of  the  Constitution  under  debate.        ^ 


AFTERNOON. 

Mr.  Symmes.  Mr.  President :  In  such  an  assembly  as  this, 
and  on  a  subject  that  puzzles  the  oldest  politicians,  a  young 
man,  Sir,  will  scarcely  dare  to  think  for  himself;  but  if  he 
venture  to  speak,  the  effort  must  certainly  be  greater.  This 
Convention  is  the  first  representative  body  in  which  I  have 
been  honored  with  a  seat ;  and  men  will  not  wonder  that  a 
scene  at  once  so  new  and  so  augusfy,  should  confuse,  oppress, 
and  almost  disqualify  me  to  proceed. 
22 


170  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

Sir,  I  bespeak  the  candor  of  the  Convention — that  candor 
which  I  know  I  need  but  ask  to  have  it  extended  to  me,  while 
I  make  a  few  indigested  observations  on  the  paragraph  now  in 
debate.  I  have  hitherto  attended  with  diligence,  but  no  great 
anxiety,  to  the  reasoning  of  the  ablest  partisans  on  both  sides 
of  the  question.  Indeed,  I  could  have  wished  for  a  more  effect- 
ual, and  (if  I  may  term  it  so)  a  more  feeling  representation  in 
the  lower  house,  and  for  a  representation  of  the  people  in  the 
Senate.  I  have  been,  and  still  am,  desirous  of  a  rotation  in 
office,  to  prevent  the  final  perpetuation  of  power  in  the  same 
men.  And  I  have  not  been  able  clearly  to  see  why  the  place 
and  mariner  of  holding  elections  should  be  in  the  disposal  of 
Congress. 

But,  Sir,  in  my  humble  opinion,  these  things  are  comparative- 
ly the  lesser  things  of  the  law.  They  doubtless  have  their 
influence  in  the  grand  effect,  and  so  are  essential  to  the  system. 
But,  Sir,  I  view  the  section  to  which  we  have  at  length  arrived, 
as  the  cement  of  the  fabric,  and  this  clause  as  the  key-stone,  or 
(if  I  may  apply  the  metaphor)  the  magic  talisman  on  which 
the  fate  of  it  depends. 

Allow  me,  Sir,  to  recall  to  your  remembrance  that  yesterday, 
when  States  were  in  doubt  about  granting  to  Congress  a  five 
per  cent,  impost,  and  the  simple  power  of  regulating  trade — the 
time  when,  so  delicate  was  the  patriotic  mind,  that  power  was 
to  be  transferred  with  reluctant,  with  a  sparing  hand,  and  the 
most  obvious  utility  could  scarcely  extort  it  from  the  people. 
It  appears  to  me  of  some  importance  to  consider  this  matter, 
and  to  demand  complete  satisfaction  upon  the  question,  why  an 
unlimited  power  in  the  affair  of  taxation  is  so  soon  required  ? 
Is  our  situation  so  vastly  different,  that  the  powers,  so  lately 
sufficient,  are  now  but  the  dust  of  the  balance  ?  I  observe, 
Sir,  that  many  men,  who  within  a  few  years  past  were  strenu- 
ous opposers  of  an  augmentation  of  the  power  of  Congress,  are 
now  the  warmest  advocates  of  power,  so  large  as  not  to  admit 
of  a  comparison  with  those  which  they  opposed.  Cannot  some 
of  them  state  their  reasons  then,  and  their  reasons  now,  that 
we  may  judge  of  their  consistency  ?  or  shall  we  be  left  to  sup- 
pose that  the  opinions  of  politicians,  like  those  of  the  multi- 
tude, vibrate  from  one  extreme  to  the  other,  and  that  we  have 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  171 

no  men  among  us  to  whom  we  can  intrust  the  philosophic  task 
of  pointing  out  the  golden  mean  ? 

At  present,  Congress  have  no  power  to  lay  taxes,  &c,  nor  even 
to  compel  a  compliance  with  their  requisitions.  May  we  not 
suppose,  that  the  members  of  the  great  Convention  had  severely 
felt  the  impotency  of  Congress,  while  they  were  in  it,  and  there- 
fore were  rather  too  keenly  set  for  an  effectual  increase  of 
power?  That  the  difficulties  they  had  encountered,  in  obtain- 
ing decent  requisitions,  had  wrought  in  them  a  degree  of  impa- 
tience, which  prompted  them  to  demand  the  purse-strings  of  the 
nation,  as  if  we  were  insolvent,  and  the  proposed  Congress  were 
to  compound  with  our  creditors  ?  Whence,  Sir,  can  this  great, 
I  had  almost  said,  this  bold  demand,  have  originated  ?  Will  it 
be  said  that  it  is  but  a  consistent  and  necessary  part  of  the  gen- 
eral system  ?  I  shall  not  deny  these  gentlemen  the  praise  of 
inventing  a  system  completely  consistent  with  itself,  and  pretty 
free  from  contradiction  ;  but  I  would  ask,  (I  shall  expect  to  be 
answered,)  how  a  system  can  be  necessary  for  us,  of  which  this 
is  a  consistent  and  necessary  part  ? 

But,  Sir,  to  the  paragraph  in  hand — Congress,  &c. 

Here,  Sir,  (however  kindly  Congress  may  be  pleased  to  deal 
with  us,)  is  a  very  good  and  valid  conveyance  of  all  the  property 
in  the  United  States,  to  certain  uses,  indeed,  but  those  uses 
capable  of  any  construction  the  trustee  may  think  proper  to 
make.  This  body  is  not  amenable  to  any  tribunal,  and  there- 
fore this  Congress  can  do  wrong.  It  will  not  be  denied  that 
they  may  tax  us  to  any  extent ;  but  some  gentlemen  are  fond 
of  arguing  that  this  body  never  will  do  any  thing  but  what  is 
for  the  common  good.     Let  us  consider  that  matter. 

Faction,  Sir,  is  the  vehicle  of  all  transactions  in  public  bodies  ; 
and  when  gentlemen  know  this  so  well,  I  am  rather  surprised 
to  hear  them  so  sanguine  in  this  respect.  The  prevalent  faction 
is  the  body ;  these  gentlemen,  therefore,  must  mean  that  the 
prevalent  faction  will  always  be  right,  and  that  the  true  patriots 
will  always  outnumber  the  men  of  less  and  selfish  principles. 
From  this  it  would  follow  that  no  public  measure  was  ever 
wrong,  because  it  must  have  been  passed  by  the  majority  ;  and 
so  I  grant  no  power  ever  was  or  will  be  abused.  In  short,  we 
know  that  all  governments  have  degenerated,  and  consequently 


172  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

have  abused  the  powers  reposed  in  them ;  and  why  we  should 
imagine  better  of  the  proposed  Congress  than  of  myriads  of 
public  bodies  who  have  gone  before  them,  I  cannot  at  present 
conceive. 

Sir,  we  ought  (I  speak  it  with  submission)  to  consider  that 
what  we  now  grant  from  certain  motives,  well  grounded,  at 
present,  will  be  exacted  of  posterity  as  a  prerogative,  when  we 
are  not  alive  to  testify  the  tacit  conditions  of  the  grant ;  that 
the  wisdom  of  this  age  will  then  be  pleaded  by  those  in  power ; 
and  that  the  cession  we  are  now  about  to  make  will  be  actually 
clothed  with  the  venerable  habit  of  ancestral  sanction. 

Therefore,  Sir,  I  humbly  presume  we  ought  not  to  take 
advantage  of  our  situation  in  point  of  time,  so  as  to  bind  pos- 
terity to  be  obedient  to  laws  they  may  very  possibly  disapprove, 
nor  expose  them  to  a  rebellion  which  at  that  period  will  very 
probably  end  only  in  their  farther  subjugation. 

The  paragraph  in  question  is  an  absolute  decree  of  the  peo- 
ple. The  Congress  shall  have  power  ;  it  does  not  say  they  shall 
exercise  it ;  but  our  necessities  say  they  must,  and  the  experi- 
ence of  ages  says  that  they  will,  and  finally,  when  the  expenses 
of  the  nation,  by  their  ambition,  are  grown  enormous,  that  they 
will  oppress  and  subject.  For,  Sir,  they  may  lay  taxes,  duties, 
imposts  and  excises  !  One  would  suppose  that  the  Convention, 
Sir,  were  not  at  all  afraid  to  multiply  words,  when  any  thing 
was  to  be  got  by  it.  By  another  clause,  all  imposts  and  duties 
on  exports  and  imports,  wherever  laid,  go  into  the  Federal 
chest ;  so  that  Congress  may  not  only  lay  imposts  and  excises, 
but  all  imposts  and  duties  that  are  laid  on  imports  and  exports 
by  any  State,  shall  be  a  part  of  the  National  revenue ;  and,  be- 
sides, Congress  may  lay  an  impost  on  the  produce  and  manufac- 
tures of  the  country,  which  are  consumed  at  home.  And  all 
these  shall  be  equal  through  the  States.  Here,  Sir,  I  raise  two 
objections :  First,  that  Congress  should  have  this  power.  It  is 
a  universal,  unbounded  permission ;  and  as  such,  I  think  no 
free  people  ought  ever  to  consent  to  it,  especially  in  so  important 
a  matter  as  that  of  property.  I  will  not  descend,  Sir,  to  an 
abuse  of  this  future  Congress,  until  it  exists,  nor  then,  until  it 
misbehaves,  nor  then,  unless  1  dare.  But  I  think  that  some 
certain  revenue,  amply  adequate  to  all  necessary  purposes,  upon 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  173 

a  peace  establishment,  but  certain  and  definitive,  would  have 
been  better,  and  the  collection  of  it  might  have  been  guaranteed 
by  every  State  to  every  other.  We  should  then  have  known  to 
what  we  were  about  to.  subscribe,  and  should  have  cheerfully 
granted  it.  But  now,  we  may  indeed  grant,  but  who  can  cheer- 
fully grant  he  knows  not  what  ? 

Again,  Sir,  I  object  to  the  equality  of  these  duties  through 
the  States.  It  matters  not  with  me,  in  the  present  argument, 
which  of  them  will  suffer  by  this  proportion.  Some  probably 
will,  as  the  consumption  of  dutied  articles  will  not,  if  we  may 
judge  from  experience,  be  uniform  in  all. 

But  some  say,  with  whom  I  have  conversed,  it  was  for  this 
reason  that  taxes  were  provided,  that  by  their  assistance  the 
defect  of  duties  in  some  States  ought  to  be  supplied.  Now, 
then,  let  us  suppose  that  the  duties  are  so  laid,  that  if  every 
State  paid  in  proportion  to  that  which  paid  most,  the  duties 
alone  would  supply  a  frugal  treasury.  Some  States  will  pay 
but  half  their  proportion,  and  some  will  scarcely  pay  any  thing. 
But  those  in  general  who  pay  the  least  duty,  viz.,  the  inland 
States,  are  least  of  all  able  to  pay  a  land  tax,  and  therefore  I  do 
not  see  but  this  tax  would  operate  most  against  those  who  are 
at  least  able  to  pay  it. 

I  humbly  submit  it,  Sir,  whether,  if  each  State  had  its  propor- 
tion of  some  certain  gross  sum  assigned,  according  to  its  num- 
bers, and  a  power  was  given  to  Congress  to  collect  the  same,  in 
case  of  default  in  the  State,  this  would  not  have  been  a  safer 
Constitution.  For,  Sir,  I  also  disapprove  of  the  power  to  col- 
lect, which  is  here  vested  in  Congress.  It  is  a  power,  Sir,  to 
burden  us  with  a  standing  army  of  ravenous  collectors — har- 
pies, perhaps  from  another  State,  but  who,  however,  were  never 
known  to  have  bowels  for  any  purpose  but  to  fatten  on  the  life- 
blood  of  the  people.  In  one  age  or  two  this  will  be  the  case, 
and  when  the  Congress  shall  become  tyrannical,  these  vultures, 
their  servants,  will  be  the  tyrants  of  the  village,  by  whose  pres- 
ence all  freedom  of  speech  and  action  will  be  taken  away. 

Sir,  I  shall  be  told  that  these  are  imaginary  evils ;  but  I  hold 
to  this  maxim,  that  power  was  never  given  (of  this  kind  espe- 
cially) but  it  was  exercised,  nor  ever  exercised  but  it  was  finally 
abused.     We  must  not  be  amused  with  handsome  probabilities, 


174  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

but  we  must  be  assured  that  we  are  in  no  danger,  and  that  this 
Congress  could  not  distress  us,  if  they  were  ever  so  much 
disposed. 

To  pay  the  debts,  &c. 

These  words,  Sir,  I  confess,  are  an  ornament  to  the  page, 
and  very  musical  words,  but  they  are  too  general  to  be  under- 
stood as  any  kind  of  limitation  of  the  power  of  Congress,  and 
not  very  easy  to  be  understood  at  all.  When  Congress  have 
the  purse,  they  are  not  confined  to  rigid  economy,  and  the  word 
debts  here  is  not  confined  to  debts  already  contracted,  or,  in- 
deed, if  it  were,  the  term  "general  welfare"  might  be  applied 
to  any  expenditure  whatever.  Or  if  it  could  not,  who  shall 
dare  to  gainsay  the  proceedings  of  this  body  at  a  future  day, 
when,  according  to  the  course  of  nature,  it  shall  be  too  firmly 
fixed  in  the  saddle  to  be  overthrown  by  any  thing  but  a  general 
insurrection  ?  an  event  not  to  be  expected,  considering  the  ex- 
tent of  this  continent,  and  if  it  were  to  be  expected,  a  sufficient 
reason  in  itself  for  rejecting  this  or  any  Constitution  that  would 
tend  to  produce  it. 

This  clause,  Sir,  contains  the  very  sinews  of  the  Constitution. 
And  I  hope  the  universality  of  it  may  be  singular  ;  but  it  may 
be  easily  seen,  that  it  tends  to  produce,  in  time,  as  universal 
powers  in  every  other  respect.  As  the  poverty  of  individuals 
prevents  luxury,  so  the  poverty  of  public  bodies,  whether  sole 
or  aggregate,  prevents  tyranny.  A  nation  cannot,  perhaps,  do 
a  more  politic  thing,  than  to  supply  the  purse  of  its  sovereign 
with  that  parsimony  which  results  from  a  sense  of  the  labor  it 
costs,  and  so  to  compel  him  to  comply  with  the  genius  of  his 
people,  and  conform  to  their  situation,  whether  he  will  or  not. 
How  different  will  be  our  conduct,  if  we  give  the  entire  disposal 
of  our  property  to  a  body,  as  yet  almost  unknown  in  theory,  in 
practice  quite  heterogeneous  in  its  composition,  and  whose 
maxims  are  yet  entirely  unknown  ! 

Sir,  I  wish  the  gentlemen  who  so  ably  advocate  this  instru- 
ment, would  enlarge  upon  this  formidable  clause,  and  I  most 
sincerely  wish  that  the  effect  of  their  reasoning  may  be  my  con- 
viction. For,  Sir,  I  will  not  dishonor  my  constituents  by  sup- 
posing that  they  expect  me  to  resist  that  which  is  irresistible,  the 
force  of  reason.     No,  Sir,  my  constituents  ardently  wish  for  a 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  175 

firm,  efficient,  continental  government,  but  fear  the  operation 
of  this  which  is  now  proposed.  Let  them  be  convinced  that 
their  fears  are  groundless,  and  I  venture  to  declare,  in  their 
name,  that  no  town  in  the  Commonwealth  will  sooner  approve 
the  form,  or  be  better  subjects  under  it. 

Mr.  Jones  (of  Boston)  enlarged  on  the  various  checks  which 
the  Constitution  provides,  and  which,  he  said,  formed  a  security 
for  liberty,  and  a  prevention  against  power  being  abused — the 
frequency  of  elections  of  the  democratic  branch,  representation 
apportioned  to  numbers,  the  publication  of  the  journals  of  Con- 
gress, <fcc.  Gentlemen,  he  said,  had  compared  the  people  of 
this  country  to  those  of  Rome  ;  but,  he  observed,  the  compari- 
son, was  very  erroneous.  The  Romans  were  divided  into  two 
classes — the  nobility  and  plebeians.  The  nobility  kept  all  kinds 
of  knowledge  to  their  own  class,  and  the  plebeians  were  in  gen- 
eral very  ignorant ;  and,  when  unemployed,  in  time  of  peace, 
were  ever  ready  to  revolt,  and  to  follow  the  dictates  of  any  de- 
signing patrician.  But,  continued  the  worthy  gentleman,  the 
people  of  the  United  States  are  an  enlightened,  well-informed 
people,  and  are  therefore  not  easily  imposed  on  by  designing 
men.  Our  right  of  representation,  concludes  Mr.  Jones,  is 
much  more  just  and  equitable  than  the  boasted  one  of  Great 
Britain,  whose  representatives  are  chosen  by  corporations,  or 
boroughs,  and  those  boroughs,  in  general,  are  the  property, 
or  at  the  disposal  of,  the  nobility  and  rich  gentry  of  the 
kingdom. 

[The  Vice-President  having  informed  the  Convention  in  the 
forenoon,  that  he  had  received  a  long  letter  from  the  Hon.  Mr. 
Gerry,  the  same  was  read,  as  soon  as  the  Convention  proceeded 
to  business  in  the  afternoon.  When  the  Vice-President  had 
read  the  letter,  Mr.  Gore  rose  and  objected  to  the  reading  a 
state  of  facts  respecting  the  construction  of  the  Senate  in  the 
Federal  Convention,  which  accompanied  the  letter  ;  "  not,"  lie 
said,  "  from  a  wish  to  preclude  information  from  his  own  mind, 
or  from  the  minds  of  the  Convention,  but  from  his  duty  to  his 
constituents,  and  the  desire  he  had  to  guard  against  infringe- 
ments on  the  orders  of  the  Convention."  Mr.  Gore  was  inter- 
rupted, as  being  out  of  order,  but  was  proceeding  on  his  objec- 
tion, when  the  Hon.  Judge  Dana  begged  Mr.  Gore's  leave  to 


176  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

say  a  few  words,  which  he  did  ;  after  which  he  retired  from  the 
Convention  until  the  consideration  of  the  letter  should  be  gone 
through  with.] 


Wednesday,  January  23, 1788. 

Mr.  Peirce  rose,  he  said,  to  make  a  few  observations  on  the 
powers  of  Congress,  in  this  section.  Gentlemen,  he  said,  in  dif- 
ferent parts  of  the  house  (Messrs.  Dalton,  Phillips  and  Gore) 
had  agreed  that  Congress  will  not  lay  direct  taxes  except  in 
cases  of  war ;  for  that  to  defray  the  exigencies  of  peace,  the 
impost  and  excise  would  be  sufficient ;  and  as  that  mode  of 
taxation  would  be  the  most  expedient  and  productive,  it  would 
undoubtedly  be  adopted.  But  it  was  necessary  Congress  should 
have  power  to  lay  direct  taxes  at  all  times,  although  they  will 
not  use  it,  because  when  our  enemies  find  they  have  sufficient 
powers  to  call  forth  all  the  resources  of  the  people,  it  will  pre- 
vent their  making  war,  as  they  otherwise  would.  As  the  Hon. 
Mr.  Phillips  used  this  proverb,  "  A  stitch  in  time  will  save  nine," 
his  meaning,  I  suppose,  was,  that  we  should  have  war  nine 
times  if  Congress  had  not  such  powers,  where  we  should  once 
if  they  had  such  powers.  But  these  arguments  to  me  are  not 
conclusive  ;  for  if  our  enemies  know  they  do  not  use  such  pow- 
ers except  in  a  war,  although  granted  to  them,  what  will  be  the 
difference  if  they  have  the  powers  only  in  the  time  of  war  ? 
But,  Mr.  President,  if  Congress  have  the  powers  of  direct  taxes, 
in  the  manner  prescribed  in  this  section,  I  fear  we  shall  have 
that  mode  of  taxation  adopted  in  preference  to  imposts  and 
excises  ;  and  the  reasons  of  my  fears  are  these  :  When  the 
impost  was  granted  to  Congress  in  this  State,  I  then,  being  a 
member  of  court,  well  remember  the  gentlemen  in  trade,  almost 
with  one  consent,  agreed  that  it  was  an  unequal  tax,  bearing 
hard  on  them,  for  although  it  finally  was  a  tax  on  the  consum- 
er, yet  in  the  first  instance  it  was  paid  by  persons  in  trade,  and 
also,  that  they  consumed  more  than  the  landed  interest  of  du- 
tied  articles,  and  nothing  but  necessity  induced  them  to  submit 
to  grant  said  impost,  as  that  was  the  only  way  Congress  could 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  177 

collect  money  to  pay  the  foreign  debt,  under  the  regulations 
they  were  then  under  ;  and  I  fear  part  of  this  State's  members 
in  Congress,  when  this  Constitution  is  adopted,  will  resume 
their  own  opinion,  when  they  can  lay  direct  taxes;  and  as 
Rhode  Island  has  always  been  against  an  impost,  and  as  they 
have  an  equal  representation  in  the  Senate,  and  part  of  Con- 
necticut will  be  interested  with  them,  and  the  southern  States 
having  no  manufactures  of  their  own,  and  consuming  much 
more  foreign  articles  than  the  northern,  it  appears  to  me  we  are 
not  certain  of  availing  ourselves  of  an  impost,  if  we  give  Con- 
gress power  to  levy  and  collect  direct  taxes  in  time  of  peace. 

While  I  am  up,  Mr.  President,  I  would  make  some  observa- 
tions on  what  has  been  passed  over,  as  I  think  it  is  within  the 
orders  of  the  house.  The  Hon.  Mr.  Sedgwick  said,  if  I  under- 
stood him  right,  that  if  he  thought  that  this  Constitution  con- 
solidated the  union  of  the  States,  he  should  be  the  last  man 
that  should  vote  for  it ;  but  I  take  his  meaning  to  be  this, 
according  to  the  reasoning  of  Mr.  Ames,  that  it  is  not  a  consoli- 
dation of  the  Union,  because  there  are  three  branches  in  the 
Union,  and  therefore,  it  is  not  a  consolidation  of  the  Union. 
But,  Sir,  I  think  I  cannot  conceive  of  a  sovereignty  of  power, 
existing  within  a  sovereign  power,  nor  do  I  wish  any  thing  in 
this  Constitution  to  prevent  Congress  being  sovereign  in  matters 
belonging  to  their  jurisdiction  ;  for  I  have  seen  the  necessity  of 
their  powers  in  almost  all  the  instances  that  have  been  men- 
tioned in  this  Convention ;  and  also  last  winter,  in  the  rebellion, 
I  thought  it  would  be  better  for  Congress  to  have  stilled  the 
people,  rather  than  people  from  amongst  themselves,  who  are 
more  apt  to  be  governed  by  temper  than  others,  as  it  appeared 
to  me  we  were  in  the  disqualifying  act,  as  in  my  opinion,  we 
then  did  not  keep  strictly  to  our  own  Constitution ;  and  I 
believe  such  a  superior  power  ought  to  be  in  Congress.  But  I 
would  have  it  distinctly  bounded,  that  every  one  may  know  the 
utmost  limits  of  it,  and  I  have  some  doubts  on  my  mind  as  to 
those  limits,  which  I  wish  to  have  solved.  I  have  also  an 
objection  as  to  the  term  for  which  the  Senate  are  to  be  in  office  ; 
for  as  the  democratical  branch  of  the  Federal  legislature  is  to 
continue  in  office  two  years,  and  they  are  the  only  check  on  the 
Federal,  and  they,  the  Senate,  to  continue  in  office  six  years, 

23 


178  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

they  will  have  an  undue  advantage  on  the  democratic  branch, 
and  I  think  they  ought  not  to  continue  in  office  for  a  longer  time 
than  the  other  ;  and  also,  that  if  they  conduct  ill  we  may  have 
a  constitutional  revolution  in  as  short  a  period  as  two  years,  if 
needed.  The  Hon.  Mr.  King  said,  some  days  past,  that  the 
Senate  going  out  by  classes,  if  rightly  considered,  were  not  for 
but  four  years  ;  because  one-third  part  were  never  more  than 
six,  another  four,  and  a  third  two — therefore  the  medium  was 
four.  But  I  think  that  way  of  arguing  would  argue  that  if 
they  were  all  to  go  out  at  the  end  of  six  years,  that  they  were 
but  three  years  in  office,  because  half  their  time  they  were 
under  the  age  of  three  years,  and  the  other  half  over  "the  age  of 
three  years  in  office  ;  therefore  his  arguing  in  that  respect  to  me 
was  not  well  founded. 

Col.  Varnum,  in  answer  to  an  inquiry,  why  a  bill  of  rights 
was  not  annexed  to  this  Constitution,  said,  that  by  the  Consti- 
tution of  Massachusetts,  the  legislature  have  a  right  to  make 
all  laws  not  repugnant  to  the  Constitution.  Now,  says  he,  if 
there  is  such  a  clause  in  the  Constitution  under  consideration, 
then  there  would  be  a  necessity  for  a  bill  of  rights.  In  the  sec- 
tion under  debate,  Congress  have  an  expressed  power  to  levy 
taxes,  &c,  and  to  pass  laws  to  carry  their  requisitions  into  exe- 
cution. This,  he  said,  was  express,  and  required  no  bill  of 
rights.  After  stating  the  difference  between  delegated  power, 
and  the  grant  of  all  power,  except  in  certain  cases,  the  Colonel 
proceeded  to  controvert  the  idea  that  this  Constitution  went  to 
a  consolidation  of  the  Union.  He  said  it  was  only  a  consolida- 
ion  of  strength ;  and  that  it  was  apparent  Congress  had  no 
right  to  alter  the  internal  regulations  of  a  State.  The  design 
in  amending  the  Confederation,  he  said,  was  to  remedy  its 
defects.  It  was  the  interest  of  the  whole  to  confederate  against 
a  foreign  enemy,  and  each  was  bound  to  exert  its  utmost  abil- 
ity to  oppose  that  enemy ;  but  it  had  been  done  at  our  expense 
in  a  great  measure  ;  and  there  was  no  way  to  provide  for  a 
remedy,  because  Congress  had  not  the  power  to  call  forth  the 
resources  of  every  State,  nor  to  coerce  delinquent  States.  But, 
under  the  proposed  government,  those  States  which  will  not 
comply  with  equal  requisitions,  will  be  coerced.  And  this,  he 
said,  is  a  glorious  provision.     In  the  late  war,  said  the  Colonel, 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  179 

the  States  of  New  Hampshire  and  Massachusetts,  for  two  or 
three  years,  had  in  the  field  half  the  Continental  army  under 
General  Washington.  Who  paid  these  troops?  The  States 
which  raised  them  were  called  on  to  pay  them.  How,  unless 
Congress  have  a  power  to  levy  taxes,  can  they  make  the  States 
pay  their  proportion  ?  In  order  that  this,  and  some  other 
States,  may  not  again  be  obliged  to  pay  eight  or  ten  times  their 
proportion  of  the  public  exigencies,  he  said,  this  power  is  highly 
necessary  to  be  delegated  to  the  Federal  head.  He  showed  the 
necessity  of  Congress  being  enabled  to  prepare  against  the 
attacks  of  a  foreign  enemy,  and  he  called  upon  the  gentleman 
from  Andover,  (Mr.  Symmes,)  or  any  other  gentleman,  to  pro- 
duce an  instance,  where  any  government,  consisting  of  three 
branches,  elected  by  the  people,  and  having  checks  on  each 
other,  as  this  has,  abused  the  power  delegated  to  them. 

Mr.  Choate  said,  that  this  clause  gives  power  to  Congress  to 
levy  duties,  excises,  imposts,  &c,  considering  the  trust  delegat- 
ed to  Congress,  that  they  are  to  "  provide  for  the  common 
defence,  promote  the  general  welfare,"  <fec.  If  this  is  to  be  the 
object  of  their  delegation,  the  next  question  is,  whether  they 
shall  not  be  vested  with  powers  to  prosecute  it.  And  this  can 
be  no  other  than  an  unlimited  power  of  taxation,  if  that  defence 
requires  it.  Mr.  Choate  contended  that  it  was  the  power  of  the 
people  concentred  to  a  point ;  that,  as  all  power  is  lodged  in 
them,  this  power  ought  to  be  supreme.  He  showed  the  neces- 
sity of  its  being  so,  not  only  for  our  common  defence,  but  for 
our  advantage  in  settling  commercial  treaties.  Do  we  wish  to 
make  a  treaty  with  any  power  of  Europe,  we  are  told  we  have 
no  stability,  as  a  nation.  As  Congress  must  provide  "for  the 
common  defence,  shall  they,  asked  Mr.  Choate,  be  confined  to 
the  impost  and  excise  ?  They  alone  are  the  judges  whether  five 
or  one  per  cent,  is  necessary  or  convenient.  It  has  been  the 
practice  of  all  nations  to  anticipate  their  resources  by  loans. 
This  will  be  the  case  of  the  United  States,  in  war;  and,  he 
asked,  if  our  resources  are  competent  and  well  established,  and 
no  doubt  remained  of  them,  whether  in  that  case  the  individ- 
uals who  have  property,  will  not  cheerfully  offer  it  for  the 
general  defence  ?  After  adverting  to  the  idea  of  some,  of  its 
being  a  consolidation  of  the  Union,  Mr.  Choate  concluded,  by  a 


180  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

brief  display  of  the  several  checks  contained,  and  securities  for 
the  people  to  be  found  in  this  system. 

Gen.  Thompson.  Sir,  the  question  is,  whether  Congress  shall 
have  power.  Some  say,  that  if  this  section  was  left  out,  the 
whole  would  fall  to  the  ground.  I  think  so  too,  as  it  is  all  of  a 
piece.  We  are  now  fixing  a  national  consolidation.  This  sec- 
tion, I  look  upon  it,  is  big  with  mischiefs.  Congress  will  have 
power  to  keep  standing  armies.  The  great  Mr.  Pitt  says  stand- 
ing armies  are  dangerous.  Keep  your  militia  in  order — we 
don't  want  standing  armies.  A  gentleman  said,  we  are  a  rich 
State.  I  say  so  too.  Then  why  shall  we  not  wait  five  or  six 
months,  and  see  what  our  sister  States  do  ?  We  are  able  to 
stand  our  own  ground  against  a  foreign  power.  They  cannot 
starve  us  out — they  cannot  bring  their  ships  on  the  land — we 
are  a  nation  of  healthy,  strong  men — our  land  is  fertile,  and  we 
are  increasing  in  numbers.  It  is  said  we  owe  money  ;  no  mat- 
ter if  we  do ;  our  safety  lies  in  not  paying  it.  Pay  only  the 
interest.  Don't  let  us  go  too  fast.  Shall  not  Massachusetts  be 
a  mediator  ?  It  is  my  wish  she  may  be  one  of  the  four  dissent- 
ing States  ;  then  we  shall  be  on  our  old  ground,  and  shall  not 
act  unconstitutionally.  Some  people  cry,  it  will  be  a  great 
charge  ;  but  it  will  be  a  greater  charge,  and  be  more  dangerous 
to  make  a  new  one.  Let  us  amend  the  old  Confederation. 
Why  not  give  Congress  power  only  to  regulate  trade  ?  Some 
say,  that  those  we  owe  will  fall  upon  us ;  but  it  is  no  such 
thing ;  the  balace  of  power  in  the  old  countries  will  not  permit 
it — the  other  nations  will  protect  us.  Besides,  we  are  a  brave 
and  a  happy  people.  Let  us  be  cautious  how  we  divide  the 
States.  By  uniting  we  stand,  by  dividing  we  fall.  We  are  in 
our  childhood  yet ;  don't  let  us  grow  too  fast,  lest  we  grow  out 
of  si  1  ape.  If  I  have  proved  that  we  are  a  respectable  people,  in 
possession  of  liberty,  property  and  virtue,  and  none  in  a  better 
situation  to  defend  themselves,  why  all  this  racket  ?  Gentlemen 
say  we  are  undone  if  we  cannot  stop  up  the  Thames :  But,  Mr. 
President,  nations  will  mind  their  own  interest,  and  not  ours. 
Great  Britain  has  found  out  the  secret  to  pick  the  subjects' 
pockets,  without  their  knowing  of  it — that's  the  very  thing 
Congress  is  after.  Gentlemen  say  this  section  is  as  clear  as  the 
sun,  and  that  all  power  is  retained  which  is  not  given.     But 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  181 

where  is  the  bill  of  rights  which  shall  check  the  power  of  this 
Congress,  which  shall  say,  thus  far  shall  ye  come,  and  no  farther? 
The  safety  of  the  people  depends  on  a  bill  of  rights.  If  we  build 
on  a  sandy  foundation,  is  it  likely  we  shall  stand  ?  I  appeal  to 
the  feelings  of  the  Convention.  There  are  some  parts  of  this 
Constitution  which  I  cannot  digest ;  and,  Sir,  shall  we  swallow 
a  large  bone  for  the  sake  of  a  little  meat  ?  Some  say,  swallow 
the  whole  now,  and  pick  out  the  bone  afterwards.  But  I  say, 
let  us  pick  off  the  meat,  and  throw  the  bone  away. 

This  section,  Sir,  takes  the  purse-strings  from  the  people. 
England  has  been  quoted  for  their  fidelity ;  but  did  their  Con- 
stitution ever  give  such  a  power  as  is  contained  in  this  Constitu- 
tion ?  Did  they  ever  allow  Parliament  to  vote  an  army  but  for 
one  year  ?  But  here  we  are  giving  Congress  power  to  vote  an 
army  for  two  years — to  tax  us  without  limitation — no  one  to 
gainsay  them,  and  no  inquiry  yearly,  as  in  Britain.  Therefore, 
if  this  Constitution  is  got  down,  we  shall  alter  the  system  en- 
tirely, and  have  no  checks  upon  Congress. 

The  Rev.  Mr.  Niles  wished  the  honorable  gentleman  would 
point  out  the  limits  to  be  prescribed  to  the  powers  given  by  this 
section. 

Hon.  Mr.  Bowdoin.  Mr.  President :  On  the  subject  of  gov- 
ernment, which  admits  of  so  great  a  variety  in  its  parts  and 
combinations,  a  diversity  of  opinions  is  to  be  expected  ;  and  it 
was  natural  to  suppose,  that  in  this  Convention,  respectable  for 
its  numbers,  but  much  more  so  for  the  characters  which  com- 
pose it,  there  would  be  a  like  diversity  concerning  the  Federal 
Constitution,  that  is  now  the  subject  of  our  consideration. 

In  considering  it,  every  gentleman  will  reflect,  how  inade- 
quate to  the  purposes  of  the  Union  the  Confederation  has  been. 
When  the  plan  of  the  Confederation  was  formed,  the  enemy 
were  invading  us ;  and  this  inspired  the  several  States  with 
such  a  spirit  of  union,  and  mutual  defence,  that  a  mere  requisi- 
tion or  recommendation  of  Congress  was  sufficient  to  procure 
the  needful  aids,  without  any  power  of  coercion;  and  for 
that  reason,  among  others,  no  such  power  was  given  by  the 
Confederation.  But  since  that  reason  has  ceased,  and  the 
idea  of  danger  being  removed  by  the  peace,  the  requisitions  of 
Congress  have,  in  most  of  the  States,  been  little  regarded; 


182  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

notwithstanding  they  solemnly  pledged  their  faith  to  comply 
with  them. 

This  non-compliance  has  compelled  Congress  to  increase  the 
foreign  debt  of  the  Union,  by  procuring  further  loans,  to  pay 
the  interest  and  instalments  due  on  former  loans ;  and  in  that 
way  to  preserve  the  public  faith,  which  had  been  pledged  to 
foreign  powers.  It  has  compelled  them,  in  order  to  prevent  the 
consequences  of  a  breach  of  faith,  as  relative  to  those  powers,  to 
enter  repeatedly  into  those  ruinous  negotiations  by  which  "  the 
United  States  jointly,  and  each  of  them  in  particular,  together 
with  all  their  lands,  chattels,  revenues  and  products,  and  also 
the  imposts  and  taxes  already  laid  and  raised  in  the  same,  or  in 
time  to  come  to  be  laid  and  raised,  are,  for  the  whole,"  mort- 
gaged for  the  repayment  of  those  loans  by  instalments,  and  for 
payment  of  the  interest  on  them  annually.  These  debts  must 
be  paid,  bona  fide,  according  to  contract ;  or  be  further  increased 
by  procuring,  if  procurable,  further  loans ;  which,  ruinous  as 
the  measure  is,  must  be  continued,  unless  the  States  empower 
Congress  to  raise  money  for  the  discharging  those  debts.  It 
will  not  be  in  the  power  of  the  United  States,  and  I  am  sure  it 
will  not  be  in  their  inclination,  to  rid  themselves  of  those  debts 
in  the  same  base  and  ignominious  manner  in  which  a  faction, 
in  one  of  them,  are  endeavoring  to  get  rid  of  theirs.  To  the 
same  cause  (a  non-compliance  with  Congressional  requisitions) 
are  owing  the  repeated  but  necessary  breaches  of  public  faith  in 
regard  to  the  payment  of  the  Federal  domestic  debt.  And 
hence,  as  relative  to  the  joint  consolidated  debt,  the  inefficiency 
of  the  public  finances,  and  the  bankrupt  state  of  the  Federal 
treasury ;  which  can  never  be  remedied  without  empowering 
Congress  to  levy  adequate  duties  and  taxes.  Without  such  a 
power,  the  accumulating  debt  will  never  be  paid,  but  by  a  forci- 
ble collection,  which  our  foreign  creditors  know  how,  and  are 
able  to  apply,  if  unhappily  it  should  be  necessary.  The  several 
loans,  which  by  contract  are  to  be  paid  by  instalments,  will,  in 
case  of  the  failure  of  any  o£  the  stipulated  payments,  become, 
the  whole  of  them,  immediately  payable  ;  and  any  of  the  prop- 
erty of  any  of  the  States,  whether  public  or  private,  that  can  be 
most  easily  come  at,  will  in  that  case  be  seized  and  applied  for 
that  purpose. 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  183 

This  mode  of  reimbursement  or  reprisal  will  be  upon  the 
trade  and  navigation  of  the  United  States  ;  and  in  proportion  as 
ours  of  this  State  may  be  larger  and  more  extensive,  than  the 
trade  and  navigation  of  other  States,  we  shall  be  the  greatest 
sufferers.  This  ruin  of  our  trade  will  involve  in  it  not  only  the 
ruin  of  the  mercantile  part  of  the  State,  and  of  the  numerous 
body  of  mechanics  dependent  upon  it,  but  will  most  essentially 
affect  every  other  class  of  citizens,  and  operate  most  extensively 
to  the  injury  of  the  Commonwealth. 

These  are  some  of  the  consequences,  certain  and  infallible, 
that  will  flow  from  the  denial  of  that  power  to  Congress.  Shall 
we,  then,  we  of  this  State,  who  are  so  much  interested  in  this 
matter,  deny  them  that  power — so  essential  to  our  political 
happiness  ? 

But  if  we  attend  to  our  trade,  as  it  is  at  present,  we  shall 
find,  that  the  miserable  state  of  it  is  owing  to  a  like  want  of 
power  in  Congress.  Other  nations  prohibit  our  vessels  from 
entering  their  ports,  or  lay  heavy  duties  on  our  exports  carried 
thither  ;  and  we  have  no  retaliating  or  regulating  power  over 
their  vessels  and  exports  to  prevent  it.  Hence  a  decrease  of 
our  commerce  and  navigation,  and  of  the  duties  and  revenue 
arising  from  them.  Hence  an  insufficient  demand  for  the  pro- 
duce of  our  lands,  and  the  consequent  discouragement  of  agri- 
culture. Hence  the  inability  to  pay  debts,  and  particularly 
taxes,  which  by  that  decrease  are  enhanced.  And  hence,  as  the 
necessary  result  of  all  these,  the  emigration  of  our  inhabitants. 
If  it  be  asked,  How  are  these  evils,  and  others  that  might  be 
mentioned,  to  be  remedied  ?  the  answer  is  short :  By  giving 
Congress  power,  and  adequate  power.  .  Whether  such  power  be 
given  by  the  proposed  Constitution,  it  is  left  with  the  Conven- 
tions from  the  several  States,  and  with  us,  who  compose  one  of 
them,  to  determine. 

In  determining  on  this  question,  every  gentleman  will  doubt- 
less consider  the  importance  of  cultivating  a  spirit  of  union 
among  ourselves,  and  with  the  several  States.  This  spirit  pro- 
cured our  emancipation  from  British  tyranny ;  and  the  same 
spirit,  by  uniting  us  in  the  necessary  means,  must  secure  to  us 
our  dear-bought,  blood-purchased  liberty  and  independence, 
and  deliver  us  from  evils  which,  unless  remedied,  must  end  in 


184  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

national  ruin.  The  means  for  effecting  these  purposes  are 
within  our  reach ;  and  the  adoption  of  the  proposed  Constitu- 
tion will  give  us  the  possession  of  them.  Like  all  other  human 
productions,  it  may  be  imperfect ;  but  most  of  the  imperfections 
imputed  to  it  are  ideal  and  unfounded  ;  and  the  rest  are  of  such 
a  nature  that  they  cannot  be  certainly  known,  but  by  the  ope- 
ration of  the  Constitution :  and  if  in  its  operation  it  should  in 
any  respect  be  essentially  bad,  it  will  be  amended  in  one  of  the 
modes  prescribed  by  it.  I  say,  will  be  amended,  because  the 
Constitution  is  constructed  on  such  principles,  that  its  bad 
effects,  if  any  such  should  arise  from  it,  will  injure  the  mem- 
bers of  Congress  equally  with  their  constituents  ;  and  therefore 
both  of  them  must  be  equally  induced  to  seek  for  and  effectuate 
the  requisite  amendments. 

There  have  been  many  objections  offered  against  the  Consti- 
tution ;  and  of  these  the  one  most  strongly  urged  has  been  the 
great  power  vested  in  Congress.  On  this  subject,  I  beg  leave  to 
make  a  few  general  observations,  which  ought  to  be  attended 
to,  as  being  applicable  to  every  branch  of  that  power. 

It  may  therefore  be  observed,  that  the  investiture  of  such 
power,  so  far  from  being  an  objection,  is  a  most  cogent  reason 
for  accepting  the  Constitution.  The  power  of  Congress,  both 
in  the  legislative  and  executive  line,  is  the  power  of  the  people, 
collected,  through  a  certain  medium,  to  a  focal  point ;  at  all 
times  ready  to  be  exerted  for  the  general  benefit,  according  as 
circumstances  or  exigencies  may  require.  If  you  diminish  or 
annihilate  it,  you  diminish  or  annihilate  the  means  of  your 
own  safety  and  prosperity ;  which  means,  if  they  were  to  be 
measured  like  mathematical  quantities,  would  be  in  exact  pro- 
portion, as  the  power  is  greater  or  less.  But  this  is  not  the 
case ;  for  power  that  does  not  reach,  or  is  inadequate  to  the 
object,  is  worse  than  none.  An  exertion  of  such  power  would 
increase  the  evil  it  was  intended  to  remove,  and  at  the  same 
time  create  a  further  evil,  which  might  be  a  very  great  one — 
the  expense  of  a  fruitless  exertion. 

If  we  consider  the  objects  of  the  power,  they  are  numerous 
and  important ;  and  as  human  foresight  cannot  extend  to  many 
of  them,  and  all  of  them  are  in  the  womb  of  futurity,  the 
quantum  of  the  power  cannot  be  estimated.     Less  than  the 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  185 

whole,  as  relative  to  Federal  purposes,  may,  through  its  insuffi- 
ciency, occasion  a  dissolution  of  the  Union,  and  a  subjugation 
or  division  of  it  among  foreign  powers.  Their  attention  is 
drawn  to  the  United  States  ;  their  emissaries  are  watching  our 
conduct,  particularly  upon  the  present  most  important  occasion ; 
and  if  we  should  be  so  unhappy  as  to  reject  the  Federal  Consti- 
tution proposed  to  us,  and  continue  much  longer  our  present 
weak,  unenergetic  Federal  government,  their  policy  will  probably 
induce  them  to  plan  a  division  or  partition  of  the  States  among 
themselves  ;  and  unite  their  forces  to  effect  it. 

But,  however  that  may  be,  this  is  certain,  that  the  respecta- 
bility of  the  United  States  among  foreign  nations,  our  commerce 
with  them  on  the  principles  of  reciprocity,  and  our  forming 
beneficial  treaties  with  them  on  those  principles,  their  estima- 
tion of  our  friendship  and  fear  of  losing  it,  our  capacity  to 
resent  injuries,  and  our  security  against  interior  as  well  as 
foreign  attacks,  must  be  derived  from  such  a  power.  In  short, 
the  commercial  and  political  happiness,  the  liberty  and  proper- 
ty, the  peace,  safety  and  general  welfare,  both  internal  and 
external,  of  each  and  all  the  States,  depend  on  that  power ; 
which,  as  it  must  be  applied  to  a  vast  variety  of  objects,  and  to 
cases  and  exigencies  beyond  the  ken  of  human  prescience,  must 
be  very  great ;  and  which  cannot  be  limited  without  endanger- 
ing the  public  safety. 

It  will  be  and  has  been  said,  this  great  power  may  be  abused; 
and,  instead  of  protecting,  may  be  employed  by  Congress  in 
oppressing  their  constituents.  A  possibility  of  abuse,  as  it  may 
be  affirmed  of  all  delegated  power  whatever,  is  by  itself  no 
sufficient  reason  for  withholding  the  delegation.  If  it  were  a 
sufficient  one,  no  power  could  be  delegated  ;  nor  could  govern- 
ment of  any  sort  subsist.  The  possibility,  however,  should 
make  us  careful,  that  in  delegations  of  importance,  like  the  one 
contained  in  the  proposed  Constitution,  there  should  be  such 
checks  provided,  as  would  not  frustrate  the  end  and  intention  of 
delegating  the  power,  but  would,  as  far  as  it  could  be  safely 
done,  prevent  the  abuse  of  it :  and  such  checks  are  provided  in 
the  Constitution.  Some  of  them  were  mentioned  the  last  even- 
ing by  one  of  my  worthy  colleagues ;  but  I  shall  here  exhibit 
all  of  them  in  one  view. 

24 


186  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

The  two  capital  departments  of  government,  the  legislative 
and  executive,  in  which  the  delegated  powers  reside,  consisting 
of  the  President,  Vice-President,  Senate  and  Representatives, 
are  directly,  and  by  their  respective  legislatures  and  delegates, 
chosen  by  the  people. 

The  President,  and  also  the  Vice-President,  when  acting  as 
President,  before  they  enter  on  the  execution  of  the  office,  shall 
each  u  solemnly  swear,  or  affirm,  that  he  will  faithfully  execute 
the  office  of  president  of  the  United  States,  and  will,  to  the  best 
of  his  ability,  preserve,  protect  and  defend,  the  Constitution  of 
the  United  States." 

"  The  senators  and  representatives  before  mentioned,  and  the 
members  of  the  several  State  legislatures,  and  all  executive  and 
judicial  officers,  both  of  the  United  States,  and  of  the  several 
States,  shall  be  bound,  by  oath  or  affirmation,  to  support  this 
Constitution." 

"•  The  president,  vice-president,  and  all  civil  officers  of  the 
United  States,  shall  be  removed  from  office  on  impeachment  for, 
and  conviction  of,  treason,  bribery,  or  other  high  crimes  or 
misdemeanors." 

"  No  senator  or  representative  shall,  during  the  time  for 
which  he  was  elected,  be  appointed  to  any  civil  office,  which 
shall  have  been  created,  or  the  emoluments  whereof  shall  have 
been  increased,  during  such  time  ;  and  no  person  holding  any 
office  under  the  United  States,  shall  be  a  member  of  either 
house,  during  his  continuance  in  office." 

"  No  title  of  nobility  shall  be  granted  by  the  United  States, 
or  by  any  particular  State  ;  and  no  person,  holding  any  office 
of  profit  or  trust  under  the  United  States,  shall,  without  the 
consent  of  the  Congress,  accept  of  any  present,  emolument, 
office  or  title,  of  any  kind  whatever,  from  any  king,  prince,  or 
foreign  state." 

"  The  United  States  shall  guarantee  to  every  State  in  this 
Union,  a  republican  form  of  government,  and  shall  protect  each 
of  them  against  invasion  and  domestic  violence." 

To  these  great  checks  may  be  added  several  other  very  essen- 
tial, ones,  as,  the  negative  which  each  house  hath  upon  the  acts 
of  the  other  ;  the  disapproving  power  of  the  President,  which 
subjects  those  acts  to  a  revision  by  the  two  houses,  and  to  a  final 


1788.1  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  187 

-J  Mi 

negative,  unless  two-thirds  of  each  house  shall  agree  to  pass  the 
returned  acts,  notwithstanding  the  President's  objections  ;  the 
printing  the  journals  of  each  house,  containing  their  joint  and 
respective  proceedings ;  and  the  publishing,  from  time  to  time, 
a  regular  statement  and  account  of  the  receipts  and  expendi- 
tures of  all  public  money,  none  of  which  shall  be  drawn  from 
the  treasury  but  in  consequence  of  appropriations  made  bylaw. 

All  these  checks  and  precautions,  provided  in  the  Constitu- 
tion, must,  in  a  great  measure,  prevent  an  abuse  of  power,  at 
least  in  all  flagrant  instances,  even  if  Congress  should  consist 
wholly  of  men  who  were  guided  by  no  other  principle  than 
their  own  interest.  Under  the  influence  of  such  checks,  this 
would  compel  them  to  a  conduct,  which,  in  the  general,  would 
answer  the  intention  of  the  Constitution.  But  the  presump- 
tion is,  (and  if  the  people  duly  attend  to  the  objects  of  their 
choice,  it  would  be  realized,)  that  the  President  of  the  United 
States,  and  the  members  of  Congress,  would,  for  the  most  part, 
be  men,  not  only  of  ability,  but  of  a  good  moral  character,  in 
which  case  an  abuse  of  power  is  not  to  be  apprehended,  nor  any 
error  in  the  government,  but  such  as  every  human  institution 
is  subject  to. 

There  is  a  further  guard  against  the  abuse  of  power,  which, 
though  not  expressed,  is  strongly  implied  in  the  Federal  Con- 
stitution, and  indeed  in  the  Constitution  of  every  government, 
founded  on  the  principles  of  equal  liberty ;  and  that  is,  that 
those  who  make  the  laws,  and  particularly  laws  for  the  levying 
of  taxes,  do,  in  common  with  their  fellow-citizens,  fall  within 
the  power  and  operation  of  those  laws. 

As  then  the  individuals  of  Congress  will  all  share  in  the  bur- 
dens they  impose,  and  be  personally  affected  by  the  good  or 
bad  laws  they  make  for  the  Union,  they  will  be  under  the 
strongest  motives  of  interest  to  lay  the  lightest  burdens  possi- 
ble, and  to  make  the  best  laws,  or  such  laws  as  shall  not  unne- 
cessarily affect  either  the  property  or  the  personal  rights  of  their 
fellow-citizens. 

With  regard  to  rights,  the  whole  Constitution  is  a  declaration 
of  rights,  which  primarily  and  principally  respect  the  general 
government  intended  to  be  formed  by  it.  The  rights  of  partic- 
ular States  and  private  citizens  not  being  the  object  or  subject 


18S  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

of  the  Constitution,  they  are  only  incidentally  mentioned.  In 
regard  to  the  former,  it  would  require  a  volume  to  describe 
them,  as  they  extend  to  every  subject  of  legislation,  not 
included  in  the  powers  vested  in  Congress,  and  in  regard  to  the 
latter,  as  all  government  is  founded  on  the  relinquishment  of 
personal  rights  in  a  certain  degree,  there  was  a  clear  impropri- 
ety in  being  very  particular  about  them.  By  such  a  particu- 
larity, the  government  might  be  embarrassed,  and  prevented 
from  doing  what  the  private  as  well  as  the  public  and  general 
good  of  the  citizens  and  States  might  require. 

The  public  good,  in  which  private  is  necessarily  involved, 
might  be  hurt  by  too  particular  an  enumeration  ;  and  the 
private  good  could  suffer  no  injury  from  a  deficient  enumera- 
tion, because  Congress  could  not  injure  the  rights  of  private 
citizens  without  injuring  their  own  ;  as  they  must,  in  their 
public  as  well  as  private  character,  participate  equally  with 
others  in  the  consequences  of  their  own  acts.  And  by  this 
most  important  circumstance,  in  connection  with  the  checks 
above  mentioned,  the  several  States  at  large,  and  each  citizen 
in  particular,  will  be  secured,  as  far  as  human  wisdom  can 
secure  them,  against  the  abuse  of  the  delegated  power. 

In  considering  the  Constitution,  we  shall  consider  it  in  all 
its  parts,  upon  these  general  principles,  which  operate  through 
the  whole  of  it,  and  are  equivalent  to  the  most  extensive  bill 
of  rights  that  can  be  formed. 

These  observations,  which  are  principally  of  a  general  nature, 
but  will  apply  to  the  most  essential  parts  of  the  Constitution, 
are,  with  the  utmost  deference  and  respect,  submitted  to  your 
candid  consideration ;  with  the  hope  that  as  they  have  influ- 
enced my  own  mind  decidedly  in  favor  of  the  Constitution, 
they  will  not  be  wholly  unproductive  of  a  like  influence  on  the 
minds  of  the  gentlemen  of  the  Convention. 

If  the  Constitution  should  be  finally  accepted  and  estab- 
lished, it  will  complete  the  temple  of  American  liberty  ;  and, 
like  the  keystone  of  a  grand  and  magnificent  arch,  be  the  bond 
of  union  to  keep  all  the  parts  firm,  and  compacted  together. 
May  this  temple,  sacred  to  liberty  and  virtue — sacred  to  jus- 
tice, the  first  and  greatest  political  virtue, — and  built  upon  the 
broad  and  solid  foundation  of  perfect  union, — be  dissoluble  only 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  189 

by  the  dissolution  of  nature ;  and  may  this  Convention  have 
the  distinguished  honor  of  erecting  one  of  its  pillars  on  that 
lasting  foundation. 

Dr.  Taylor  said,  the  consideration  of  the  eighth  section  had 
taken  up  a  great  deal  of  time ;  that  gentlemen  had  repeated 
the  same  arguments  over  and  over  again ;  and  although  the 
order  of  the  Convention  was,  that  the  proposed  Constitution 
should  be  considered  by  paragraphs,  he  was  pleased,  he  said, 
to  observe  that  the  honorable  gentleman  last  speaking,  had 
gone  into  the  matter  at  large  ;  and  therefore,  he  hoped  that 
other  gentlemen  would  take  the  same  liberty,  and  that  all 
further  observations  might  be  on  the  system  at  large. 

Mr.  Parsons  (of  Newburyport.)  Mr.  President :  A  great 
variety  of  supposed  objections  have  been  made  against  vesting 
Congress  with  some  of  the  powers  denned  in  the  eighth 
section.  Some  of  the  objectors  have  considered  the  powers  as 
unnecessary,  and  others,  that  the  people  have  not  the  proper 
security  that  these  powers  will  not  be  abused.  To  most  of  these 
objections,  answers,  convincing  in  my  opinion,  to  a  candid 
mind,  have  been  given.  But  as  some  of  the  objections  have 
not  been  noticed,  I  shall  beg  the  indulgence  of  the  Convention, 
while  I  very  briefly  consider  them.  And  as  it  is  my  intention 
to  avoid  all  repetition,  my  observations  will  necessarily  be 
unconnected  and  desultory. 

It  has  been  said  that  the  grant  in  this  section  includes  all  the 
possessions  of  the  people,  and  divests  them  of  every  thing ; 
that  such  a  grant  is  impolitic,  for,  as  the  poverty  of  an  individ- 
ual gaurds  him  against  luxury  and  extravagance,  so  poverty  in 
a  ruler  is  a  fence  against  tyranny  and  oppression.  Sir,  gentle- 
men do  not  distinguish  between  the  government  of  an  hered- 
itary aristocracy,  where  the  interest  of  the  governors  is  very 
different  from  that  of  the  subjects,  and  a  government  to  be 
administered  for  the  common  good  by  the  servants  of  the 
people,  vested  with  delegated  powers  by  popular  elections  at 
stated  periods.  The  Federal  Constitution  establishes  a  govern- 
ment of  the  last  description,  and  in  this  case  the  people  divest 
themselves  of  nothing.  The  government  and  powers  which  the 
Congress  can  administer,  are  the  mere  result  of  a  compact 
made  by  the  people  with  each  other  for  the  common  defence 


190  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

and  general  welfare.  To  talk,  therefore,  of  keeping  Congress 
poor,  if  it  means  any  thing,  must  mean  a  depriving  the  people 
themselves  of  their  own  resources.  But  if  gentlemen  will  still 
insist,  that  these  powers  are  a  grant  from  the  people,  and  con- 
sequently improper,  let  it  then  be  observed  that  it  is  now  too 
late  to  impede  the  grant.  It  is  already  completed.  The  Con- 
gress under  the  Confederation  are  invested  with  it  by  solemn 
compact.  They  have  powers  to  demand  what  moneys  and 
forces  they  judge  necessary  for  the  common  defence  and  gen- 
eral welfare  ;  powers  as  extensive  as  those  proposed  in  this 
Constitution.  But  it  may  be  said,  as  the  ways  and  means  are 
reserved  to  the  several  States,  they  have  a  check  upon  Congress 
by  refusing  a  compliance  with  the  requisitions.  Sir,  is  this 
the  boasted  check — a  check  that  can  never  be  exercised  but  by 
perfidy  and  a  breach  of  public  faith — by  a  violation  of  the  most 
solemn  stipulations  ?  It  is  this  check  that  has  embarrassed  us 
at  home,  and  made  us  contemptible  abroad  :  and  will  any  hon- 
est man  plume  himself  upon  a  check  which  an  honest  man 
would  blush  to  exercise  ? 

It  has  been  objected,  that  the  Constitution  provides  no 
religious  test  by  oath,  and  we  may  have  in  power  unprincipled 
men,  atheists  and  pagans.  No  man  can  wish  more  ardently 
than  I  do,  that  all  our  public  offices  may  be  filled  by  men  who 
fear  God  and  hate  wickedness-;  but  it  must  remain  with  the 
electors  to  give  the  government  this  security  :  an  oath  will  not 
do  it.  Will  an  unprincipled  man  be  entangled  by  an  oath  ? 
Will  an  atheist  or  a  pagan  dread  the  vengeance  of  the  Chris- 
tian's God — a  being,  in  his  opinion,  the  creature  of  fancy  and 
credulity  ?  It  is  a  solecism  in  expression.  No  man  is  so  illiberal 
as  to  wish  the  confining  places  of  honor  or  profit  to  any  one  sect 
of  Christians  ;  but  what  security  is  it  to  government,  that  every 
public  officer  shall  swear  that  he  is  a  Christian  ?  For  what 
will  then  be  called  Christianity  ?  One  man  will  declare  that 
the  Christian  religion  is  only  an  illumination  of  natural  relig- 
ion, and  that  he  is  a  Christian  ;  another  Christian  will  assert 
that  all  men  must  be  happy  hereafter  in  spite  of  themselves ;  a 
third  Christian  reverses  the  image,  and  declares,  that  let  a  man 
do  all  he  can,  he  will  certainly  be  punished  in  another  world ; 
and  a  fourth  will  tell  us,  that  if  a  man  use  any  force  for  the 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  191 

common  defence,  he  violates  every  principle  of  Christianity. 
Sir,  the  only  evidence  we  can  have  of  the  sincerity  and  excel- 
lency of  a  man's  religion,  is  a  good  life  ;  and  I  trust  that  such 
evidence  will  be  required  of  every  candidate  by  every  elector. 
That  man  who  acts  an  honest  part  to  his  neighbor,  will  most 
probably  conduct  honorably  towards  the  public. 

It  has  been  objected,  that  we  have  not  so  good  security  against 
the  abuse  of  power  under  the  new  Constitution,  as  the  Confed- 
eration gives  us.  It  is  my  deliberate  opinion,  that  we  have  a 
better  security.  Under  the  Confederation  the  whole  power, 
executive  and  legislative,  is  vested  in  one  body,  in  which  the 
people  have  no  representation,  and  where  the  States,  the  great 
and  the  small  States,  are  equally  represented ;  and  all  the 
checks  the  States  have,  is  a  power  to  remove  and  disgrace  an 
unfaithful  servant,  after  the  mischief  is  perpetrated.  Under 
this  Constitution,  an  equal  representation,  immediately  from 
the  people,  is  introduced,  who  by  their  negative,  and  the  exclu- 
sive right  of  originating  money-bills,  have  the  power  to  control 
the  Senate,  where  the  sovereignty  of  the  States  is  represented. 
But  it  has  been  objected,  that  in  the  old  Confederation  the 
States  could  at  any  time  recall  their  delegates,  and  there  was  a 
rotation.  No  essential  benefit  could  be  derived  to  the  people 
from  these  provisions,  but  great  inconveniences  will  result  from 
them.  It  has  been  observed  by  a  gentleman  who  has  argued 
against  the  Constitution,  that  a  representative  ought  to  have  an 
intimate  acquaintance  with  the  circumstances  of  his  constitu- 
ents, and  after  comparing  them  with  the  situation  of  every  part 
of  the  Union,  so  conduct  as  to  promote  the  common  good.  The 
sentiment  is  an  excellent  one,  and  ought  to  be  engraved  on  the 
hearts  of  every  representative.  But  what  is  the  effect  of  the 
power  of  recalling  ?  Your  representative,  with  an  operating 
revocation  over  his  head,  will  lose  all  ideas  of  the  general  good, 
and  will  dwindle  to  a  servile  agent,  attempting  to  secure  local 
and  partial  benefits  by  cabal  and  intrigue.  There  are  great 
and  insuperable  objections  to  a  rotation.  It  is  an  abridgment 
of  the  rights  of  the  people,  and  it  may  deprive  them,  at  critical 
seasons,  of  the  services  of  the  most  important  characters  in  the 
nation.  It  deprives  a  man  of  honorable  ambition,  whose  high- 
est glory  is  the  applause  of  his  fellow-citizens,  of  an  efficient 


192  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

motive  to  great  and  patriotic  exertions.  The  people  individually 
have  no  method  of  testifying  their  esteem,  but  by  a  reelection ; 
and  shall  they  be  deprived  of  the  honest  satisfaction  of  wreath- 
ing for  their  friend  and  patriot  a  crown  of  laurel  more  durable 
than  monarchy  can  bestow  ? 

It  has  been  objected,  that  the  Senate  are  made  too  indepen- 
dent upon  the  State  legislatures.  No  business  under  the  Con- 
stitution of  the  Federal  Convention  could  have  been  more 
embarrassing,  than  the  constructing  the  Senate  ;  as  that  body 
must  conduct  our  foreign  negotiations,  and  establish  and  pre- 
serve a  system  of  national  politics,  an  uniform  adherence  to 
which  can  alone  induce  other  nations  to  negotiate  with  and 
confide  in  us.  It  is  certain,  the  change  of  the  men  who  com- 
pose it  should  not  be  too  frequent,  and  should  be  gradual.  At 
the  same  time  suitable  checks  should  be  provided  to  prevent  an 
abuse  of  power,  and  to  continue  their  dependence  on  their  con- 
stituents. I  think  the  Convention  have  most  happily  extricated 
themselves  from  the  embarrassment.  Although  the  senators 
are  elected  for  six  years,  yet  the  Senate,  as  a  body  composed  of 
the  same  men,  can  exist  only  for  two  years,  without  the  consent 
of  the  States.  If  the  States  think  proper,  one-third  of  that  body 
may,  at  the  end  of  every  second  year,  be  new  men.  When  the 
Senate  act  as  legislators  they  are  controllable  at  all  times  by  the 
representatives ;  and  in  their  executive  capacity,  in  making 
treaties  and  conducting  the  national  negotiations,  the  consent  of 
two-thirds  is  necessary,  who  must  be  united,  to  a  man  (which 
is  hardly  possible)  or  the  new  men  biennially  sent  to  the  Sen- 
ate, if  the  States  choose,  it  can  control  them ;  and  at  all  times 
there  will  also  be  one-third  of  the  Senate,  who  at  the  expiration 
of  two  years  must  obtain  a  reelection,  or  return  to  the  mass  of 
the  people.  And  the  change  of  men  in  the  Senate  will  be  so 
gradual  as  not  to  destroy  or  disturb  any  national  system  of 
politics. 

It  is  objected,  that  it  is  dangerous  to  allow  the  Senate  a  right 
of  proposing  alterations  or  amendments  in  money-bills  ;  that  the 
Senate  may  by  this  power  increase  the  supplies,  and  establish 
profuse  salaries ;  that  for  these  reasons  the  Lords  in  the.  British 
Parliament  have  not  this  power,  which  is  a  great  security  to 
the  liberties  of  Englishmen.     I  was  much  surprised  at  hearing 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  193 

this  objection,  and  the  grounds  upon  which  it  was  supported. 
The  reason  why  the  Lords  have  not  this  power,  is  founded  on  a 
principle  in  the  English  Constitution,  that  the  Commons  alone 
represent  the  whole  property  of  the  nation  ;  and  as  a  money-bill 
is  a  grant  to  the  king,  none  can  make  the  grant  but  those  who 
represent  the  property  of  the  nation ;  and  the  negative  of  the 
Lords  is  introduced  to  check  the  profusion  of  the  Commons,  and 
to  guard  their  own  property.  The  manner  of  passing  a  money- 
bill,  is  conclusive  evidence  of  these  principles ;  for  after  the 
assent  of  the  Lords,  it  does  not  remain  with  the  clerk  of  the 
Parliament,  but  is  returned  to  the  Commons,  who,  by  their 
Speaker,  present  it  to  the  King,  as  the  gift  of  the  Commons. 
But  every  supposed  control  the  Senate  by  this  power  may  have 
over  money-bills,  they  can  have  without  it ;  for  by  private  com- 
munications with  the  representatives,  they  may  as  well  insist 
upon  an  increase  of  the  supplies,  or  salaries,  as  by  official  com- 
munications. But  had  not  the  Senate  this  power,  the  Repre- 
sentatives might  tack  any  foreign  matter  to  a  money-bill,  and 
compel  the  Senate  to  concur  or  lose  the  supplies.  This  might 
be  done  in  critical  seasons,  when  the  Senate  might  give  way  to 
the  encroachments  of  the  Representatives,  rather  than  sustain 
the  odium  of  embarrassing  the  affairs  of  the  nation.  The  bal- 
ance between  the  two  branches  of  the  legislature,  would  in 
this  way  be  endangered,  if  not  destroyed,  and  the  Constitution 
materially  injured.  This  subject  was  fully  considered  by  the 
Convention  for  forming  the  Constitution  of  Massachusetts,  and 
the  provision  made  by  that  body,  after  mature  deliberation,  is 
introduced  into  the  Federal  Constitution. 

It  was  objected,  that  by  giving  Congress  a  power  of  direct 
taxation,  we  give  them  power  to  destroy  the  State  governments 
by  prohibiting  them  from  raising  any  moneys.  But  this  objec- 
tion is  not  founded  in  the  Constitution.  Congress  have  only 
a  concurrent  right  with  each  State,  in  laying  direct  taxes,  not 
an  exclusive  right ;  and  the  right  of  each  State  to  direct  taxa- 
tion is  equally  extensive  and  perfect  as  the  right  of  Congress. 
Any  law,  therefore,  of  the  United  States  for  securing  to  Con- 
gress more  than  a  concurrent  right  with  each  State,  is  usurpa- 
tion, and  void. 

It  has  been  objected,  that  we  have  no  bill  of  rights.     If  gen- 

25 


194  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

tlemen  who  make  this  objection  would  consider  what  are  the 
supposed  inconveniences  resulting  from  the  want  of  a  declara- 
tion of  rights,  I  think  they  would  soon  satisfy  themselves  that 
the  objection  has  no  weight.  Is  there  a  single  natural  right 
we  enjoy,  uncontrolled  by  our  own  legislature,  that  Congress 
can  infringe  ?  Not  one.  Is  there  a  single  political  right 
secured  to  us  by  our  Constitution,  against  the  attempts  of  our 
own  legislature,  which  we  are  deprived  of  by  this  Constitution  ? 
Not  one,  that  I  can  reccollect.  All  the  rights  Congress  can 
control,  we  have  surrendered  to  our  own  legislature ;  and  the 
only  question  is,  whether  the  people  shall  take  from  their  own 
legislature  a  certain  portion  of  the  several  sovereignties,  and 
unite  them  in  one  head,  for  the  more  effectual  securing  of  the 
national  prosperity  and  happiness. 

The  honorable  gentleman  from  Boston,  has  stated  at  large, 
most  of  the  checks  the  people  have  against  usurpation  and  the 
abuse  of  power  under  the  proposed  Constitution  ;  but  from  the 
abundance  of  his  matter  he  has,  in  my  opinion,  omitted  two  or 
three,  which  I  shall  mention.  The  oath  the  several  legislative, 
executive,  and  judicial  officers  of  the  several  States  take  to  sup- 
port the  Federal  Constitution,  is  as  effectual  a  security  against 
the  usurpation  of  the  general  government,  as  it  is  against  the  en- 
croachment of  the  State  governments.  For  an  increase  of  the 
powers  by  usurpation,  is  as  clearly  a  violation  of  the  Federal 
Constitution,  as  a  diminution  of  these  powers  by  private  encroach- 
ment; and  that  oath  obliges  the  officers  of  the  several  States,  as 
vigorously  to  oppose  the  one  as  the  other.  But  there  is  another 
check,  founded  in  the  nature  of  the  Union,  superior  to  all 
parchment  checks  that  can  be  invented.  If  there  should  be  an 
usurpation,  it  will  not  be  upon  the  farmer  and  merchant, 
employed  and  attentive  only  to  their  several  occupations ;  it 
will  be  upon  thirteen  legislatures,  completely  organized,  pos- 
sessed of  the  confidence  of  the  people,  and  having  the  means, 
as  well  as  inclination,  successfully  to  oppose  it.  Under  these 
circumstances,  none  but  madmen  would  attempt  an  usurpa- 
tion. But,  Sir,  the  people  themselves  have  it  in  their  power 
effectually  to  resist  usurpation,  without  being  driven  to  an 
appeal  to  arms.  An  act  of  usurpation  is  not  obligatory,  it  is 
not  law ;  and  any  man  may  be  justified  in  his  resistance.     Let 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  195 

him  be  considered  as  a  criminal  by  the  general  government, 
yet  only  his  own  fellow-citizens  can  convict  him  ;  they  are  his 
jury  ;  and  if  they  pronounce  him  innocent,  not  all  the  powers  of 
Congress  can  hurt  him  ;  and  innocent  they  certainly  will  pro- 
nounce him,  if  the  supposed  law  he  resisted  was  an  act  of 
usurpation. 


AFTERNOON. 

As  soon  as  the  Convention  met  this  afternoon,  Mr.  Nasson,  in 
a  short  speech,  introduced  a  motion  to  this  effect :  "  That  this 
Convention  so  far  reconsider  their  former  vote  to  discuss  the 
Constitution  by  paragraphs,  as  to  leave  the  subject  at  large, 
open  for  consideration."  This  motion  met  with  a  warm  oppo- 
sition from  several  parts  of  the  house. 

Mr.  Wales  said,  that  the  time  which  had  been  spent  in  the 
discussion,  had  been  well  spent ;  and  that  he  was  much  sur- 
prised to  see  gentlemen  wishing  thus  to  hurry  the  matter. 

Mr.  Wedgery  said,  that  necessity  compelled  them  to 
hurry. 

Mr.  D alton.  Mr.  President,  we  have  been  but  six  or  seven 
days  in  the  discussion  of  the  Constitution.  Sir,  has  not  para- 
graph after  paragraph  been  considered  and  explained  ?  Has 
not  great  light  been  thrown  on  the  articles  we  have  considered  ? 
For  my  part,  I  profess  to  have  received  much  light  on  them. 
We  are  now  discussing  the  powers  of  Congress.  Sir,  shall  we 
pass  that  over  ?  Shall  we  pass  over  the  article  of  the  judiciary 
power  without  examination  ?  I  hope,  Sir,  it  will  be  particu- 
larly inquired  into.  1  am  sorry  to  hear  gentlemen  allege  that 
they  have  been  a  long  time  from  home  ;  and  that  the  want  of 
money  necessitates  them  to  wish  for  an  early  decision.  Sir, 
have  not  the  general  court  provided  for  the  payment  of  the 
members  of  this  Convention  ?  and  the  treasurer,  I  am  informed, 
is  collecting  money  to  comply  with  that  provision.  There  are 
many  parts  which  ought  to  be  explained :  I  hope  we  shall  attend 
to  them  with  deliberation  ;  and  that  for  the  sake  of  saving  a  little 
money,  we  may  not  pass  over  the  Constitution  without  well 
considering  it. 

Judge  Sumner  wished  the  motion  might  be  withdrawn. 


196  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

Mr.  Nasson  said  he  would  withdraw  his  motion  for  the  pres- 
ent ;  but  mentioned  his  intention  of  again  making  it  at  ten 
o'clock  to-morrow  morning. 


Thursday,  January  24, 1788. 

Mr.  Nasson  renewed  his  motion  for  reconsidering  a  former 
vote  to  discuss  the  Constitution  by  paragraphs,  so  that  the 
whole  might  be  taken  up. 

The  Hon.  Mr.  Adams  said  he  was  one  of  those  who  had 
difficulties  and  doubts  respecting  some  parts  of  the  proposed 
Constitution.  He  had,  he  said,  for  several  weeks  after  the 
publication  of  it,  laid  by  all  the  writings  in  the  public  papers 
on  the  subject,  in  order  to  be  enabled  leisurely  to  consider 
them.  He  had,  he  said,  still  some  difficulties  on  his  mind  ;  but 
that  he  had  chosen  rather  to  be  an  auditor,  than  an  objector, 
and  he  had  particular  reasons  therefor.  As  this  was  the  case 
with  him,  and  as  others,  he  believed,  were  in  a  similar  situa- 
tion, he  was  desirous  to  have  a  full  investigation  of  the  subject ; 
that  thereby  such  might  be  confirmed,  either  in  favor,  or 
against  the  Constitution.  He  was  therefore  against  the  mo- 
tion. We  ought  not,  he  said,  to  be  stingy  of  our  time,  or  the 
public  money,  when  so  important  an  object  demanded  them; 
and  the  public  expect  that  we  will  not.  He  was  sorry,  he  said, 
for  gentlemen's  necessities  ;  but  he  had  rather  support  the  gen- 
tlemen who  were  thus  necessitated,  or  lend  them  money  to  do  it, 
than  that  they  should  hurry  so  great  a  subject.  He  therefore 
hoped  that  the  question  would  be  put,  and  that  we  should 
proceed  as  we  began. 

Hon.  Mr.  Pitts  said  it  was  impossible  to  consider  the  whole 
until  the  parts  had  been  examined ;  our  constituents,  said  he, 
have  a  right  to  demand  of  us  the  reasons  which  shall  influence 
us  to  vote  as  we  shall  do  :  he  must,  he  said,  therefore,  oppose 
the  motion. 

The  honorable  Mr.  King,  Col.  Smith,  and  several  other  gen- 
tlemen, spoke  against  the  motion. 

Mr.  Wedgery  opposed  the  motion's  being  winked  out   of 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  197 

sight.  He  wished  he  said,  the  question  might  be  put,  that  the 
sense  of  the  Convention  respecting  it,  might  be  taken. 

Gen.  Thompson  said  it  was  not  essential  how  the  matter 
was  considered,  but  he  wished  to  have  the  whole  subject  at 
large,  open  to  discussion,  so  that  every  body  might  speak  to  it. 
A  member,  says  he,  gets  up  and  speaks,  but  he  is  called  to 
order,  as  not  confining  himself  to  the  particular  paragraph 
under  debate,  and  this  puts  him  out.  In  his  opinion,  he  said, 
the  Constitution,  and  the  reasons  which  induced  gentlemen  to 
frame  it,  ought  to  have  been  sent  to  the  several  towns,  to  be 
considered  by  them.  My  town,  says  he,  considered  it  seven 
hours,  and  after  this  there  was  not  one  in  favor  of  it.  If  this 
had  been  done,  we  should  have  known  the  minds  of  the  people 
on  it ;  and  should  we  dare,  he  asked,  to  act  different  from  the 
sense  of  the  people  ?  It  is  strange,  he  said,  that  a  system  which 
its  planners  say,  is  so  plain  that  he  that  runs  may  read  it, 
should  want  so  much  explanation. 

[The  question  being  generally  called  for,  the  motion  was 
put,  and  negatived  without  a  return  of  the  house.  The 
endeavors  of  gentlemen  to  hush  to  silence,  a  small  buzz  of  con- 
gratulation among  a  few  citizens  in  the  gallery,  being  mistaken 
by  some  of  the  members  for  a  hiss,  created  a  momentary  agita- 
tion in  the  Convention  ;  which,  however,  after  a  short  conver- 
sation, subsided.] 

The  eighth  section  was  again  read. 

The  Hon.  Mr.  Sedgwick  went  into  a  general  answer  to 
the  objections  which  had  been  started  against  the  powers  to  be 
granted  to  Congress  by  this  section.  He  showed  the  absolute 
necessity  there  was  that  the  body  which  had  the  security  of  the 
whole  for  their  object,  should  have  the  necessary  means  al- 
lowed them  to  effect  it ;  and  in  order  to  secure  the  people 
against  the  abuse  of  this  power,  the  representatives  and  people, 
he  said,  are  equally  subject  to  the  laws,  and  can  therefore  have 
but  one  and  the  same  interest ;  that  they  never  would  lay 
unnecessary  burdens,  when  they  themselves  must  bear  a  part  of 
them  ;  and  from  the  extent  of  their  objects,  their  power  ought 
necessarily  to  be  illimitable.  Men,  says  he,  rarely  do  mischief 
for  the  sake  of  being  mischievous.  With  respect  to  the  power 
in  this  section  to  raise  armies,  the  honorable  gentleman  said, 


198  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

although  gentlemen  had  thought  it  a  dangerous  power,  which 
would  be  used  for  the  purpose  of  tyranny,  yet  they  did  not 
object  to  the  Confederation  in  this  particular ;  and  by  this, 
Congress  could  have  kept  the  whole  of  the  late  army  in  the 
field,  had  they  seen  fit.  He  asked,  if  gentlemen  could  think  it 
possible,  that  the  legislature  of  the  United  States  should  raise 
an  army  unnecessarily,  which,  in  a  short  time,  would  be  under 
the  control  of  other  persons  ?  For  if  it  was  not  to  be  under 
their  control,  what  object  could  they  have  in  raising  it  ?  It 
was,  he  said,  a  chimerical  idea  to  suppose  that  a  country  like 
this  could  ever  be  enslaved.  How  is  an  army  for  that  purpose 
to  be  obtained  ?  From  the  freemen  of  the  United  States  ? 
They,  certainly,  said  he,  will  know  to  what  object  it  is  to  be 
applied.  Is  it  possible,  he  asked,  that  an  army  could  be  raised 
for  the  purpose  of  enslaving  themselves  and  their  brethren  ? 
or,  if  raised,  can  they  subdue  a  nation  of  freemen,  who  know 
how  to  prize  liberty,  and  who  have  arms  in  their  hands  ? 
He  said  it  was  a  deception  in  gentlemen  to  say  that  this  power 
could  be  thus  used.  The  honorable  gentleman  said  that  in 
the  Constitution,  every  possible  provision  against  an  abuse 
of  power  was  made  ;  and  if  gentlemen  would  candidly  investi- 
gate for  themselves,  they  would  find  that  the  evils  they  lament 
cannot  ensue  therefrom. 

Mr.  Dawes  observed,  upon  the  authority  of  Congress  to 
raise  and  support  armies,  that  all  the  objections  which  had 
been  made  by  gentlemen  against  standing  armies,  were  inap- 
plicable to  the  present  question  ;  which  was  that  as  there 
must  be  an  authority  somewhere,  to  raise  and  support  armies, 
whether  that  authority  ought  to  be  in  Congress.  As  Congress 
are  the  legislature,  upon  the  proposed  plan  of  government,  in 
them  only,  said  he,  should  be  lodged  the  power  under  debate. 
Some  gentlemen  seem  to  have  confused  ideas  about  standing 
armies.  That  the  legislature  of  a  country  should  not  have, 
power  to  raise  armies,  is  a  doctrine  he  had  never  heard  before. 
Charles  II.  in  England,  kept  in  pay  an  army  of  five  thousand 
men,  and  James  II.  augmented  them  to  thirty  thousand.  This 
occasioned  a  great  and  just  alarm  through  the  nation  ;  and  ac- 
cordingly when  William  III.  came  to  the  throne,  it  was  declared 
to  be  unconstitutional  to  raise  or  keep  a  standing  army  in  time 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  199 

of  peace,  without  the  consent  of  the  legislature.  Most  of  our 
own  State  constitutions  have  borrowed  this  language  from  the 
English  declaration  of  rights  ;  but  none  of  them  restrain  their 
lsgislatures  from  raising  and  supporting  armies.  Those  who 
never  objected  to  such  an  authority  in  Congress,  as  vested  by 
the  old  Confederation,  surely  ought  not  to  object  to  such  a 
power  in  a  Congress,  where  there  is  to  be  a  new  branch  of  rep- 
resentation, arising  immediately  from  the  people,  and  which 
branch  alone  must  originate  those  very  grants  that  are  to 
maintain  the  army.  When  we  consider  that  this  branch 
is  to  be  elected  every  two  years,  there  is  great  propriety 
in  its  being  restrained  from  making  any  grants  in  support  of 
the  army  for  a  longer  space  than  that  of  their  existence.  If 
the  election  of  this  popular  branch  were  for  seven  years,  as  in 
England,  the  same  men  who  would  make  the  first  grant,  might 
also  the  second  and  third,  for  the  continuance  of  the  army  ; 
and  such  an  acquaintance  might  exist  between  the  representa- 
tives in  Congress  and  the  leaders  of  the  army,  as  might  be 
unfavorable  to  liberty.  But  the  wisdom  of  the  late  Conven- 
tion has  avoided  this  difficulty.  The  army  must  expire  of 
itself  in  two  years  after  it  shall  be  raised,  unless  renewed  by 
representatives,  who  at  that  time  will  have  just  come  fresh 
from  the  body  of  the  people.  It  will  share  the  same  fate  as 
that  of  a  temporary  law,  which  dies  at  the  time  mentioned  in 
the  act  itself,  unless  revived  by  some  future  legislature. 

Capt.  Dench  said,  it  had  been  observed,  and  he  was  not 
convinced  that  the  observation  was  wrong,  that  the  grant  of  the 
powers  in  this  section  would  produce  a  consolidation  of  the 
States  ;  and  the  moment  it  begins,  a  dissolution  of  the  State 
governments  commences.  If  mistaken,  he  wished  to  be  set 
right. 


AFTERNOON. 

Dr.  Taylor  asked,  why  there  was  to  be  a  Federal  town,  over 
which  Congress  is  to  exercise  exclusive  legislation  ? 

Hon.  Mr.  Strong  said,  that  every  gentleman  must  think  that 
the  erection  of  a  Federal  town  was  necessary,  wherein  Congress 
might  remain  protected  from  insult.     A  few  years  ago,  said  the 


200  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

honorable  gentleman,  Congress  had  to  remove,  because  they 
were  not  protected  by  the  authority  of  the  State  in  which  they 
were  then  sitting.  He  asked  whether  this  Convention,  though 
convened  for  but  a  short  period,  did  not  think  it  was  necessary 
that  they  should  have  power  to  protect  themselves  from  insult  ? 
much  more  so  must  they  think  it  necessary  to  provide  for 
Congress,  considering  they  are  to  be  a  permanent  body. 

Hon.  Mr.  Davis  (of  Boston)  said,  it  was  necessary  that 
Congress  should  have  a  permanent  residence  ;  and  that  it  was 
the  intention  of  Congress,  under  the  Confederation,  to  erect  a 
Federal  town.  He  asked,  would  Massachusetts,  or  any  other 
State,  wish  to  give  to  New  York,  or  the  State  in  which  Congress 
shall  sit,  the  power  to  influence  the  proceedings  of  that  body 
which  was  to  act  for  the  benefit  of  the  whole,  by  leaving  them 
liable  to  the  outrages  of  the  citizens  of  such  States  ? 

Dr.  Taylor  asked,  why  it  need  be  ten  miles  square,  and 
whether  one  mile  square  would  not  be  sufficient. 

Hon.  Mr.  Strong  said,  Congress  were  not  to  exercise  juris- 
diction over  a  district  of  ten  miles,  but  one  not  exceeding-  ten 
miles  square. 

Rev.  Mr.  Stillman  said,  that  whatever  were  the  limits  of  the 
district,  it  would  depend  on  the  cession  of  the  legislature  of 
one  of  the  States. 

Mr.  Dench  said,  that  he  wished  further  light  on  the  subject ; 
but  that  from  the  words,  "  We,  the  people,"  in  the  first  clause 
ordaining  this  Constitution,  he  thought  it  was  an  actual  consol- 
idation of  the  States,  and  that,  if  he  was  not  mistaken,  the 
moment  it  took  place,  a  dissolution  of  the  State  governments 
will  also  take  place.  t 

Gen.  Brooks  (of  Lincoln)  rose,  he  said,  to  consider  the  idea 
suggested  by  the  gentleman  last  speaking,  that  this  Constitution 
would  produce  a  dissolution  of  the  State  governments,  or  a 
consolidation  of  the  whole,  which,  in  his  opinion,  he  said,  was 
ill  founded,  or  rather  a  loose  idea.  In  the  first  place,  says  he, 
the  Congress  under  this  Constitution  cannot  be  organized  with- 
out repeated  acts  of  the  legislatures  of  the  several  States ;  and 
therefore,  if  the  creating  power  is  dissolved,  the  body  to  be 
created  cannot  exist.  In  the  second  place,  says  the  General,  it 
is  impossible  the    general   government  can  exist,   unless   the 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  201 

governments  of  the  several  States  are  forever  existing,  as  the 
qualifications  of  the  electors  of  Federal  representatives  are  to 
be  the  same  as  those  of  the  electors  of  the  most  numerous 
branch  of  the  State  legislatures.  It  was,  therefore,  he  said, 
impossible,  that  the  State  governments  should  be  annihilated 
by  the  general  government;  and  it  was,  he  said,  strongly 
implied,  from  that  part  of  the  section  under  debate,  which  gave 
Congress  power  to  have  exclusive  jurisdiction  over  the  Federal 
town,  that  they  should  exercise  it  over  no  other  place.  When 
we  attend  to  the  Constitution,  we  shall  see,  says  the  General,  that 
the  powers  to  be  given  to  Congress  amount  only  to  a  consolida- 
tion of  the  strength  of  the  Union,  and  that  private  rights  are 
not  consolidated.  The  General  mentioned  the  rights  which 
Congress  could  not  infringe  upon,  and  said,  that  their  power  to 
define  what  was  treason  was  much  less  than  is  vested  in  the 
legislature  of  this  State,  by  our  own  Constitution ;  as  it  was 
confined,  in  the  third  section  of  Article  III.,  to  levying  war5  or 
adhering  to,  and  comforting  enemies,  only.  He  mentioned  the 
restraint  upon  Congress  in  the  punishment  of  treason,  and 
compared  it  with  the  extended  powers  lodged  in  the  Parliament  * 
of  Great  Britain,  on  like  crimes  ;  and  concluded  by  observing, 
that,  as  the  United  States  guarantee  to  each  State  a  republican 
form  of  government,  the  State  governments  were  as  effectually 
secured  as  though  this  Constitution  should  never  be  in  force. 

Hon.  Mr.  King  said,  in  reply  to  the  inquiry  respecting  a 
Federal  town,  that  there  was  now  no  place  for  Congress  to 
reside  in,  and  that  it  was  necessary  that  they  should  have  a 
permanent  residence,  where  to  establish  proper  archives,  in 
which  to  deposit  treaties,  state  papers,  deeds  of  cession,  &c. 

Hon.  Mr.  Singletary  said,  that  all  gentlemen  had  said  about 
a  bill  of  rights  to  the  Constitution,  was,  that  what  is  written  is 
written  ;  but  he  thought  we  were  giving  up  all  power,  and  that 
the  States  will  be  like  towns  in  this  State.  Towns,  says  he, 
have  a  right  to  lay  taxes  to  raise  money,  and  the  States  possibly 
may  have  the  same.  We  have  now,  says  he,  a  good  republican 
Constitution,  and  we  do  not  want  it  guaranteed  to  us.  He  did 
not  understand  what  gentlemen  meant  by  Congress  guaranteeing 
a  republican  form  of  government.  He  wished  they  would  not 
play  round  the  subject  with  their  fine  stories,  like  a  fox  round 

26 


202  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

a  trap,  but  come  to  it.  Why  don't  they  say  that  Congress  will 
guarantee  our  State  Constitution  ? 

Gen.  Thompson  said,  Congress  only  meant  to  guarantee  a 
form  of  government. 

Hon.  Mr.  King  asked,  whether,  if  the  present  Constitution 
of  this  State  had  been  guaranteed  by  the  United  States,  the 
honorable  gentleman  from  Sutton  would  not  have  considered  it 
as  a  great  defect  in  the  proposed  Constitution,  as  it  must  have 
precluded  the  State  from  making  any  alteration  in  it,  should 
they  see  fit  so  to  do,  at  the  time  mentioned  in  the  Constitution  ? 

[Several  other  gentlemen  spoke,  in  a  desultory  conversation, 
on  various  parts  of  the  Constitution,  in  which  several  articles 
from  the  Constitution  of  this  State,  and  the  Confederation, 
were  read  ;  many  questions  asked  the  honorable  gentlemen  who 
framed  the  Constitution,  to  which  answers  apparently  satisfactory 
were  given.] 


Friday,  January  25, 1788. 

The  eighth  section  still  under  debate,  but  the  conversation 
continued  desultory,  and  much  attention  was  paid  to  the  inqui- 
ries of  gentlemen  on  different  parts  of  the  Constitution,  by 
those  who  were  in  favor  of  it. 

Mr.  Ames,  in  a  short  discourse,  called  on  those  who  stood 
forth  in  1775,  to  stand  forth  now  ;  to  throw  aside  all  interested 
and  party  views,  to  have  one  purse  and  one  heart  for  the  whole  ; 
and  to  consider,  that  as  it  was  necessary  then,  so  was  it  neces- 
sary now,  to  unite,  or  die  we  must. 

Hon.  Mr.  Singlet ary.  Mr.  President:  I  should  not  have 
troubled  the  Convention  again,  if  some  gentlemen  had  not 
called  upon  them  that  were  on  the  stage  in  the  beginning  of 
our  troubles,  in  the  year  1775.  I  was  one  of  them.  I  have 
had  the  honor  to  be  a  member  of  the  court  all  the  time,  Mr. 
President,  and  I  say,  that  if  any  body  had  proposed  such  a 
Constitution  as  this,  in  that  day,  it  would  have  been  thrown 
away  at  once.  It  would  not  have  been  looked  at.  We  con- 
tended with  Great  Britain,  some  said,  for  a  three-penny  duty 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  203 

on  tea  ;  but  it  was  not  that — it  was  because  they  claimed  a  right 
to  tax  us  and  bind  us  in  all  cases  whatever.  And  does  not  this 
Constitution  do  the  same  ?  Does  it  not  take  away  all  we  have, 
all  our  property  ?  Does  it  not  lay  all  taxes,  duties,  imposts  and 
excises  ?  And  what  more  have  we  to  give  ?  They  tell  us  Con- 
gress won't  lay  dry  taxes  upon  us,  but  collect  all  the  money  they 
want  by  impost.  I  say  there  has  always  been  a  difficulty  about 
impost.  Whenever  the  general  court  was  agoing  to  lay  an 
impost,  they  would  tell  us  it  was  more  than  trade  could  bear, 
that  it  hurt  the  fair  trader,  and  encouraged  smuggling ;  and 
there  will  always  be  the  same  objection — they  won't  be  able  to 
raise  money  enough  by  impost,  and  then  they  will  lay  it  on  the 
land,  and  take  all  we  have  got.  These  lawyers,  and  men  of 
learning,  and  moneyed  men,  that  talk  so  finely,  and  gloss  over 
matters  so  smoothly,  to  make  us,  poor  illiterate  people,  swallow 
down  the  pill,  expect  to  get  into  Congress  themselves ;  they 
expect  to  be  the  managers  of  this  Constitution,  and  get  all  the 
power  and  all  the  money  into  their  own  hands,  and  then  they 
will  swallow  up  all  us  little  folks,  like  the  great  leviathan,  Mr. 
President ;  yes,  just  as  the  whale  swallowed  up  Jonah.  This 
is  what  I  am  afraid  of;  but  I  won't  say  any  more  at  present, 
but  reserve  the  rest  to  another  opportunity. 

Hon.  Mr.  Smith.  Mr.  President:  I  am  a  plain  man  and  get 
my  living  by  the  plough.  I  am  not  used  to  speak  in  public,  but 
I  beg  your  leave  to  say  a  few  words  to  my  brother  plough- 
joggers  in  this  house.  I  have  lived  in  a  part  of  the  country 
where  I  have  known  the  worth  of  good  government  by  the  want 
of  it.  There  was  a  black  cloud  that  rose  in  the  east  last  winter, 
and  spread  over  the  west.  [Here  Mr.  Wedgery  interrupted  :  Mr. 
President,  I  wish  to  know  what  the  gentleman  means  by  the  east  ?] 
I  mean,  Sir,  the  county  of  Bristol.  The  cloud  rose  there,  and 
burst  upon  us,  and  produced  a  dreadful  effect.  It  brought  on 
a  state  of  anarchy,  and  that  leads  to  tyranny.  I  say,  it  brought 
anarchy.  People  that  used  to  live  peaceably,  and  were  before 
good  neighbors,  got  distracted,  and  took  up  arms  against  gov- 
ernment. [Here  Mr.  Kinsley  called  to  order,  and  asked,  what 
had  the  history  of  last  winter  to  do  with  the  Constitution  ? 
Several  gentlemen,  and  among  the  rest,  the  Hon.  Mr.  Adams, 
said  the  gentleman  was  in  order,  let  him  go  on  in  his  own  way.] 


204  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

I  am  agoing,  Mr.  President,  to  show  you,  my  brother  farmers, 
what  were  the  effects  of  anarchy,  that  you  may  see  the  reasons 
why  I  wish  for  good  government.  People,  I  say,  took  up  arms, 
and  then,  if  you  went  to  speak  to  them,  you  had  the  musket  of 
death  presented  to  your  breast.  They  would  rob  you  of  your 
property,  threaten  to  burn  your  houses  ;  oblige  you  to  be  on 
your  guard  night  and  day  ;  alarms  spread  from  town  to  town  ; 
families  were  broke  up ;  the  tender  mother  would  cry  :  0,  my 
son  is  among  them  !  What  shall  I  do  for  my  child  !  Some 
were  taken  captive,  children  taken  out  of  their  schools  and 
carried  away.  Then  we  should  hear  of  an  action,  and  the  poor 
prisoners  were  set  in  the  front,  to  be  killed  by  their  own  friends. 
How  dreadful,  how  distressing  was  this !  Our  distress  was  so 
great  that  we  should  have  been  glad  to  snatch  at  any  thing  that 
looked  like  a  government,  for  protection.  Had  any  person,  that 
was  able  to  protect  us,  come  and  set  up  his  standard,  we  should 
all  have  flocked  to  it,  even  if  it  had  been  a  monarch,  and  that 
monarch  might  have  proved  a  tyrant ;  so  that  you  see  that 
anarchy  leads  to  tyranny  ;  it  is  better  to  have  one  tyrant  than  so 
many  at  once. 

Now,  Mr.  President,  when  I  saw  this  Constitution,  I  found 
that  it  was  a  cure  for  these  disorders.  It  was  just  such  a  thing 
as  we  wanted.  I  got  a  copy  of  it  and  read  it  over  and  over.  I 
had  been  a  member  of  the  Convention  to  form  our  own  State 
Constitution,  and  had  learnt  something  of  the  checks  and 
balances  of  power,  and  I  found  them  all  here.  I  did  not  go  to 
any  lawyer,  to  ask  his  opinion  ;  we  have  no  lawyer  in  our  town, 
and  we  do  well  enough  without.  I  formed  my  own  opinion, 
and  was  pleased  with  this  Constitution.  My  honorable  old 
daddy  there  (pointing  to  Mr.  Singletary)  won't  think  that  I 
expect  to  be  a  Congressman,  and  swallow  up  the  liberties  of 
the  people.  I  never  had  any  post,  nor  do  I  want  one,  and 
before  I  am  done  you  will  think  that  I  don't  deserve  one.  But 
1  don't  think  the  worse  of  the  Constitution  because  lawyers, 
and  men  of  learning,  and  moneyed  men,  are  fond  of  it.  I  don't 
suspect  that  they  want  to  get  into  Congress  and  abuse  their 
power.  I  am  not  of  such  a  jealous  make.  They  that  are 
honest  men  themselves  are  not  apt  to  suspect  other  people.  I 
don't  know  why  our  constituents  have  not  as  good  a  right  to  be 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  205 

jealous  of  us,  as  we  seem  to  be  of  the  Congress,  and  I  think 
those  gentlemen  who  are  so  very  suspicious  that  as  soon  as  a 
man  gets  into  power  he  turns  rogue,  had  better  look  at  home. 

We  are  by  this  Constitution  allowed  to  send  ten  members  to 
Congress.  Have  we  not  more  than  that  number  fit  to  go  ?  I 
dare  say,  if  we  pick  out  ten,  we  shall  have  another  ten  left,  and 
I  hope  ten  times  ten — and  will  not  these  be  a  check  upon  those 
that  go  ?  Will  they  go  to  Congress  and  abuse  their  power,  and 
do  mischief,  when  they  know  that  they  must  return  and  look 
the  other  ten  in  the  face,  and  be  called  to  account  for  their 
conduct  ?  Some  gentlemen  think  that  our  liberty  and  property 
are  not  safe  in  the  hands  of  moneyed  men,  and  men  of  learning. 
I  am  not  of  that  mind. 

Brother  farmers,  let  us  suppose  a  case  now :  Suppose  you  had 
a  farm  of  fifty  acres,  and  your  title  was  disputed,  and  there  was 
a  farm  of  five  thousand  acres  joined  to  you,  that  belonged  to  a 
man  of  learning,  and  his  title  was  involved  in  the  same  diffi- 
culty ;  would  not  you  be  glad  to  have  him  for  your  friend, 
rather  than  to  stand  alone  in  the  dispute  ?  Well,  the  case  is 
the  same ;  these  lawyers,  these  moneyed  men,  these  men  of 
learning,  are  all  embarked  in  the  same  cause  with  us,  and  we 
must  all  swim  or  sink  together ;  and  shall  we  throw  the  Consti- 
tution overboard  because  it  does  not  please  us  alike  ?  Suppose 
two  or  three  of  you  had  been  at  the  pains  to  break  up  a  piece 
of  rough  land,  and  sow  it  with  wheat ;  would  you  let  it  lie 
waste,  because  you  could  not  agree  what  sort  of  a  fence  to 
make  ?  Would  it  not  be  better  to  put  up  a  fence  that  did  not 
please  every  one's  fancy,  rather  than  not  fence  it  at  all,  or  keep 
disputing  about  it,  until  the  wild  beasts  came  in  and  devoured 
it.  Some  gentlemen  say — don't  be  in  a  hurry,  take  time  to 
consider,  and  don't  take  a  leap  in  the  dark.  I  say — take  things 
in  time,  gather  fruit  when  it  is  ripe.  There  is  a  time  to  sow, 
and  a  time  to  reap.  We  sowed  our  seed  when  we  sent  men  to 
the  Federal  Convention  ;  now  is  the  harvest,  now  is  the  time  to 
reap  the  fruit  of  our  labor,  and  if  we  don't  do  it  now,  I  am 
afraid  we  never  shall  have  another  opportunity. 

Mr.  Parsons  considered  the  several  charges  of  ambiguity 
which  gentlemen  had  laid  to  the  Constitution,  and  with  a  great 
deal  of  accuracy  stated  the  obvious  meaning  of  the  clauses  thus 


206  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

supposed  to  be  ambiguous.  He  concluded  his  explanation  by- 
saying,  that  no  compositions  which  men  can  pen,  could  be 
formed,  but  what  would  be  liable  to  the  same  charge. 


AFTERNOON. 

Hon.  Mr.  Dalton.  Mr.  President:  It  has  been  demanded 
by  some  gentlemen  in  opposition  to  this  Constitution,  why  those 
who  were  opposed  to  the  augmentation  of  the  powers  of  Con- 
gress a  few  years  since,  should  now  be  the  warmest  advocates 
for  the  powers  to  be  granted  by  the  section  under  debate.  Sir, 
I  was  opposed  to  the  five  per  cent,  impost  being  granted  to 
Congress,  and  I  conceived  that  such  a  grant,  under  the  Confed- 
eration, would  produce  great  difficulties  and  embarrassments. 
But,  Sir,  as  Congress  is,  by  the  proposed  Constitution,  to  be 
differently  constructed  ;  as  a  proportionate  voice  of  the  States 
in  that  body  is  to  be  substituted  for  the  present  equal  (or  rather 
unequal)  one — my  objections  will  be  removed.  In  my  opinion, 
the  delegating  of  power  to  a  government,  in  which  the  people 
have  so  many  checks,  will  be  perfectly  safe,  and  consistent  with 
the  preservation  of  their  liberties. 

Mr.  Ames  said,  that  in  the  course  of  the  debates,  gentlemen 
had  justified  the  Confederation  ;  but  he  wished  to  asked,  whether 
there  was  any  danger  in  this  Constitution,  which  is  not  in  the 
Confederation  ?  If  gentlemen  are  willing  to  confederate,  why, 
he  asked,  ought  not  Congress  to  have  the  powers  granted  by 
this  section.  In  the  Confederation,  said  Mr.  Ames,  the  checks 
are  wanting,  which  are  to  be  found  in  this  Constitution.  And 
the  fears  of  gentlemen,  that  this  Constitution  will  provide  for  a 
permanent  aristocracy,  are  therefore  ill  founded  ;  for  the  rulers 
will  always  be  dependent  on  the  people,  and,  like  the  insects  of 
a  sunshine  day,  may,  by  the  breath  of  their  displeasure,  be 
annihilated. 

Mr.  Wedgery.  Mr.  President :  Enough  has,  I  think,  been 
said  on  the  eighth  section.  It  has  been  repeated  over  and  over 
again,  that  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution  will  please  all  ranks 
of  people  ;  that  the  present  inefficiency  of  the  Confederation  is 
obvious  ;  and  that  blessed  things  will  surely  be  the  result  of  this 
Constitution.     Many  say,  ask  the  merchants  ;  ask  the  yeomanry. 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  207 

But  they  do  not  tell  us  what  the  answer  of  these  will  be.  All 
we  hear  is,  that  the  merchant  and  farmer  will  flourish,  and  that 
the  mechanic  and  tradesman  are  to  make  their  fortunes  directly, 
if  the  Constitution  goes  down.  Is  it,  Sir,  because  the  seat  of 
government  is  to  be  carried  to  Philadelphia  ?  Who,  Sir,  is  to 
pay  the  debts  of  the  yeomanry,  and  others  ?  Sir,  when  oil  will 
quench  fire,  I  will  believe  all  this,  and  not  till  then.  On  the 
contrary,  I  think  the  adopting  this  Constitution  makes  against 
them,  though  it  may  be  something  in  favor  of  the  merchants. 
Have  hot  Congress  power  to  tax  polls  ? — for  there  is  no  other 
way  of  levying  a  dry  tax  ;  and  by  this  means  the  poor  will  pay 
as  much  as  the  rich.  Gentlemen  say  we  are  undone,  and  that 
there  is  no  resource,  unless  this  Constitution  is  adopted.  I 
cannot  see  why  we  need  swallow  a  great  bone  for  the  sake  of  a 
little  meat,  which,  if  it  should  happen  to  stick  in  our  throats, 
can  never  be  got  out.  Some  gentlemen  have  given  out,  that 
we  are  surrounded  by  enemies,  that  we  owe  debts,  and  that  the 
nations  will  make  war  against  us,  and  take  our  shipping,  &c. 
Sir,  I  ask,  if  this  is  a  fact  ?  or  whether  gentlemen  think  as 
they  say?  I  believe  they  do  not.  For  I  believe  they  are  con- 
vinced, that  the  nations  we  owe  do  not  wish  us  at  present  to  pay 
more  than  the  interest. 

Mr.  Wedgery,  after  considering  some  other  observations  which 
had  dropped  from  gentlemen  in  the  course  of  the  debates  on 
the  eighth  section,  concluded  by  saying,  that  he  could  not  see 
the  great  danger  that  would  arise  from  rejecting  the  Consti- 
tution. 

The  Hon.  Mr.  Gorham  adverted  to  the  suggestion  of  some 
gentlemen,  that  by  granting  the  impost  to  Congress,  this  State 
would  pay  more  than  its  proportion  ;  and  said,  that  it  could  be 
made  an  objection  as  much  against  one  government  as  another. 
But  he  believed,  gentlemen  would  accede  that  the  impost  was 
a  very  proper  tax.  As  to  the  tax  on  polls,  which  the  gentleman 
from  New  Gloucester  had  said  would  take  place,  he  saw,  he 
said,  no  article  in  the  Constitution  which  warranted  the  asser- 
tion. It  was,  he  said,  a  distressful  tax,  and  would  never  be 
adopted.  By  impost  and  excise,  the  man  of  luxury  will  pay, 
and  the  middling  and  poor  parts  of  the  community,  who  live  by 
their  industry,  will  go  clear ;  and  as  this  would  be  the  easiest 


208  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

method  of  raising  a  revenue,  it  was  the  most  natural  to  suppose 
it  would  be  resorted  to.  Twenty  per  cent.,  he  said,  may  as  well 
be  paid  for  some  luxuries,  as  five  ;  nay,  one  hundred  per  cent, 
impost  on  some  articles  might  be  laid  on,  as  is  done  in  England 
and  France.  How  often,  observed  the  honorable  gentleman, 
has  Mr.  Adams  tried  to  accomplish  a  commercial  treaty  with 
England  !  But  they  think  Congress  but  a  feeble  power.  They 
prohibit  our  oil,  fish,  lumber,  pot  and  pearl  ashes,  from  being 
imported  into  their  territories,  in  order  to  favor  Nova  Scotia, 
for  they  know  we  cannot  make  general  retaliating  laws.  They 
have  a  design  in  Nova  Scotia  to  rival  us  in  the  fishery,  and  our 
situation  at  present  favors  their  design.  From  the  abundance 
of  our  markets  we  could  supply  them  with  beef,  butter,  pork, 
&c.  ;  but  they  lay  what  restrictions  on  them  they  please,  which 
they  dare  not  do,  was  there  an  adequate  power  lodged  in  the 
general  government  to  regulate  commerce. 

Mr.  Jones,  Col.  Porter  and  Col.  Varnum  said  a  few  words 
in  favor  of  the  article,  when  the  Convention  proceeded  to  the 
consideration  of  the  ninth  section. 

Mr.  Neal  (from  Kittery)  went  over  the  ground  of  objection 
to  this  section,  on  the  idea,  that  the  slave  trade  was  allowed  to 
be  continued  for  twenty  years.  His  profession,  he  said,  obliged 
him  to  bear  witness  against  any  thing  that  should  favor  the 
making  merchandise  of  the  bodies  of  men  ;  and  unless  his 
objection  was  removed,  he  could  not  put  his  hand  to  the  Con- 
stitution. Other  gentlemen  said,  in  addition  to  this  idea,  that 
there  was  not  even  a  provision  that  the  negroes  ever  shall  be 
free  ;  and 

Gen.  Thompson  exclaimed — Mr.  President :  Shall  it  be  said, 
that  after  we  have  established  our  own  independence  and 
freedom,  we  make  slaves  of  others  ?  0,  Washington,  what  a 
name  has  he  had !  How  he  has  immortalized  himself!  But 
he  holds  those  in  slavery  who  have  as  good  right  to  be  free  as  he 
has.  He  is  still  for  self,  and,  in  my  opinion,  his  character  has 
sunk  fifty  per  cent. 

On  the  other  side,  gentlemen  said,  that  the  step  taken  in  this 
article,  towards  the  abolition  of  slavery,  was  one  of  the  beauties 
of  the  Constitution.  They  observed,  that  in  the  Confederation 
there  was  no  provision  whatever  for  its  ever  being  abolished  ; 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  209 

but  this  Constitution  provides  that  Congress  may,  after  twenty 
years,  totally  annihilate  the  slave  trade  ;  and  that,  as  all  the 
States,  except  two,  have  passed  laws  to  this  effect,  it  might 
reasonably  be  expected  that  it  would  then  be  done.  In  the 
interim,  all  the  States  were  at  liberty  to  prohibit  it. 


Saturday,  January  26,  1788. 

[The  debate  on  the  ninth  section  still  continued  desultory, 
and  consisted  of  similar  objections  a"nd  answers  thereto,  as  had 
before  been  used.  Both  sides  deprecated  the  slave  trade  in 
the  most  pointed  terms.  On  one  side  it  was  pathetically 
lamented,  by  Mr.  Nasson,  Major  Lusk,  Mr.  Neal,  and  others, 
that  this  Constitution  provided  for  the  continuation  of  the 
slave  trade  for  twenty  years.  On  the  other,  the  Hon.  Judge 
Dana,  Mr.  Adams,  and  others,  rejoiced  that  a  door  was  now  to 
be  opened,  for  the  annihilation  of  this  odious,  abhorrent  practice, 
in  a  certain  time.] 

The  paragraph  which  provides  that  "  the  privilege  of  the  writ 
of  habeas  corpus  shall  not  be  suspended,  unless  in  cases  of 
rebellion  or  invasion,"  was  read,  when 

Gen.  Thompson  asked  the  President  to  please  to  proceed. 
We  have,  says  he,  read  the  book  often  enough  ;  it  is  a  consistent 
piece  of  inconsistency. 

Hon.  Mr.  Adams,  in  answer  to  an  inquiry  of  the  Hon.  Mr. 
Taylor,  said  that  this  power,  given  to  the  general  government 
to  suspend  this  privilege  in  cases  of  rebellion  and  invasion,  did 
not  take  away  the  power  of  the  several  States  to  suspend  it,  if 
they  see  fit. 

Dr.  Taylor  asked  why  this  darling  privilege  was  not  express- 
ed in  the  same  manner  it  was  in  the  Constitution  of  Massachu- 
setts. [Here  the  honorable  gentleman  read  the  paragraph 
respecting  it,  in  the  Constitution  of  this  State,  and  then  the  one 
in  the  proposed  Constitution.]  He  remarked  on  the  difference 
of  expression,  and  asked  why  the  time  was  not  limited. 

Judge  Dana  said,  the  answer,  in  part,  to  the  honorable  gen- 
tleman must  be,  that  the  same  men  did  not  make  both  Consti- 

27 


210  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

tutions — that  he  did  not  see  the  necessity  or  great  benefit  of 
limiting  the  time.  Supposing  it  had  been,  as  in  our  Constitution, 
"  not  exceeding  twelve  months,"  yet,  as  our  legislature  can,  so 
might  the  Congress,  continue  the  suspension  of  the  writ  from 
time  to  time,  or  from  year  to  year.  The  safest  and  best  restric- 
tion, therefore,  arises  from  the  nature  of  the  cases  in 'which 
Coiigress  are  authorized  to  exercise  that  power  at  all,  namely,  in 
those  of  rebellion  or  invasion.  These  are  clear  and  certain 
terms;  facts  of  public  notoriety.  And  whenever  these  shall 
cease  to  exist,  the  suspension  of  the  writ  must  necessarily  ceas 
also.  He  thought  the  citizen  had  a  better  security  for  his 
privilege  of  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus  under  the  Federal  than 
under  the  State  Constitution  ;  for  our  legislatur  e  may  suspen 
the  writ  as  often  as  they  judge  "  the  most  urgent  and  pressing 
occasions"  call  for  it.  He  hoped  these  short  observations  would 
satisfy  the  honorable  gentleman's  inquiries,  otherwise  he  should 
be  happy  in  endeavoring  to  do  it,  by  going  more  at  large  into 
the  subject. 

Judge  Sumner  said,  that  this  was  a  restriction  on  Congress, 
that  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus  should  not  be  suspended,  except 
in  cases  of  rebellion  and  invasion.  The  learned  judge  then 
explained  the  nature  of  this  writ.  When  a  person,  said  he,  is 
imprisoned,  he  applies  to  a  judge  of  the  supreme  court — the 
judge  issues  his  writ  to  the  jailer,  calling  upon  him  to  have  the 
body  of  the  person  imprisoned,  before  him,  with  the  crime  on 
which  he  was  committed.  If  it  then  appears  that  the  person 
was  legally  committed,  and  that  he  was  not  bailable,  he  is 
remanded  to  prison  ;  if  illegally  confined,  he  is  enlarged.  This 
privilege,  he  said,  is  essential  to  freedom — and  therefore  the 
power  to  suspend  it  is  restricted.  On  the  other  hand  the  State, 
he  said,  might  be  involved  in  danger  :  the  worst  enemy  may  lay 
plans  to  destroy  us,  and  so  artfully  as  to  prevent  any  evidence 
against  him,  and  might  ruin  the  country,  without  the  power  to 
suspend  the  writ  was  thus  given.  Congress  have  only  power  to 
suspend  the  privilege  to  persons  committed  by  their  authority. 
A  person  committed  under  the  authority  of  this  State,  will  still 
have  a  right  to  this  writ. 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  211 

Monday,  January  28, 1788. 

This,  and  the  two  following  days,  were  taken  up  in  consider- 
ing the  several  sections  of  the  second  and  third  articles — every 
one  of  which  was  objected  to  by  those  who  were  opposed  to  the 
Constitution  ;  and  the  objections  were  obviated  by  gentlemen 
in  favor  it.  Wr.  do  not  think  it  essential  to  go  into  a  minute 
detail  oi  the  conversation ;  as,  in  the  speeches  on  the  grand 
question,  the  field  is  again  gone  over.  We  can  only  say,  that 
with  the  utmost  attention  every  objection,  however  trifling,  was 
answered ;  and  that  the  unremitted  endeavors  of  gentlemen 
who  advocated  the  Constitution,  to  convince  those  who  were  in 
error,  were  not  without  effect.  The  main  objections  to  the 
judiciary  power,  are  contained  in  the  following  speech  delivered 
on  Wednesday,  January  30. 

Mr.  Holmes.  Mr.  President:  I  rise  to  make  some  remarks 
on  the  paragraph  under*  consideration,  which  treats  of  the 
judiciary  power. 

It  is  a  maxim  universally  admitted,  that  the  safety  of  the 
subject  consists  in  having  a  right  to  a  trial  as  free  and  impartial 
as  the  lot  of  humanity  will  admit  of.  Does  the  Constitution 
make  provision  for  such  a  trial  ?  I  think  not :  for  in  a  criminal 
process  a  person  shall  not  have  a  right  to  insist  on  a  trial  in  the 
vicinity  where  the  fact  was  committed,  where  a  jury  of  the  peers 
would,  from  their  local  situation,  have  an  opportunity  to  form 
a  judgment  of  the  character  of  the  person  charged  with  the 
crime,  and  also  to  judge  of  the  credibility  of  the  witnesses. 
There  a  person  must  be  tried  by  a  jury  of  strangers — a  jury 
who  may  be  interested  in  his  conviction ;  and  where  he  may, 
by  reason  of  the  distance  of  his  residence  from  the  place  of  trial, 
be  incapable  of  making  such  a  defence  as  he  is  in  justice  enti- 
tled to,  and  which  he  could  avail  himself  of,  if  his  trial  was 
in  the  same  county  where  the  crime  is  said  to  have  been  com- 
mitted. 

These  circumstances,  as  horrid  as  they  are,  are  rendered  still 
more  dark  and  gloomy,  as  there  is  no  provision  made  in  the 
Constitution  to  prevent  the  attorney-general  from  filing  informa- 
tion against  any  person,  whether  he  is  indicted  by  the  grand 
jury  or  not ;  in  consequence  of  which  the  most  innocent  person 


212  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

in  the  Commonwealth  may  be  taken  by  virtue  of  a  warrant 
issued  in  consequence  of  such  information,  and  dragged  from 
his  home,  his  friends,  his  acquaintance,  and  confined  in  prison, 
until  the  next  session  of  the  court  which  has  jurisdiction  of  the 
crime  with  which  he  is  charged,  (and  how  frequent  those  ses- 
sions are  to  be,  we  are  not  yet  informed  of,)  and  after  long, 
tedious  and  painful  imprisonment,  though  acquitted  on  trial, 
may  have  no  possibility  to  obtain  any  kind  of  satisfaction  for 
the  loss  of  his  liberty,  the  loss  of  his  time,  great  expenses,  and 
perhaps  cruel  sufferings. 

But  what  makes  the  matter  still  more  alarming  is  that  the 
mode  of  criminal  process  is  to  be  pointed  out  by  Congress,  and 
they  have  no  constitutional  check  on  them,  except  that  the 
trial  is  to  be  a  jury ;  but  who  this  jury  is  to  be,  how  qualified, 
where  to  live,  how  appointed,  or  by  what  rules  to  regulate  their 
procedure,  we  are  ignorant  of  as  yet ;  whether  they  are  to  live 
in  the  county  where  the  trial  is ;  whether  they  are  to  be  chosen 
by  certain  districts  ;  or  whether  they  are  to  be  appointed  by  the 
sheriff,  ex  officio ;  whether  they  are  to  be  for  one  session  of  the 
court  only,  or  for  a  certain  term  of  time,  or  for  good  behavior, 
or  during  pleasure  ;  are  matters  which  we  are  entirely  ignorant 
of  as  yet. 

The  mode  of  trial  is  altogether  indetermined.  Whether  the 
criminal  is  to  be  allowed  the  benefit  of  counsel ;  whether  he  is 
to  be  allowed  to  meet  his  accuser  face  to  face  ;  whether  he  is  to 
be  allowed  to  confront  the  witnesses,  and  have  the  advantage  of 
cross-examination,  we  are  not  yet  told. 

These  are  matters  by  no  means  of  small  consequence,  yet  we 
have  not  the  smallest  constitutional  security  that  we  shall  be 
allowed  the  exercise  of  these  privileges,  neither  is  it  made  cer- 
tain in  the  Constitution,  that  a  person,  charged  with  a  crime, 
shall  have  the  privilege  of  appearing  before  the  Court  or  jury 
which  is  to  try  him. 

On  the  whole,  when  we  fully  consider  this  matter,  and  fully 
investigate  the  powers  granted,  explicitly  given,  and  specially 
delegated,  we  shall  find  Congress  possessed  of  powers  enabling 
them  to  institute  judicatories,  little  less  inauspicious  than  a 
certain  tribunal  in  Spain,  which  has  long  been  the  disgrace  of 
Christendom :  I  mean  that  diabolical  institution,  the  Inquisition, 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  213 

What  gives  an  additional  glare  of  horror  to  these  gloomy  cir- 
cumstances is,  the  consideration  that  Congress  have  to  ascertain, 
point  out,  and  determine,  what  kind  of  punishments  shall  be 
inflicted  on  persons  convicted  of  crimes.  They  are  no  where 
restrained  from  inventing  the  most  cruel  and  unheard  of  pun- 
ishments, and  annexing  them  to  crimes,  and  there  is  no  consti- 
tutional check  on  them,  but  that  racks  and  gibbets  may  be 
amongst  the  most  mild  instruments  of  their  discipline. 

There  is  nothing  to  prevent  Congress  from  passing  laws 
which  shall  compel  a  man  who  is  accused  or  suspected  of  a 
crime,  to  furnish  evidence  against  himself,  and  even  from  estab- 
lishing laws  which  shall  order  the  court  to  take  the  charge 
exhibited  against  a  man  for  truth,  unless  he  can  furnish  evi- 
dence of  his  innocence. 

I  do  not  pretend  to  say  Congress  will  do  this,  but,  Sir,  I 
undertake  to  say  that  Congress  (according  to  the  powers  pro- 
posed to  be  given  them  by  the  Constitution)  may  do  it ;  and  if 
they  do  not,  it  will  be  owing  entirely — I  repeat  it,  it  will  be 
owing  entirely  to  the  goodness  of  the  men,  and  not  in  the  least 
degree  owing  to  the  goodness  of  the  Constitution. 

The  framers  of  our  State  Constitution  took  particular  care  to 
prevent  the  general  court  from  authorizing  the  judicial  author- 
ity to  issue  a  warrant  against  a  man  for  a  crime,  unless  his 
being  guilty  of  the  crime  was  supported  by  oath  or  affirmation, 
prior  to  the  warrant  being  granted  ;  why  it  should  be  esteemed 
so  much  more  safe  to  intrust  Congress  with  the  power  of  enact- 
ing laws,  which  it  was  deemed  so  unsafe  to  intrust  our  State 
legislature  with,  I  am  unable  to  conceive. 

Mr.  Gore  observed,  in  reply  to  Mr.  Holmes,  that  it  had  been 
the  uniform  conduct  of  those  in  opposition  to  the  proposed  form 
of  government,  to  determine,  in  every  case  where  it  was  possi- 
ble that  the  administrators  thereof  could  do  wrong,  that  they 
would  do  so,  although  it  were  demonstrable  that  such  wrong 
would  be  against  their  own  honor  and  interest,  and  productive 
of  no  advantage  to  themselves.  On  this  principle  alone  have 
they  determined  that  the  trial  by  jury  would  be  taken  away  in 
civil  cases,  when  it  had  been  clearly  shown  that  no  words  could 
be  adopted,  apt  to  the  situation  and  customs  of  each  State  in 
this  particular.      Jurors   are   differently   chosen  in  different 


214  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

States,  and  in  point  of  qualification  the  laws  of  the  several 
States  are  very  diverse  ;  not  less  so,  in  the  causes  and  disputes 
which  are  entitled  to  trial  by  jury.  What  is  the  result  of  this  ? 
That  the  laws  of  Congress  may  and  will  be  conformable  to  the 
local  laws  in  this  particular,  although  the  Constitution  could 
not  make  an  universal  rule  equally  applying  to  the  customs  and 
statutes  of  the  different  States.  Very  few  governments  (cer- 
tainly not  this)  can  be  interested  in  depriving  the  people  of 
trial  by  jury  in  questions  of  meum  et  tuum.  In  criminal  cases 
alone  are  they  interested  to  have  trial  under  their  own  control ; 
and  in  such  cases  the  Constitution  expressly  stipulates  for  trial 
by  jury.  But  then,  says  the  gentleman  from  Rochester,  (Mr. 
Holmes,)  to  the  safety  of  life  it  is  indispensably  necessary  the 
trial  of  crimes  should  be  in  the  vicinity — and  the  vicinity  is 
construed  to  mean  county.  This  is  very  incorrect,  and  gentle- 
men will  see  the  impropriety,  by  referring  themselves  to  the 
different  local  divisions  and  districts  of  the  several  States.  But 
further,  said  the  gentleman,  the  idea  that  the  jury,  coming  from 
the  neighborhood,  and  knowing  the  character  and  circumstances 
of  the  party  in  trial,  is  promotive  of  justice,  on  reflection  will 
appear  not  founded  in  truth.  If  the  jury  judge  from  any  other 
circumstances  but  what  are  part  of  the  cause  in  question,  they 
are  not  impartial.  The  great  object  is,  to  determine  on  the 
real  merits  of  the  cause,  uninfluenced  by  any  personal  consider- 
ations. If,  therefore,  the  jury  could  be  perfectly  ignorant  of 
the  person  in  trial,  a  just  decision  would  be  more  probable. 
From  such  motives  did  the  wise  Athenians  so  constitute  the 
famed  Areopagus,  that  when  in  judgment,  this  court  should  sit 
at  midnight,  and  in  total  darkness,  that  the  decision  might  be 
on  the  thing,  and  not  on  the  person.  Further,  said  the  gentle- 
man, it  has  been  said,  because  the  Constitution  does  not 
expressly  provide  for  an  indictment  by  grand  jury  in  criminal 
cases,  therefore  some  officer  under  this  government  will  be 
authorized  to  file  informations  and  bring  any  man  to  jeopardy 
of  his  life,  and  indictment  by  grand  jury  will  be  disused.  If 
gentlemen  who  pretend  such  fears,  will  look  into  the  Constitu- 
tion of  Massachusetts,  they  will  see  that  no  provision  is  therein 
made  for  an  indictment  by  grand  jury,  or  to  oppose  the  danger 
of  an  attorney- general  filing  informations  ;  yet  no  difficulty  or 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  215 

danger  has  arisen  to  the  people  of  this  Commonwealth  from 
this  defect,  if  gentlemen  please  to  call  it  so.  If  gentlemen 
would  be  candid,  and  not  consider  that  wherever  Congress  may 
possibly  abuse  power,  that  they  certainly  will,  there  would  be 
no  difficulty  in  the  minds  of  any  in  adopting  the  proposed 
Constitution. 

Mr.  Dawes  said,  he  did  not  see  that  the  right  of  trial  by  jury 
was  taken  away  by  the  article.  The  word  court  does  not,  either 
by  a  popular  or  technical  construction,  exclude  the  use  of  a 
jury  to  try  facts.  When  people  in  common  language  talk  of  a 
trial  at  the  court  of  common  pleas,  or  the  supreme  judicial 
court,  do  they  not  include  all  the  branches  and  members  of 
such  court,  the  jurors,  as  well  as  the  judges  ?  They  certainly 
do,  whether  they  mention  the  jurors  expressly  or  not.  Our 
State  legislature  have  construed  the  word  court  in  the  same 
way  ;  for  they  have  given  appeals  from  a  justice  of  peace  to  the 
court  of  common  pleas,  and  from  thence  to  the  supreme  court, 
without  saying  any  thing  of  the  jury.  But  in  cases  which, 
almost  time  out  of  mind,  have  been  tried  without  jury,  there 
the  jurisdiction  is  given  expressly  to  the  justices  of  a  particular 
court,  as  may  be  instanced  by  suits  upon  the  absconding  act,  so 
called. 

Gentlemen  have  compared  the  article  under  consideration  to 
that  power  which  the  British  claimed,  and  which  we  resisted  at 
the  Revolution,  namely,  the  power  of  trying  the  Americans 
without  a  jury.  But  surely  there  is  no  parallel  in  the  cases ; 
it  was  criminal  cases  in  which  they  attempted  to  make  this 
abuse  of  power.  Mr.  Dawes  mentioned  one  example  of  this, 
which,  though  young,  he  well  remembered,  and  that  was  the 
case  of  Nickerson,  the  pirate,  who  was  tried  without  a  jury, 
and  whose  judges  were  the  governors  of  Massachusetts,  and  of 
some  neighboring  provinces,  together  with  Admiral  Montague, 
and  some  gentlemen  of  distinction.  Although  this  trial  was 
without  a  jury,  yet,  as  it  was  a  trial  upon  the  civil  law,  there 
was  not  so  much  clamor  about  it,  as  otherwise  there  might 
have  been  ;  but  still  it  was  disagreeable  to  the  people,  and  was 
one  ground  of  the  then  complaints.  But  the  trial  by  jury  was 
not  attempted  to  be  taken  from  civil  causes.  It  was  no  object 
of  power,  whether  one  subject's  property  was  lessened,  while 


216  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

another's  was  increased  ;  nor  can  it  now  be  an  object  with  the 
Federal  legislature.  What  interest  can  they  have  in  constitut- 
ing a  judiciary,  to  proceed  in  civil  causes  without  a  trial  by 
jury  ?  In  criminal  causes  by  the  proposed  government,  there 
must  be  a  jury.  It  is  asked,  why  is  not  the  Constitution  as 
explicit  in  securing  the  right  of  jury  in  civil,  as  in  criminal 
cases  ?  The  answer  is :  Because  it  was  out  of  the  power  of  the 
Convention.  The  several  States  differ  so  widely  in  their  modes 
of  trial,  some  States  using  a  jury  in  causes  wherein  other  States 
employ  only  their  judges,  that  the  Convention  have  very  wisely 
left  it  to  the  Federal  legislature  to  make  such  regulations  as 
shall,  as  far  as  possible,  accommodate  the  whole.  Thus  our 
own  State  Constitution  authorizes  the  general  court  to  erect 
judicatories,  but  leaves  the  nature,  number  and  extent  of  them 
wholly  to  the  discretion  of  the  legislature.  The  bill  of  rights 
indeed  secures  the  trial  by  jury  in  civil  causes,  except  in  cases 
where  a  contrary  practice  has  obtained.  Such  a  clause  as  this 
some  gentlemen  wish  were  inserted  in  the  proposed  Consti- 
tution ;  but  such  a  clause  would  be  absurd  in  that  Constitution, 
as  has  been  clearly  stated  by  the  honorable  gentleman  from 
Charlestown,  (Mr.  Gorham,)  because  the  "  exception  of  all 
cases  where  a  jury  have  not  heretofore  been  used,',  would 
include  almost  all  cases  that  could  be  mentioned,  when  applied 
to  all  the  States,  for  they  have  severally  differed  in  the  kinds  of 
causes  where  they  have  tried  without  jury. 

Gen.  Heath.  Mr.  President:  By  my  indisposition,  and 
absence,  I  have  lost  several  important  opportunities.  I  have 
lost  the  opportunity  of  expressing  my  sentiments,  with  a  candid 
freedom,  on  some  of  the  paragraphs  of  the  system,  which  have 
lain  heavy  on  my  mind.  I  have  lost  the  opportunity  of  express- 
ing my  warm  approbation  on  some  of  the  paragraphs.  I  have 
lost  the  opportunity  of  asking  some  questions  for  my  own  infor- 
mation, touching  some  of  the  paragraphs,  and  which  naturally 
occurred,  as  the  system  unfolded.  I  have  lost  the  opportunity 
of  hearing  those  judicious,  enlightening  and  convincing  argu- 
ments, which  have  been  advanced  during  the  investigation  of 
the  system.  This  is  my  misfortune,  and  I  must  bear  it.  The 
paragraph  respecting  the  migration  or  importation  of  such 
persons  as  any  of  the  States  now  existing  shall  think  proper  to 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  217 

admit,  &c,  is  one  of  those  considered  during  my  absence,  and 
I  have  heard  nothing  on  the  subject,  save  what  has  been  men- 
tioned this  morning ;  but  I  think  the  gentlemen  who  have 
spoken,  have  carried  the  matter  rather  too  far  on  both  sides.  I 
apprehend  that  it  is  not  in  our  power  to  do  any  thing  for  or 
against  those  who  are  in  slavery  in  the  southern  States.  No 
gentleman  within  these  walls  detests  every  idea  of  slavery  more 
than  I  do  ;  it  is  generally  detested  by  the  people  of  this  Common- 
wealth ;  and  I  ardently  hope  that  the  time  will  soon  come,  when 
our  brethren  in  the  southern  States  will  view  it  as  we  do,  and  put 
a  stop  to  it ;  but  to  this  we  have  no  right  to  compel  them.  Two 
questions  naturally  arise,  if  we  ratify  the  Constitution :  Shall 
we  do  any  thing  by  our  act  to  hold  the  blacks  in  slavery  ?  or 
shall  we  become  partakers  of  other  men's  sins  ?  I  think  neither 
of  them.  Each  State  is  sovereign  and  independent  to  a  certain 
degree,  and  they  have  a  right,  and  will  regulate  their  own 
internal  affairs,  as  to  themselves  appears  proper  ;  and  shall  we 
refuse  to  eat,  or  to  drink,  or  to  be  united,  with  those  who  do 
not  think  or  act  just  as  we  do  ?  Surely  not.  We  are  not  in 
this  case  partakers  of  other  men's  sins,  for  in  nothing  do  we 
voluntarily  encourage  the  slavery  of  our  fellow  men.  A  restric- 
tion is  laid  on  the  Federal  government,  which  could  not  be 
avoided,  and  a  union  take  place.  The  Federal  Convention  went 
as  far  as  they  could.  The  migration  or  importation,  &c,  is 
confined  to  the  States  now  existing  only ;  new  States  cannot 
claim  it.  Congress,  by  their  ordinance  for  erecting  new  States, 
some  time  since  declared  that  the  new  States  shall  be  republi- 
can, and  that  there  shall  be  no  slavery  in  them.  But  whether 
those  in  slavery  in  the  southern  States  will  be  emancipated  after 
the  year  1808, 1  do  not  pretend  to  determine.     I  rather  doubt  it. 

After  the  fifth  article  was  read  at  the  table, 

The  Hon.  Mr.  King  observed,  that  he  believed  gentlemen  had 
not,  in  their  objections  to  the  Constitution,  recollected  that  this 
article  was  a  part  of  it,  for  many  of  the  arguments  of  gentle- 
men were  founded  on  the  idea  of  future  amendments  being 
impracticable.  The  honorable  gentleman  observed  on  the 
superior  excellence  of  the  proposed  Constitution,  in  this  partic- 
ular, and  called  upon  gentlemen  to  produce  an  instance  in  any 
other  national  Constitution,  where  the  people  had  so  fair  an 

28 


218  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

opportunity  to  correct  any  abuse  which  might  take  place  in  the 
future  administration  of  the  government  under  it. 

Dr.  Jarvis.  Mr.  President :  I  cannot  suffer  the  present 
article  to  be  passed,  without  rising  to  express  my  entire  and 
and  perfect  approbation  of  it.  Whatever  may  have  been  my 
private  opinion  of  any  other  part,  or  whatever  faults  or  imper- 
fections I  have  remarked,  or  fancied  I  have  seen,  in  any  other 
instance,  here,  Sir,  I  have  found  complete  satisfaction.  This 
has  been  a  resting-place,  on  which  I  have  reposed  myself  in  the 
fullest  security,  whenever  a  doubt  has  occurred,  in  considering 
any  other  passage  in  the  proposed  Constitution.  The  honorable 
gentleman  last  speaking,  has  called  upon  those  persons  who  are 
opposed  to  our  receiving  the  present  system,  to  show  another 
government  in  which  such  a  wise  precaution  has  been  taken  to 
secure  to  the  people  the  right  of  making  such  alterations  and 
amendments,  in  a  peaceable  way,  as  experience  shall  have 
proved  to  be  necessary.  Allow  me  to  say,  Sir,  as  far  as  the 
narrow  limits  of  my  own  information  extend,  I  know  of  no  such 
example.  In  other  countries,  Sir,  unhappily  for  mankind,  the 
history  of  their  respective  revolutions  has  been  written  in  blo«d ; 
and  it  is  in  this  only  that  any  great  or  important  change  in  our 
political  situation  has  been  effected,  without  public  commotions. 
When  we  shall  have  adopted  the  Constitution  before  us,  we  shall 
have  in  this  article  an  adequate  provision  for  all  the  purposes 
of  political  reformation.  If,  in  the  course  of  its  operation,  this 
government  shall  appear  to  be  too  severe,  here  are  the  means 
by  which  this  severity  may  be  attempered  and  corrected ;  if,  on 
the  other  hand,  it  shall  become  too  languid  in  its  movements, 
here,  again,  we  have  a  method  designated,  by  which  a  new  por- 
tion of  health  and  spirit  may  be  infused  in  the  Constitution. 

There  is,  Sir,  another  view  which  I  have  long  since  taken  of 
this  subject,  which  has  produced  the  fullest  conviction  in  my 
own  mind,  in  favor  of  our  receiving  the  government  which  we 
have  now  in  contemplation.  Should  it  be  rejected,  I  beg  gen- 
tlemen would  observe,  that  a  concurrence  of  all  the  States  must 
be  had  before  a  new  Convention  can  be  called  to  form  another 
Constitution,  but  the  present  article  provides,  upon  nine  States 
concurring  in  any  alteration  or  amendment  to  be  proposed, 
either  by  Congress  or  any  future  Convention,  that  this  alteration 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  219 

shall  be  a  part  of  the  Constitution,  equally  powerful  and  obli- 
gatory with  any  other  part.  If  it  be  alleged  that  this  union  is 
not  likely  to  happen,  will  it  be  more  likely  that  an  union  of  a 
greater  number  of  concurring  sentiments  may  be  had,  as  must 
be,  in  case  we  reject  the  Constitution  in  hopes  of  a  better  ? 
But  that  this  is  practicable,  we  may  safely  appeal  to  the  history 
of  this  country  as  a  proof,  in  the  last  twenty  years.  We  have 
united  against  the  British — we  have  united  in  calling  the  late 
Federal  Convention — and  we  may  certainly  unite  again  in  such 
alterations  as  in  reason  shall  appear  to  be  important  for  the 
peace  and  happiness  of  America. 

In  the  Constitution  of  this  State,  the  article  providing  for 
alterations  is  limited,  in  its  operation  to  a  given  time  ;  but  in 
the  present  Constitution,  the  article  is  perfectly  at  large, 
unconfined  to  any  period,  and  may  admit  of  measures  being 
taken,  in  any  moment  after  it  is  adopted.  In  this  point  it  has 
undoubtedly  the  advantage.  I  shall  not  sit  down,  Sir,  with- 
out repeating  that  it  is  clearly  more  difficult  for  twelve  States 
to  agree  to  another  Convention,  than  for  nine  to  unite  in  favor 
of  amendments,  so  it  is  certainly  better  to  receive  the  present 
Constitution,  in  the  hope  of  its  being  amended,  than  it  would 
be  to  reject  it  altogether,  with  perhaps,  the  vain  expectation  of 
obtaining  another  more  agreeable  than  the  present.  I  see  no 
fallacy  in  the  argument,  Mr.  President ;  but  if  there  is,  permit 
me  to  call  upon  any  gentleman  to  point  it  out,  in  order  that  it 
may  be  corrected ;  for  at  present  it  seems  to  me  of  such  force 
as  to  give  me  entire  satisfaction. 


Thursday,  January  31,  1788. 

In  the  conversation  on  Thursday,  on  the  sixth  article, 
which  provides  that  "  no  religious  test  shall  ever  be  required, 
as  a  qualification  to  any  office,"  &c,  several  gentlemen  urged 
that  it  was  a  departure  from  the  principles  of  our  forefathers, 
who  came  here  for  the  preservation  of  their  religion  ;  and  that 
it  would  admit  deists,  atheists,  <fec.  into  the  general  govern- 
ment ;     and  people  being  apt  to  imitate  the  examples  of  the 


220  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

court,  these  principles  will  be  disseminated,  and  of  course 
a  corruption  of  morals  ensue.  Gentlemen  on  the  other  side 
applauded  the  liberality  of  the  clause;  and  represented,  in 
striking  colors,  the  impropriety  and  almost  impiety  of  the 
requisition  of  a  test,  as  practised  in  Great  Britain  and  else- 
where. In  this  conversation,  the  following  is  the  substance  of 
the  observations  of  the 

Rev.  Mr.  Shute.  Mr.  President :  To  object  to  the  latter 
part  of  the  paragraph  under  consideration,  which  excludes  a 
religious  test,  is,  I  am  sensible,  very  popular  ;  for  the  most  of 
men,  somehow,  are  rigidly  tenacious  of  their  own  sentiments 
in  religion,  and  disposed  to  impose  them  upon  others  as  the 
standard  of  truth.  If,  in  my  sentiments  upon  the  point  in  view, 
I  should  differ  from  some  in  this  honorable  body,  I  only  wish  from 
them  the  exercise  of  that  candor  with  which  true  religion  is 
adapted  to  inspire  the  honest  and  well-disposed  mind. 

To  establish  a  religious  test  as  a  qualification  for  offices  in 
the  proposed  Federal  Constitution,  appears  to  me,  Sir,  would  be 
attended  with  injurious  consequences  to  some  individuals,  and 
with  no  advantage  to  the  whole. 

.  By  the  injurious  consequences  to  individuals,  I  mean,  that 
some,  who  in  every  other  respect  are  qualified  to  fill  some 
important  post  in  government,  will  be  excluded  by  their  not 
being  able  to  stand  the  religious  test ;  which  I  take  to  be  a 
privation  of  part  of  their  civil  rights. 

Nor  is  there  to  me  any  conceivable  advantage,  Sir,  that 
would  result  to  the  whole*  from  such  a  test.  Unprincipled  and 
dishonest  men  will  not  hesitate  to  subscribe  to  any  thing  that 
may  open  the  way  for  their  advancement,  and  put  them  into  a 
situation  the  better  to  execute  their  base  and  iniquitous 
designs.  Honest  men  alone,  therefore,  howevfer  well  qualified 
to  serve  the  public,  would  be  excluded  by  it,  and  their  country 
be  deprived  of  the  benefit  of  their  abilities. 

In  this  great  and  extensive  empire,  there  is,  and  will  be,  a 
great  variety  of  sentiments  in  religion  among  its  inhabitants. 
Upon  the  plan  of  a  religious  test,  the  question  I  think,  must  be, 
who  shall  be  excluded  from  national  trusts  ?  Whatever  an- 
swer bigotry  may  suggest,  the  dictates  of  candor  and  equity,  I 
conceive,  will  be,  None. 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  221 

Far  from  limiting  my  charity  and  confidence  to  men  of  my 
own  denomination  in  religion,  I  suppose,  and  I  believe,  Sir, 
that  there  are  worthy  characters  among  men  of  every  denomi- 
nation— among  the  Quakers,  the  Baptists,  the  Church  of  Eng- 
land, the  Papists,  and  even  among  those  who  have  no  other 
guide  in  the  way  to  virtue  and  heaven,  than  the  dictates  of 
natural  religion. 

I  must  therefore  think,  Sir,  that  the  proposed  plan  of  govern- 
ment, in  this  particular,  is  wisely  constructed :  that  as  all  have 
an  equal  claim  to  the  blessings  of  the  government  under  which 
they  live,  and  which  they  support,  so  none  should  be  excluded 
from  them  for  being  of  any  particular  denomination  in  reli- 
gion. 

The  presumption  is,  that  the  eyes  of  the  people  will  be  upon 
the  faithful  in  the  land,  and,  from  a  regard  to  their  own  safety, 
they  will  choose  for  their  rulers  men  of  known  abilities — of 
known  probity — of  good  moral  characters.  The  apostle  Peter 
tells  us,  that  God  is  no  respecter  of  persons,  but  in  every  nation 
he  that  feareth  him  and  worketh  righteousness,  is  acceptable  to 
him.  And  I  know  of  no  reason,  why  men  of  such  a  character, 
in  a  community,  of  whatever  denomination  in  religion,  cceteris 
paribus,  with  other  suitable  qualifications,  should  not  be  accept- 
able to  the  people,  and  why  they  may  not  be  employed  by  them 
with  safety  and  advantage  in  the  important  offices  of  govern- 
ment. The  exclusion  of  a  religious  test  in  the  proposed  Con- 
stitution, therefore,  clearly  appears  to  me,  Sir,  to  be  in  favor  of 
its  adoption. 

Col.  Jones  (of  Bristol)  thought,  that  the  rulers  ought  to 
believe  in  God  or  Christ ;  and  that,  however  a  test  may  be 
prostituted  in  England,  yet  he  thought  if  our  public  men  were 
to  be  of  those  who  had  a  good  standing  in  the  church,  it  would 
be  happy  for  the  United  States ;  and  that  a  person  could  not 
be  a  good  man  without  being  a  good  Christian. 

The  conversation  on  the  Constitution  by  paragraphs  being 
ended, 

Mr.  Parsons  moved,  that  this  Convention  do  assent  to  and 
ratify  this  Constitution. 

Mr.  Neal  rose  and  said,  that  as  the  Constitution  at  large  was 
now  under  consideration,  he  would  just  remark,  that  the  article 


222  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

which  respected  the  Africans  was  the  one  which  lay  on  his 
mind ;  and  unless  his  objections  to  that  were  removed,  it  must, 
how  much  soever  he  liked  the  other  parts  of  the  Constitution, 
be  a  sufficient  reason  for  him  to  give  his  negative  to  it. 

Col.  Jones  said,  that  one  of  his  principal  objections  was,  the 
omission  of  a  religious  test. 

Rev.  Mr.  Payson.  Mr.  President:  After  what  has  been 
observed  relative  to  a  religious  test  by  gentlemen  of  acknowl- 
edged abilities,  I  did  not  expect  it  would  again  be  mentioned, 
as  an  objection  to  the  proposed  Constitution,  that  such  a  test 
was  not  required  as  a  qualification  for  office.  Such  were  the 
abilities  and  integrity  of  the  gentlemen  who  constructed  the 
Constitution,  as  not  to  admit  of  the  presumption  that  they 
would  have  betrayed  so  much  vanity  as  to  attempt  to  erect  bul- 
warks and  barriers  to  the  throne  of  God.  Relying  on  the 
candor  of  this  Convention,  I  shall  take  the  liberty  to  express 
my  sentiments  on  the  nature  of  a  religious  test,  and  shall 
endeavor  to  do  it  in  such  propositions  as  will  meet  the  approba- 
tion of  every  mind. 

The  great  object  of  religion  being  God  supreme,  and  the  seat 
of  religion  in  man  being  the  heart  or  conscience,  i.e.  the  reason 
God  has  given  us,  employed  on  our  moral  actions,  in  their  most 
important  consequences,  as  related  to  the  tribunal  of  God,  hence 
I  infer,  that  God  alone  is  the  God  of  the  conscience,  and  conse- 
quently, attempts  to  erect  human  tribunals  for  the  consciences 
of  men,  are  impious  encroachments  upon  the  prerogatives  of 
God.  Upon  these  principles,  had  there  been  a  religious  test,  as 
a  qualification  for  office,  it  would,  in  my  opinion,  have  been  a 
great  blemish  to  the  instrument. 

Gen.  Heath.  Mr.  President :  After  a  long  and  painful  inves- 
tigation of  the  Federal  Constitution,  by  paragraphs,  this  honor- 
able Convention  are  drawing  nigh  to  the  ultimate  question :  a 
question  as  momentous  as  ever  invited  the  attention  of  man. 
We  are  soon  to  decide  on  a  system  of  government,  digested,  not 
for  the  people  of  the  Commonwealth  of  Massachusetts  only ;  not 
for  the  present  people  of  the  United  States  only ;  but,  in  addi- 
tion to  these,  for  all  those  States  which  may  hereafter  rise  into 
existence  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  United  States,  and  for 
millions  of  people  yet  unborn :  a  system  of  government,  not  for 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  223 

a  nation  of  slaves,  but  for  a  people  as  free  and  as  virtuous  as 
any  on  earth  ;  not  for  a  conquered  nation,  subdued  to  our  will, 
but  for  a  people  who  have  fought,  who  have  bled,  and  who  have 
conquered ;  who,  under  the  smiles  of  heaven,  have  established 
their  independence  and  sovereignty,  and  have  taken  equal  rank 
among  the  nations  of  the  earth.  In  short,  Sir,  it  is  a  system  of 
government  for  ourselves,  and  for  our  children,  for  all  that  is 
near  and  dear  to  us  in  life ;  and  on  the  decision  of  the  question 
is  suspended  our  political  prosperity  or  infelicity,  perhaps  our 
existence  as  a  nation.  What  can  be  more  solemn  ?  What  can 
be  more  interesting  ?  Every  thing  depends  on  our  union.  I 
know  that  some  have  supposed  that  although  the  Union  should 
be  broken,  particular  States  may  retain  their  importance  ;  but 
this  cannot  be.  The  strongest  nerved  State,  even  the  right  arm, 
if  separated  from  the  body,  must  wither.  If  the  great  Union  be 
broken,  our  country,  as  a  nation,  perishes ;  and  if  our  country 
so  perishes,  it  will  be  as  impossible  to  save  a  particular  State, 
as  to  preserve  one  of  the  fingers  of  a  mortified  hand. 

By  one  of  the  paragraphs  of  the  system,  it  is  declared  that 
the  ratification  of  the  Conventions  of  nine  States  shall  be  suffi- 
cient for  the  establishment  of  the  Constitution  between  the 
States  so  ratifying  the  same  ;  but,  Sir,  how  happy  will  it  be,  if 
not  only  nine,  but  even  all  the  States  should  ratify  it !  It  will 
be  a  happy  circumstance,  if  only  a  small  majority  of  this  Con- 
vention should  ratify  the  Federal  system  ;  but  how  much  more 
happy  if  we  could  be  unanimous  !  It  will  be  a  happy  circum- 
stance if  a  majority  of  the  people  of  this  Commonwealth  should 
be  in  favor  of  the  Federal  system  ;  but  how  much  more  so,  if  they 
should  be  unanimous  !  and  if  there  are  any  means  whereby  they 
may  be  united,  every  exertion  should  be  made  to  effect  it.  I 
presume,  Sir,  that  there  is  not  a  single  gentleman  within  these 
walls,  who  does  not  wish  for  a  Federal  government — for  an 
efficient  Federal  government ;  and  that  this  government  should 
be  possessed  of  every  power  necessary  to  enable  it  to  shed  on 
the  people  the  benign  influences  of  a  good  government.  But 
I  have  observed  from  the  first,  that  many  gentlemen  appear 
opposed  to  the  system,  and  this  I  apprehend  arises  from  their 
objections  to  some  particular  parts  of  it.  Is  there  not  a  way  in 
which  their  minds  may  be  relieved  from  embarrassment  ?     I 


224  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

think  there  is  ;  and  if  there  is,  no  exertions  should  be  spared 
in  endeavoring  to  do  it. 

If  we  should  ratify  the  Constitution,  and  instruct  our  first 
members  to  Congress  to  exert  their  utmost  endeavors  to  have 
such  checks  and  guards  provided  as  appears  to  be  necessary  in 
some  of  the  paragraphs  of  the  Constitution,  and  communicate 
what  we  may  judge  proper  to  our  sister  States,  and  request 
their  concurrence,  is  there  not  the  highest  probability  that 
every  thing  which  we  wish  may  be  effectually  secured  ?  I  think 
there  is ;  and  I  cannot  but  natter  myself  that  in  this  way,  the 
gentlemen  of  the  Convention  will  have  the  difficulties  under 
which  they  now  labor,  removed  from  their  minds ;  we  shall  be 
united.  The  people  of  this  Commonwealth;  and  of  our  sister 
States,  may  be  united.  Permit  me,  therefore,  most  earnestly 
to  recommend  it  to  the  serious  consideration  of  every  gentle- 
man in  the  honorable  Convention. 

After  Gen.  Heath  sat  down,  his  Excellency  the  President 
rose  and  observed,  that  he  was  conscious  of  the  impropriety, 
situated  as  he  was,  of  his  entering  into  the  deliberations  of  the 
Convention  ;  that,  unfortunately,  through  painful  indisposition 
of  body,  he  had  been  prevented  from  giving  his  attendance  in 
his  place  ;  but,  from  the  information  he  had  received,  and  from 
the  papers,  there  appeared  to  him  to  be  a  great  dissimilarity  of 
sentiments  in  the  Convention.  To  remove  the  objections  of 
some  gentlemen,  he  felt  himself  induced,  he  said,  to  hazard  a 
proposition  for  their  consideration  ;  which,  with  the  permission 
of  the  Convention,  he  would  offer  in  the  afternoon. 


AFTERNOON. 

When  the  Convention  met  in  the  afternoon, 

His  Excellency  the  President  observed,  that  a  motion  had 
been  made  and  seconded,  that  this  Convention  do  assent  to,  and 
ratify,  the  Constitution  which  had  been  under  consideration  ; 
and  that  he  had  in  the  former  part  of  the  day  intimated  his 
intention  of  submitting  a  proposition  to  the  consideration  of 
the  Convention.  My  motive,  says  he,  arises  from  my  earnest 
desire  to  this  Convention,  my  fellow-citizens,  and  the  public  at 
large,  that  this  Convention  may  adopt  such  a  form  of  govern- 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  225 

ment  as  may  extend  its  good  influences  to  every  part  of  the 
United  States,  and  advance  the  prosperity  of  the  whole  world. 
His  situation,  his  Excellency  said,  had  not  permitted  him  to 
enter  into  the  debates  of  this  Convention :  it  however  appeared 
to  him  necessary,  from  what  had  been  advanced  in  them,  to 
adopt  the  form  of  government  proposed  ;  but,  observing  a 
diversity  of  sentiment  in  the  gentlemen  of  the  Convention,  he 
had  frequently  had  conversation  with  them  on  the  subject ;  and 
from  this  conversation,  he  was  induced  to  propose  to  them, 
whether  the  introduction  of  some  general  amendments  would 
not  be  attended  with  the  happiest  consequences.  For  that 
purpose  he  should,  with  the  leave  of  the  honorable  Convention, 
submit  to  their  consideration  a  proposition,  in  order  to  remove 
the  doubts,  and  quiet  the  apprehensions  of  gentlemen ;  and  if 
in  any  degree  the  object  should  be  acquired,  he  should  feel 
himself  perfectly  satisfied.  He  should,  therefore,  submit  them  ; 
for  he  was,  he  said,  unable  to  go  more  largely  into  the  subject, 
if  his  abilities  would  permit  him ;  relying  on  the  candor  of  the 
Convention  to  bear  him  witness  that  his  wishes  for  a  good 
Constitution  were  sincere.  [His  Excellency  then  read  his 
proposition.19]  This,  gentlemen,  concluded  his  Excellency,  is 
the  proposition  which  I  had  to  make  ;  and  I  submit  it  to  your 
consideration,  with  the  sincere  wish  that  it  may  have  a  tendency 
to  promote  a  spirit  of  union. 

[The  proposition  submitted  by  his  Excellency  was  committed 
to  a  large  committee,  who  reported  some  amendments.] 

Hon.  Mr.  Adams.  Mr.  President :  I  feel  myself  happy  in 
contemplating  the  idea  that  many  benefits  will  result  from 
your  Excellency's  conciliatory  proposition,  to  this  Common- 
wealth and  to  the  United  States  ;  and  I  think  it  ought  to  pre- 
cede the  motion  made  by  the  gentleman  from  New  bury  port, 
and  to  be  at  this  time  considered  by  the  Convention.  1  have 
said,  that  I  have  had  my  doubts  of  this  Constitution.  I  could 
not  digest  every  part  of  it,  as  readily  as  some  gentlemen  ;  but 
this,  Sir,  is  my  misfortune,  not  my  fault.  Other  gentlemen 
have  had  their  doubts,  but  in  my  opinion,  the  proposition  sub- 
mitted, will  have  a  tendency  to  remove  such  doubts  and  to 


19  [See  Journal,  page  79.] 
29 


226  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

conciliate  the  minds  of  the  Convention  and  the  people  without 
doors.  This  subject,  Sir,  is  of  the  greatest  magnitude,  and  has 
employed  the  attention  of  every  rational  man  in  the  United 
States ;  but  the  minds  of  the  people  are  not  so  well  agreed  on 
it  as  all  of  us  could  wish.  A  proposal  of  this  sort,  coming 
from  Massachusetts,  from  her  importance,  will  have  its  weight. 
Four  or  five  States  have  considered  and  ratified  the  Constitu- 
tion as  it  stands  ;  but  we  know  there  is  a  diversity  of  opinion, 
even  in  these  States,  and  one  of  them  is  greatly  agitated.  If 
this  Convention  should  particularize  the  amendments  neces- 
sary to  be  proposed,  it  appears  to  me  it  must  have  weight  in 
other  States  where  Conventions  have  not  yet  met.  I  have 
observed  the  sentiments  of  gentlemen  on  the  subject  as  far  as 
Virginia ;  and  I  have  found  that  the  objections  were  similar, 
in  the  newspapers,  and  in  some  of  the  Conventions.  Consider- 
ing these  circumstances,  it  appears  to  me  that  such  a  measure 
will  have  the  most  salutary  effect  throughout  the  Union.  It  is 
of  the  greatest  importance  that  America  should  still  be 
united  in  sentiment.  I  think  I  have  not  been  heretofore 
unmindful  of  the  advantage  of  such  an  Union.  It  is  essential 
that  the  people  should  be  united  in  the  Federal  government,  to 
withstand  the  common  enemy,  and  to  preserve  their  valuable 
rights  and  liberties.  We  find,  in  the  great  State  of  Pennsyl- 
vania, one-third  of  the  Convention  are  opposed  to  it ;  should 
there  then  be  large  minorities  in  the  several  States,  I  should 
fear  the  consequences  of  such  disunion. 

Sir,  there  are  many  parts  of  it  I  esteem  as  highly  valuable, 
particularly  the  article  which  empowers  Congress  to  regulate 
commerce,  to  form  treaties,  &c.  For  want  of  this  power  in  our 
national  head,  our  friends  are  grieved  and  our  enemies  insult 
us.  Our  ambassador  at  the  court  of  London  is  considered  as  a 
mere  cipher,  instead  of  the  representative  of  the  United  States. 
Therefore  it  appears  to  me,  that  a  power  to  remedy  this  evil 
should  be  given  to  Congress,  and  the  remedy  applied  as  soon 
as  possible. 

The  only  difficulty  on  gentlemen's  minds  is,  whether  it  is 
best  to  accept  this  Constitution  on  conditional  amendments, 
or  to  rely  on  amendments  in  future,  as  the  Constitution  pro- 
vides.    When  I  look  over  the   article  which  provides  for  a 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  227 

revision,  I  have  my  doubts.  Suppose,  Sir,  nine  States  accept 
the  Constitution  without  any  conditions  at  all ;  and  the  four 
States  should  wish  to  have  amendments,  where  will  you  find 
nine  States  to  propose,  and  the  legislatures  of  nine  States  to 
agree  to  the  introduction  of  amendments  ?  Therefore  it  seems 
to  me  that  the  expectation  of  amendments  taking  place  at 
some  future  time  will  be  frustrated.  This  method,  if  we  take 
it,  will  be  the  most  likely  to  bring  about  the  amendments,  as 
the  Conventions  of  New  Hampshire,  Rhode  Island,  New  York, 
Maryland,  Virginia  and  South  Carolina,  have  not  yet  met.  I 
apprehend,  Sir,  that  these  States  will  be  influenced  by  the 
proposition  which  your  Excellency  has  submitted,  as  the  reso- 
lutions of  Massachusetts  have  ever  had  their  influence.  If  this 
should  be  the  case,  the  necessary  amendments  would  be  intro- 
duced more  early,  and  more  safely.  From  these  considera- 
tions, as  your  Excellency  did  not  think  it  proper  to  make  a 
motion,  with  submission,  I  move  that  the  paper  read  by  your 
Excellency,  be  now  taken  under  consideration  by  the  Conven- 
tion. 

The  motion  being  seconded,  the  proposition  was  read  by  the 
Secretary,  at  the  table. 

Dr.  Taylor  liked  the  idea  of  amendments  ;  but,  he  said,  he 
did  not  see  any  constitutional  door  open  for  the  introduction  of 
them  by  the  Convention.  He  read  the  several  authorities  which 
provided  for  the  meeting  of  Conventions  ;  but  did  not  see  in  any 
of  them,  any  power  given  to  propose  amendments.  We  are,  he 
said,  therefore,  treading  on  unsafe  ground  to  propose  them.  We 
must  take  the  whole  or  reject  the  whole.  The  honorable  gen- 
tleman was  in  favor  of  the  adjournment ;  and  'in  a  speech  of 
some  length,  deprecated  the  consequences,  which,  he  said, 
must  arise  if  the  Constitution  was  adopted  or  rejected  by  a 
small  majority  ;  and  that  the  expenses  which  would  accrue 
from  the  adjournment  would  not  exceed  4d.  per  poll  through- 
out the  Commonwealth. 

Hon.  Mr.  Cabot  rose  and  observed  on  what  fell  from  the 
honorable  gentleman  last  speaking — that  the  reason  why  no 
provision  for  the  introduction  of  amendments  was  made  in  the 
authorities  quoted  by  the  honorable  gentleman,  was,  that  they 
were  provided  for  in  the  fifth  article  of  the  Constitution. 


\/ 


228  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

Friday,  February  1, 1788. 

Mr.  Bowdoin  (of  Dorchester)  observed  that  he  could  not 
but  express  his  hearty  approbation  of  the  propositions  made  by 
his  Excellency,  as  they  would  have  a  tendency  to  relieve  the 
fears  and  quiet  the  apprehensions  of  some  very  respectable  and 
worthy  gentlemen,  who  had  expressed  their  doubts  whether 
some  explanation  of  certain  clauses  in  the  Constitution,  and 
some  additional  restrictions  upon  Congress,  similar  to  those 
proposed  by  his  Excellency,  were  not  necessary.  But,  he  said, 
as  the  propositions  were  incorporated  with  the  great  question, 
whether  this  Convention  will  adopt  and  ratify  the  Constitu- 
tion ;  he  conceived  himself  in  order,  and  would,  with  the  per- 
mission of  the  Convention,  make  a  few  general  observations 
upon  the  subject,  which  were  as  follows : — 

It  was  an  answer  of  Solon's,  when  he  was  asked  what  kind  of 
a  Constitution  he  had  constructed  for  the  Athenians,  that  he 
had  prepared  as  good  a  Constitution  of  government  as  the 
people  would  bear ;  clearly  intimating  that  a  Constitution  of 
government  should  be  relative  to  the  habits,  manners  and 
genius  of  the  people  intended  to  be  governed  by  it.  As  the 
particular  State  governments  are  relative  to  the  manners  and 
genius  of  the  inhabitants  of  each  State,  so  ought  the  general  gov- 
ernment to  be  an  assemblage  of  the  principles  of  all  the  govern- 
ments ;  for  without  this  assemblage  of  the  principles,  the  general 
government  will  not  sufficiently  apply  to  the  genius  of  the  people 
confederated ;  and  therefore  by  its  meeting,  in  its  operation, 
with  a  continual  opposition,  through  this  circumstance  it  must 
necessarily  fail  in  its  execution :  because,  agreeably  to  the  idea 
of  Solon,  the  people  would  not  bear  it. 

It  may  not,  therefore,  be  improper  to  examine  whether  the 
Federal  Constitution  proposed,  has  a  likeness  to  the  different 
State  Constitutions,  and  such  alone  as  to  give  the  spirit  and 
features  of  the  particular  governments.  For  Baron  Montes- 
quieu observes,  that  all  governments  ought  to  be  relative  to 
their  particular  principles  ;  and  that  "  a  confederate  government 
ought  to  be  composed  of  States  of  the  same  nature,  especially  of 
the  republican  kind ;"  and  instances,  that  as  "  the  spirit  of 
monarchy  is  war,  enlargement  of  dominion ;    peace  and  mod- 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  229 

eration,  the  spirit  of  a  republic ;  these  two  kinds  of  govern- 
ments cannot  naturally  subsist  in  a  confederate  republic." 

From  hence  it  follows,  that  all  the  governments  of  the  States 
in  the  Union,  ought  to  be  of  the  same  nature — of  the  republi- 
can kind ;  and  that  the  general  government  ought  to  be  an 
assemblage  of  the  spirit  and  principles  of  them  all.  A  short 
comparison,  pointing  out  the  likeness  of  the  general,  to  the 
particular  constitutions,  may  sufficiently  elucidate  the  subject. 

All  the  constitutions  of  the  States  consist  of  three  branches, 
except  as  to  the  legislative  powers,  which  are  chiefly  vested  in 
two ;  the  powers  of  government  are  separated  in  all,  and 
mutually  check  each  other.  These  are  laid  down,  as  funda- 
mental principles,  in  the  Federal  Constitution.  All  power  is 
derived,  either  mediately  or  immediately,  from  the  people,  in 
all  the  constitutions ;  this  is  the  case  with  the  Federal  Consti- 
tution. The  electors  of  representatives  to  the  State  govern- 
ments are  electors  of  representatives  to  the  Federal  govern- 
ment. The  representatives  are  chosen  for  two  years ;  so  are 
the  representatives  to  the  assemblies  of  some  of  the  States. 
The  equality  of  representation  is  determined,  in  nearly  all  the 
States,  by  numbers  ;  so  it  is  in  the  Federal  Constitution. 

The  second  branch  of  the  legislature,  in  some  of  the  States, 
is  similar  to  the  Federal  Senate,  having  not  only  legislative, 
but  executive  powers  ;  being  a  legislating,  and  at  the  same 
time  an  advising  body  to  the  executive.  Such  are  the  assist- 
ants of  Rhode  Island  and  Connecticut,  and  the  councils  of 
New  Jersey  and  Georgia.  The  senators  of  Virginia  and  New 
York  are  chosen  for  four  years,  and  so  elected  that  a  continual 
rotation  is  established,  by  which  one-quarter  of  their  respective 
Senates  is  annually  elected ;  and  by  which  (as  one  of  the  Con- 
stitutions observes)  there  are  more  men  trained  to  public  busi- 
ness, and  there  will  always  be  found  a  number  of  persons 
acquainted  with  the  proceedings  of  the  foregoing  years,  and 
thereby  the  public  business  be  more  consistently  conducted. 
The  Federal  senators  are  to  be  chosen  for  six  years  ;  and  there 
is  a  rotation  so  established,  for  the,  reasons  above-mentioned, 
that  one-third  of  the  Senate  is  to  be  chosen  every  two  years. 

The  president  and  vice-president  answer  to  offices  of  the  same 
name  in  some  of  the  States,  and  to  the  office  of  governor  and 


230  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

lieutenant-governor  in  most  of  the  States.  As  this  office  is  of 
the  utmost  importance,  the  manner  of  choosing,  for  the  better 
security  of  the  interests  of  the  Union,  is  to  be  by  delegates,  to 
be  expressly  chosen  for  the  purpose,  in  such  manner,  as  the  dif- 
ferent legislatures  may  direct.  This  method  of  choosing  was 
probably  taken  from  the  manner  of  choosing  senators,  under 
the  Constitution  of  Maryland. 

The  legislative  powers  of  the  president  are  precisely  those  of* 
the  governors  of  this  State  and  of  New  York  ;  rather  negative 
than  positive  powers ;  given  with  a  view  to  secure  the  independ- 
ence of  the  executive,  and  to  preserve  a  uniformity  in  the  laws, 
which  are  committed  to  them  to  execute. 

The  executive  powers  of  the  president  are  very  similar  to 
those  of  the  several  States,  except  in  those  points  which  relate 
more  particularly  to  the  Union  ;  and  respect  ambassadors, 
public  ministers  and  consuls. 

If  the  genius  of  the  people  of  the  States,  as  expressed  by 
their  different  constitutions  of  government;  if  the  similarity  of 
each,  and  the  general  spirit  of  all  the  governments,  concur  to 
point  out  the  policy  of  a  confederate  government,  by  comparing 
the  Federal  Constitution  with  those  of  the  several  States,  can 
we  expect  one  more  applicable  to  the  people,  to  the  different 
States,  and  to  the  purposes  of  the  Union,  than  the  one  proposed, 
unless  it  should  be  contended  that  a  Union  was  unnecessary  ? 
"^  "  If  a  republic  is  small,"  says  Baron  Montesquieu,  "  it  is 
destroyed  by  a  foreign  force  ;  if  it  is  large,  it  is  ruined  by  an 
internal  imperfection. "  "  Fato  potentice  sua  vi  nixce."  And  if 
mankind  had  not  contrived  a  confederate  republic,  says  the  same 
author,  "  a  Constitution,  that  has  all  the  internal  advantages 
of  a  republican,  and  the  external  force  of  a  monarchical  gov- 
ernment,' '  they  would  probably  have  always  lived  under  the 
tyranny  of  a  single  person.  Admitting  this  principle  of  Baron 
yX  Montesquieu's,  the  several  States  are  either  too  small  to  be 
defended  against  a  foreign  enemy,  or  too  large  for  republican 
constitutions  of  government.  If  we  apply  the  first  position  to 
the  different  States,  which,  reason,  and  the  experience  of  the 
late  war,  point  out  to  be  true,  a  confederate  government  is 
necessary.  But  if  we  admit  the  latter  position,  then  the  several 
governments,  being  in  their  own  nature  imperfect,  will  be  neces- 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  231 

sarily  destroyed,  from  their  being  too  extensive  for  republican 
governments. 

From  whence  it  follows,  if  the  foregoing  principles  are  true, 
that  we  ought  to  adopt  a  Confederation,  presuming  the  different 
States  well  calculated  for  republican  governments  ;  for  if  they 
are  not,  their  corruption  will  work  their  destruction  separately  ; 
and  if  they  are  destined  for-  destruction,  from  their  natural 
imperfection,  it  will  certainly  be  more  advantageous  to  have 
them  destroyed  collectively  than  separately,  as  in  that  case  we 
should  fall  under  one  great  national  government. 

But  if  the  advantages  of  a  confederacy,  admitting  the  prin- 
ciples of  it  to  be  good,  are  duly  considered  ;  that  it  will  give 
security  and  permanency  to  the  several  States,  not  only  against 
foreign  invasion,  but  against  internal  disputes,  and  wars  with 
one  another ;  if  the  wars  in  Europe,  arising  from  jarring  and 
opposing  interests,  are  a  public  calamity ;  if  it  is  for  the  benefit 
of  ourselves,  and  future  generations,  to  prevent  its  horrid  devas- 
tations on  this  continent,  to  secure  the  States  against  such 
calamities,  it  will  be  necessary  to  establish  a  general  govern- 
ment, to  adjust  the  disputes,  and  to  settle  the  differences, 
between  State  and  State.  For,  without  a  confederacy,  the  sev- 
eral States,  being  distinct  sovereignties,  would  be  in  a  state  of 
nature,  with  respect  to  each  other,  and  the  law  of  nature,  which 
is  the  right  of  the  strongest,  would  determine  the  disputes  that 
might  arise.  To  prevent  the  operation  of  so  unjust  a  title  ;  to 
afford  protection  to  the  weakest  State  against  the  strongest ;  to 
secure  the  rights  of  all  against  the  encroachments  of  any  of  the 
States  ;  to  balance  the  power  of  all  the  States,  by  each  giving  up 
a  portion  of  its  sovereignty,  thereby  better  to  secure  the  remain- 
der of  it,  are  amongst  the  main  objects  of  a  confederacy. 

But  the  advantages  of  a  union  of  the  States  are  not  confined 
to  mere  safety  from  within  or  from  without.  They  extend  not 
only  to  the  welfare  of  each  State,  but  even  to  the  interest  of 
each  individual  of  the  States. 

The  manner  in  which  the  States  have  suffered  for  the  want 
of  a  general  regulation  of  trade,  is  so  notorious,  that  little  need 
be  said  upon  the  subject,  to  prove  that  the  continent  has  been 
exhausted  of  its  wealth,  for  the  want  of  it ;  and  if  the  evil  from 
the  not  regulating  it  is  not  speedily  remedied,  by  placing  the 


232  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

necessary  powers  in  the  hands  of  Congress,  the  liberties  of  the 
people,  or  the  independence  of  the  States,  will  be  irretrievably 
lost.  The  people,  feeling  the  inconvenience  of  systems  of  gov- 
ernment that  instead  of  relieving,  increase  their  perplexities  ; 
instead  of  regulating  trade  upon  proper  principles,  instead  of 
improving  the  natural  advantages  of  onr  own  country,  and 
opening  new  sources  of  wealth,  our  lands  have  sunk  in  their 
value,  our  trade  has  languished,  our  credit  has  been  daily 
reducing,  and  our  resources  are  almost  annihilated — can  we 
expect,  in  such  a  state,  that  the  people  will  long  continue  their 
allegiance  to  systems  of  government,  whether  arising  from  the 
weakness  of  their  administration,  or  the  insufficiency  of  their 
principles,  which  entail  on  them  so  many  calamities  ?  I  pre- 
sume not.  The.  well-being  of  trade  depends  on  a  proper  regu- 
lation of  it ;  on  the  success  of  trade,  depends  wealth ;  on  wealth, 
the  value  of  lands ;  the  strength,  the  welfare  and  happiness  of 
a  country,  upon  the  numbers,  the  ease  and  independence  of  its 
yeomanry.  For  the  want  of  this  have  our  taxes  most  oppres- 
sively fallen  upon  the  most  useful  of  all  our  citizens,  our  hus- 
bandmen ;  while  trade,  for  the  want  of  its  being  confined  to 
proper  objects,  has  served  rather  to  ruin  than  to  enrich  those 
that  have  carried  it  on. 

Shall  we,  then,  let  causeless  jealousies  arise,  and  distract  our 
councils  ?  Shall  we  let  partial  views  and  local  prejudices  influ- 
ence our  decisions  ?  Or  shall  we,  with  a  becoming  wisdom, 
determine  to  adopt  the  Federal  Constitution  proposed,  and 
thereby  confirm  the  liberty,  the  safety  and  the  welfare  of  our 
country  ? 

I  might  go  on,  Sir,  and  point  out  the  fatal  consequences  of 
rejecting  the  Constitution ;  but,  as  I  have  already  intruded  too 
much  upon  the  time  and  patience  of  the  Convention,  I  shall, 
for  the  present,  forbear  any  further  observations,  requesting  the 
candor  of  the  Convention  for  those  I  have  already  made. 

Hon.  Mr.  Adams.  As  your  Excellency  was  pleased  yesterday 
to  offer,  for  the  consideration  of  this  Convention,  certain  propo- 
sitions intended  to  accompany  the  ratification  of  the  Constitu- 
tion before  us,  I  did  myself  the  honor  to  bring  them  forward 
by  a  regular  motion,  not  only  from  the  respect  due  to  your 
Excellency,  but  from  a  clear  conviction  in  my  own  mind  that 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  233 

they  would  tend  to  effect  the  salutary  and  important  purposes 
which  you  had  in  view,  "  the  removing  the  fears  and  quieting 
the  apprehensions  of  many  of  the  good  people  of  this  Common- 
wealth, and  the  more  effectually  guarding  against  an  undue 
administration  of  the  Federal  government. " 

I  beg  leave,  Sir,  more  particularly  to  consider  those  proposi- 
tions, and  in  a  very  few  words  to  express  my  own  opinion  that 
they  must  have  a  strong  tendency  to  ease  the  minds  of  gentle- 
men who  wish  for  the  immediate  operation  of  some  essential 
parts  of  the  proposed  Constitution,  as  well  as  the  most  speedy 
and  effectual  means  of  obtaining  alterations  in  some  other  parts 
of  it,  which  they  are  solicitous  should  be  made.  I  will  not 
repeat  the  reasons  I  offered  when  the  motion  was  made,  which 
convinced  me  that  the  measure  now  under  consideration  will 
have  a  more  speedy,  as  well  as  a  more  certain  influence  in  effect- 
ing the  purpose  last  mentioned,  than  the  measure  proposed  in 
the  Constitution  before  us. 

Your  Excellency's  first  proposition  is,  "  that  it  be  explicitly 
declared,  that  all  powers  not  expressly  delegated  to  Congress, 
are  reserved  to  the  several  States,  to  be  by  them  exercised. " 
This  appears  to  my  mind  to  be  a  summary  of  a  bill  of  rights, 
which  gentlemen  are  anxious  to  obtain  ;  it  removes  a  doubt 
which  many  have  entertained  respecting  this  matter,  and  gives 
assurance  that  if  any  law  made  by  the  Federal  government 
shall  be  extended  beyond  the  power  granted  by  the  proposed 
Constitution,  and  inconsistent  with  the  Constitution  of  this 
State,  it  will  be  an  error,  and  adjudged  by  the  courts  of  law  to 
be  void.  It  is  consonant  with  the  second  article  in  the  present 
Confederation,  that  each  State  retains  its  sovereignty,  freedom 
and  independence,  and  every  power,  jurisdiction  and  right, 
which  is  not  by  this  Confederation  expressly  delegated  to  the 
United  States  in  Congress  assembled.  I  have  long  considered 
the  watchfulness  of  the  people  over  the  conduct  of  their  rulers, 
the  strongest  guard  against  the  encroachments  of  power ;  and 
I  hope  the  people  of  this  country  will  always  be  thus  watchful. 

Another  of  your  Excellency's  propositions  is  calculated  to 
quiet  the  apprehensions  of  gentlemen,  lest  Congress  should 
exercise  an  unreasonable  control  over  the  State  legislatures, 
with  regard  to  the  times,  places  and  manner  of  holding  elec- 

30 


234  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

tions,  which  by  the  fourth  section  of  the  first  article,  are  to  be 
prescribed  in  each  State  by  the  legislature  thereof,  subject  to 
the  control  of  Congress.  I  have  had  my  fears  lest  this  control 
should  infringe  the  freedom  of  elections,  which  ought  ever  to 
be  held  sacred.  Gentlemen  who  have  objected  to  this  controlling 
power  in  Congress,  have  expressed  their  wishes  that  it  had  been 
restricted  to  such  States  as  may  neglect  or  refuse  that  power 
vested  in  them,  and  to  be  exercised  by  them  if  they  please. 
Your  Excellency  proposes,  in  substance,  the  same  restriction, 
which,  I  should  think,  cannot  but  meet  with  their  full  appro- 
bation. 

The  power  to  be  given  to  Congress,  to  lay  and  collect  taxes, 
duties,  imposts  and  excises,  has  alarmed  the  minds  of  some 
gentlemen.  They  tell  you,  Sir,  that  the  exercise  of  the  power 
of  laying  and  collecting  direct  taxes  might  greatly  distress  the 
several  States,  and  render  them  incapable  of  raising  moneys  for 
the  payment  of  their  respective  State  debts,  or  for  any  purpose. 
They  say  the  impost  and  excise  may  be  made  adequate  to  the 
public  emergencies  in  the  time  of  peace,  and  ask  why  the  laying 
direct  taxes  may  not  be  confined  to  a  time  of  war.  You  are 
pleased  to  propose  to  us,  that  it  be  a  recommendation,  that 
"  Congress  do  not  lay  direct  taxes  but  when  the  moneys  arising 
from  the  impost  and  excise  shall  be  insufficient  for  the  public 
exigencies."  The  prospect  of  approaching  war  might  necessa- 
rily create  an  expense  beyond  the  productions  of  impost  and 
excise.  How,  then,  would  the  government  have  the  necessary 
means  of  providing  for  the  public  defence  ?  Must  they  not 
have  recourse  to  other  resources  besides  impost  and  excise  ? 
The  people,  while  they  watch  for  their  own  safety,  must  and 
will  have  a  just  confidence  in  a  legislature  of  their  own  election. 
The  approach  of  war  is  seldom,  if  ever,  without  observation  ; 
it  is  generally  observed  by  the  people  at  large,  and  I  believe  no 
legislature  of  a  free  country  would  venture  a  measure  which 
should  directly  touch  the  purses  of  the  people,  under  a  mere 
pretence,  or  unless  they  could  show,  to  the  people's  satisfaction, 
that  there  had,  in  fact,  been  a  real  public  exigency  to  justify  it. 

Your  Excellency's  next  proposition  is,  to  introduce  the  indict- 
ment of  a  grand  jury  before  any  person  shall  be  tried  for  any 
crime,  by  which  he  may  incur  infamous  punishment,  or  loss  of 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  235 

life  ;  and  it  is  followed  by  another,  which  recommends  a  trial 
by  jury,  in  civil  actions  between  citizens  of  different  States,  if 
either  of  the  parties  shall  request  it.  These,  and  several  others 
which  I  have  not  mentioned,  are  so  evidently  beneficial,  as  to 
need  no  comment  of  mine.  And  they  are  all,  in  every  partic- 
ular, of  so  general  a  nature,  and  so  equally  interesting  to  every 
State,  that  I  cannot  but  persuade  myself  to  think,  they  would 
all  readily  join  with  us  in  the  measure  proposed  by  your  Excel- 
lency, if  we  should  now  adopt  it.  Gentlemen  may  make  addi- 
tional propositions,  if  they  think  fit ;  it  is  presumed  that  we 
shall  exercise  candor  towards  each  other  ;  and  that,  whilst  on 
the  one  hand  gentlemen  will  cheerfully  agree  to  any  proposition 
intended  to  promote  a  general  union,  which  may  not  be  incon- 
sistent with  their  own  mature  judgment,  others  will  avoid  the 
making  such  as  may  be  needless,  or  tend  to  embarrass  the 
minds  of  the  people  of  this  Commonwealth  and  our  sister 
States,  and  thereby  not  only  frustrate  your  Excellency's  wise 
intention,  but  endanger  the  loss  of  that  degree  of  reputation, 
which,  I  natter  myself,  this  Commonwealth  has  justly  sustained. 
Mr.  Nasson.  Mr.  President :  I  feel  myself  happy,  that  your 
Excellency  has  been  placed,  by  the  free  suffrages  of  your  fellow- 
citizens,  at  the  head  of  this  government.  I  also  feel  myself 
happy,  that  your  Excellency  has  been  placed  in  the  chair  of 
this  honorable  Convention  ;  and  I  feel  a  confidence  that  the 
proposition  submitted  to  our  consideration  yesterday,  by  your 
Excellency,  has  for  its  object  the  good  of  your  country.  But, 
Sir,  as  I  have  not  had  an  opportunity  leisurely  to  consider  it,  I 
shall  pass  it  over,  and  take  a  short  view  of  the  Constitution  at 
large,  which  is  under  consideration,  though  my  abilities,  Sir, 
will  not  permit  me  to  do  justice  to  my  feelings,  or  to  my  con- 
stituents. Great  Britain,  Sir,  first  attempted  to  enslave  us,  by 
declaring  her  laws  supreme,  and  that  she  had  a  right  to  bind  us 
in  all  cases  whatever.  What,  Sir,  roused  the  Americans  to 
shake  off  the  yoke  preparing  for  them  ?  It  was  this  measure, 
the  power  to  do  which  we  are  now  about  giving  to  Congress. 
And  here,  Sir,  I  beg  the  indulgence  of  this  honorable  body,  to 
permit  me  to  make  a  short  apostrophe  to  liberty.  0,  liberty  ! 
thou  greatest  good  !  thou  fairest  property !  With  thee  I  wish  to 
live,  with  thee  I  wish  to  die  !     Pardon  me  if  I  drop  a  tear  on 


236  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

the  peril  to  which  she  is  exposed.  I  cannot,  Sir,  see  this  bright- 
est of  jewels  tarnished !  a  jewel  worth  ten  thousand  worlds  ! 
And  shall  we  part  with  it  so  soon !  0,  no.  Gentlemen  ask, 
can  it  be  supposed  that  a  Constitution,'  so  pregnant  with  danger, 
could  come  from  the  hands  of  those  who  framed  it !  Indeed, 
Sir,  I  am  suspicious  of  my  own  judgment,  when  I  contemplate 
this  idea;  when  I  see  the  list  of  illustrious  names  annexed  to  it; 
but,  Sir,  my  duty  to  my  constituents  obliges  me  to  oppose  the 
measure  they  recommend,  as  obnoxious  to  their  liberty  and 
safety. 

When,  Sir,  we  dissolved  the  political  bands  which  connected 
us  with  Great  Britain,  we  were  in  a  state  of  nature.  We  then 
formed  and  adopted  the  Confederation,  which  must  be  consid- 
ered as  a  sacred  instrument ;  this  confederates  us  under  one 
head,  as  sovereign  and  independent  States.  Now,  Sir,  if  we 
give  Congress  power  to  dissolve  that  Confederation,  to  what  can 
we  trust  ?  If  a  nation  consent  thus  to  treat  their  most  solemn 
compacts,  who  will  ever  trust  them  ?  Let  us,  Sir,  begin  with 
this  Constitution,  and  see  what  it  is.  And  first,  "  We,  the 
people  of  the  United  States,  do,"  <fec.  If  this,  Sir,  does  not  go 
to  an  annihilation  of  the  State  governments,  and  to  a  perfect 
consolidation  of  the  whole  Union,  I  do  not  know  what  does. 
What !  shall  we  consent  to  this  ?  Can  ten,  twenty  or  an  hun- 
dred persons  in  this  State,  who  have  taken  the  oath  of  alle- 
giance to  it,  dispense  with  this  oath  ?  Gentlemen  may  talk  as 
they  please  of  dispensing  in  certain  cases  with  oaths  ;  but,  Sir, 
with  me  they  are  sacred  things.  We  are  under  oath  ;  we  have 
sworn  that  Massachusetts  is  a  sovereign  and  independent  State. 
How,  then,  can  we  vote  for  this  Constitution,  that  destroys  that 
sovereignty  ? 

The  Hon.  Col.  Varnum  begged  leave  to  set  the  worthy 'gen- 
tleman right.  The  very  oath,  he  said,  which  the  gentleman 
has  mentioned,  provides  an  exception  for  the  power  to  be  granted 
to  Congress. 

•  Well,  continued  Mr.  Nasson,  to  go  on.     Mr.  President :  Let 
us  consider  the  Constitution  without  a  bill  of  rights.     When  I 

give  up  any  of  my  natural  rights,  it  is  for  the  security  of  the 

rest ;  but  here  is  not  one  right  secured,  although  many  are 

neglected. 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  237 

With  respect  to  biennial  elections,  the  paragraph  is  rather 
loosely  expressed.  I  am  a  little  in  favor  of  our  ancient  custom. 
Gentlemen  say  they  are  convinced  that  the  alteration  is  neces- 
sary.    It  may  be  so ;  when  I  see  better,  I  will  join  with  them. 

To  go  on.  Representation  and  taxation  to  be  apportioned 
according  to  numbers.  This,  Sir,  I  am  opposed  to  ;  it  is  une- 
qual. I  will  show  an  instance  in  point.  We  know  for  certainty, 
that  in  the  town  of  Brooklyn,  persons  are  better  able  to  pay 
their  taxes,  than  in  the  parts  I  represent.  Suppose  the  tax  is 
laid  on  polls.  Why,  the  people  of  the  former  place  will  pay 
their  tax  ten  times  as  easy  as  the  latter,  thus  helping  that  part 
of  the  community  which  stands  in  the  least  need  of  help.  On 
this  footing,  the  poor  pay  as  much  as  the  rich  ;  and  in  this  a 
way  is  laid,  that  five  slaves  shall  be  rated  no  more  than  three 
children.  Let  gentlemen  consider  this.  A  farmer  takes  three 
small  orphans,  on  charity,  to  bring  up  ;  they  are  bound  to  him  ; 
when  they  arrive  at  twenty-one  years  of  age,  he  gives  each  of 
them  a  couple  of  suits  of  clothes,  a  cow,  and  two  or  three  young 
cattle  ;  we  are  rated  as  much  for  these,  as  a  farmer  in  Virginia 
is  for  five  slaves,  whom  he  holds  for  life,  they  and  their 
posterity,  the  male,  and  the  she  ones,  too.  The  Senate,  Mr. 
President,  are  to  be  chosen  two  from  each  State.  This,  Sir, 
puts  the  smaller  States  on  a  footing  with  the  larger,  when  the 
States  have  to  pay  according  to  their  numbers.  New  Hampshire 
does  not  pay  a  fourth  part  as  much  as  Massachusetts.  We  must, 
therefore,  to  support  the  dignity  of  the  Union,  pay  four  times 
as  much  as  New  Hampshire,  and  almost  fourteen  times  as  much 
as  Georgia,  who,  we  see,  are  equally  represented  with  us. 

The  term,  Sir,  for  which  the  Senate  is  chosen,  is  a  grievance. 
It  is  too  long  to  trust  any  body  of  men  with  power.  It  is 
impossible  but  that  such  men  will  be  tenacious  of  their  places ; 
they  are  to  be  raised  to  a  lofty  eminence,  and  they  will  be  loth 
to  come  down  ;  and  in  the  course  of  six  years,  may,  by  man- 
agement, have  it  in  their  power  to  create  officers,  and  obtain 
influence  enough  to  get  in  again,  and  so  for  life.  When  we 
felt  the  hand  of  British  oppression  upon  us,  we  were  so  jealous 
of  rulers  as  to  declare  them  eligible  but  for  three  years  in  six. 
In  this  Constitution  we  forget  this  principle.  I,  Sir,  think  that 
rulers  ought,  at  short  periods,  to  return  to  private  life,  that 


238  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

they  may  know  how  to  feel  for  and  regard  their  fellow-creatures. 
In  six  years,  Sir,  and  at  a  great  distance,  they  will  quite  forget 
them ;  for 

"  Time  and  absence  cure  the  purest  love." 

We  are  apt  to  forget  our  friends,  except  when  we  are  conversing 
with  them. 

We  now  come,  Sir,  to  the  fourth  section.  Let  us  see— .-the 
times,  places  and  manner  of  holding  elections  shall  be  prescribed 
in  each  State  by  the  legislature  thereof.  No  objections  to  this  ; 
but,  Sir,  after  the  flash  of  lightning  comes  the  peal  of  thunder. 
"  But  Congress  may  at  any  time  alter  them,"  &c.  Here  it  is, 
Mr.  President ;  this  is  the  article  which  is  to  make  Congress 
omnipotent.  Gentlemen  say  this  is  the  greatest  beauty  of  the 
Constitution  ;  this  is  the  great  security  for  the  people  ;  this  is 
the  all  in  all.  Such  language  have  I  heard  in  this  house  ;  but, 
Sir,  I  say,  by  this  power  Congress  may,  if  they  please,  order 
the  election  of  Federal  representatives  for  Massachusetts,  to  be 
at  Great  Barrington,  or  Machias ;  and  at  such  a  time,  too,  as 
shall  put  it  in  the  power  of  a  few  artful  and  designing  men  to 
get  themselves  elected  at  their  pleasure. 

The  eighth  section,  Mr.  President,  provides  that  Congress 
shall  have  power  to  lay  and  collect  taxes,  duties,  imposts, 
excises,  &c.  We  may,  Sir,  be  poor ;  we  may  not  be  able  to 
pay  these  taxes,  <fcc  We  must  have  a  little  meal,  and  a  little 
meat,  whereon  to  live  ;  and  save  a  little  for  a  rainy  day.  But 
what  follows  ?  Let  us  see.  To  raise  and  support  armies. 
Here,  Sir,  comes  the  key  to  unlock  this  cabinet ;  here  are  the 
means  by  which  you  will  be  made  to  pay  your  taxes !  But  will 
ye,  my  countrymen,  submit  to  this  ?  Suffer  me,  Sir,  to  say  a 
few  words  on  the  fatal  effects  of  standing  armies,  that  bane  of 
republican  governments  !  A  standing  army  !  Was  it  not  with 
this  that  Caesar  passed  the  Rubicon,  and  laid  prostrate  the  liber- 
ties of  his  country  ?  By  this  have  seven-eighths  of  the  once 
free  nations  of  the  globe  been  brought  into  bondage  !  Time 
would  fail  me,  were  I  to  attempt  to  recapitulate  the  havoc  made 
in  the  world  by  standing  armies.  Britain  attempted  to  enforce 
her  arbitrary  measures  by  a  standing  army.  But,  Sir,  we  had 
patriots  then  who  alarmed  us  of  our  danger  ;  who  showed  us 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  239 

the  serpent,  and  bid.  us  beware  of  it.  Shall  I  name  them  ?  I 
fear  I  shall  offend  your  Excellency  ;  but  I  cannot  avoid  it.  I 
must.  We  had  an  Hancock,  an  Adams,  and  a  Warren.  Our 
sister  States,  too,  produced  a  Randolph,  a  Washington,  a 
Greene,^and  a  Montgomery,  who  led  us  in  our  way.  Some  of 
these  have  given  up  their  lives  in  defence  of  the  liberties  of 
their  country ;  and  my  prayer  to  God  is,  that  when  this  race  of 
illustrious  patriots  shall  have  bid  adieu  to  the  world,  that  from 
their  dust,  as  from  the  sacred  ashes  of  the  phoenix,  another  race 
may  arise,  who  shall  take  our  posterity  by  the  hand,  and  lead 
them  to  trample  on  the  necks  of  those  who  shall  dare  to  infringe 
on  their  liberties.  Sir,  had  I  a  voice  like  Jove,  I  would  pro- 
claim it  throughout  the  world,  and  had  I  an  arm  like  Jove,  I 
would  hurl  from  the  globe  those  villains  who  would  dare  attempt 
to  establish  in  our  country  a  standing  army.  I  wish,  Sir,  that 
the  gentlemen  of  Boston  would  bring  to  their  minds  the  fatal 
evening  of  the  5th  of  March,  1770,  when  by  standing  troops 
they  lost  five  of  their  fellow-townsmen.  I  will  ask  them,  what 
price  can  atone  for  their  lives  ?  What  money  can  make  satisfac- 
tion for  the  loss  ?  The  same  causes  produce  the  same  effects. 
An  army  may  be  raised  on  pretence  of  helping  a  friend,  or 
many  pretences  might  be  used.  That  night,  Sir,  ought  to  be 
a  sufficient  warning  against  standing  armies,  except  in  cases  of 
great  emergency.  They  are  too  frequently  used  for  no  other 
purpose  than  dragooning  the  people  into  slavery  ;  but  I  beseech 
you,  my  countrymen,  for  the  sake  of  your  posterity,  to  act  like 
those  worthy  men  who  have  stood  forth  in  defence  of  the  rights 
of  mankind,  and  show  to  the  world  that  you  will  not  submit  to 
tyranny.  What  occasion  have  we  for  standing  armies  ?  We 
fear  no  foe.  If  one  should  come  upon  us,  we  have  a  militia, 
which  is  our  bulwark.  Let  Lexington  witness  that  we  have  the 
means  of  defence  among  ourselves.  If,  during  the  last  winter, 
there  was  not  much  alacrity  shown  by  the  militia  in  turning 
out,  we  must  consider  that  they  were  going  to  fight  their  coun- 
trymen. Do  you,  Sir,  suppose,  that  had  a  British  army  invaded 
us  at  that  time,  such  supineness  would  have  been  discovered  ? 
No,  Sir  !  To  our  enemies'  dismay  and  discomfort,  they  would 
have  felt  the  contrary  ;  but  against  deluded,  infatuated  men, 
they  did  not  wish  to  exert  their  valor  or  their  strength.     There- 


240  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

fore,  Sir,  I  am  utterly  opposed  to  a  standing  army  in  time  of 
peace. 

The  paragraph  that  gives  Congress  power  to  suspend  the  writ 
of  habeas  corpus,  claims  a  little  attention.  This  is  a  great  bul- 
wark ;  a  great  privilege  indeed,  We  ought  not,  therefore,  to 
give  it  up  on  any  slight  pretence.  Let  us  see  :  How  long  is  it 
to  be  suspended  ?  As  long  as  rebellion  or  invasion  shall  con- 
tinue. This  is  exceeding  loose.  Why  is  not  the  time  limited, 
as  in  our  Constitution  ?  But,  Sir,  its  design  would  then  be 
defeated.  It  was  the  intent,  and  by  it  we  shall  give  up  one  of 
our  greatest  privileges.  Mr.  Nasson  concluded  by  saying,  he 
had  much  more  to  say,  but  as  the  house  were  impatient,  he 
should  sit  down  for  the  present,  to  give  other  gentlemen  an 
opportunity  to  speak. 

Judge  Sumner,  adverting  to  the  pathetic  apostrophe  of  the 
gentleman  last  speaking,  said,  he  could,  with  as  much  sincerity, 
apostrophize  :  0,  government !  thou  greatest  good !  thou  best 
of  blessings  !  With  thee  I  wish  to  live  ;  with  thee  I  wish  to 
die.  Thou  art  as  necessary  to  the  support  of  the  political  body, 
as  meat  and  bread  are  to  the  natural  body.  The  learned  judge 
then  turned  his  attention  to  the  proposition  submitted  by  the 
President,  and  said,  he  sincerely  hoped  that  it  would  meet  the 
approbation  of  the  Convention,  as  it  appeared  to  him  a  remedy 
for  all  the  difficulties  which  gentlemen  in  the  course  of  the 
debates  had  mentioned.  He  particularized  the  objections  that 
had  been  started,  and  showed  that  their  removal  was  provided 
for  in  the  proposition  ;  and  concluded  by  observing,  that  the 
probability  was  very  great,  that  if  the  amendments  proposed 
were  recommended  by  this  Convention,  they  would,  on  the 
meeting  of  the  first  Congress,  be  adopted  by  the  general  gov- 
ernment. 

Mr.  Wedgery  said,  he  did  not  see  the  probability  that  these 
amendments  would  be  made,  if  we  had  authority  to  propose  , 
them.  He  considered,  he  said,  that  the  Convention  did  not 
meet  for  the  purpose  of  recommending  amendments,  but  to 
adopt  or  reject  the  Constitution.  He  concluded  by  asking, 
whether  it  was  probable  that  those  States  who  had  already 
adopted  the  Constitution*,  would  be  likely  to  submit  to  amend- 
ments ? 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  241 

AFTERNOON. 

[When  the  Convention  met,  a  short  conversation  ensued  on 
the  time  when  the  grand  question  should  be  taken.  It  was 
agreed  that  it  should  not  be  until  Tuesday.  After  this  conver- 
sation subsided,  another  took  place  on  the  division  of  the  motion, 
in  order  that  the  question  of  ratifying  might  be  considered 
separately  from  the  amendments,  but  nothing  final  was  deter- 
mined upon.] 

Judge  Dana  advocated  the  proposition  submitted  by  his  Ex- 
cellency the  President.  It  contained,  he  said,  the  amendments 
generally  wished  for ;  as  they  were  not  of  a  local  nature,  but 
extended  to  every  part  of  the  union,  if  they  were  recommended 
to  be  adopted  by  this  Convention,  it  was  very  probable  that 
two-thirds  of  the  Congress  would  concur  in  proposing  them ; 
or  that  two-thirds  of  the  legislatures  of  the  several  States 
would  apply  for  the  call  of  a  Convention  to  consider  them, 
agreeably  to  the  mode  pointed  out  in  the  Constitution ;  and 
that  he  did  not  think  that  gentlemen  would  wish  to  reject  the 
whole  of  the  system,  because  some  part  of  it  did  not  please 
them.  He  then  went  into  a  consideration  of  the  advantages 
which  would  ensue  from  its  adoption,  to  the  United  States,  to 
the  individual  States,  and  to  the  several  classes  of  citizens,  and 
concluded  by  representing,  in  a  lively  manner,  the  evils  to  the 
whole  continent,  and  to  the  northern  States  in  particular, 
which  must  be  the  unavoidable  attendants  on  the  present 
system  of  general  government. 

Mr.  Russell  rose,  he  said,  with  diffidence,  to  offer  his  senti- 
ments on  the  subject  in  debate ;  but  he  could"  not,  he  said, 
forbear  to  give  his  sentiments  on  the  advantage  which  lie  appre- 
hended must  result  from  the  adoption  of  the  proposed  Consti- 
tution, to  thic  State,  and  to  the  United  States,  in  the  advance- 
ment of  their  commerce.  Mr.  Russell  said,  he  believed,  it  had 
always  been  the  policy  of  trading  nations,  to  secure  to  them- 
selves the  advantages  of  their  carrying  trade ;  he  observed, 
how  tenacious  France,  Holland  and  England  were  in  this  par- 
ticular, and  how  beneficial  it  had  proved  to  them.  He  then 
went  into  an  accurate  and  interesting  statement  of  the  quantities 
of  produce  which  were  exported  from  the  several  States ;  and 

31 


242  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

showed  the  ability  of  the  States  to  furnish  from  among  themselves 
shipping  fully  sufficient  for  the  transportation  of  this  produce  ; 
which,  he  observed,  if  confined  by  the  general  government  to 
American  vessels,  while  the  restriction  would  not  increase  the 
rates  of  freightage  to  the  southern  States,  as  the  northern  and 
middle  States  could  produce  a  surplusage  of  shipping,  and  a  spirit 
of  competition  would  call  forth  the  resources,  would  greatly 
increase  our  navigation,  furnish  us  with  a  great  nursery  of  sea- 
men, give  employment  not  only  to  the  mechanics  in  constructing 
the  vessels,  and  the  trades  dependant  thereon,  but  to  the  hus- 
bandman, in  cutting  down  trees  for  timber  and  transporting  them 
to  the  places  of  building,  increase  the  demand  for  the  products 
of  the  land,  and  for  our  pork,  butter,  &c.  ;  and  give  such  life 
and  spirit  to  commerce  as  would  extend  it  to  all  the  nations  of 
the  world.  These,  he  said,  were  some  of  the  blessings  he  anti- 
cipated from  the  adoption  of  the  Federal  Constitution ;  and  so 
convinced  was  he  of  its  utility  and  necessity,  that,  while  he 
wished,  that  on  the  grand  question  being  put,  there  might  not 
be  one  dissenting  voice,  if  he  was  allowed,  he  would  hold  up 
both  his  hands  in  favor  of  it ;  and  he  concluded,  if  his  left 
hand  was  unwilling  to  be  extended  with  his  right,  in  this  all 
important  decision,  he  would  cut  it  off,  as  unworthy  of  him, 
and  lest  it  should  infect  his  whole  body. 

Mr.  Pierce.  Mr.  President:  The  amendments  proposed  by 
your  Excellency  are  very  agreeable  to  my  opinion,  and  I  should 
wish  to  add  several  more,  but  will  mention  but  one,  and  that  is, 
that  the  Senate  should  not  continue  in  office  more  than  two 
years ;  but,  Sir,  I  think  that  if  the  want  of  these  amendments 
were  sufficient  for  me- to  vote  against  the  Constitution,  the  ad- 
dition, in  the  manner  proposed  by  your  Excellency,  will  not  be 
sufficient  for  me  to  vote  for  it,  as  it  appears  to  me  very  uncer- 
tain whether  they  ever  are  a  part  of  the  Constitution. 

Several  gentlemen  said  a  few  words  each  on  the  proposition 
of  amendments — which  it  was  acceded  to  by  gentlemen  opposed 
to  the  Constitution,  was  good — but  that  it  was  not  probable  it 
would  be  interwoven  in  the  Constitution.  Gentlemen,  on  the 
other  side,  said  there  was  a  great  probability  that  it  would,  from 
its  nature,  be  also  recommended  by  the  several  Conventions 
which  have  not  yet  convened. 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  .  243 

Saturday,  February  2, 1788. 

The  Hon.  Mr.  Strong  went  into  a  particular  discussion  of  the 
several  amendments  recommended  in  the  proposition  submitted 
by  his  Excellency ;  each  of  which  he  considered  with  much 
attention.  He  anticipated  the  good  effect  it  must  have  in  con- 
ciliating the  various  sentiments  of  gentlemen  on  the  subject ; 
and  expressed  his  firm  belief,  that  if  it  was  recommended  by  the 
Convention,  it  would  be  inserted  in  the  Constitution. 

Gen.  Thompson  said,  we  have  no  right  to  make  amendments  ; 
it  was  not,  he  said,  the  business  we  were  sent  for.  He  was 
glad,  he  said,  that  gentlemen  were  convinced  it  was  not  a  per- 
fect system,  and  that  it  wanted  amendments.  This,  he  said, 
was  different  from  the  language  they  had  formerly  held.  How- 
ever, as  to  the  amendments,  he  could  not  say  amen  to  them, 
but  they  might  be  voted  for  by  some  men — he  did  not  say 
Judases. 

Mr.  Parsons,  Col..  Orne,  Hon.  Mr.  Phillips,  and  the  Rev. 
Mr.  Niles,  and  several  other  gentlemen,  spoke  in  favor  of  the 
proposition,  as  a  conciliatory  measure,  and  the  probability  of 
the  amendments  being  adopted.  Mr.  Nasson,  Dr.  Taylor,  Mr. 
Thomas,  of  Middleborough,and  others,  though  in  sentiment  with 
gentlemen  on  the  propriety  of  their  being  admitted  into  the 
Constitution,  did  not  think  it  was  probable  they  would  be  inserted. 

Before  the  Convention  adjourned,  Gen.  Whitney  moved,  that 
a  committee,  consisting  of  two  from  each  county,  should  be 
raised  to  consider  the  amendments,  or  any  other  that  might  be 
proposed,  and  report  thereon. 

Hon.  Mr.  Sedgwick  seconded  the  motion. 

Hon.  Mr.  Dalton.  Mr.  President :  I  am  not  opposed  to  the 
motion ;  but,  Sir,  that  gentlemen  may  not  again  say,  as  has 
been  the  case  several  times  this  day,  that  the  gentlemen  who 
advocate  the  measure  of  the  proposition  were  now  convinced 
that  amendments  to  the  Constitution  are  indispensable,  I,  Sir, 
in  my  place,  say,  that  I  am  willing  to  accept  the  Constitution 
as  it  is :  and  I  am  in  favor  of  the  motion  of  proposing  amend- 
ments, only  as  it  is  of  a  conciliating  nature,  and  not  as  a  con- 
cession that  amendments  are  necessary. 

The  motion  was  put  and  carried  unanimously. 


244  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

The  following  gentlemen  were  then  appointed  on  the  said 
committee,  viz. : — 

Hon.  Mr.  Bowdoin,  Mr.  Southworth,  Mr.  Parsons,  Hon.  Mr. 
Hutchinson,  Hon.  Mr.  Dana,  Mr.  Winn,  Hon.  Mr.  Strong,  Mr. 
Bodman,  Hon.  Mr.  Turner,  Mr.  Thomas,  of  Plymouth,  Dr. 
Smith,  Mr.  Bourn,  Hon.  Mr.  Spooner,  Mr.  Bishop,  Rev.  Dr. 
Hemmenway,  Mr.  Barrell,  Mr.  Mayhew,  Hon.  Mr.  Taylor,  Hon. 
Mr.  Sprague,  Mr.  Fox,  Mr.  Longfellow,  Mr.  Sewall,  Mr.  Syl- 
vester, Mr.  Lusk,  Hon.  Mr.  Sedgwick. 


Monday,  February  4, 1788. 

Rev.  Mr.  Thatcher.  Mr.  President:  While  the  different 
paragraphs  of  the  proposed  Constitution  have  been  debated,  I 
have  not  troubled  this  honorable  Convention  with  any  observa- 
tions of  my  own  upon  the  subject.  Conscious  that  there  were 
men  of  deeper  political  knowledge,  and  of  better  abilities,  than 
myself,  I  conceived  it  my  duty  to  attend  to  their  instruction,, 
that,  having  heard  with  attention,  I  might  decide  with  integ- 
rity. I  view  the  object  before  us  as  of  greater  moment  than 
ever  was  known  within  the  memory  of  man,  or  than  hath 
been  recorded  by  the  historic  page.  Were  we,  Mr.  President, 
this  day  to  decide  on  the  lives  and  fortunes  of  an  hundred 
of  the  best  citizens  of  this  Commonwealth,  solemn  would 
that  province  be ;  but  much  more  interesting  is  the  result  of 
the  present  question ;  for  in  this  case  not  a  single  City,  not  a 
single  State,  but  a  Continent,  wide  and  extended,  may  be  happy 
or  wretched  according  to  our  judgment,  and  posterity  will 
either  bless  us  for  laying  the  foundation  of  a  wise  and  equal 
government,  or  curse  us  for  neglecting  their  important  interests, 
and  for  forging  chains  for  them,  when  we  disdained  to  wear 
them  ourselves.  Having,  therefore,  as  I  trust,  a  full  view  of 
the  magnitude  of  the  object,  I  hope  I  shall  be  pardoned  if  I 
offer  my  sentiments  with  freedom.  I  am  sensible  of  the  pre- 
judices that  subsist  against  the  profession  to  which  I  belong ; 
but  yet,  intrusted  by  my  constituents  with  so  solemn  a  charge, 
I  think  they  have  a  right  to  expect  from  me  the  reasons  why  I 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  245 

shall  finally  consent  to  ratify  the  proposed  form  of  govern- 
ment. 

There  are  three  circumstances  which  deserve  notice  in  con- 
sidering the  subject :  these  are,  the  necessity  that  all  the  States 
have  of  some  general  band  of  union ;  the  checks  upon  the 
government  in  the  form  offered  for  our  adoption  ;  and,  lastly, 
the  particular  disadvantages  to  which  we  shall  be  exposed  if 
we  reject  it. 

With  respect  to  the  first  of  these  considerations,  I  trust 
there  is  no  man  in  his  senses  but  what  will  own,  that  the  whole 
country  hath  largely  felt  the  want  of  energy  in  the  general 
government.  While  we  were  at  war  with  Britain,  common 
danger  produced  a  common  union ;  but,*the  cause  being  re- 
moved, the  effect  ceased  also.  Nay,  I  do  not  know  but  we  may 
safely  add,  that  that  union,  produced  by  uniform  danger,  was 
still  inadequate  to  general  and  national  purposes.  This  Com- 
monwealth, with  a  generous,  disinterested  regard  to  the  good 
of  the  whole,  appeared  foremost  in  the  day  of  danger.  At  the 
conclusion  of  the  late  war,  two-thirds  of  the  continental  army 
were  from  Massachusetts ;  their  provision  and  their  clothing 
proceeded  also  in  a  great  measure  from  our  extraordinary  exer- 
tions. The  people  did  this  in  the  fullest  confidence  that  when 
peace  and  tranquillity  was  restored,  from  the  honor  and  justice 
of  our  sister  States,  our  supernumerary  expenses  would  be 
abundantly  repaid.  But,  alas !  how  much  have  our  expecta- 
tions been  blasted  !  The  Congress,  though  willing,  yet  had  no 
power  to  do  us  justice.  The  small  district  of  Rhode-Island  put 
a  negative  upon  the  collected  wisdom  of  the  continent.  This 
was  done,  not  by  those  who  are  the  patrons  of  their  present 
infamous  system  of  paper  currency ;  but  by  that  part  of  them 
who  now  call  themselves  honest  men.  We  have  made  exertions 
to  stop  the  importation  of  foreign  luxuries.  Our  brethren  in  the 
neighboring  States,  from  the  view  of  local  advantages,  have 
taken  occasion  to  distress  us  upon  the  same  account.  They 
have  encouraged,  where  we  have  prohibited ;  and  by  those 
iniquitous  measures  have  made  our  virtue  and  public  spirit  an 
additional  cause  of  our  calamity.  Nor  have  our  calamities 
been  local ;  they  have  reached  to  all  parts  of  the  United  States, 
and  have  produced  dissipation  and  indigence  at  home,  and  con- 


246  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

tempt  in  foreign  countries.  On  the  one  hand,  the  haughty 
Spaniard  has  deprived  us  of  the  navigation  of  the  river  Missis- 
sippi ;  on  the  other,  the  British  nation  are  by  extravagant 
duties  ruining  our  fisheries.  Our  sailors  are  enslaved  by  the 
pirates  of  Algiers  ;  our  credit  is  reduced  to  so  low  an  ebb  that 
American  faith  is  a  proverbial  expression  for  perfidy,  as  punic 
faith  was  among  the  Romans.  Thus  have  we  suffered  every 
species  of  infamy  abroad,  and  poverty  at  home.  Such,  in  fact, 
have  been  our  calamities,  as  are  enough  to  convince  the  most 
sceptical  among  us,  of  the  want  of  a  general  government,  in 
which  energy  and  vigor  should  be  established,  and  at  the  same 
time  the  rights  and  liberties  of  the  people  preserved. 

A  constitution  hath  been  presented  to  us  which  was  composed 
and  planned  by  men  who,  in  the  council  and  field,  have,  in  the 
most  conspicuous  offices,  served  their  country  in  the  late  war. 
It  comes  authenticated  by  a  man  who,  without  any  pecuniary 
reward,  commanded  our  army,  and  who  retired  to  a  private 
station  with  more  pleasure  than  he  left  it.  I  do  not  say,  Mr. 
President,  that  this  proves  the  form  of  government  to  be  per- 
fect, or  that  it  is  an  unanswerable  argument  that  we  should 
adopt  it.  But  it  is  a  reason  why  we  should  examine  it  with  care 
and  caution,  and  that  we  ought  not  rashly  and  precipitately  to 
reject  it. 

It  will  be  objected :  "  There  are  more  powers  granted  than 
are  necessary,  and  that  it  tends  to  destroy  the  local  governments 
of  the  particular  States,  and  that  it  will  eventually  end  either 
in  aristocracy  or  despotism.' '  To  answer  the  objection  two  con- 
siderations should  be  taken  into  view :  the  situation  of  the  conti- 
nent when  a  constitution  was  formed,  and  the  impossibility  of 
preserving  a  perfect  sovereignty  in  the  States,  after  necessary 
powers  were  ceded  to  a  supreme  council  of  the  whole.  As  to 
the  first,  let  us  candidly  examine  the  state  of  these  republics, 
from  New  Hampshire  to  Georgia,  and  see  how  far  vigor  and 
energy  were  required.  During  the  session  of*  the  late  Conven- 
tion, Massachusetts  was  on  the  point  of  civil  war.  In  Vermont 
and  New  Hampshire,  a  great  disaffection  to  their  several  gov- 
ernments prevailed  among  the  people.  New  York  absolutely 
refused  complying  with  the  requisitions  of  Congress.  In  Vir- 
ginia, armed  men  endeavored  to  stop  the  courts  of  justice.     In 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  247 

South  Carolina,  creditors  by  law  were  obliged  to  receive  barren 
and  useless  land,  for  contracts  made  in  silver  and  gold.  I  pass 
over  the  instance  of  Rhode  Island ;  their  conduct  was  notori- 
ous. In  some  States,  laws  were  made- directly  against  the  treaty 
of  peace  ;  in  others,  statutes  were  enacted  which  clashed  directly 
against  any  Federal  union ;  hew  lands,  sufficient  to  discharge  a 
great  part  of  the  continental  debt,  intruded  upon  by  needy 
adventurers  ;  our  frontier  settlements  exposed  to  the  ravages  of 
the  Indians,  while  the  several  States  were  unable  or  unwilling 
to  relieve  their  distress.  Lay  all  these  circumstances  together, 
and  you  will  find  some  apology  for  those  gentlemen  who  framed 
this  Constitution.  I  trust  you  may  charitably  assign  other 
motives  for  their  conduct  than  a  design  to  enslave  their  country 
and  to  parcel  out  to  themselves  its  honors  and  emoluments. 

The  second  consideration  deserves  its  weight.  Can  these 
local  governments  be  sufficient  to  protect  us  from  foreign  ene- 
mies, or  from  disaffection  at  home  ?  Thirteen  States  are  formed 
already.  The  same  number  are  probably  to  be  formed  from 
the  lands  not  yet  cultivated.  Of  the  former,  yet  smaller  divis- 
ions may  be  made.  The  province  of  Maine  hath  desired  a 
separation  ;  in  time  a  separation  may  take  place.  Who  knows 
but  what  the  same  may  happen  with  respect  to  the  old  colony 
of  Plymouth  ?  Now  conceive  the  number  of  States  increased  ; 
their  boundaries  lessened  ;  their  interests  clashing ;  how  easy  a 
prey  to  a  foreign  power !  how  liable  to  war  among  themselves  ! 
Let  these  arguments  be  weighed ;  and  I  dare  say,  Sir,  there  is 
no  man  but  what  would  conceive,  that  a  coercive  power  over 
the  whole,  searching  through  all  parts  of  the  system,  is  neces- 
sary to  the  preservation  and  happiness  of  the  whole  people. 

But  I  readily  grant  all  these  reasons  are  not  sufficient  to 
surrender  up  the  essential  liberties  of  the  people.  But  do  we 
surrender  them  ?  This  Constitution  hath  been  compared,  both 
by  its  defenders  and  opponents,  to  the  British  government.  In 
my  view  of  it,  there  is  a  great  difference.  In  Britain,  the  govern- 
ment is  said  to  consist  of  the  three  forms,  monarchy,  aristocracy 
and  democracy ;  but  in  fact  is  but  a  few  removes  from  absolute 
despotism.  In  the  crown  is  vested  the  power  of  adding,  at 
pleasure,  to  the  second  branch ;  of  nominating  all  the  places  of 
honor  and  emolument ;  of  purchasing,  by  its  immense  revenues, 


248  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

the  suffrages  of  the  House  of  Commons.  The  voice  of  the 
people  is  but  the  echo  of  the  king ;  and  their  boasted  privileges 
lie  entirely  at  his  mercy.  In  this  proposed  form,  each  branch 
of  power  is  derived  either  mediately  or  directly  from  the  peo- 
ple. The  lower  house  are  elected  directly  by  those  persons 
who  are  qualified  to  vote  for  the  representatives  of  the  State ; 
and  at  the  expiration  of  two  years  become  private  men,  unless 
their  past  conduct  entitles  them  a  future  election.  The  Senate 
are  elected  by  the  legislatures  of  the  different  States,  and  rep- 
resent their  sovereignty.  These  powers  are  a  check  on  each 
other,  and  can  never  be  made  either  dependant  on  one  another, 
or  independent  of  the  people.  The  President  is  chosen  by  the 
electors,  who  are  appointed  by  the  people.  The  high  courts  of 
justice  arise  from  the  President  and  Senate ;  but  yet  the  min- 
isters of  them  can  be  removed  only  upon  bad  behavior.  The  inde- 
pendence of  judges  is  one  of  the  most  favorable  circumstances 
to  the  public  liberty ;  for  when  they  become  the  slaves  of  a 
venal,  corrupt  court,  and  the  hirelings  of  tyranny,  all  property 
is  precarious,  and  personal  security  at  an  end.  A  man  may  be 
stripped  of  all  his  possessions  and  murdered,  with  the  forms  of 
law.  Thus  it  appears  that  all  parts  of  this  system  arise  ulti- 
mately from  the  people,  and  are  still  independent  of  each  other. 
There  are  other  restraints,  which,  though  not  directly  named 
in  this  Constitution,  yet  are  evidently  discerned  by  every  man 
of  common  observation.  These  are,  the  governments  of  the 
several  States,  and  the  spirit  of  liberty  in  the  people.  Are  we 
wronged  or  injured  ?  Our  immediate  representatives  are  those 
to  whom  we  ought  to  apply.  Their  power  and  influence  will 
still  be  great.  But  should  any  servants  of  the  people,  however 
eminent  their  stations,  attempt  to  enslave  them,  from  this  spirit 
of  liberty  such  opposition  would  arise  as  would  bring  them  to 
the  scaffold.  But,  admitting  that  there  are  dangers  in  accept- 
ing this  general  government,  yet  are  there  not  greater  hazards 
in  rejecting  it  ?  Such  is,  Mr.  President,  the  state  of  our  affairs, 
that  it  is  not  in  our  power  to  carve  for  ourselves.  To  avoid  the 
greatest,  and  to  choose  the  least  of  two  evils,  is  all  that  we  can 
do.  What  then  will  be  the  probable  effects  if  this  Constitution 
be  rejected  ?  Have  we  not  reason  to  fear  new  commotions  in  this 
Commonwealth  ?     If  they  arise,  can  we  be  always  certain  that 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  249 

we  shall  be  furnished  with  a  citizen,  who,  though  possessed  of 
extensive  influence  and  the  greatest  abilities,  will  make  no 
other  use  of  them  than  to  quiet  the  tumult  of  the  people,  to 
prevent  civil  war,  and  to  restore  the  usual  course  of  law  and 
justice  ?  Are  we  not  in  danger  from  other  States,  when  their 
interests  or  prejudices  are  opposite  to  ours  ?  And  in  some  such 
scenes  of  hostile  contention,  will  not  some  Sylla  drench  the  land 
in  blood,  or  some  Cromwell  or  Caesar  lay  our  liberties  prostrate 
at  his  feet  ?  Will  not  foreign  nations  attack  us  in  our  weak, 
divided  condition,  and  once  more  render  us  provinces  to  some 
potentate  of  Europe  ?  Or  will  those  powers  to  whom  we  are 
indebted  lie  quiet  ?  They  certainly  will  not.  They  are  now 
waiting  for  our  decision ;  but  when  they  once  see  that  our 
union  is  broken,  and  that  we  are  determined  to  neglect  them, 
they  will  issue  out  letters  of  marque  and  reprisal,  and  entirely 
destroy  our  commerce. 

If  this  system  is  broken  up,  will  thirteen,  or  even  nine,  States 
ever  agree  to  another  ?  And  will  Providence  smile  on  a  people 
who  despise  the  privileges  put  into  their  hands,  and  who  neglect 
the  plainest  principles  of  justice  and  honesty  ?  After  all,  I  by 
no  means  pretend  that  there  is  complete  perfection  in  this  pro- 
posed Constitution.  Like  all  other  human  productions,  it  hath 
its  faults.  Provision  is  made  for  an  amendment,  whenever 
from  practice  it  is  found  oppressive.  I  would  add,  the  propo- 
sals which  his  Excellency  hath  condescended  to  lay  before  this 
honorable  Convention,  respecting  future  alterations,  are  real 
improvements  for  the  better,  and  we  have  no  reason  to  doubt 
but  they  will  be  equally  attended  to  by  .other  States,  as  they 
lead  to  common  security  and  preservation. 

Some  of  the  gentlemen  in  the  opposition  have  quoted  ancient 
history,  and  applied  it  to  the  question  now  under  debate.  They 
have  shown  us  the  danger  which  arises  from  vesting  magistrates 
with  too  much  power.  I  wish  they  had  gone  on  to  tell  the 
whole  truth.  They  might  have  shown  how  nearly  licentious- 
ness and  tyranny  are  allied ;  that  they  who  will  not  be  gov- 
erned by  reason,  must  submit  to  force  ;  that  demagogues,  in  all 
free  governments,  have  at  first  held  out  an  idea  of  extreme 
liberty  and  have  seized  on  the  rights  of  the  people  under  the 
mask  of  patriotism.      They  might  have  shown  us  a  republic 

32 


250  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

in  which  wisdom,  virtue  and  order,  were  qualities  for  which  a  man 
was  liable  to  banishment ;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  boasting, 
sedition  and  falsehood,  the  sure  road  to  honor  and  promotion. 

I  am  sorry  that  it  hath  been  hinted  by  some  gentlemen  in 
this  house,  as  if  there  were  a  combination  of  the  rich,  the 
learned,  and  those  of  liberal  professions,  to  establish  and  sup- 
port an  arbitrary  form  of  government.  Far  be  it  from  me  to 
retort  so  uncharitable  and  unchristian  a  suggestion.  I  doubt 
not  but  the  gentlemen  who  are  of  different  sentiments  from 
myself  are  actuated  by  the  purest  motives.  Some  of  them  I 
have  the  pleasure  to  be  particularly  acquainted  with,  and  can 
safely  pronounce  them  to  be  men  of  virtue  and  honor.  They 
have,  no  doubt,  a  laudable  concern  for  the  liberties  of  their 
country ;  but  I  would  beg  them  to  remember,  that  extreme 
jealousy  and  suspicion  may  be  as  fatal  to  freedom  as  security 
and  negligence. 

With  respect  to  myself,  I  am  conscious  of  no  motive  which 
guides  me  in  this  great  and  solemn  question,  but  what  I  could 
justify  to  my  own  heart,  both  on  the  bed  of  death,  and  before 
the  tribunal  of  Omnipotence.  I  am  a  poor  man :  I  have  the 
feelings  of  a  poor  man.  If  there  are  honors  and  emoluments 
in  this  proposed  Constitution,  I  shall,  by  my  profession  and  cir- 
cumstances in  life,  be  forever  excluded  from  them.  It  is  my 
wish  and  prayer,  that  in  the  solemn  verdict  we  are  very  soon  to 
pronounce,  we  may  be  directed  to  that  measure  which  will  be 
for  the  glory,  freedom  and  felicity  of  my  country. 

I  shall  trouble  this  House  no  further,  than  by  joining  sin- 
cerely in  the  wish  of  the  honorable  gentleman  from  Topsham, 
that  the  people,  in  this  their  day,  may  know  the  things  which 
belong  to  thgir  peace. 

[The  committee  appointed  on  Saturday  to  consider  his  Excel- 
lency's propositions,  by  their  chairman,  Hon.  Mr.  Bowdoin, 
reported  a  few  alterations  to  the  amendments  submitted  to 
them ;  and  that  at  the  decision,  the  committee  consisted  of 
twenty-four ;  fifteen  of  whom  agreed  in  the  report ;  seven  were 
against  it ;  one  was  absent,  and  one  declined  giving  his  opinion.] 

Major  Lusk  concurred  in  the  idea  already  thrown  out  in  the 
debate,  that  although  the  insertion  of  the  amendments  in  the 
Constitution  was  devoutly  wished,  yet  he  did  not  see  any  reason 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  251 

to  suppose  they  ever  would  be  adopted.  Turning  from  the 
subject  of  amendments,  the  Major  entered  largely  into  the  con- 
sideration of  the  ninth  section,  and  in  the  most  pathetic  and  feel- 
ing manner  described  the  miseries  of  the  poor  natives  of  Africa, 
who  are  kidnapped  and  sold  for  slaves.  With  the  brightest  colors, 
he  painted  their  happiness  and  ease  on  their  native  shores,  and 
contrasted  them  with  their  wretched,  miserable  and  unhappy 
condition  in  a  state  of  slavery.  From  this  subject,  he  passed 
to  the  article  dispensing  with  the  qualification  of  a  religious 
test,  and  concluded  by  saying,  that  he  shuddered  at  the  idea, 
that  Roman  Catholics,  Papists  and  Pagans  might  be  introduced 
into  office  ;  and  that  Popery  and  the  Inquisition  may  be  estab- 
lished in  America. 

Rev.  Mr.  Backus.  Mr.  President :  I  have  said  very  little  in 
this  honorable  Convention  ;  but  I  now  beg  leave  to  offer  a  few 
thoughts  upon  some  points  in  the  Constitution  proposed  to  us. 
And  I  shall  begin  with  the  exclusion  of  any  religious  test. 
Many  appear  to  be  much  concerned  about  it ;  but  nothing  is 
more  evident,  both  in  reason  and  in  the  holy  Scriptures,  than 
that  religion  is  ever  a  matter  between  God  and  individuals ; 
and  therefore  no  man  or  men  can  impose  any  religious  test 
without  invading  the  essential  prerogatives  of  our  Lord  Jesus 
Christ.  Ministers  first  assumed  this  power  under  the  Christian 
name  ;  and  then  Constantine  approved  of  the  practice,  when  he 
adopted  the  profession  of  Christianity,  as  an  engine  of  state 
policy.  And  let  the  history  of  all  nations  be  searched,  from 
that  day  to  this,  and  it  will  appear  that  the  imposing  of  reli- 
gious tests  hath  been  the  greatest  engine  of  tyranny  in  the 
world.  And  I  rejoice  to  see  so  many  gentlemen  who  are  now 
giving  in  the  rights  of  conscience,  in  this  great  and  important 
matter.  Some  serious  minds  discover  a  concern  lest,  if  all 
religious  tests  should  be  excluded,  the  Congress  would  here- 
after establish  Popery  or  some  other  tyrannical  way  of  worship. 
But  it  is  most  certain  that  no  such  way  of  worship  can  be  estab- 
lished without  any  religious  test. 

Much,  Sir,  hath  been  said  about  the  importation  of  slaves 
into  this  country.  I  believe  that,  according  to  my  capacity,  no 
man  abhors  that  wicked  practice  more  than  I  do,  and  would 
gladly  make  use  of  all  lawful  means  toward  the  abolishing  of 


252  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

slavery  in  all  parts  of  the  land.  But  let  us  consider  where  we 
are,  and  what  we  are  doing.  In  the  Articles  of  Confederation, 
no  provision  was  made  to  hinder  the  importation  of  slaves  into 
any  of  these  States,  but  a  door  is  now  opened  hereafter  to  do 
it ;  and  each  State  is  at  liberty  now  to  abolish  slavery  as  soon 
as  they  please.  And  let  us  remember  our  former  connection 
with  Great  Britain,  from  whom  many  in  our  land  think  we 
ought  not  to  have  revolted.  How  did  they  carry  on  the  slave 
trade  ?  T  know  that  the  Bishop  of  Gloucester,  in  an  annual 
sermon,  in  London,  in  February,  1766,  endeavored  to  justify 
their  tyrannical  claims  of  power  over  us,  by  casting  the  reproach 
of  the  slave  trade  upon  the  Americans.  But  at  the  close  of 
the  war,  the  Bishop  of  Chester,  in  an  annual  sermon,  in  Feb- 
ruary, 1783,  ingenously  owned,  that  their  nation  is  the  most 
deeply  involved  in  the  guilt  of  that  trade  of  any  nation  in  the 
world  ;  and  also,  that  they  have  treated  their  slaves  in  the  West 
Indies  worse  than  the  French  or  Spaniards  have  done  theirs. 
Thus  slavery  grows  more  and  more  odious  through  the  world ; 
and,  as  an  honorable  gentleman  said  some  days  ago,  "  Though 
we  cannot  say  that  slavery 'is  struck  with  an  apoplexy,  yet  we 
may  hope  it  will  die  with  a  consumption."  And  a  main  source, 
Sir,  of  that  iniquity,  hath  been  an  abuse  of  the  covenant  of  cir- 
cumcision, which  gave  the  seed  of  Abraham  power  to  destroy  the 
inhabitants  of  Canaan,  and  to  take  their  houses,  vineyards,  and 
all  their  estates,  as  their  own ;  and  also  to  buy  and  hold  others 
as  servants.  And  as  Christian  privileges  are  much  greater  than 
those  of  Hebrews  were,  many  have  imagined  that  they  had  a 
right  to  seize  upon  the  lands  of  the  heathen,  and  to  destroy  or 
enslave  them  as  far  as  they  could  extend  their  power.  And 
from  thence  the  mystery  of  iniquity  carried  many  into  the 
practice  of  making  merchandise  of  slaves  and  souls  of  men. 
But  all  ought  to  remember  that  when  God  promised  the  land 
of  Canaan  to  Abraham  and  his  seed,  he  let  him  know  that  they 
were  not  to  take  possession  of  that  land  until  the  iniquity  of 
the  Amorites  was  full ;  and  then  they  did  it  under  the  imme- 
diate direction  of  Heaven ;  and  they  were  as  real  executors  of 
the  judgment  of  God  upon  those  heathen,  as  any  person  ever 
was  an  executor  of  a  criminal  justly  condemned.  And  in 
doing  it  they  were  not  allowed  to  invade  the  lands  of  the 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  253 

Edomites,  who  sprang  from  Esau,  who  was  not  only  of  the 
seed  of  Abraham,  but  was  born  at  the  same  birth  with  Israel ; 
and  yet  they  were  not  of  that  church.  Neither  was  Israel 
allowed  to  invade  the  lands  of  the  Moabites,  or  of  the  children 
of  Ammon,  who  were  of  the  seed  of  Lot.  And  no  officer  in 
Israel  had  any  legislative  power,  but  such  as  were  immediately 
inspired.  Even  David,  the  man  after  God's  own  heart,  had  no 
legislative  power,  but  only  as  he  was  inspired  from  above ;  and 
he  is  expressly  called  a  prophet  in  the  New  Testament.  And 
we  are  to  remember  that  Abraham  and  his  seed,  for  four  hun- 
dred years,  had  no  warrant  to  admit  any  strangers  into  that 
church,  but  by  buying  of  him  as  a  servant,  with  money.  And 
it  was  a  great  privilege  to  be  bought  and  adopted  into  a  reli- 
gious family  for  seven  years,  and  then  to  have  their  freedom. 
And  that  covenant  was  expressly  repealed  in  various  parts  of 
the  New  Testament ;  and  particularly  in  the  first  epistle  to  the 
Corinthians,  wherein  it  is  said,  "  Ye  are  bought  with  a  price  ; 
therefore  glorify  God  in  your  body,  and  in  your  spirit,  which 
are  God's."  And  again:  "  Circumcision  is  nothing,  anduncir- 
cumcision  is  nothing,  but  keeping  of  the  commandments  of 
God.  Ye  are  bought  with  a  price  ;  be  not  ye  the  servants  of 
men  ?  "  Thus  the  gospel  sets  all  men  upon  a  level ;  very  con- 
trary to  the  declaration  of  an  honorable  gentleman  in  this 
house,  "  That  the  Bible  was  contrived  for  the  advantage  of  a 
particular  order  of  men." 

Another  great  advantage  in  the  Constitution  before  us,  is  its 
excluding  all  titles  of  nobility  or  hereditary  succession  of 
power ;  which  hath  been  a  main  engine  of  tyranny  in  foreign 
countries.  But  the  American  Revolution  was  built  upon  the 
principle  that  all  men  are  born  with  an  equal  right  to  liberty 
and  property,  and  that  officers  have  no  right  to  any  power  but 
what  is  fairly  given  them  by  the  consent  of  the  people.  And 
in  the  Constitution  now  proposed  to  us,  a  power  is  reserved  to 
the  people,  constitutionally  to  reduce  every  officer  again  to  a 
private  station  ;  and  what  a  guard  is  this  against  their  inva- 
sion of  others'  rights  or  abusing  of  their  power  !  Such  a  door 
is  now  opened  for  the  establishing  of  righteous  government, 
and  for  securing  equal  liberty,  as  never  was  before  opened  to 
any  people  upon  earth. 


254  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

Dr.  Jarvis.  Mr.  President :  The  objections  which  gentlemen 
have  made  to  the  form  of  ratification  which  has  been  submitted 
by  your  Excellency,  have  arisen,  either  from  a  doubt  of  our 
having  a  right  to  propose  alterations,  or  from  the  supposed 
improbability  that  any  amendments  recommended  by  this  assem- 
bly, will  ever  become  a  part  of  the  Federal  system.  If  we  have 
no  right,  Sir,  to  propose  alterations,  there  remains  nothing  fur- 
ther to  be  attempted,  but  to  take  the  final  question,  independent 
of  the  propositions  for  amendment.  But,  I  hope  that  the  mere 
assertion  of  any  one  is  not  to  operate  as  an  argument  in  this 
assembly ;  and  we  are  yet  waiting  for  evidence  to  prove  this 
very  singular  position,  which  has  been  so  often  repeated.  If 
we  have  a  right,  Sir,  to  receive  or  reject  the  Constitution, 
surely  we  have  an  equal  authority  to  determine  in  what  way 
this  right  shall  be  exercised.  It  is  a  maxim,  I  believe  univer- 
sally admitted,  that  in  every  instance,  the  manner  in  which 
every  power  is  to  be  exerted,  must  be  in  its  nature  discretion- 
ary with  that  body  to  which  this  power  is  delegated.  If  this 
principle  be  just,  Sir,  the  ground  which  has  been  taken  to 
oppose  your  Excellency's  proposal,  by  disputing  the  right  of 
recommending  alterations,  must  be  necessarily  relinquished. 
But  gentlemen  say,  that  they  find  nothing  about  amendments 
in  the  commission  under  which  they  were  acting,  and  they 
conceive  it  neither  agreeable  to  the  resolution  of  the  legis- 
lature, nor  to  the  sense  of  their  constituents,  that  such  a 
scheme  should  be  adopted.  Let  us  inquire  then,  Sir,  under 
what  authority  we  are  acting ;  and  to  what  tribunal  we  are 
amenable.  Is  it  then,  Sir,  from  the  late  Federal  Convention, 
that  we  derive  our  authority  ?  Is  it  from  Congress,  or  is  it 
even  from  the  legislature  itself?  It  is  from  neither,  Sir: 
we  are  convened  in  right  of  the  people,  as  their  immediate 
representatives,  to  execute  the  most  important  trust  which  it  is 
possible  to  receive ;  and  we  are  accountable,  in  its  execution, 
to  God  only,  and  our  own  consciences.  When  gentlemen 
assert,  then,  that  we  have  no  right  to  recommend  alterations, 
they  must  have  ideas  strangely  derogatory  to  the  influence  and 
authority  of  our  constituents,  whom  we  have  the  honor  of  rep- 
resenting. But  should  it  be  thought  there  was  even  a  part  of 
the  people  who  conceived  we  were  thus  restricted  as  to  the 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  255 

forms  of  our  proceedings,  we  are  still  to  recollect  that  their 
aggregate  sense,  on  this  point,  can  only  be  determined  by  the 
voices  of  the  majority  in  this  Convention.  The  arguments  of 
those  gentlemen  who  oppose  any  propositions  of  amendments, 
amount  simply  to  this,  Sir,  that  the  whole  people  of  Massachu- 
setts, assembled  by  their  delegates,  on  the  most  solemn  and 
interesting  occasion,  are  not  at  liberty  to  resolve  in  what  form 
this  trust  shall  be  executed.  When  we  reflect  seriously  and 
coolly  on  this  point,  I  think,  Sir,  we  shall  doubt  no  longer. 

But  with  respect  to  the  prospect  of  these  amendments,  which 
are  the  subject  of  discussion,  being  adopted  by  the  first  Congress 
which  shall  be  appointed  under  the  new  Constitution,  I  really 
think,  Sir,  that  it  is  not  only  far  from  being  improbable,  but  is 
in  the  highest  degree  likely.  I  have  thought  long  and  often  on 
the  subject  of  amendments,  and  I  know  no  way  in  which  they 
could  be  more  likely  to  succeed.  If  they  were  made  conditional 
to  our  receiving  the  proposed  Constitution,  it  has  ever  appeared 
to  me,  that  a  conditional  amendment  must  operate  as  a  total 
rejection.  As  so  many  other  States  have  received  the  Constitu- 
tion as  it  is,  how  can  it  be  made  to  appear  that  they  will  not 
adhere  to  their  own  resolutions  ?  and  should  they  remain  as 
warmly  and  pertinaciously  attached  to  their  opinion,  as  we 
might  be  decidedly  in  favor  of  our  own  sentiments,  a  long  and 
painful  interval  might  elapse  before  we  should  have  the  benefit 
of  a  Federal  Constitution.  I  have  never  yet  heard  an  argument 
to  remove  this  difficulty.  Permit  me  to  inquire  of  gentlemen 
what  reason  we  have  to  suppose  that  the  States  which  have 
already  adopted  the  Constitution,  will  suddenly  consent  to  call 
a  new  Convention,  at  the  request  of  this  State.  Are  we  going 
to  expose  the  Commonwealth  to  the  disagreeable  alternative  of 
being  forced  into  a  compliance,  or  of  remaining  in  opposition, 
provided  nine  others  should  agree  to  receive  if  ?  As  highly  as 
some  persons  talk  of  the  force  of  this  State,  I  believe  we  should 
be  but  a  feeble  power,  unassisted  by  others,  and .  detached  from 
the  general  benefit  of  a  national  government.  We  are  told, 
that  under  the  blessing  of  Providence,  we  may  do  much.  It  is 
very  true,  Sir,  but  it  must  be  proved,  that  we  shall  be  most 
likely  to  secure  the  approbation  of  Heaven  by  refusing  the 
proposed  system. 


256  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

It  has  been  insinuated,  Sir,  that  these  amendments  have  been 
artfully  introduced  to  lead  to  a  decision  which  would  not  other-  * 
wise  be  had.  Without  stopping  to  remark  on  the  total  want  of 
candor  in  which  such  an  idea  has  arisen,  let  us  inquire  whether 
there  is  even  the  appearance  of  reason  to  support  this  insinua- 
tion. The  propositions  are  annexed,  it  is  true,  to  the  ratifica- 
tion ;  but  the  assent  is  complete  and  absolute  without  them. 
It  is  not  possible  it  can  be  otherwise  understood  by  a  single 
member  in  this  honorable  body.  Gentlemen,  therefore,  when 
they  make  such  an  unjust  observation,  do  no  honor  to  the  saga- 
city of  others.  Supposing  it  possible  that  any  single  member 
can  be  deceived  by  such  a  shallow  artifice,  permit  me  to  do 
justice  to  the  purity  of  intention  in  which  they  have  arisen,  by 
observing,  that  I  am  satisfied  nothing  can  be  farther  from  your 
Excellency's  intentions.  The  propositions  are  general,  and  not 
local ;  they  are  not  calculated  for  the  peculiar  interests  of  this 
State,  but  with  indiscriminate  justice  comprehend  the  circum- 
stances of  the  individual  on  the  banks  of  the  Savannah,  as  well 
as  of  the  hardy  and  industrious  husbandman  on  the  margin  of 
the  Kennebec.  Why  then  they  should  not  be  adopted,  I  confess 
I  cannot  conceive.  There  is  one  of  them  in  a  particular  man- 
ner which  is  very  agreeable  to  me.  When  we  talk  of  our  wanting 
a  bill  of  rights  to  the  new  Constitution,  the  first  article  proposed 
must  remove  every  doubt  on  this  head  ;  as,  by  positively  secur- 
ing what  is  not  expressly  delegated,  it  leaves  nothing  to  the 
uncertainty  of  conjecture,  or  to  the  refinements  of  implication, 
but  is  an  explicit  reservation  of  every  right  and  privilege  which 
are  nearest  and  most  agreeable  to  the  people.  There  has  been 
scarcely  an  instance  where  the  influence  of  Massachusetts  has 
not  been  felt  and  acknowledged  in  the  Union.  In  such  a  case, 
her  voice  will  be  heard,  Sir ;  and  I  am  fully  in  sentiment,  if 
these  amendments  are  not  engrafted  on  the  Constitution,  it  will 
be  our  own  fault.  The  remaining  seven  States  will  have  our 
example  before  them,  and  there  is  a  high  probability  that  they, 
or  at  least  some  of  them,  will  take  our  conduct  as  a  precedent, 
and  will  perhaps  assume  the  same  mode  of  procedure.  Should 
this  be  the  fact,  their  influence  will  be  united  to  ours.  But 
your  delegates  will  besides  be  subject  to  a  perpetual  instruction, 
until  its  object  is  completed  ;  and  it  will  be  always  in  the  power 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  257 

of  the  people  and  legislature  to  renew  those  instructions.  But 
if  they  should  fail,  we  must  then  acquiesce  in  the  decision  of 
the  majority  ;  and  this  is  the  known  condition  on  which  all  free 
governments  depend. 

Would  gentlemen  who  are  opposed  to  the  Constitution  wish 
to  have  no  amendments  ?  This  does  not  agree  with  their  reit- 
erated objections  to  the  proposed  system.  Or  are  they  afraid, 
Sir,  that  these  propositions  will  secure  a  larger  majority  ?  On 
such  an  occasion  we  cannot  be  too  generally  united.  The  Con- 
stitution is  a  great  political  experiment.  The  amendments  have 
a  tendency  to  remove  many  objections  which  have  been  made  to 
it;  and  I  hope,  Sir,  when  it  is  adopted,  that  they  will  be 
annexed  to  the  ratification  in  the  manner  which  your  Excellency 
has  proposed. 


Tuesday,  February  5,  1788. 

Mr.  Ames  observed,  that  at  length  it  is  admitted  that  the 
Constitution,  connected  with  the  amendments,  is  good.  Almost 
every  one  who  has  appeared  against  the  Constitution,  has 
declared  that  he  approves  it,  with  the  amendments.  One 
gentleman,  who  has  been  distinguished  by  his  zealous  opposi- 
tion, has  declared  that  he  would  hold  up  both  hands  for  it,  if  they 
could  be  adopted.  I  admire  this  candid  manner  of  discussing 
the  subject,  and  will  endeavor  to  treat  it  myself  with  equal 
care  and  fairness.  The  only  question  which  seems  to  labor,  is 
this ;  the  amendments  are  not  a  part  of  the  Constitution,  and 
there  is  nothing  better  than  a  probability  to  trust  to,  that  they 
will  ever  be  adopted.  The  nature  of  the  debate  is  totally 
shifted,  and  the  inquiry  is  now,  not  what  the  Constitution  is, 
but  what  degree  of  probability  there  is,  that  the  amendments 
will  hereafter  be  incorporated  into  it. 

Before  he  proceeded  to  discuss  this  question,  he  wished  to 
notice  two  objections  which  had  been  urged  against  his  Excel- 
lency's proposition  :  That  this  Convention,  being  confined  in 
their  powers  to  reject  or  ratify  the  Constitution  as  it  is,  have 
no  right  to  propose  amendments  ;  and  that  the  very  propositions 

33 


258  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

imply  the  Constitution  is  not  perfect,  and  amount  to  a  confes- 
sion that  it  ought  to  be  rejected.  It  is  well  that  these  objec- 
tions were  not  made  by  a  lawyer ;  they  would  have  been  called 
quibbles,  and  he  would  have  been  accused  of  having  learned 
them  at  the  bar.  Have  we  no  right  to  propose  amendments  ? 
This  is  the  fullest  representation  of  the  people  ever  known : 
and  if  we  may  not  declare  their  opinion,  and  upon  a  point  for 
which  we  have  been  elected,  how  shall  it  ever  be  known  ?  A 
majority  may  not  fully  approve  the  Constitution  ;  and  yet  they 
may  think  it  unsafe  to  reject  it :  and  they  may  fully  approve 
his  Excellency's  propositions.  What  shall  they  say  ?  That 
they  accept,  or  reject,  and  no  more  ?  They  may  be  embar- 
rassed perhaps,  to  do  either.  But  let  them  say  the  truth,  that 
they  accept  it  in  the  hope  that  the  amendments  will  obtain. 
We  are  chosen  to  consider  the  Constitution  and  it  is  clearly 
incident  to  our  appointment  to  declare  the  result  of  our  delib- 
erations. This  very  mode  of  obtaining  amendments  is  pointed 
out  in  the  Constitution  itself.  How  can  it  be  said  that  we 
have  no  right  then,  to  propose  them  ?  If,  however,  there  was 
any  irregularity  in  this  proceeding,  the  General  Court  would 
not  delay  to  confirm  it. 

If  it  is  insisted  that  the  Constitution  is  admitted  to  be 
imperfect,  let  those  objectors  consider  the  nature  of  their  own 
argument.  Do  they  expect  a  perfect  Constitution  ?  Do  they 
expect  to  find  that  perfection  in  government,  which  they  well 
know  is  not  to  be  found  in  nature  ?  There  is  not  a  man  who 
is  not  more  or  less  discontented  with  his  condition  in  life,  and 
who  does  not  experience  a  mixture  of  good  and  evil.  And  will 
he  expect  that  a  whole  society  of  men  can  exclude  that  imper- 
fection which  is  the  lot  of  every  individual  in  it  ?  The  truth 
is,  we  call  that  condition  good  and  happy,  which  is  so  upon  the 
whole.  But  this  Constitution  may  be  good  without  any 
amendments,  and  yet  the  amendments  may  be  good  ;  for  they 
,are  not  repugnant  to  the  Constitution.  It  is  a  gratification  to 
observe  how  little  we  disagree  in  our  sentiments :  but  it  is  not 
my  purpose  to  compare  the  amendments  with  the  Constitution. 
Whatever  opinion  may  be  formed  of  it  by  others,  Mr.  Ames 
professed  to  think  it  comparatively  perfect.  There  was  not  any 
government  which  he  knew  to  subsist,  or  which  he  had  ever 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  259 

heard  of,  that  would  bear  a  comparison  with  the  new  Constitu- 
tion. Considered  merely  as  a  literary  performance,  it  was  an 
honor  to  our  country  ;  legislators  have  at  length  condescended 
to  speak  the  language  of  philosophy ;  and  if  we  adopt  it,  we 
shall  demonstrate  to  the  sneering  world,  who  deride  liberty 
because  they  have  lost  it,  that  the  principles  of  our  govern- 
ment are  as  free  as  the  spirit  of  our  people. 

I  repeat  it,  our  debates  have  been  profitable,  because  upon 
every  leading  point  we  are  at  last  agreed.  Yery  few  among 
us  now  deny  that  a  federal  government  is  necessary  to  save  us 
from  ruin ;  that  the  Confederation  is  not  that  government ; 
and  that  the  proposed  Constitution,  connected  with  the  amend- 
ments, is  worthy  of  being  adopted.  The  question  recurs,  will 
the  amendments  prevail  and  become  part  of  the  system  ?  In 
order  to  obtain  such  a  system  as  the  Constitution  and  the 
amendments,  there  are  but  three  ways  of  proceeding;  to  reject 
the  whole  and  begin  anew ;  to  adopt  this  plan,  upon  condition 
that  the  amendments  be  inserted  into  it;  or  to  adopt  his 
Excellency's  propositions. 

Those  who  propose  to  reject  the  whole,  are  bound  to  show 
that  we  shall  possess  some  advantage  in  forming  a  system 
which  we  do  not  enjoy  at  present,  or  that  some  obstacles  will 
be  removed  which  impede  us  now.  But  will  that  be  the  case  ? 
Shall  we  adopt  another  Constitution  with  more  unanimity  than 
we  expect  to  find  in  this  Convention  ?  Do  gentlemen  so  soon 
forget  their  own  arguments  ?  We  have  been  told  that  the  new 
Constitution  will  be  rebellion  against  the  Confederation ;  that 
the  interests  of  the  States  are  too  dissimilar  for  an  Union ;  and 
that  Massachusetts  can  do  without  the  Union,  and  is  a  match 
for  all  the  world.  We  have  been  warned  of  the  tendency  of 
all  power  towards  tyranny,  and  of  the  danger  of  trusting  Con- 
gress with  the  power  of  the  purse  and  of  the  sword ;  that  the 
system  is  not  perfect ;  there  is  no  religious  test,  and  slavery  is 
not  abolished.  Now,  Sir,  if  we  reject  the  Constitution,  and 
after  two  or  three  years  exertion,  another  Constitution  should 
be  submitted  to  another  Convention  of  Massachusetts,  shall  we 
escape  the  opposition  which  is  made  in  this  assembly  ?  Will 
not  the  same  objections  then  apply,  with  equal  force,  to  another 
system  ?     Or  do  gentlemen  expect  that  a  Constitution  may  be 


260  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

formed  which  will  not  be  liable  to  those  objections  ?  Do  they 
expect  one  which  will  not  annul  the  Confederation,  or  that  the 
persons  and  properties  of  the  people  shall  not  be  included  in 
the  compact,  and  that  we  shall  hear  no  more  about  armies  and 
taxes  ?  But  suppose  that  it  was  so  framed,  who  is  there  even 
amongst  the  objectors  who  would  give  his  vote  for  so  paltry  a 
system  ?  If  we  reject,  we  are  exposed  to  the  risk  of  having  no 
Constitution,  of  being  torn  with  factions,  and  at  last  divided 
into  distinct  Confederacies. 

If  we  accept,  upon  condition,  shall  we  have  a  right  to  send 
members  to  the  new  Congress  ?  We  shall  not ;  and  of  course 
this  State  would  lose  its  voice  and  influence  in  obtaining  the 
adoption  of  the  amendments.  This  is  too  absurd  to  need  any 
further  discussion. 

But  in  objection  to  your  Excellency's  propositions,  it  is  said 
that  it  is  no  more  than  probable  that  they  will  be  agreed  to  by 
the  other  States.  I  ask  what  is  any  future  thing  that  we 
devise,  more  than  probable  ?  What  more  is  another  Constitu- 
tion ?  All  agree  that  we  must  have  one  ;  and  it  is  easy  to 
perceive  that  such  an  one  as  the  majority  of  the  people  approve 
must  be  submitted  to  by  this  State ;  for  what  right  have  an 
eighth  or  a  tenth  part  of  the  people  to  dictate  a  government  for 
the  whole  ?  It  comes  to  this  point,  therefore :  is  any  method 
more  likely  to  induce  the  people  of  the  United  States  to  con- 
cur with  Massachusetts,  than  that  proposed  by  your  Excel- 
lency ?  If  it  is  answered  that  there  is  none,  as  I  think  it 
must  be,  then  the  objection  that  the  chance  of  obtaining  the 
amendments  is  no  more  than  probable,  will  come  to  the 
ground,  and  it  will  appear  that  of  all  chances  we  depend  upon 
that  which  is  the  safest.  For  when  will  the  voice  of  Massa- 
chusetts have  so  powerful  an  influence  as  at  present  ?  There 
is  not  any  government  now  to  counteract  or  awe  the  people. 
The  attention  of  the  people  is  excited  from  one  end  of  the 
States  to  the  other,  and  they  will  watch  and  control  the  con- 
duct of  their  members  in  Congress.  Such  amendments  as 
aflord  better  security  to  liberty  will  be  supported  by  the  people. 
There  will  be  a  Congress  in  existence  .to  collect  their  senti- 
ments and  to  pursue  the  objects  of  their  wishes.  Nine  States 
may  insert  amendments  into  the  Constitution ;  but  if  we  reject 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  261 

it,  the  vote  must  be  unanimous.  Our  State  in  that  case,  would 
lose  the  advantage  of  having  representatives  according  to  the 
numbers,  which  is  allowed  by  the  Constitution.  Upon  a  few 
points,  and  those  not  of  a  local  nature,  unanimity  may  be 
expected.  But  in  discussing  a  whole  Constitution,  in  which 
the  very  amendments,  that  it  is  said  will  not  be  agreed  to  by 
the  States,  are  to  be  inserted,  unanimity  will  be  almost  a  mira- 
cle. Either  the  amendments  will  be  agreed  to  by  the  Union, 
or  they  will  not.  If  it  is  admitted  that  they  will  be  agreed  to, 
then  there  is  an  end  of  the  objection  to  your  Excellency's 
propositions,  and  we  ought  to  be  unanimous  for  the  Constitu- 
tion. If  it  is  said  that  they  will  not  be  agreed  to,  then  it  must 
be  because  they  are  not  approved  by  the  United  States,  or  at 
least,  nine  of  them.  Why  shall  we  reject  the  Constitution, 
then,  for  the  sole  purpose  of  obtaining  that  unanimous  vote  of 
thirteen  States,  which  it  is  confidently  said  it  is  impossible  we 
ever  shall  obtain  from  nine  only  ?  An  object  which  is  impos- 
sible is  out  of  the  question.  The  argument  that  the  amend- 
ments will  not  prevail  is  not  only  without  force,  but  directly 
against  those  who  use  it,  unless  they  admit  that  we  have  no 
need  of  a  government,  or  assert  that  by  ripping  up  the  founda- 
tions of  compact,  upon  which  we  now  stand,  and  setting  the 
whole  Constitution  afloat,  and  introducing  an  infinity  of  new 
subjects  of  controversy,  we  pursue  the  best  method  to  secure 
the  entire  unanimity  of  thirteen  States. 

But  shall  we  put  everything  that  we  hold  precious  to  the 
hazard,  by  rejecting  this  Constitution  ?  We  have  great  advan- 
tages by  it  in  respect  of  navigation  ;  and  it  is  the  general  inter- 
est of  the  States  that  we  should  have  them.  But  if  we  reject 
it,  what  security  have  we  that  we  shall  obtain  them  a  second 
time,  against  the  local  interests  and  prejudices  of  the  other 
States  ?  WTho  is  there  that  really  loves  liberty,  that  will  not 
tremble  for  its  safety,  if  the  Federal  government  should  be  dis- 
solved ?     Can  liberty  be  safe  without  government  ? 

The  period  of  our  political  dissolution  is  approaching. 
Anarchy  and  uncertainty  attend  our  future  state ;  but  this  we 
know,  that  liberty,  which  is  the  soul  of  our  existence,  once  fled, 
can  return  no  more. 

The  Union  is  essential  to  our  being  as  a  nation.     The  pillars 


262  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

that  prop  it,  are  crumbling  to  powder.  The  Union  is  the  vital 
sap  that  nourishes  the  tree.  If  we  reject  the  Constitution,  to 
use  the  language  of  the  country,  we  girdle  the  tree,  its  leaves 
will  wither  and  its  branches  drop  off,  and  the  mouldering 
trunk  will  be  torn  down  by  the  tempest.  What  security  has 
this  single  State  against  foreign  enemies  ?  Could  we  defend 
the  mast  country  which  the  Britons  so  much  desire  ?  Can  we 
protect  our  fisheries  or  secure  by  treaties  a  sale  for  the  produce 
of  our  lands  in  foreign  markets  ?  Is  there  no  loss,  no  danger, 
by  delay  ?  In  spite  of  our  negligence  and  perverseness,  are  we 
to  enjoy,  at  all  times,  the  privilege  of  forming  a  Constitution 
which  no  other  nation  has  ever  enjoyed  at  all  ?  We  approve 
our  own  form  of  State  government,  and  seem  to  think  ourselves 
in  safety  under  its  protection.  We  talk  as  if  there  was  no 
danger  in  deciding  wrong.  But  when  the  inundation  comes, 
shall  we  stand  on  dry  land  ?  The  State  government  is  a  beau- 
tiful structure.  It  is  situated,  however,  upon  the  naked  beach. 
The  Union  is  the  dike  to  fence  out  the  flood.  That  dike  is 
broken  and  decayed,  an$  if  we  do  not  repair  it,  when  the  next 
spring-tide  comes,  we  shall  be  buried  in  one  common  destruc- 
tion. 

Mr.  Barrell  (of  York).  Awed  in  the  presence  of  this 
august  assembly ;  conscious  of  my  inability  to  express  my 
mind  fully  on  this  important  occasion,  and  sensible  how  little 
1  must  appear  in  the  eyes  of  those  giants  of  rhetoric,  who  have 
exhibited  such  a  pompous  display  of  declamation  ;  without  any 
of  those  talents  calculated  to  draw  attention ;  without  the 
pleasing  eloquence  of  Cicero,  or  the  blaze  of  Demosthenian 
oratory,  I  rise,  Sir,  to  discharge  my  duty  to  my  constituents, 
who  I  know,  expect  something  more  from  me  than  merely 
a  silent  vote.  With  no  pretension's  to  talents  above  the  simple 
language  adapted  to  the  line  of  my  calling,  the  plain  husband- 
man, I  hope  the  gentlemen  who  compose  this  honorable  body  will 
fully  understand  me  when  I  attempt  to  speak  my  mind  of  the 
Federal  Constitution  as  it  now  stands.  I  wish,  Sir,  to  give  my 
voice  for  its  amendment  before  it  can  be  salutary  for  our 
acceptance  ;  because,  Sir,  notwithstanding  the  Wilsonian  ora- 
tory, and  all  the  learned  arguments  I  have  seen  written, 
notwithstanding  the  many  labored  speeches  I  have  heard  in 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  263 

its  defence,  and  after  the  best  investigation  I  am  able  to  give 
this  subject,  I  fear  it  is  pregnant  with  baneful  effects,  although 
I  may  not  live  to  feel  them. 

Because,  Sir,  as  it  now  stands,  Congress  will  be  vested  with 
more  extensive  powers  than  ever  Great  Britain  exercised  over 
us,  too  great  in  my  opinion  to  entrust  with  any  class  of  men,  let 
their  talents  or  virtues  be  ever  so  conspicuous,  even  though 
composed  of  such  exalted,  amiable  characters  as  the  great 
Washington  :  for  while  we  consider  them  as  men  of  like  pas- 
sions, the  same  spontaneous,  inherent  thirst  for  power  with 
ourselves ; .  great  and  good  as  they  may  be,  when  they  enter 
upon  this  all  important  charge,  what  security  can  we  have  that 
they  will  continue  so  ?  And,  Sir,  were  we  sure  they  would 
continue  the  faithful  gaurdians  of  our  liberties,  and  prevent 
any  infringement  on  the  privileges  of  the  people,  what  assur- 
ance can  we  have  that  such  men  will  always  hold  the  reins  of 
government ;  that  their  successors  will  be  such  ?  History  tells 
us  Rome  was  happy  under  Augustus,  though  wretched  under 
Nero,  who  could  have  no  greater  powerthan  Augustus  :  and  yet 
this  same  Nero,  when  young  in  government,  could  shed  tears 
on  signing  a  death  warrant,  though  afterwards  he  became  so 
callous  to  the  tender  feelings  of  humanity,  as  to  behold  with 
pleasure,  Rome  in  flames. 

Because,  Sir,  I  think  that  six  years  is  too  long  a  term  for  any 
set  of  men  to  be  at  the  helm  of  government ;  for  in  that  time 
they  may  get  so  firmly  rooted,  and  their  influence  be  so  great 
as  to  continue  themselves  for  life. 

Because,  Sir,  I  am  not  certain  we  are  able  to  support  the 
additional  expense  of  such  a  government. 

Because,  Sir,  I  think  a  continental  collector  will  not  be  so 
likely  to  do  us  justice  in  collecting  the  taxes,  as  collectors  of 
our  own. 

Because,  Sir,  I  think  a  frame  of  government  on  which  all 
laws  are  founded,  should  be  so  simple  and  explicit,  that  the 
most  illiterate  may  understand  it,  whereas  this  appears  to  me 
so  obscure  and  ambiguous  that  the  most  capacious  mind  can- 
not fully  comprehend  it. 

Because,  Sir,  the  duties  of  excise  and  impost,  and  to  be 
taxed  besides,  appear  too  great  a  sacrifice  :  and  when  we  have 


264:  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

given  them  up,  what  shall  we  have  to  pay  our  own  debts  but  a 
dry  tax  ? 

Because,  Sir,  I  do  not  think  this  will  produce  the  efficient 
government  we  are  in  pursuit  of. 

Because,  Sir,  they  fix  their  own  salaries,  without  allowing 
any  control. 

And  because,  Sir,  I  think  such  a  government  may  be  disa- 
greeable to  men  with  the  high  notions  of  liberty  we  Americans 
have. 

And,  Sir,  I  could  wish  this  Constitution  had  not  been  in 
some  parts  of  the  continent  hurried  on  like  the  driving  of 
Jehu,  very  furiously,  for  such  important  transactions  should 
be  without  force,  and  with  cool  deliberation.  These,  Sir,  were 
my  objections,  and  those  of  my  constituents,  as  they  occur  to 
my  memory ;  some  of  which  have  been  removed  in  the  course 
of  the  debates,  by  the  ingenious  reasoning  of  the  speakers ;  I 
wish  I  could  say  the  whole  were.  But,  after  all,  there  are  some 
yet  remain  on  my  mind,  enough  to  convince  me,  excellent  as 
this  system  is,  in  some  respects  it  needs  alterations  ;  therefore, 
1  think  it  becomes  us,  as  wise  men,  as  the  faithful  guardians  of 
the  people's  rights,  and  as  we  wish  well  to  posterity,  to  propose 
such  amendments  as  will  secure  to  us  and  ours  that  liberty, 
without  which  life  is  a  burden. 

Thus,  Sir,  have  I  ventured,  to  deliver  my  sentiments,  in 
which  are  involved  those  of  my  constituents,  on  this  important 
subject,  cautiously  avoiding  every  thing  like  metaphysical  reas- 
oning, lest  I  should  invade  the  prerogative  of  those  respectable 
gentlemen  of  the  law,  who  have  so  copiously  displayed  their 
talents  on  this  occasion.  But,  Sir,  although  you  may  perceive, 
by  what  I  have  said,  that  this  is  not,  in  my  view,  the  most  per- 
fect system  I  could  wish  ;  yet  as  I  am  possessed  with  an  assur- 
ance that  the  proposed  amendments  will  take  place ;  as  I  dread 
the  fatal  effects  of  anarchy  ;  as  1  am  convinced  the  Confederation 
is  essentially  deficient,  and  that  it  will  be  more  difficult  to 
amend  that  than  to  reform  this ;  and  as  I  think  this  Constitu- 
tion, with  all  its  imperfections,  is  excellent  compared  with  that ; 
and  that  it  is  the  best  Constitution  we  can  now  obtain ;  as  the 
greatest  good  I  can  do  my  country  at  present,  I  could  wish  for 
an  adjournment,  that  I  might  have  an  opportunity  to  lay  it 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  265 

before  my  constituents  with  the  arguments  which  have  been 
used  in  the  debates,  which  have  eased  my  mind,  and  I  trust 
would  have  the  effect  on  theirs,  so  as  heartily  to  join  me  in 
ratifying  the  same.  But,  Sir,  if  I  cannot  be  indulged  on  this 
desirable  object,  I  am  almost  tempted  to  risk  their  displeasure 
and  adopt  it  without  their  consent. 

Dr.  Taylor  examined  the  observations  of  several  gentlemen, 
who  had  said,  that  had  the  Constitution  been  so  predicated  as 
to  require  a  bill  of  rights  to  be  annexed  to  it  it  would  have  been 
the  work  of  a  year,  and  could  not  be  contained  but  in  volumes. 
This,  if  true,  he  said,  was  an  argument  in  favor  of  one  being 
annexed ;  but  so  far  from  its  being  the  case,  he  believed  any 
gentleman  in  that  Convention  could  form  one  in  a  few  hours ; 
as  he  might  take  the  bill  of  rights  of  Massachusetts  for  a  guide. 
He  concluded  by  objecting  to  the  amendments,  because  no 
assurance  was  given  that  they  ever  would  become  a  part  of  the 
system. 

Mr.  Parsons  demonstrated  the  impracticability  of  forming  a 
bill,  in  a  national  Constitution,  for  securing  individual  rights, 
and  showed  the  inutility  of  the  measure,  from  the  idea,  that 
no  power' was  given  to  Congress  to  infringe  on  any  one  of  the 
natural  rights  of  the  people  by  this  Constitution ;  and  should 
they  attempt  it,  without  constitutional  authority,  the  act  would 
be  a  nullity  and  could  not  be  enforced. 

Several  other  gentlemen  spoke  in  a  desultory  conversation  on 
the  amendments.  It  was  urged  again  and  again,  on  one  side, 
that  it  was  uncertain  whether  they  would  ever  be  interwoven 
in  the  Constitution ;  and  that,  therefore,  they  could  not  vote 
for  it  on  that  precarious  condition.  On  the  other  side,  the 
importance  of  the  opinion  of  Massachusetts,  in  other  States,  in 
determining  on  great  political  questions,  the  general  nature  of 
the  amendments  proposed,  &c,  were  repeatedly  urged  in  favor 
of  their  being  a  part  of  the  ratification. 

[A  motion  was  made  by  Mr.  Dench,  and  seconded :  That  for 
the  purpose  of  informing  the  good  people  of  this  Common- 
wealth of  the  principles  of  the  proposed  Federal  Constitution, 
and  the  amendments  offered  by  his  Excellency  the  President, 
and  reported  by  the  committee ;  and  of  uniting  their  opinions 
respecting  the  same,  this  Convention  do  adjourn  to  a  future 

34 


266  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

day.  After  debate,  (which  continued  the  best  part  of  the  day,) 
the  question  was  put,  and  was  determined  in  the  negative ; 
three  hundred  and  twenty-nine  members  being  present,  and  one 
hundred  and  fifteen  only  voting  in  the  affiramtive.] 


Wednesday,  February  6, 1788. 

[The  Hon.  Mr.  Adams  introduced  some  amendments  to  be 
added  to  those  reported  by  the  committee  ;  but  they  not  meet- 
ing the  approbation  of  those  gentlemen  whose  minds  they  were 
intended  to  ease,  after  they  were  debated  a  considerable  time, 
the  honorable  gentlemen  withdrew  them.] 

Rev.  Mr.  Stillman.  Mr.  President :  I  rise,  with  deference 
to  gentlemen  of  superior  abilities,  to  give  my  opinion  on  the 
all  important  national  question,  and  the  reasons  on  which  it  is 
founded  ;  an  opinion,  the  result  of  the  most  serious  delibera- 
tion. 

Upon  entering  the  Convention,  it  was  my  full  determination 
to  keep  my  mind  cool  and  open  to  conviction,  that  so  I  might 
profit  by  the  discussion  of  this  interesting  subject ;  and  now, 
Sir,  return  my  sincere  thanks  to  the  gentlemen  who  have  taken 
opposite  sides  in  the  course  of  the  debates.  From  both  I  have 
received  advantage :  from  one  class,  in  bringing  forward  a  great 
variety  of  objections  ;  from  the  other  class,  in  answering  them. 
Whatever  my  previous  opinion  was,  I  now  stand  on  firmer 
ground  than  ever,  respecting  the  proposed  Constitution. 

But  my  present  situation,  Sir,  is  to  me  extremely  affecting. 
To  be  called  by  the  voice  of  my  fellow  citizens  to  give  my  vote 
for  or  against  a  Constitution  of  government  that  will  involve 
the  happiness  or  misery  of  millions  of  my  countrymen,  is  of  so 
solemn  a  nature  as  to  have  occasioned  the  most  painful  anxiety. 

I  have  no  interest  to  influence  me  to  accept  this  Constitution 
of  government,  distinct  from  the  interest  of  my  countrymen  at 
at  large.  We  are  all  embarked  in  one  bottom  and  must  sink 
or  swim  together. 

Besides,  Sir,  Heaven  has  fixed  me  in  a  line  of  duty  that  pre- 
cludes every  prospect  of  the  honors  and  the  emoluments  of 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  267 

office.  Let  who  will  govern,  I  must  obey.  Nor  would  I  ex- 
change the  pulpit  for  the  highest  honors  my  country  can  confer. 
I,  too,  have  personal  liberties  to  secure,  as  dear  to  me  as  any 
gentlemen  in  the  Convention,  and  as  numerous  a  family,  prob- 
ably, to  engage  my  attention.  Besides  which,  I  stand  here, 
with  my  very  honorable  colleagues,  as  a  representative  of  the 
citizens  of  this  great  metropolis  who  have  been  pleased  to 
honor  me  with  their  confidence  ;  an  honor,  in  my  view,  unspeak- 
ably greater  than  a  peerage  or  a  pension. 

The  absolute  deficiency  of  the  Articles  of  Confederation  is 
allowed  by  all.  Nor  have  I  seen  any  publication  that  places 
this  subject  in  so  convincing  a  point  of  light  as  a  letter  written 
by  his  Excellency  Governor  Randolph,  which  has  appeared  in 
several  of  our  newspapers ;  whom  I  the  rather  introduce  on 
this  occasion,  because  he  was  a  delegate  in  the  late  Federal 
Convention,  refused  to  sign  the  Constitution  before  us,  and  has 
been  twice  mentioned  by  gentlemen  in  the  opposition.  His 
candor,  apparent  in  the  letter  referred  to,  does  him  honor,  and 
merits  the  esteem  of  every  candid  mind.  I  declare,  Sir,  I 
revere  his  character,  while  I  differ  from  him  in  opinion. 

"  Before  my  departure  for  the  (Federal)  Convention,"  says 
he,  "  I  believed  that  the  Confederation  was  not  so  eminently 
defective  as  it  had  been  supposed.  But  after  I  had  entered  into 
a  free  conversation  with  those  who  were  best  informed  of  the 
condition  and  interest  of  each  State  ;  after  I  had  compared  the 
intelligence  derived  from  them,  with  the  properties  that  ought  to 
characterize  the  government  of  our  Union,  I  became  persuaded 
that  the  Confederation  was  destitute  of  every  energy  which  a 
Constitution  of  the  United  States  ought  to  possess."  And 
after  he  had  in  a  most  masterly  manner  proved  its  inefficiency, 
he  adds,  "  But  now,  Sir,  permit  me  to  declare,  that  in  my  hum- 
ble judgment,  the  powers,  by  which  alone  the  blessings  of  a 
general  government  can  be  accomplished ,  cannot  be  interwoven 
in  the  Confederation,  without  a  change  of  its  very  essence ;  or, 
in  other  words,  that  that  Confederation  must  be  thrown  aside." 
Having  stated  his  objections  to  it,  he  proceeded  thus  :  "  My  infer- 
ence from  these  facts  and  principles  is,  that  the  new  powers 
must  be  deposited  in  a  new  body,  growing  out  of  the  consolida- 
tion of  the  Union,  as  far  as  the  circumstances  of  the  States 


268  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

will  allow."  Thus  fully  and  candidly  does  this  gentleman 
insist  on  the  absolute  necessity  of  a  new  Constitution  of  general 
government,  at  the  very  time  that  he  objected  to  the  present 
form,  and  concludes  his  letter  with  these  memorable  words, 
which  I  most  heartily  wish  may  make  a  deep  impression  on  the 
mind  of  every  gentleman  in  the  opposition  :  "  I  hesitate  not  to 
say,  that  the  most  fervent  prayer  of  my  soul  is  the  establish- 
ment of  a  firm,  energetic  government ;  that  the  most  inveterate 
curse  that  can  befal  us  is  a  dissolution  of  the  Union ;  and  that 
the  present  moment,  if  suffered  to  pass  away  unemployed,  can 
never  be  recalled.  I  shall  therefore  cling  to  the  Union  as  the 
rock  of  our  salvation,  and  urge  Virginia  to  finish  the  salutary 
work  which  she  hath  begun.  And  if,  after  our  best  efforts  for 
amendments,  they  cannot  be  obtained,  I  scruple  not  to  declare 
(notwithstanding  the  advantage  the  declaration  may  give  to 
the  enemies  of  my  proposal)  that  I  will,  as  an  individual 
citizen,  accept  the  Constitution." 

I  pause,  Sir,  that  every  gentleman  present  may  have  time  to 
indulge  those  feelings  which  these  excellent  expressions  must 
occasion.  May  that  God  who  has  the  hearts  of  all  'men  under 
his  control,  inspire  every  member  of  this  Convention  with  a 
similar  disposition !  Then  shall  we  lay  aside  every  opposite 
interest,  and  unite,  as  a  band  of  brothers,  in  the  ratification  of 
this  Constitution  of  national  government. 

Then,  Sir,  will  your  terms  of  conciliation  be  attended  to 
with  gratitude  and  candor.  Your  Excellency,  depressed  with 
bodily  infirmity,  and  exercised  with  severe  pain,  has  stepped 
forth  at  the  critical  moment,  and,  from  the  benevolence  of  your 
heart,  presented  us  with  a  number  of  proposed  amendments, 
in  order,  if  possible,  to  quiet  the  minds  of  the  gentlemen  in 
the  opposition  and  bring  us  together  in  amity  and  peace ; 
amendments  which  you,  Sir,  declare  you  do  not  think  neces- 
sary, except  for  the  sole  purpose  of  uniting  us  in  a  common 
and  most  important  cause. 

r~"l?ut  what  has  been  the  consequence  of  your  Excellency's 
conciliatory  propositions  ?  Jealousy  ;  jealousy,  Sir,  that  there 
was  a  snake  in  the  grass ;  a  secret  intention  to  deceive !  I 
shudder  at  the  ungenerous  suggestion ;  nor  will  I  dwell  a 
moment  longer  on  the  distressing  idea.\  Be  banished  forever, 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  269 

the  groundless  suspicion  of  him  whose  name  stands  foremost  in 
the  list  of  American  patriots !     Let  love  and  harmony  prevail. 

The  important  hour  is  just  arrived  when  the  die  will  be  cast, 
that  will,  in  a  great  measure,  determine  the  fate  of  this  Com- 
monwealth and  have  a  mighty  influence  on  the  general  interest 
of  the  Union  ;  for,  from  the  best  information  I  have  been  able 
to  collect  from  gentlemen  of  observation  and  of  undoubted 
veracity,  there  is  the  greatest  reason  to  fear  that  the  rejection 
of  this  Constitution  will  be  followed  with  anarchy  and  confusion. 

The  Convention,  I  doubt  not,  will  bear  with  me  while  I  take 
a  general  view  of  the  Constitution  -before  us. 

From  all  that  has  been  said  on  the  subject  of  biennial  elec- 
tions, it  is  my  decided  opinion,  that  two  years  in  the  general 
government  will  not  be  in  proportion  to  one  year  in  the  local 
governments ;  because,  in  the  former,  the  objects  of  govern- 
ment will  be  great,  numerous  and  extensive ;  in  the  latter, 
comparatively  small  and  limited.  The  general  government 
involves  all  the  States  now  in  the  Union ;  all  such  as  shall  in 
future  accede  to  it ;  all  foreign  nations  with  whom  we  are  now, 
or  hereafter  shall  be,  in  alliance ;  an  extensive  and  growing 
commerce  ;  war  and  peace,  &c,  &c. 

It  has  been  said,  that  this  is  a  stride  toward  septennial  elec- 
tions or  perpetuity  in  office.  I  answer,  the  Constitution  itself 
is  to  be  the  rule;  that  declares,  that  "representatives  shall  be 
chosen  every  second  year  by  the  people  of  the  several  States." 
Elections  then  of  representatives  must  be  every  second  year ; 
nor  can  they  be  otherwise,  without  a  direct  violation  of  the 
Constitution.  The  men  who  shall  be  wicked  enough  to  do  this, 
would  not  be  restrained  had  the  elections  been  annual ;  it  being 
equally  easy  to  violate  the  Constitution  in  the  one  case  as  in 
the  other.  Elections,  indeed,  ought  to  be  so  frequent  as  to 
make  the  representatives  feel  that  they  are  dependent  on,  and 
amenable  to,  the  people.  The  difference  then  between  annual 
and  biennial  elections  is  small ;  and  in  either  case  will  answer 
the  end  just  mentioned. 

The  powers  that  are  granted  to  Congress  by  this  instrument 
are  great  and  extensive  ;  but,  Sir,  they  are  defined  and  limited, 
and,  in  my  judgment,  sufficiently  checked  ;  which  I  shall  prove 
before  I  sit  down.     These  powers  have  been  the  subject  of  long 


270      ,  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

and  ingenious  debate.  But  the  arguments  that  have  been  made 
use  of  against  delegating  these  powers  to  the  general  govern- 
ment prove  too  much,  being  applicable  to  all  delegated  power ; 
I  mean  the  possible  abuse  of  it.  The  very  term,  government, 
implies  a  supreme,  controlling  power  somewhere  ;  a  power  to 
coerce,  whenever  coercion  shall  be  necessary ;  of  which  neces- 
sity government  must  be  the  judge.  This  is  admitted  ;  if  so, 
the  power  may  be  abused.  Every  gentleman  must  confess,  that 
we  cannot  give  a  power  to  do  good,  but  it  may  be  abused  to  do 
evil.  If  a  merchant  commits  the  care  of  a  ship  and  cargo  to 
the  master,  he  may  dispose  of  both  and  appropriate  the  money 
to  his  own  use.  If  we  raise  a  body  of  men  and  put  arms  into 
their  hands  for  our  defence,  they  may  turn  them  against  us  and 
destroy  us.  All  these  things  prove,  however,  that  in  order  to 
guard  as  much  as  possible  against  the  abuse  of  those  powers 
we  delegate  to  government,  there  ought  to  be  sufficient  checks 
to  them ;  every  precaution  should  be  used  to  secure  the  liber- 
ties of  the  people  on  the  one  hand  and  not  render  the  govern- 
ment inefficient  on  the  other.  I  believe,  Sir,  such  security  is 
provided  in  this  Constitution ;  if  not,  no  consideration  shall 
induce  me  to  give  my  voice  in  its  favor.  But  the  people  are 
secured  by  the  following  circumstances : — 

1st.  All  the  offices  in  Congress  are  elective,  not  hereditary. 
The  president  and  senators  are  to  be  chosen  by  the  interposi- 
tion of  the  legislatures  of  the  several  States,  who  are  the  repre 
sentatives  and  guardians  of  the  people;  whose  honor  and 
interest  will  lead  them,  in  all  human  probability,  to  have  good 
men  placed  in  the  general  government. 

2d.  The  representatives  in  Congress  are  to  be  chosen  every 
second  year  by  the  people  in  the  several  States.  Consequently 
it  lies  with  the  people,  themselves,  to  say  who  shall  represent 
them.  It  will  then  be  their  own  fault  if  they  do  not  choose  the 
best  men  in  the  Commonwealth. 

Who  are  Congress,  then  ?  They  are  ourselves  ;  the  men  of 
our  own  choice,  in  whom  we  can  confide  ;  whose  interest  is  insep- 
arably connected  with  our  own.  Why  is  it,  then,  that  gentle- 
men speak  of  Congress  as  some  foreign  body — as  a  set  of  men 
who  will  seek  every  opportunity  to  enslave  us  ?  Such  institu- 
tions are  repugnant  to  the  spirit  of  the  Constitution. 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  271 

But  a  worthy  gentleman  from  Middleborough  has  told  us, 
that  though  they  may  be  good  men  when  chosen,  they  may  become 
corrupt.  They  may  so  ;  nor  is  it  in  the  power  of  angels  or 
men  to  prevent  it ;  but  should  this  be  the  case,  the  Constitution 
has  made  provision  for  such  an  event.  When  it  happens,  we 
shall  know  what  method  to  adopt,  in  order  to  bring  them  to 
punishment. 

In  all  governments  where  officers  are  elective,  there  ever  has 
been,  and  there  ever  will  be,  a  competition  of  interests.  They 
who  are  in  office  wish  to  keep  in,  and  they  who  are  out,  to  get 
in ;  the  probable  consequence  of  which  will  be,  that  they  who 
are  already  in  place,  will  be  attentive  to  the  rights  of  the  peo- 
ple, because  t\\ej  know  that  they  are  dependent  on  them  for  a 
future  election  which  can  be  secured  by  good  behavior  only. 
Besides,  they  who  are  out  of  office  will  watch  them  who  are  in 
with  a  most  critical  eye,  in  order  to  discover  and  expose  their 
mal-conduct,  if  guilty  of  any,  that  so  they  may  step  into  their 
places.  Every  gentleman  knows  the  influence  that  a  desire  to 
obtain  a  place,  or  the  fear  of  losing  it,  hath  on  mankind.  Mr. 
Burgh  tells  us,  that  towards  the  close  of  the  seven  years  for 
which  the  representatives  are  chosen  in  the  British  Parliament, 
they  become  exceedingly  polite  to  the  people.  Why  ?  Because 
they  know  there  is  an  approaching  election  depending.  This 
competition  of  interest,  therefore,  between  those  persons  who 
are  in  and  those  who  are  out  of  office,  will  ever  form  one 
important  check  to  the  abuse  of  power  in  our  representatives. 

3d.  Every  two  years  there  will  be  a  revolution  in  the  gen- 
eral government  in  favor  of  the  people.  At  the  expiration  of 
the  first  two  years  there  will  be  a  new  choice  of  representatives ; 
at  the  expiration  of  the  second  two  years  there  will  be  a  new 
choice  of  president  and  representatives ;  and  at  the  expiration 
of  the  third  term,  making  six  years  from  the  commencement 
of  the  Congress,  there  will  be  a  new  choice  of  senators  and 
representatives.  We  all  know,  Sir,  that  power  thus  frequently 
reverting  to  the  people  will  prove  a  security  to  their  liberties, 
and  a  most  important  check  to  the  power  of  the  general 
government. 

4th.  Congress  can  make  no  laws  that  will  oppress  the  people 
which  will  not  equally  involve  themselves  in  the  oppression. 


272  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

What  possible  motive  then  can  Congress  have  to  abuse  their 
power  ?  Can  any  man  suppose  that  they  will  be  so  lost  to  their 
own  interest  as  to  abuse  their  power,  knowing,  at  the  same 
time,  that  they  equally  involve  themselves  in  the  difficulty  ?  It 
is  a  most  improbable  supposition.  This  would  be  like  a  man's 
cutting  off  his  nose  to  spite  his  face.  I  place  this,  Sir,  among  the 
securities  of  the  liberties  of  my  fellow-citizens,  and  rejoice  in  it. 

5th.  Congress  guarantee  to  every  State  in  the  Union  a 
republican  form  of  government,  and  engage  to  protect  them 
against  all  foreign  and  domestic  enemies  ;  that  is,  as  it  hath 
been  justly  observed  by  the  honorable  gentleman  (Mr.  Adams) 
near  me,  of  known  and  tried  abilities  as  a  politician,  each 
State  shall  choose  such  republican  form  of  government  as  they 
please,  and  Congress  solemnly  engage  themselves  to  protect  it 
from  every  kind  of  violence,  whether  of  faction  at  home  or 
enemies  abroad.  This  is  an  admirable  security  of  the  people 
at  large,  as  well  as  of  the  several  governments  of  the  States ; 
consequently  the  general  government  cannot  swallow  up  the 
local  governments,  as  some  gentlemen  have  suggested.  Their 
existence  is  dependent  on  each  other,  and  must  stand  or  fall 
together.  Should  Congress  ever  attempt  the  destruction  of 
the  particular  legislatures,  they  would  be  in  the  same  predica- 
ment with  Samson,  who  overthrew  the  house  in  which  the 
Philistines  were  making  sport  at  his  expense  ;  them  he  killed 
indeed,  but  he  buried  himself  in  the  ruins. 

6th.  Another  check  in  favor  of  the  people  is  this :  That  the 
Constitution  provides  for  the  impeachment,  trial  and  punish- 
ment of  every  officer  in  Congress  who  shall  be  guilty  of  mal- 
conduct.  With  such  a  prospect,  who  will  dare  to  abuse  the 
powers  vested  in  him  by  the  people  ? 

7th.  Having  thus  considered  several  of  the  checks  to  the 
powers  of  Congress,  which  are  interwoven  with  the  Constitu- 
tion, we  will  now  suppose  the  worst  that  can  take  place  in  con- 
sequence of  its  adoption :  I  mean  that  it  shall  be  found  in 
some  of  its  parts  oppressive  to  the  people  ;  still  we  have  this 
dernier  resort — it  may  be  amended.  It  is  not  like  the  laws  of 
the  Modes  and  Persians,  immutable.  The  fifth  article  provides 
for  amendments. 

It  has  been  said,  it  will  be  difficult  after  its  ratification  to 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  273 

procure  any  alterations.  By  no  means,  Sir ;  for  this  weighty 
reason :  it  is  a  general  government,  and  as  such,  will  have  a 
general  influence ;  all  the  States  in  the  Union  will  feel  the 
difficulty  ;  and,  feeling  it,  will  readily  concur  in  adopting  the 
method  provided  by  the  Constitution.  And  having  once  made 
the  trial,  experience  will  teach  us  what  amendments  are  neces- 
sary. 

Viewing  the  Constitution  in  this  light,  I  stand  ready  to  give 
my  vote  for  it  without  any  amendments  at  all.  Yet,  if  the 
amendments  proposed  by  your  Excellency  will  tend  to  concili- 
ation, I  readily  admit  them,  not  as  a  condition  of  acceptance, 
but  as  a  matter  of  recommendation  only;  knowing  that, 
"  Blessed  are  the  peace  makers."  I  am  ready,  Sir,  to  submit 
my  life,  my  liberty,  my  family,  my  property,  and,  as  far  as  my 
vote  will  go,  the  interest  of  my  constituents,  to  the  general 
government. 

After  all,  if  this  Constitution  was  as  perfect  as  the  sacred 
volume  is,  it  would  not  secure  the  liberties  of  the  people  unless 
they  watch  their  own  liberties.  Nothing  written  on  paper  will 
do  this.  It  is  therefore  necessary  that  the  people  should  keep 
a  watchful,  not  an  over  jealous,  eye  on  their  rulers ;  and  that 
they  should  give  all  due  encouragement  to  our  colleges,  schools 
of  learning,  &c,  that  so  knowledge  may  be  diffused  through 
every  part  of  our  country.  Ignorance  and  slavery,  knowledge 
and  freedom,  are  inseparably  connected.  While  Americans 
remain  in  their  present  enlightened  condition  and  warmly 
attached  to  the  cause  of  liberty,  they  cannot  be  enslaved. 
Should  the  general  government  become  so  lost  to  all  sense  of 
honor  and  the  freedom  of  the  people,  as  to  attempt  to  enslave 
them,  they  who  are  the  descendants  of  a  race  of  men  who  have 
dethroned  kings,  would  make  an  American  Congress  tremble, 
strip  them  of  their  public  honors  and  reduce  them  to  the  low- 
est state  of  degradation. 


AFTERNOON. 

Hon.  Mr.  Turner.  Mr.  President :  Being  advanced  in  life, 
and  having  endeavored,  I  hope,  with  a  faithful  attention, 
according  to  my  ability,  to  assist  my  country  in  her  trying 

36 


274  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

difficulties  and  dangers,  for  more  than  twenty  years ;  and  as 
for  three  weeks  past  my  state  of  health  has  been  such  as  to 
render  me  unable  to  speak  in  this  assembly,  I  trust  I  shall  be 
heard  with  some  indulgence  while  I  express  a  few  sentiments 
at  this  solemn  crisis.  I  have  been  averse  to  the  reception  of  this 
Constitution  while  it  was  considered  merely  in  its  original  form  ; 
but  since  the  honorable  Convention  have  been  pleased  to  agree 
to  the  recommendation  of  certain  amendments,  I  acknowledge 
my  mind  is  reconciled.  But  even  thus  amended,  I  still  see,  or 
think  I  see,  several  imperfections  in  it,  and  some  which  give 
me  pain.  Indeed,  I  never  expect  to  see  a  Constitution  free 
from  imperfections ;  and,  considering  the  great  diversity  of 
local  interests,  views  and  habits — considering  the  unparalleled 
variety  of  sentiments  among  the  citizens  of  the  United  States — 
I  despair  of  obtaining  a  more  perfect  Constitution  than  this,  at 
present.  And  a  Constitution  preferable  to  the  Confederation 
must  be  obtained,  and  obtained  soon,  or  we  shall  be  an  undone 
people.  In  my  judgment  there  is  a  rational  probability,  a  moral 
certainty,  that  the  proposed  amendments  will  meet  the  appro- 
bation of  the  several  States  in  the  Union.  If  there  is  any 
respect  due  to  the  hoary  head  of  Massachusetts,  it  will  undoubt- 
edly have  its  proper  influence  in  this  case.  The  minds  of  gen- 
tlemen, throughout  the  nation,  must  be  impressed  with  such  a 
sense  of  necessity  of  all  important  union,  especially  in  our 
present  circumstances,  as  must  strongly  operate  in  favor  of  a 
concurrence.  The  proposed  amendments  are  of  such  a  liberal, 
such  a  generous,  such  a  catholic  nature  and  complexion,  they 
are  so  congenial  to  the  soul  of  every  man  who  is  possessed  of  a 
patriotic  regard  to  the  preservation  of  the  just  rights  and 
immunities  of  his  country,  as  well  as  to  the  institution  of  a  good 
and  necessary  government,  that  I  think  they  must,  they  will  be 
universally  accepted.  When,  in  connection  with  this  confidence, 
I  consider  the  deplorable  state  of  our  navigation  and  com- 
merce, and  various  branches  of  business  thereon  dependent, 
the  inglorious  and  provoking  figure  we  make  in  the  eyes  of  our 
European  creditors,  the  degree  in  which  the  landed  interest  is 
burdened  and  depreciated,  the  tendency  of  depreciating  paper 
and  tender  acts  to  destroy  mutual  confidence,  faith  and  credit, 
to  prevent  the  circulation  of   specie,  and  to   overspread   the 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  275 

land  with  an  inundation,  a  chaos  of  multiform  injustice, 
oppression  and  knavery ;  when  I  consider  that  want  of  efficiency 
there  is  in  our  government,  as  to  obliging  people  seasonably  to 
pay  their  dues  to  the  public,  instead  of  spending  their  money 
in  support  of  luxury  and  extravagance,  of  consequence  the 
inability  of  government  to  satisfy  the  just  demands  of  its 
creditors,  and  to  do  it  in  season,  so  as  to  prevent  their  suffer- 
ing amazingly  by  depreciation  ;  in  connection  with  my  anxious 
desires  that  my  ears  may  be  no  longer  perstringed,  nor  my  heart 
pained  with  the  cries  of  the  injured,  suffering  widow  and  orphan ; 
when  I  also  consider  that  state  of  our  finances  which  daily 
exposes  us  to  become  a  prey  to  the  despotic  humor  even  of  an 
impotent  invader,  I  find  my  myself  constrained  to  say,  before 
this  Assembly,  and  before  God,  that  I  think  it  my  duty  to  give 
my  vote  in  favor  of  this  Constitution,  with  the  proposed  amend- 
ments f  and  unless  some  further  light  shall  be  thrown  in  my 
way  to  influence  my  opinion,  I  shall  conduct  accordingly.  I 
know  not  whether  this  Convention  will  vote  a  ratification  of 
this  Constitution  or  not.  If  they  should  do  it,  and  have  the 
concurrence  of  the  other  States,  may  that  God,  who  has  always 
in  a  remarkable  manner  watched  over  us  and  our  fathers  for 
good,  in  all  difficulties,  dangers  and  distresses,  be  pleased  to 
command  his  almighty  blessing  upon  it,  and  make  it  instru- 
mental of  restoring  justice,  honor,  safety,  support  and  salva- 
tion to  a  sinking  land.  But  I  hope  it  will  be  considered  by 
persons  of  all  orders,  rank  and  ages,  that  without  the  preva- 


30  [We  find  the  following  interesting  incident  connected  with  the  speech  of 
Mr.  Turner,  in  the  Centinel  of  March  8,  1788  :— 

"  On  the  day  of  the  final  decision  on  the  question  of  ratifying  the  Federal 
Constitution,  by  our  Convention,  when  the  Hon.  Mr.  Turner  rose  to  make 
some  observations  on  the  subject,  Dr.  S.,  a  delegate  from  a  neighboring  town, 
who  voted  in  the  minority,  and  who  expected  the  honorable  gentleman  would 
do  so  too,  whispered  to  a  worthy  member  in  the  pew  with  him,  '  Now,  Sir,  you 
will  hear  the  truth.'  When  the  honorable  gentleman  began  to  mention  the 
dangers  of  rejecting  the  Constitution,  the  Doctor  began  to  stare,  but  at  the 
close  of  his  speech,  when  he  expressed  his  determination  of  voting  in  favor  of 
it,  the  Doctor,  rolling  up  his  eyes  and  raising  his  hands,  ejaculated,  •  Help, 
Lord,  for  the  righteous  man  faileth — the  faithful  fail  from  among  the  children 
of  men.' "] 


276  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

lence  of  Christian  piety  and  morals,  the  best  republican  Con- 
stitution can  never  save  us  fr'om  slavery  and  ruin.  If  vice  is 
predominant,  it  is  to  be  feared  we  shall  have  rulers  whose  grand 
object  will  be  (slily  evading  the  spirit  of  the  Constitution)  to 
enrich  and  aggrandize  themselves  and  their  connections,  to  the 
injury  and  oppression  of  the  laborious  part  of  the  community ; 
while  it  follows,  from  the  moral  constitution  of  the  Deity,  that 
prevalent  iniquity  must  be  the  ruin  of  any  people.  The  world 
of  mankind  have  always,  in  general,  been  enslaved  and  miser- 
able, and  always  will  be,  until  there  is  a  greater  prevalence  of 
Christian  moral  principles ;  nor  have  I  an  expectation  of  this, 
in  any  great  degree,  unless  some  superior  mode  of  education 
shall  be  adopted.  It  is  education  which  almost  entirely  forms 
the  character,  the  freedom  or  slavery,  the  happiness  or  misery, 
of  the  world.  And  if  this  Constitution  shall  be  adopted,  I 
hope  the  Continental  Legislature  will  have  the  singular  honor, 
the  indelible  glory,  of  making  it  one  of  their  first  acts,  in  their 
first  session,  most  earnestly  to  recommend  to  the  several  States 
in  the  Union,  the  institution  of  such  means  of  education,  as 
shall  be  adequate  to  the  divine,  patriotic  purpose  of  training  up 
the  children  and  youth  at  large,  in  that  solid  learning,  and  in 
those  pious  and  moral  principles,  which  are  the  support,  the 
life  and  soul  of  republican  government  and  liberty,  of  which  a 
free  Constitution  is  the  body ;  for  as  the  body  without  the 
spirit  is  dead,  so  a  free  form  of  government  without  the  ani- 
mating principles  of  piety  and  virtue,  is  dead  also,  being  alone. 
May  religion,  with  sanctity  of  morals,  prevail  and  increase,  that 
the  patriotic  civilian  and  ruler  may  have  the  sublime,  parental 
satisfaction  of  eagerly  embracing  every  opportunity  of  mitigat- 
ing the  rigors  of  government  in  proportion  to  that  increase  of 
morality  which  may  render  the  people  more  capable  of  being  a 
law  to  themselves.  How  much  more  blessed  this,  than  to  be 
employed  in  fabricating  Constitutions  of  a  higher  tone,  in  obe- 
dience to  necessity,  arising  from  an  increase  of  turbulent  vice 
and  injustice  in  society  !  I  believe  your  Excellency's  patience 
will  not  be  further  exercised  by  hearing  the  sound  of  my  voice 
on  the  occasion,  when  I  have  said :  May  the  United  States  of 
America  live  before  God!  May  they  be  enlightened,  pious, 
virtuous,  free  and  happy,  to  all  generations ! 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  277 

Capt.  Southworth  spoke  a  short  time  against  the  adoption 
of  the  Constitution,  but  the  worthy  gentleman,  from  indisposi- 
tion of  body,  not  being  able  to  complete  his  speech,  we  cannot 
give  it  to  the  public. 

Mr.  Symmes.  Mr.  President:  I  hope,  Sir,  the  Convention 
will  indulge  me  with  a  few  words,  and  I  promise  them  I  will 
not  detain  them  long.  It  may  be  known  to  your  Excellency, 
that  I  have  heretofore  had  the  honor  to  address  the  Convention 
in  opposition  to  a  certain  paragraph  in  the  Constitution.  That 
fact  is  the  sole  occasion  of  my  craving  a  turn  to  be  heard  again. 

Sir,  it  never  was  my  opinion  that  we  ought  entirely  to  aban- 
don this  Constitution.  I  thought  it  had  great  defects,  and  I 
still  think  it  by  no  means  free  from  blemishes ;  but  I  ever 
expected  the  worst  consequences  to  follow  a  total  rejection  of  it. 
I  always  intended  to  urge  amendments,  and  was  in  hopes  that 
the  wisdom  of  this  assembly  would  devise  a  method  to  secure 
their  adoption.  Therefore,  when  your  Excellency  came  forward, 
as  well  became  your  high  office,  in  the  character  of  a  mediator,  a 
ray  of  hope  shone  in  upon  the  gloom  that  overspread  my  heart — 
of  hope,  that  we  should  still  be  united  in  the  grand  decision ! 

Sir,  a  mortal  hatred,  a  deadly  opposition,  can  be  deserved  by 
no  government  but  the  tyranny  of  hell,  and  perhaps  a  few  sim- 
ilar forms  on  earth.  A  government  of  that  complexion,  in  the 
present  enlightened  age,  could  never  enter  the  heart  of  man  ; 
and  if  it  could,  and  impudence  enough  were  found  to  propose 
it — nay,  if  it  should  be  accepted — I  affirm,  Sir,  that  in  America 
it  would  never  operate  a  moment.  I  should  glory  in  debating 
on  my  grounds  for  this  assertion ;  but  who  will  dare  to  question 
the  truth  of  it  ? 

Mr.  President:  So  ample  have  been  the  arguments  drawn 
from  our  national  distress,  the  weakness  of  the  present  Confed- 
eration, the  danger  of  instant  disunion,  and  perhaps  some  other 
topics  not  included  in  these,  that  a  man  must  be  obstinate 
indeed  to  say  at  this  period,  that  a  new  government  is  needless. 
One  is  proposed.  Shall  we  reject  it  totally,  or  shall  we  amend 
it?  Let  any  man  recollect  or  peruse  the  debates  in  this 
assembly,  and  I  venture  to  say,  he  shall  not  be  a  moment,  if  he 
loves  his  country,  in  making  his  election.  He  would  contem- 
plate the  idea  of  rejection  with  horror  and  detestation.     But, 


278  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

Sir,  it  has  been  alleged  that  the  necessary  amendments  cannot 
be  obtained  in  the  way  your  Excellency  has  proposed.  This 
matter  has  been  largely  debated.  I  beg  a  moment  to  consider 
it.  Our  Committee,  Sir,  were  pretty  well  agreed  on  the 
amendments  necessary  to  be  made,  and  in  their  report  it  appears 
that  these  amendments  are  equally  beneficial  to  all  the  citizens 
of  America.  There  is  nothing  local  in  them.  Shall  we  then 
totally  reject  the  Constitution,  because  we  are  only  morally 
certain  that  they  will  be  adopted  ?  Shall  we  choose  certain 
misery  in  one  way,  when  we  have  the  best  human  prospect  of 
enjoying  our  most  sanguine  wishes  in  another  ?     God  forbid  ! 

But,  Sir,  a  great  deal  has  been  said  about  the  amendments. 
Here  again  I  refer  to  the  debates.  Such  has  been  said  to  have 
been  the  past  prevalence  of  the  northern  States,  in  Congress, 
the  sameness  of  interest  in  a  majority  of  the  States,  and  their 
necessary  adhesion  to  each  other,  that  I  think  there  can  be  no 
reasonable  doubt  of  the  success  of  any  amendments  proposed 
by  Massachusetts.  Sir,  we  have,  we  do,  and  we  shall,  in  a  great 
measure,  give  birth  to  all  events,  and  hold  the  balance,  among 
the  United  States. 

The  honorable  gentleman,  my  respected  friend  from  Scituate, 
has  so  fully  entered  into  the  expediency  of  ratifying  the  Con- 
stitution upon  the  basis  of  the  report,  and  so  ably  stated  the 
unanswerable  reasons  he  finds  for  giving  his  sanction  to  it,  not- 
withstanding his  former  different  opinion,  that  I  may  decently 
waive  a  task  I  could  not  half  so  well  perform. 

Upon  the  whole,  Mr.  President,  approving  the  amendments, 
and  firmly  believing  that  they  will  be  adopted,  I  recall  my 
former  opposition,  such  as  it  was,  to  this  Constitution,  and 
shall,  especially  as  the  amendments  are  to  be  a  standing 
instruction  to  our  delegates  until  they  are  obtained,  give  it  my 
unreserved  assent. 

In  so  doing,  I  stand  acquitted  to  my  own  conscience,  I  hope 
and  trust  I  shall  to  my  constituents,  and  (laying  his  hand  on 
his  breast)  I  know  I  shall  before  my  God. 

The  time  agreed  upon  for  taking  the  question  being  arrived, 
and  the  same  being  called  for  from  every  quarter, 

His  Excellency  the  President  rose,  and  addressed  the  honor- 
able Convention  as  follows  : — 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  279 

Gentlemen — Being  now  called  upon  to  bring  the  subject 
under  debate  to  a  decision,  by  bringing  forward  the  question,  I 
beg  your  indulgence  to  close  the  business  with  a  few  words.  I 
am  happy  that  my  health  has  been  so  far  restored,  that  I  am 
rendered  able  to  meet  my  fellow-citizens  as  represented  in  this 
Convention.  I  should  have  considered  it  as  one  of  the  most 
distressing  misfortunes  of  my  life,  to  be  deprived  of  giving  my 
aid  and  support  to  a  system,  which,  if  amended  (as  I  feel 
assured  it  will  be)  according  to  your  proposals,  cannot  fail  to 
give  the  people  of  the  United  States  a  greater  degree  of  political 
freedom,  and  eventually  as  much  national  dignity,  as  falls  to 
the  lot  of  any  nation  on  the  earth.  I  have  not,  since  I  had  the 
honor  to  be  in  this  place,  said  much  on  the  important  subject 
before  us  ;  all  the  ideas  appertaining  to  the  system,  as  well  those 
which  are  against  as  for  it,  have  been  debated  upon  with  so 
much  learning  and  ability,  that  the  subject  is  quite  exhausted. 

But  you  will  permit  me,  gentlemen,  to  close  the  whole  with 
one  or  two  general  observations.  This  I  request,  not  expecting 
to  throw  any  new  light  upon  the  subject,  but  because  it  may 
possibly  prevent  uneasiness  and  discordance  from  taking  place 
amongst  us  and  amongst  our  constituents. 

That  a  general  system  of  government  is  indispensably  neces- 
sary to  save  our  country  from  ruin,  is  agreed  upon  all  sides. 
That  the  one  now  to  be  decided  upon  has  its  defects,  all  agree  ; 
but  when  we  consider  the  variety  of  interests,  and  the  different 
habits  of  the  men  it  is  intended  for,  it  would  be  very  singular 
to  have  an  entire  union  of  sentiment  respecting  it.  Were  the 
people  of  the  United  States  to  delegate  the  powers  proposed  to 
be  given,  to  men  who  were  not  dependent  on  them  frequently 
for  elections — to  men  whose  interests,  either  from  rank  or  title, 
would  differ  from  that  of  their  fellow-citizens  in  common — the 
task  of  delegating  authority  would  be  vastly  more  difficult ; 
but  as  the  matter  now  stands,  the  powers  reserved  by  the  people 
render  them  secure,  and  until  they  themselves  become  corrupt, 
they  will  always  have  upright  and  able  rulers.  I  give  my  assent 
to  the  Constitution,  in  full  confidence  that  the  amendments 
proposed  will  soon  become  a  part  of  the  system.  These  amend- 
ments being  in  no  wise  local,  but  calculated  to  give  security  and 
ease  alike  to  all  the^States,  I  think  that  all  will  agree  to  them. 


280  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

Suffer  me  to  add,  that  let  the  question  be  decided  as  it  may, 
there  can  be  no  triumph  on  the  one  side,  or  chagrin  on  the 
other.  Should  there  be  a  great  division,  every  good  man,  every 
one  who  loves  his  country,  will  be  so  far  from  exhibiting  extra- 
ordinary marks  of  joy,  that  he  will  sincerely  lament  the  want 
of  unanimity,  and  strenuously  endeavor  to  cultivate  a  spirit  of 
conciliation,  both  in  Convention,  and  at  home.  The  people  of 
this  Commonwealth  are  a  people  of  great  light,  of  great  intelli- 
gence in  public  business.  They  know  that  we  have  none  of  us 
an  interest  separate  from  theirs  ;  that  it  must  be  our  happiness 
to  conduce  to  theirs  ;  and  that  we  must  all  rise  or  fall  together. 
They  will  never,  therefore,  forsake  the  first  principle  of  society, 
that  of  being  governed  by  the  voice  of  the  majority  ;  and  should 
it  be  that  the  proposed  form  of  government  should  be  rejected, 
they  will  zealously  attempt  another.  Should  it,  by  the  vote  now 
to  be  taken,  be  ratified,  they  will  quietly  acquiesce,  and  where 
they  see  a  want  of  perfection  in  it,  endeavor  in  a  constitutional 
way  to  have  it  amended. 

The  question  now  before  you  is  such  as  no  nation  on  earth, 
without  the  limits  of  America,  has  ever  had  the  privilege  of 
deciding  upon.  As  the  Supreme  Ruler  of  the  Universe  has 
seen  fit  to  bestow  upon  us  this  glorious  opportunity,  let  us 
decide  upon  it,  appealing  to  him  for  the  rectitude  of  our  inten- 
tions, and  in  humble  confidence  that  he  will  yet  continue  to 
bless  and  save  our  country. 

[The  question  being  put,  it  was  decided  in  the  affirmative — 
yeas  187,  nays  168.]  a 

On  the  motion  for  ratifying  being  declared  in  the  affirmative, 
by  a  majority  of  nineteen, 

The  Hon.  Mr.  White  rose  and  said,  that  notwithstanding  he 
had  opposed  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution,  upon  the  idea 
that  it  would  endanger  the  liberties  of  his  country,  yet  as  a 
majority  had  seen  fit  to  adopt  it,  he  should  use  his  utmost 
exertions  to  induce  his  constituents  to  live  in  peace  under,  and 
cheerfully  submit  to  it. 

He  was  followed  by  Mr.  Wedgery,  who  said  that  he  should 
return  to  his  constituents,  and  inform  them  that  he  had  opposed 

21  [See  Journal,  pages  83  to  92.] 


1788.]  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  281 

the  adoption  of  this  Constitution,  but  that  he  had  been  over- 
ruled, and  that  it  had  been  carried  by  a  majority  of  wise  and 
understanding  men ;  that  he  should  endeavor  to  sow  the  seeds 
of  union  and  peace  among  the  people  he  represented  ;  and  that 
he  hoped  and  believed  that  no  person  would  wish  for,  or  sug- 
gest, the  measure  of  a  protest ;  for,  said  he,  we  must  consider 
that  this  body  is  as  full  a  representation  of  the  people  as  can  be 
convened.  After  expressing  his  thanks  for  the  civility  which 
the  inhabitants  of  this  town  have  shown  to  the  Convention,  and 
declaring,  as  his  opinion,  that  they  had  not  in  the  least  influ- 
enced the  decision,  he  concluded  by  saying,  that  he  should 
support,  as  much  as  in  him  lay,  the  Constitution,  and  that  he 
believed,  as  this  State  had  adopted  it,  that  not  only  nine,  but 
the  whole  thirteen,  would  come  into  the  measure. 

Gen.  Whitney  said,  that  though  he  had  been  opposed  to  the 
Constitution,  he  should  support  it  as  much  as  if  he  had  voted 
for  it. 

Mr.  Cooley  (of  Amherst)  said,  that  he  endeavored  to  govern 
himself  by  the  principles  of  reason ;  that  he  was  directed  to  vote 
against  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution,  and  that,  in  so  doing, 
he  had  not  only  complied  with  his  directions,  but  had  acted 
according  to  the  dictates  of  his  own  conscience ;  and  that,  as  it 
had  been  agreed  to  by  a  majority,  he  should  endeavor  to 
convince  his  constituents  of  the  propriety  of  its  adoption. 

Dr.  Taylor  also  said,  he  had  uniformly  opposed  the  Consti- 
tution ;  that  he  found  himself  fairly  beaten ;  and  expressed  his 
determination  to  go  home  and  endeavor  to  infuse  a  spirit  of 
harmony  and  love  among  the  people. 

Other  gentlemen  expressed  their  inclination  to  speak,  but  it 
growing  late,  the  Convention  adjourned  to  the  next  morning, 
ten  o'clock. 


Thursday,  February  7, 1788. 

The  Convention  met,  when  Major  Nasson,  in  a  short  address, 
intimated  his  determination  to  support  the  Constitution,  and  to 
exert  himself  to  influence  his  constituents  to  do  the  same. 

36 


282  DEBATES    OF    CONVENTION.  [1788. 

Mr.  Randal  said,  he  had  been  uniformly  opposed  to  the  Con- 
stitution. He  had,  he  said,  fought  like  a  good  soldier ;  but,  as 
he  was  beat,  he  should  sit  down  contented,  hoping  the  minority 
may  be  disappointed  in  their  fears,  and  that  the  majority  may 
reap  the  full  fruition  of  the  blessings  they  anticipate.  In  the 
hope  that  the  amendments  recommended  by  his  Excellency  the 
President  will  take  place,  I  shall,  says  he,  go  home  and  endeavor 
to  satisfy  those  that  have  honored  me  by  their  choice,  so  that 
we  may  all  live  in  peace. 

Major  Sawin  declared,  that  the  Constitution  had  had  a  fair 
trial,  and  that  there  had  not,  to  his  knowledge,  been  any  undue 
influence  exercised  to  obtain  the  vote  in  its  favor  ;  that  many 
doubts  which  lay  in  his  mind  had  been  removed ;  and  that, 
although  he  was  in  the  minority,  he  should  support  the  Consti- 
tution as  cheerfully  and  as  heartily  as  though  he  had  voted  on 
the  other  side  of  the  question. 

The  Convention  then  passed  the  pay  roll — amounting  to 
X4,499  2s. — and,  after  unanimously  passing  votes  of  thanks  to 
his  Excellency  the  President,  the  honorable  the  Vice-President, 
and  the  reverend  clergymen  of  the  town  of  Boston,  who  officia- 
ted as  Chaplains,  for  their  services,  it  was 

Voted,  That  when  the  business  of  the  Convention  shall  be 
completed,  the  members  will  proceed  to  the  State  House  to 
proclaim  the  ratification,  and  to  take  an  affectionate  leave  of 
each  other. 

An  invitation  from  a  number  of  the  inhabitants  of  Boston, 
requesting  the  members  of  the  Convention  to  take  refreshment 
at  the  Senate  Chamber,  when  the  ratification  of  the  Constitu- 
tion should  be  declared,  was  read,  and  thereon 

Voted,  That  the  thanks  of  the  Convention  be  given  to  the 
inhabitants  of  Boston  for  their  polite  invitation,  and  that  the 
Convention  will  attend  as  requested. 

The  business  being  finished,  the  Convention  proceeded  to  the 
State  House,  when  the  ratification  was  proclaimed  by  Joseph 
Henderson,  Esq.,  High-Sheriff  of  the  county  of  Suffolk,  after 
which  the  Convention  was  dissolved. 


1788.]  MESSAGE    OF    GOVERNOR    HANCOCK.  283 


MESSAGE  OF  GOVERNOR  HANCOCK. 

[Extract  from  the  Speech  of  Gov.  Hancock,  to  the  Senate  and  House 
of  Representatives,  at  the  opening  df  the  General  Court,  held,  by 
adjournment,  at  Boston,  February  27,  1788.] 

"  In  the  beginning  of  your  last  session  I  laid  before  you  the 
Constitution  and  frame  of  government  for  the  United  States  of 
America,  agreed  upon  by  the  late  general  Convention,  and  trans- 
mitted to  me  by  Congress.  As  the  system  was  to  be  submitted 
to  the  people,  and  to  be  decided  upon  by  their  delegates  in  Con- 
vention, I  forbore  to  make  any  remarks  upon  it.  The  Conven- 
tion which  you  appointed  to  deliberate  upon  that  important 
subject,  have  concluded  their  session,  after  having  adopted  and 
ratified  the  proposed  plan,  according  to  their  resolution,  a  copy 
whereof  I  have  directed  the  secretary  to  lay  before  you. 

The  obvious  imbecility  of  the  Confederation  of  the  United 
States,  has  too  long  given  pain  to  our  friends,  and  pleasure  to 
our  enemies  ;  but  the  forming  a  new  system  of  government,  for 
so  numerous  a  people,  of  very  different  views  and  habits,  spread 
upon  such  a  vast  extent  of  territory,  containing  such  a  great 
variety  of  soils,  and  under  such  extremes  of  climate,  was  a  task 
which  nothing  less  than  the  dreadful  apprehension  of  losing  our 
national  existence,  could  have  compelled  the  people  to  under- 
take. 

We  can  be  known  to  the  world  only  under  the  appellation  of 
the  United  States ;  if  we  are  robbed  of  the  idea  of  our  union, 
we  immediately  become  separate  nations,  independent  of  each 
other,  and  no  less  liable  to  the  depredations  of  foreign  powers, 
than  to  wars  and  bloody  contentions  amongst  ourselves.  To 
pretend  to  exist  as  a  nation  without  possessing  those  powers  of 
coerce  which  are  necessarily  incident  to  the*  national  character, 
would  prove  a  fatal  solecism  in  politics.  The  objects  of  the 
proposed  Constitution  are,  defence  against  external  enemies,  and 
the  promotion  of  tranquillity  and  happiness  amongst  the  States. 
Whether  it  is  well  calculated  for  those  important  purposes,  has 
been  the  subject  of  extensive  and  learned  discussion  in  the  Con- 
vention which  you  appointed.  I  believe  there  was  never  a  body 
of  men  assembled,  with  greater  purity  of  intention,  or  with 


284  MESSAGE    OF    GOVERNOR   HANCOCK.  [1788. 

higher  zeal  for  the  public  interest.  And  although  when  the 
momentous  question  was  decided,  there  was  a  greater  division 
than  some  expected,  yet  there  appeared  a  candor,  and  a  spirit 
of  conciliation  in  the  minority,  which  did  them  great  honor, 
and  afforded  a  happy  presage  of  unanimity  amongst  the  people 
at  large.  Though  so  many  of  the  members  of  the  late  Conven- 
tion could  not  feel  themselves  convinced  that  they  ought  to  vote 
for  the  ratification  of  this  system,  yet  their  opposition  was  con- 
ducted with  a  candid  and  manly  firmness,  and  with  such  marks 
of  integrity  and  real  regard  to  the  public  interest,  as  did  them 
the  highest  honor,  and  leaves  no  reason  to  suppose  that  the 
peace  and  good  order  of  the  government  is  not  their  object. 

The  amendments  proposed  by  the  Convention  are  intended  to 
obtain  a  constitutional  security  of  the  principles  to  which  they 
refer  themselves,  and  must  meet  the  wishes  of  all  the  States. 
I  feel  myself  assured  that  they  will  very  early  become  a  part  of 
the  Constitution,  and  when  they  shall  be  added  to  the  proposed 
plan,  I  shall  consider  it  the  most  perfect  system  of  government, 
as  to  the  objects  it  embraces,  that  has  been  known  amongst 
mankind. 

Gentlemen : 

As  that  Being  in  whose  hands  is  the  government  of  all  the 
nations  of  the  earth,  and  who  putteth  down  one,  and  raiseth  up 
another,  according  to  His  sovereign  pleasure,  has  given  to  the 
people  of  these  States  a  rich  and  an  extensive  country ;  has  in  a 
marvellous  manner  given  them  a  name  and  a  standing  among 
the  nations  of  the  world,  has  blessed  them  with  external  peace 
and  internal  tranquillity  ;  I  hope  and  pray  that  the  gratitude  of 
their  hearts  may  be  expressed  by  a  proper  use  of  those  inesti- 
mable blessings,  by  the  greatest  exertions  of  patriotism,  by 
forming  and  supporting  institutions  for  cultivating  the  human 
understanding,  and  for  the  greatest  progress  of  the  arts  and 
sciences,  by  establishing  laws  for  the  support  of  piety,  religion 
and  morality,  as  well  as  for  punishing  vice  and  wickedness,  and 
by  exhibiting  on  the  great  theatre  of  the  world,  those  social, 
public  and  private  virtues,  which  give  more  dignity  to  a  people 
possessing  their  own  sovereignty,  than  crowns  and  diadems 
afford  to  sovereign  princes." 


MINUTES 


CHIEF   JUSTICE    PARSONS, 


OF   THE 


DEBATES  IN  CONVENTION. 


MINUTES. 


January  15, 1788. 

The  paragraph  in  debate  was  the  biennial  election  of  the 
representatives. 

Caleb  Strong.  Stated  the  grounds  proceeded  on  in  Federal 
Convention ;  determined  at  first  to  be  triennial ;  afterwards 
reduced  to  biennial ;  South  Carolina  having  at  home  biennial 
elections,  and  it  was  a  compromise. 

Fisher  Ames.  People  cannot,  without  a  representation, 
exercise  any  powers  but  pulling  down  a  government.  Man  has 
no  natural  liberty  in  a  state  of  nature,  because  he  has  no  secu- 
rity for  it.  Too  long  or  too  short  a  time  for  elections  is  dan- 
gerous and  inconvenient.  The  time  must  be  regulated  by  the 
nature  of  the  business  the  representatives  have  to  do.  1.  The 
extensive  dominion  to  be  governed.  2.  The  object  of  legisla- 
tion.    3.  The  security  of  the  liberties  of  the  people. 

Gilbert  Dench.  Immaterial  whether  biennial  or  annual. 
My  difficulty  is,  whether  biennial  elections  are  secured  to  the 
people  in  the  fourth  section.  He  was  called  to  order,  for 
reasoning  on  that  section,  by  Mr.  Dana.  After  debate,  Mr. 
Dench  stated,  he  was  satisfied  he  was  out  of  order. 

Gov.  Bowdoin.  Thought  that  Dench  was  in  order.  He  was 
called  to  order  by  Mr.  Parsons,  when,  after  some  debate,  the 
following  question  was  put : — 

To  reconsider  the  order  of  debate  passed  yesterday,  so  far  as 
to  amend  it  by  allowing  any  member  to  refer  to  any  other  par- 
agraph which  in  his  opinion  relates  to  the  paragraph  under 
debate,  and  it  passed  in  the  affirmative. 

Then  Gov.  Bowdoin  arose.  There  was  no  reason  for  annual 
elections  arising  from  the  course  of  the  sun,  for  the  time  of 
election  would  then  be  varied  in  every  planet.  He  then  argued 
in  favor  of  a  biennial  election.     1.  There  was  no  danger,  as 


288  JUDGE   PARSONS's   MINUTES.  [1788. 

they  cannot  alter  the  Constitution.  2.  They  can  lay  no  burdens 
but  such  as  they  bear  their  part  of.  3.  A  shorter  election  would 
not  give  sufficient  time  for  information. 

Gen.  Heath  showed  the  importance  of  the  subject  from  the 
extent  of  country.  Opinions  of  the  best  writers  show  that  short 
s  elections  are  necessary.  Montesquieu  says  more  than  a  year 
would  be  dangerous.  In  this  country  we  have  always  had 
annual  elections  ;  that  length  of  time  is  necessary  to  acquaint 
themselves  with  their  business  is  a  novel  observation,  for  being 
a  representative  of  the  people  implies  a  knowledge  of  their 
circumstances.  While  sitting  in  Congress  how  can  they  learn 
the  situation  of  other  States  ?  Members  of  British  Parliament 
return  home  for  the  knowledge  of  the  situation  of  their  con- 
stituents. He  was,  however,  in  favor  of  biennial  elections,  as 
there  will  be  but  one  session  in  a  year,  and  all  the  business  not 
being  then  done  will  be  left,  if  the  same  body  cannot  meet  again. 

Charles  Turner,  Esq.  Is  for  a  year,  because  it  is  the  most 
proper  length  of  time.  If  we  allow  two  years,  then  by  some 
means  or  other  there  will  be  a  stretch  as  long  as  the  new  star's 
revolution. 

Mr.  Dawes.  Montesquieu's  opinion  applies  only  to  single 
governments,  not  to  a  confederated  one. 

Gen.  Brooks,  of  Medford.  Montesquieu  gives  the  greatest 
plaudits  to  the  British  government,  where  elections  were  never 
annual.  In  answer  to  the  objection  that  biennial  elections  are 
novel :  But  our  situation  is  new — which  he  states — rising  from 
dependent  colonies  to  independent  States.  Then  reasons  from 
the  state  of  parliaments  in  Europe. 

Gen.  Sam.  Thompson.  Argues  for  frequent  reelections, 
because  if  the  administration  had  not  been  changed  last  year, 
we  should  now  be  in  blood.  He  was  called  to  order  by  Dr. 
Jarvis.  After  debate,  it  was  moved  that  he  proceed.  Then 
Dr.  Spring  presented  a  letter  to  the  Convention  from  Mr.  Gerry. 
After  some  debate,  a  motion  was  made  to  adjourn,  which 
passed  in  the  affirmative. 

3  o'clock,  P.  M. 
Gen.  Thompson.     Was  in  favor  of  annual  elections,  for  the 
end  of  government  is  to  please  the  people,  who  can  please  them- 


1788.]  JUDGE   PARSONS's    MINUTES.  289 

selves  by  annual  elections,  and  the  people  are  quieted  by  a  new 
election,  the  last  year.  It  is  said  the  elected  will  want  time  to 
learn,  but  he  hopes  the  people  will  not  send  men  who  are 
unlearned  ;  it  is  the  duty  of  a  representative  to  know  the  inter- 
ests of  his  own  constituents,  and  then  to  determine,  by  compar- 
ing their  situation  with  the  state  of  the  nation.  Also,  he  objects 
that  the  representatives  pay  themselves  ;  compares  it  to  the 
king's  government  and  the  judges  being  paid  by  the  king  ;  here 
they  pay  themselves. 

Mr.  Gore.  We  must  be  careful  in  taking  the  opinion  of 
writers  on  the  subject  of  government.  Opinions  deduced  from 
the  state  of  ancient  governments  do  not  apply.  They  did  not 
check  their  governments  by  having  different  branches,  with 
negatives.  He  then  observes  on  the  nature  of  British  parlia- 
ments, and  applies  his  observations  in  favor  of  biennial  elections ; 
was  in  favor  of  frequent  elections,  but  the  true  rule  is  to  give 
them  time  to  inform  themselves,  and  not  too  much  time  to 
feel  independent  of  the  electors. 

Mr.  King.  The  rule  is,  that  the  elected  should  have  tinie 
enough  to  inform  themselves,  and  not  so  much  time  as  will 
make  them  independent  of  the  electors.  He  states  the  rise  of 
parliaments  upon  the  feudal  system.  Elections  longer  than 
annual  have  been  thought  of  by  Massachusetts ;  instanced  in 
the  confederation  of  the  united  New  England  colony.  Remarks 
on  Heath's  notion,  that  any  man  chosen  a  representative  has 
knowledge  enough.  Thought  there  was  no  danger  of  loss  of 
liberty  from  biennial  elections. 

Hon.  Charles  Turner  charges  King  with  ridiculing  him 
about  the  planets,  and  resents  it. 

Mr.  King  explains  himself.  He  did  not  mean  to  ridicule  any 
argument,  and  had  a  profound  opinion  for  the  gentleman. 

Hon.  Mr.  Dana.  From  annual  elections,  States,  in  Congress, 
have  frequently  been  deprived  of  their  votes  for  want  of  the 
delegates  receiving  their  commissions. 

Hon.  Abram  White  says,  our  delegates  being  chosen  in  June, 
there  is  time  enough. 

Hon.  Mr.  Dana.     He  applies  to  the  southern  States. 

Hon.  Mr.  Gorham  says,  Congress  is  not  represented  at  present 
for  the  same  reason  ;  observes,  as  Congress  will  have  but  one 

37 


290  JUDGE    PARSONS'S    MINUTES.  [1788. 

session  a  year,  and  our  General  Court  have  two,  biennial 
elections  for  Congress  will  not  be  longer  than  annual  elections 
for  this  State. 

Mr.  Nasson.  If  members  will  not  engage  in  business  for  fear 
of  not  finishing,  then  no  man  would  undertake  any  business  lest 
he  should  die  and  leave  it  unfinished  to  his  executors  or 
administrators. 

Mr.  Gorham,  in  reply,  referred  to  the  situation  of  our  Gen- 
eral Court  the  last  session,  when  the  whole  session  was  employed 
in  collecting  and  arranging  materials  for  the  next  session. 

Mr.  Carnes  reads  part  of  a  letter  from  Mr.  Otis,  that  Con- 
gress was  now  not  sitting,  as  only  five  States  were  represented. 

Hon.  Job  Sprague.  The  advantages  of  biennial  elections 
have  been  sufficiently  demonstrated.  If  any  still  object,  it  is 
incumbent  on  them  to  prove  the  inconveniences. 

Hon.  Jno.  Taylor.  If  one  session  in  a  year  is  not  sufficient 
to  originate  and  complete  the  business,  then  let  them  have  two 
sessions,  or  sit  all  the  year,  if  necessary. 

Capt.  Southworth,  from  Stoughton.  He  thought  the  advan- 
tages of  a  biennial  election  had  been  sufficiently  stated ;  his 
difficulty  was,  whether  the  fourth  section  did  not  render  the 
right  of  biennial  elections  insecure. 

Adjourned  to  to-morrow. 


January  16, 1788,  A.  M. 

Voted  to  pass  to  the  next  paragraph. 

Moved  to  reconsider  the  vote,  and  debate  thereon,  but  it  did 
not  prevail.  The  next  paragraph  was  read,  viz. :  "  No  person 
shall  be  a  representative.  &c,  in  which  he  shall  be  chosen." 

Mr.  Dench  observed  that  he  wished  to  add  something  on  the 
paragraph  last  debated,  and  asked  leave,  and  it  was  granted. 
His  difficulty  was,  that  no  provision  was  made  to  qualify  the 
election  but  by  the  intervention  of  the  State  legislatures,  and 
still  under  the  control  of  the  Congress,  and  so  the  rights  of 
election  are  insecure. 

Mr.  Gorham  cannot  see  how  Mr.  Dench's  objection  applies  to 


1788.]  JUDGE   PARSONS's    MINUTES.  291 

biennial  elections,  for  if  biennial  elections  are  insecure,  so  would 
annual  elections,  or  elections  for  any  shorter  time,  be. 

That  the  practice  of  the  several  States,  in  conducting  elec- 
tions, is  various,  and  the  legislature  of  each  State  will  devise 
the  best  possible  way  for  itself. 

That  the  age  of  twenty-five  was  necessary,  that  the  man 
might  be  old  enough  to  understand  public  business,  and  a  citi- 
zenship of  seven  years  is  necessary  to  give  his  electors  evidence 
of  his  knowledge  and  attachment  to  their  interests. 

Hon.  Mr.  White.  Though  the  legislature  may  devise  and 
ordain  the  manner  of  election,  and  Congress  can  and  will  con- 
trol it,  and  so  we  shall  be  slaves  to  the  southern  States. 

Mr.  Gorham  said,  he  did  not  mean  to  consider  the  effect  of 
the  revising  power  of  Congress  ;  it  was  time  enough  to  consider 
that  when  we  come  to  it. 

Mr.  Pierce,  of  Partridgefield,  said  he  had  no  objection  to  the 
qualifications  in  the  article  under  debate,  but  he  wanted  to  be 
satisfied  why  there  was  no  qualification  in  point  of  property. 

Mr.  King  said  it  was  necessary  to  show  the  certainty  of  the 
people's  exercising  the  right  of  election.  It  is  clearly  certain 
and  positive  in  the  paragraph  last  under  debate,  and  the  ques- 
tion is,  whether  it  is  rendered  insecure  by  the  fourth  section. 

Now,  that  does  not  render  it  insecure  ;  for  1.  Time  of  elec- 
tion does  not  mean  the  term  for  which  the  representatives  are 
chosen  ;  2.  Nor  the  place  where  elections  are  held  ;  nor  3.  The 
manner  of  holding  elections.  Therefore  the  controlling  power 
of  Congress  does  not  extend  to  altering  biennial  elections.  The 
legislatures  of  the  several  States  shall  prescribe  in  these  cases  ; 
it  is  their  duty.  But  the  difficulty  is,  why  should  Congress 
have  those  powers  ?  For  the  same  reasons  that  the  General  Court 
have  power  to  compel  every  town  to  send  representatives  ;  other- 
wise the  electors  may  be  negligent,  and  the  liberties  of  the 
people  may  be  utterly  destroyed,  without  the  vigilance  and 
coercion  of  government. 

Dr.  Taylor.  My  difficulty  is,  Congress  may  make  such  regu- 
lations as  to  deprive  the  people  of  the  right  of  electing.  I  make 
no  difficulty  as  to  the  time,  but  as  to  the  place  ;  Congress  may  fix 
the  place  in  Berkshire  or  Lincoln,  where  the  people  cannot 
attend. 


292  JUDGE    PARSONS^    MINUTES.  [1788. 

Hon.  Mr.  Sedgwick.  We  are  to  consider  in  what  terms  the 
clauses  are  expressed.  The  first  clause  is  in  the  affirmative  and 
positive,  and  the  second  clause  extends  only  to  the  when,  where 
and  how,  and  not  to  the  term  of  election.  Dr.  Taylor's  objec- 
tion supposes  the  power  will  be  used  to  the  worst  possible  pur- 
poses ;  if  we  are  to  suppose  that,  we  had  better  dissolve  all 
governments,  and  live  as  the  savages.  But  in  forming  a  gov- 
ernment, we  must  grant  the  necessary  powers,  and  not  contem- 
plate only  the  possible  abuse  of  power ;  otherwise  there  is  the 
same  objection  to  our  own  government — they  may  call  every 
man  into  the  field,  take  away  all  our  money,  erect  courts  in 
every  street,  give  judges  .£10,000  a  year,  unite  all  the  counties 
into  one,  and  make  Penobscot  a  shire  town.  But  to  suppose 
this,  is  to  suppose  the  legislature  devils,  or  worse.  A  sufficient 
check  against  the  wanton  abuse  of  power  is  the  spirit  of  the 
people,  as  in  the  encroachments  of  Great  Britain ;  but  where  there 
is  a  common  interest  we  are  not  to  presume  an  abuse  of  power. 

But  this  controlling  power  is  necessary  to  preserve  the  gen- 
eral government.  Those  who  wish  this  power  alone  existed  in 
the  several  legislatures,  are  influenced  because  it  would  be  safe 
from  the  common  interest.  The  same  reason  applies  to  the 
general  legislature.  Attend  to  the  conduct  of  Rhode  Island 
last  winter ;  without  any  reason,  they  recalled  their  delegate 
and  refused  to  send  any.  The  same  may  happen  under  the 
general  government. 

If  it  should  be  said  that  the  place  may  be  fixed  in  Boston, 
that  the  mercantile  interest  may  choose  their  representatives  ; 
but  if  that  was  the  case  the  country  party  within  twelve  miles 
could  come  in  and  out-vote  it. 

Dr.  Taylor  rises,  and  asks  whether  he  remembered  the  time 
when  a  corrupt  administration  kept  the  General  Court  moving, 
to  inflame  the  members. 

Mr.  Sedgwick  replies:  Yes;  and  that  the  effect  was  a  greater 
firmness  in  opposition  to  the  administration. 

Gov.  Bowdoin  observes  that  there  is  a  positive  injunction 
upon  the  several  legislatures  to  determine  the  time,  place  and 
manner,  and  it  is  fit ;  otherwise,  as  in  the  case  of  Rhode  Island, 
the  Union  may  be  dissolved.  The  controlling  power  in  Congress 
is  necessary,  from  the  different  manner  in  which  the  elections 


1788.]  JUDGE   PARSjONS's    MINUTES.  293 

are  made  in  the  different  States,  and  to  prevent  partiality  and 
indirect  and  improper  conduct  in  the  several  States. 

Gen.  Thompson.  We  have  now  got  forward  to  the  fourth 
paragraph,  and  we  had  as  good  thump  it  about  and  see  what  is 
in  it.  I  do  not  know  the  hearts  of  men,  but  I  believe  men  are 
as  wicked  now  as  ever.  I  should  make  no  difficulty  to  give 
Congress  this  power,  in  case  a  State  should  refuse ;  but  now 
Congress  may  order  us  to  go  to  South  Carolina,  to  choose  where 
they  choose,  over  head  and  heels ;  in  which  case  we  shall  not 
be  safe.  But  as  I  shall  have  a  further  opportunity  to  thump 
it,  I  will  now  sit  down.  N.  B.  He  observed  that  there  was  no 
danger  from  the  legislature,  but  great  danger  from  Congress. 

Hon.  Mr.  Adams.  We  have  gone  from  the  point  in  debate. 
We  are  now  on  the  fourth  section,  which  is  a  very  different 
subject,  and  spoke  to  order. 

Hon.  Mr.  Sedgwick  spoke  to  order,  and  exculpated  himself. 

Adjourned. 

3  o'clock,  P.  M. 

Mr.  Pierce,  of  Partridgefield.  He  objects,  1.  That  Congress 
may  declare  that  he  that  has  the  most  votes  shall  be  chosen,  not 
he  who  has  a  majority  of  votes.  2.  That  Congress  may  order 
Boston  to  be  the  place  of  election,  and  by  that  means  may 
influence  elections.  Congress  may  do  so,  and  may  have  sufficient 
motives  so  to  do.     3.  A  bankrupt  may  be  chosen. 

Col.  Porter.  If  a  State  should  require  a  majority  of  the 
votes  in  the  State  it  ought  to  be  altered,  and  there  is  no  reason 
to  presume  a  majority  of  the  people  would  choose  a  bankrupt. 

Mr.  Bishop.  He  should  have  no  objection  to  the  controlling 
power  of  Congress  in  case  the  States  refuse  to  make  the  necessary 
regulations — but  to  give  Congress  this  controlling  power  when 
a  State  does  not  refuse,  is  to  give  up  the  liberties  of  the  people. 

Gov.  Bowdoin.  As  to  Rhode  Island,  he  has  not  the  records 
of  Rhode  Island,  but  has  always  so  understood  it,  and  the 
printed  accounts  of  their  journals,  as  published  in  the  newspa- 
pers, confirm  it. 

Mr.  King  affirms  that  the  State  of  Rhode  Island  did  recall 
their  delegates,  as  appears  by  the  journals  of  Congress. 

Mr.  Bishop  does  not  believe  it. 


294  JUDGE   PARSONS'S    MINUTES.  [1788, 

Mr.  Gorham  affirms  as  Mr.  King  did. 

Mr.  Bishop  says  he  has  been  informed  to  the  contrary. 

Col.  Porter.     If  Mr.  Bishop  will  not  believe  it,  it  is- 


Mr.  Bishop  now  believes  it,  and  repeats  his  former  objections 
to  the  Constitution. 

Hon.  Mr.  Strong.  It  is  clear  that  the  Federal  Constitution 
could  not  provide  a  general  regulation  for  elections,  as  the 
practice  of  different  States  will  be  different.  There  were,  then, 
but  two  ways  of  obtaining  this  regulation — either  by  Congress, 
or  the  State  legislatures.  But  it  will  not  be  safe  to  trust  it 
wholly  with  the  States  ;  the  people  will  be  remiss  in  exercising 
their  privileges,  and  a  disunion  may  be  the  consequence. 

Mr.  Bishop  admits  that  Congress  may  have  this  power  in  case 
the  States  do  not  make  proper  regulations  ;  if  this  was  the  case, 
still  Congress  must  judge  of  the  regulations,  which  comes  to 
the  same  tiling. 

Mr.  Bishop  says  his  objection  is  against  the  unlimited  power 
to  which  he  can  see  no  end. 

Mr.  Cabot,  of  Beverly.  As  to  the  propriety  of  biennial  elec- 
tions he  would  add  one  thing — the  necessity  of  continuing  long 
enough  to  form  a  system.  But  as  to  the  fourth  section.  The 
representative  branch  is  the  popular  branch,  they  are  designed 
to  balance  and  check  the  Federal  Senate. 

Mr.  Adams,  of  Ashley. 

Mr.  Parsons. 

Mr.  Dalton. 

Mr.  Jones. 

Dr.  Jarvis.22 


January  17, 1T88,  A.  M. 


,    a.  i  wu, 


Hon.  Mr.  Turner  objects  to  the  fourth  section.  He  has  no 
objection  to  a  coercive  power  in  Congress  to  make  the  people 
attend  to  their  privileges,  but  he  does  not  see  any  such  power 
vested  in  Congress :  by  this  section,  Congress  may  fix  on  so 

22  [These  gentlemen  appear  from  the  Minutes  to  have  taken  part  in  the 
debate  ;  but  their  names  only  were  recorded.] 


1788.]  JUDGE    PARSONS'S   MINUTES.  295 

inconvenient  a  place  as  to  influence  the  situation  in  favor  of 
creatures  of  Congress,  and  no  reason  can  be  given  why  the 
place  of  election  should  be  altered  by  Congress  but  for  that 
purpose,  and  that  it  be  to  influence  the  election  in  favor  of  the 
members  then  in  Congress,  or  their  friends ;  and  therefore  he 
considers  it  as  a  system  to  perpetuate  the  members  of  Congress 
in  their  places ;  for  the  power  can  never  be  exercised  unexcep- 
tionably  in  any  case  whatever  ;  and  he  thinks  a  rotation  neces- 
sary in  the  lower  house  to  guard  against  the  deep  arts  of  popular 
men ;  has  well  grounded  fears  that  some  of  the  rulers  would 
be  bad  men — we  must  therefore  guard  against  them  ;  that  paper 
money  and  privateering  has  introduced  corruption  and  immoral- 
ity, and  a  disregard  to  private  and  public  justice.  In  conse- 
quence of  that  corruption,  it  requires  a  more  energetic  Federal 
government ;  but  the  rulers  will  be  taken  out  of  this  corrupt 
mass.  Like  prince,  like  people,  and  promotion  will  increase  the 
corruption.  Every  possible  guard  must  be  devised,  therefore, 
against  rulers  ;  therefore,  Congress  must  not  have  the  power  in 
the  fourth  section,  because  they  cannot  use  it  without  abusing 
it.  Let  us  not  act  like  the  people  .of  England  at  the  Restora- 
tion, who,  from  their  sufferings  under  anarchy,  run  mad  with 
loyalty.  He  has  a  strong  sense  of  the  difficulties  of  this  coun- 
try, arising  from  the  want  of  an  energetic  Federal  government, 
but  is  not  disposed,  for  that  cause,  to  adopt  any  government 
without  examination. 

Hon.  Mr.  Sumner.  Our  situation  is  very  alarming.  If  this 
Constitution  should  be  rejected  from  trivial  or  ill  founded 
objections.  The  objection  to  the  fourth  section  is  of  this  kind. 
The  delegation  of  the  powers  in  this  section  is  not  dangerous  to 
the  people  ;  it  is  possible  it  may  be  abused,  but  it  is  exceedingly 
improbable.  It  may  be  necessary  that  Congress  may  regulate 
the  time,  for  public  convenience,  and  the  manner,  for  uni- 
formity. As  to  the  place,  if  the  Congress  should  enact  an 
inconvenient  place,  it  must  be  but  temporary,  for  the  people 
will  certainly  choose  members  to  redress  any  grievance  they 
feel.  But  cases  may  arise  when  Congress  ought  to  have  this 
power,  as  when  by  foreign  force  half  a  State  may  be  possessed 
by  an  enemy,  as  in  South  Carolina. 

Mr.  Wedgery  is  willing  that  the  general  government  should 


296  JUDGE    PARSONS'S    MINUTES.  [1788. 

have  power  to  support  itself,  but  shall  they  have  a  general 
power  ?  The  discretionary  power  is  more  safely  trusted  in  the 
State  legislature  than  in  Congress.  Mr.  King  said  the  same 
discretionary  power  is  trusted  in  by  the  government  over 
towns.  It  is  not  true  ;  they  can  only  fine.  Dr.  Jarvis  has 
raised  an  argument  because  every  thirty  thousand  shall  have  a 
member.  It  is  not  true.  This  power  in  the  fourth  section  is 
therefore  unlimited,  and  to  trust  this  power  in  Congress  is  more 
dangerous  than  to  trust  the  State  ;  is  contented  with  this  power 
in  Congress,  when  States  refuse  or  neglect,  but  no  further. 

Rev.  Mr.  West.  To  argue  against  the  grant  of  powers 
because  they  may  be  abused,  is  an  argument  against  all  govern- 
ments— against  our  own ;  and  an  argument  which  proves  too 
much,  proves  nothing.  Those  who  object  ought  to  show  that 
it  is  probable  Congress  will  abuse  the  power.  It  has  been  said 
that  Congress  may  appoint  a  place  out  of  the  State,  but  the 
words  of  the  article  are  against  it,  for  the  place  is  to  be  appoint- 
ed in  this  place.  It  is  not  presumable  Congress  would  appoint 
an  improper  place.  Also  sorry  to  see  obstinacy,  party  spirit 
and  prejudice.  We  are  not.  to  reject  the  Constitution  merely 
because  we  have  some  objections ;  we  ought  to  determine,  upon 
comparing  the  advantages  of  adopting  or  rejecting. 

Gen.  Thompson  is  sensible  all  powers  may  be  abused,  but  this 
power  can  only  be  abused,  and  not  used  to  any  good ;  the  place 
may  be  appointed  out  of  the  State  ;  then  tells  the  story  of 
David  and  Absalom ;  objects,  because  after  a  certain  age,  when 
people  grow  old,  they  are  not  disqualified. 

Col.  Smith.  Observes  on  the  guarantee  of  a  republican 
form  of  government. 

Dr.  Holton.  Observes  on  the  supposition  that  the  present 
delegates  are  not  as  much  the  representatives  of  the  people  as 
they  were  formerly.  All  agree  the  present  Confederation  is 
defective.  I  will  confine  myself  to  state  facts.  When  this 
Convention  has  laid  open  to  them  every  defect  in  the  old  gov- 
ernment, they  will  determine  better.  He  is  in  distress  about 
our  present  situation,  but  we  should  take  care  not  to  make  bad 
worse.  If  we  agree  to  have  this  consolidated  form,  he  thinks 
the  power  in  the  fourth  section  proper,  and  necessary  to  give 
energy.      We  are  to  consider  whether  the  government  can  be 


1788.]  JUDGE    PARSONS'S    MINUTES.  297 

carried  into  effect  without  war ;  it  is  imperium  in  imperio. 
Questions  between  the  general  government  and  each  State  will 
soon  arise,  and  then  force  will  settle  it. 

Dr.  Snow.  The  question  is,  if  Congress  have  this  power, 
whether  it  will  not  be  more  dangerous  than  beneficial.  Most 
of  the  objections  have  been  considered.  There  will  be  some 
good  men  and  some  bad  men  in  the  government.  The  bad  men 
will  take  off  their  heads  if  they  are  traitors.  I  think  Congress 
must  have  great  powers,  or  we  are  ruined  ;  and  we  must  be 
careful  whom  we  choose.  Our  character  abroad  is  infamous, 
like  a  negro  in  a  rich  family.  He  is  for  the  powers  in  the  fourth 
section  to  be  trusted  in  Congress,  and  there  is  no  danger  of 
abuse,  because  it  must  be  exerted  by  both  branches,  who  will 
be  opposed  to  each  other. 

Gen.  Lincoln  thinks  the  danger  of  trusting  Congress  not 
proved  by  Mr.  Turner  ;  for,  admitting  the  Federal  representa- 
tives may  appoint  a  place,  to  continue  themselves  in  place,  yet 
ambitious  men  in  General  Court  may  by  this  influence  appoint 
an  improper  place  to  obtain  an  election.  Dr.  Holton  observed 
that  he  had  no  objection  to  this  power,  if  this  form  of  govern- 
ment is  to  be  adopted.  That  is  a  general  question,  and  cannot 
now  be  considered. 

Gilbert  Dench.  The  difficulty  he  had  yesterday  is  not  alto- 
gether removed.  The  argument  of  Mr.  Cabot  was  so  sweet, 
that  on  any  other  occasion  he  should  be  convinced,  but  in  this 
case  he  had  not  such  a  relish  as  to  satisfy  him,  because  Congress 
may  make  these  regulations,  whether  the  States  neglect  it  or 
not.  Was  it  my  own  personal  right  alone  concerned,  I  should 
make  no  difficulty ;  but  it  concerns  the  unborn.  What  will  be 
the  law  providing  these  regulations  ?  The  first  Congress  will 
probably  please  their  constituents,  as  far  as  they  can ;  popular 
commotions  will  probably  occasion  these  regulations.  Had  any 
Federal  government  ever  such  powers  ? 

Rev.  Mr.  Niles.  As  to  Congress  fixing  on  an  inconvenient 
place,  let  us  suppose  the  worst.  Suppose  they  fix  on  the  most 
inconvenient  places  for  election, — it  will  then  be  considered  as 
an  abuse,  and  the  people  will  call  a  Convention  and  amend  the 
Constitution.     What  greater  security  can  we  wish  for  ? 

Hon.  Mr.  Dana  proposes  not  to  go  into  the  debate,  but  to 

38 


298  JUDGE    PARSONS'S    MINUTES.  [1788. 

suggest  one  idea.  It  seems  agreed  there  would  be  no  objection 
if  Congress  only  had  this  power  when  the  State  neglected  or 
refused ;  and  it  has  been  asked,  what  necessity  there  can  be  for 
this  power  in  any  other  case.  I  will  state  a  case.  A  State  may 
make  provision,  but  it  may  not  be  agreeable  to  the  spirit  of  the 
Federal  Constitution.  It  is  not  enough  that  a  State  sends  its 
complement  of  representatives,  but  all  the  people  ought  to  have 
equal  influence,  and  the  State  regulation  is  unequal  and  unjust. 
Suppose  a  State  should  proportion  the  representatives  according 
to  corporations,  unequal  among  themselves.  Though  our 
Constitution  will  restrain  our  legislature,  yet  our  legislature  is 
not  bound  to  incorporate  new  places,  and  give  the  people  the 
right  of  election ;  or,  when  our  Constitution  is  revised,  the 
present  restraint  may  be  removed.  There  may,  therefore,  be  a 
case  put,  when  Congress  ought  to  have  this  power,  when  a  State 
may  not  neglect.  Power  may  be  abused,  but  the  spirit  of  the 
people  is  the  surest  and  a  certain  defence. 

Dr.  Taylor.  Arguments  drawn  from  the  amendment  of  the 
proposed  Constitution,  have  no  foundation.  It  will  be  almost 
impossible  to  amend  it ;  and  reasons  from  the  manner  in  which 
amendments  are  to  be  made,  have  also  no  foundation.  We 
have  not  in  our  Constitution  an  equal  representation. 

Adjourned  to  3  o'clock,  P.  M. 

3  o'clock,  P.  M. 

Hon.  Mr.  White  objects  to  the  qualifications,  as  no  value  in 
property  is  required ;  for  I  may  have  three  sons,  who  may  have 
spent  two  or  three  thousand  dollars  that  I  have  given  them,  and 
then  get  into  Congress  and  serve  the  States  in  the  same  manner. 

Mr.  Pierce  says  he  has  the  same  objection,  for  he  should  not 
choose  to  trust  any  man  with  his  concerns  who  had  no  property  ; 
and  why  should  we  trust  a  man  in  public  matters  ? 

Hon.  Mr.  Sedgwick  says,  this  objection  is  democratic ;  the 
people  may  choose  at  large,  and  no  man  without  property  will 
ever  be  chosen,  unless  he  is  a  man  of  great  talents  and  virtues. 

Gen.  Thompson  thinks  the  objection  of  no  weight,  as  the 
poor  man  has  generally  as  much  integrity  as  a  rich  man. 

Hon.  Mr.  King  thinks  property  no  mark  of  integrity  or 
talents.     Those  who  have  ruined  the  liberties  of  their  country, 


1788.]  JUDGE    PARSONS'S    MINUTES.  299 

were  generally  rich.  If  a  certain  property  was  required,  still 
it  could  not  be  ascertained  whether  the  elected  was  qualified  in 
point  of  property  or  not.  If  property  was  required,  the  differ- 
ent States  would  have  different  ideas  on  the  subject.  The  old 
Confederation  requires  no  property.  As  to  the  exclusion  of 
men  of  advanced  years,  there  is  a  difficulty  ;  for  in  the  southern 
States  an  old  man,  is,  in  the  eastern  States  a  man  of  vigor  and 
maturity  of  judgment. 

Mr.  Jones,  of  Bristol.     I  could  not  hear  him. 

Mr.  Backus.  In  Connecticut  there  is  no  exclusion  on  account 
of  age,  and  no  inconvenience  has  resulted  from  it. 

Mr.  Hubbard.  In  Connecticut  no  qualification  in  point  of 
property  is  required  of  the  electors,  which  is  the  reason  why 
the  elected  there  have  no  qualifications  either  as  to  property  or 
age.  Here  we  have  qualifications  for  electors,  therefore  there 
should  be  for  the  elected. 

Hon.  Mr.  Dana.  If  we  consider  the  impossibility  of  ascer- 
taining the  quantum  of  property,  we  shall  be  satisfied.  Beside, 
why  should  we  bridle  the  people  in  their  elections  ?  and  in 
framing  the  Constitution  the  Convention  have  acted  wisely. 

Mr.  Dench  thinks  the  objection  of  no  weight,  from  the  great 
number  of  electors  every  representative  should  have. 

Mr.  Thomas,  of  Middleborough,  thinks  they  should  have 
property,  otherwise  they  cannot  feel  the  burdens  they  lay  on 
the  people.  ♦ 

Hon.  Mr.  Dana.  The  people  will  take  care  of  that.  If  a 
man  has  not  property  they  will  not  choose  him,  unless  he  has 
qualifications  that  can  dispense  with  his  poverty. 

Mr.  Wedgery  thinks  there  can  be  no  weight  in  the  objection. 
Rich  men  will  most  commonly  be  the  object  of  their  choice. 

Ordered  to  proceed  to  the  next  paragraph,  viz. :  "  Represen- 
tatives and  direct  taxes,  <fec,  &c. — Georgia  three." 

Hon.  Mr.  King.  The  principle  on  which  this  paragraph  is 
founded  is,  that  taxation  and  representation  should  go  hand  in 
hand.  By  the  Confederation,  the  apportionment  is  upon  sur- 
veyed land,  the  buildings  and  improvements.  The  rule  could 
never  be  assessed.  A  new  rule  has  been  proposed  by  Congress, 
similar  to  the  present  rule,  which  has  been  adopted  by  eleven 
States — all  but  New  Hampshire  and  Rhode  Island. 


300  JUDGE    PARSONS'S    MINUTES.  [1788. 

Mr.  Wedgery  objects  to  the  rule,  as  apprentices  are  not  free- 
men, but  blunders  about  it. 

Mr.  King  explains 

Mr.  Shurtleff.  His  difficulty  is,  our  negroes  are  free,  but 
those  of  other  States  are  not.  But  the  number  of  representa- 
tives first  chosen 

Gen.  Thompson.  The  rule  is  unequal ;  as  we  have  more 
children  than  the  luxurious  inhabitants  of  the  southern  States. 
Congress  will  have  no  impost  or  excise,  but  lay  the  whole  tax 
on  polls.  We  live  longer  than  they  live.  We  live  to  one  hun- 
dred ;  they  to  forty. 

Dr.  Taylor.  If  eleven  States  have  agreed  to  the  rule  of 
polls,  twelve  have  agreed  to  alter  the  Confederation.  So  the 
agreement  of  eleven  States  is  no  reason.  But  I  object  to 
another  part ;  the  number  of  representatives  shall  not  exceed 
one  to  thirty  thousand.  The  representation  will  not  be  numer- 
ous enough.  It  may  be  objected,  that  if  a  larger  number,  it 
would  be  unwieldy — but  it  is  not  unwieldy.  It  may  not  be 
increased,  it  may  be  said,  and  that  we  may  increase  the  expense. 
But  the  expense  will  be  trifling,  compared  to  the  advantage  to 
let  every  class  be  represented.  The  additional  expense  is  but 
three  pence  per  poll.  Supposed  twelve  instead  of  eight,  at 
forty  shillings  per  day.  The  smallest  representation  that  ever 
was.     It  is  trifling. 

Mr.  Wedgery  wants  to  know  whether  all  white  infants  are 
free  persons  ?     If  they  are,  we  are  over-taxed. 

Hon.  Mr.  King.  All  persons  born  free  are  counted  among 
free  persons,  to  which  three-fifths  of  all  persons  born  or  imported 
slaves,  make  the  census. 

Mr.  Wedgery.  If  Mr.  King  is  right,  then  we  shall  pay  one- 
quarter  of  the  debt. 

Mr.  Gorham.  Mr.  Wedgery  is  totally  in  the  wrong.  It  will 
lessen  our  old  proportion  nearly  one-seventh.  As  eleven  States 
have  agreed  to  this  rule,  among  which  was  Massachusetts,  it  is 
a  rule  most  likely  to  be  adopted.  As  to  representation  men- 
tioned  

Col.  Fuller.  The  arguments  against  the  representation  are 
groundless.  As  the  rule  of  proportion  is  by  numbers,  five  slaves 
to  three  freemen  is  but  equal,  for  slaves  are  but  chattels. 


1788.]  JUDGE    PARSONS'S    MINUTES.  301 

Hon.  Mr.  Dana.  If  this  government  was  a  consolidation  and 
not  a  confederation,  he  should  then  think  the  number  too  small. 
But  as  it  is  Federal,  and  we  have  our  own  governments  to 
support,  the  expense  would  have  been  too  great.  We  can  send 
seven  on  the  old  plan,  but  have  only  sent  four  or  five,  which 
proves  the  sense  of  the  people  not  to  have  a  large  representa- 
tion. The  Constitution  provides  for  increasing  the  representa- 
tives. 'Tis  true  Congress  are  not  bound  to  increase  representa- 
tion as  numbers  increase,  nor  should  they ;  for,  from  the  rapidity 
of  population,  the  representation  would  be  enormous.  We  can 
instruct  our  representatives ;  they  will  not  dare  to  disobey 
them.  The  old  rule  of  apportionment  by  lands  was  against 
this  State.  Our  lands  are  worth  more  by  the  acre.  Lands 
cultivated  by  slaves  are  not  worth  as  much  as  lands  cultivated 
by  freemen.  Slaves  are  their  masters'  moneys,  and  at  their 
risk,  and  it  would  be  unjust  to  tax  a  slave  as  much  as  a  free- 
man. If  we  think  there  should  be  a  difference,  the  only  ques- 
tion would  be,  what  difference.  The  States  have  agreed,  in 
Convention,  on  materials,  which  we  have  not.  The  southern 
States  have  not  half  the  value  of  buildings  we  have,  arising 
from  the  climate  and  manner  of  living. 

Hon.  Mr.  White.  If  we  are  to  be  taxed  by  numbers,  it  will 
ruin  all  the  poor  people ;  but  I  do  not  understand  the  matter, 
and  will  wait  to  hear  it  explained. 

Mr.  Shurtleff  wants  to  know  whether  five  smart  negro  slaves 
are  to  be  equal  to  three  of  our  children  ? 

Mr.  Nasson  thinks  both  sides  should  be  stated.  Mr.  King 
says  five  of  their  infant  slaves  are  equal  to  three  of  our  govern- 
ors ;  but  three  of  our  infants  are  equal  to  five  of  their  healthy 
strong  slaves.  Besides,  though  our  climates  make  us  build 
houses,  yet  we  have  to  work  all  summer  for  winter.  Also,  the 
representation  is  unequal  between  us  and  New  Hampshire; 
also,  our  negroes  are  all  free,  and  theirs  are  slaves. 

Mr.  Randal.  Lands  in  the  southern  States  are  as  good  as 
ours  ;  if  not  better.  It  produces  every  thing.  Mr.  Dana  is 
mistaken  ;  but  as  to  the  slaves,  he  is  about  right.  The  laboring 
part  of  the  free  men  in  the  southern  States  can  live  upon  two 
days'  work,  as  easily  as  we  can  upon  six.  They  can  work  all 
winter,  we  cannot. 


302  JUDGE   PARSONS's    MINUTES.  [1788. 

January  18, 1788. 

Mr.  Dalton  is  in  favor  of  the  method  of  fixing  the  census  ; 
it  is  much  in  our  favor. 

Mr.  Cooley  asks  how  the  direct  [tax]  is  to  be  apportioned 
among  the  inhabitants  of  any  State  ? 

Gen.  Brooks,  of  Lincoln.  No  rule  is  fixed  in  the  Constitu- 
tion ;  that  is  a  legislative  act,  for  Congress  to  determine. 

Mr.  Randal  wants  to  know  how  far  Mr.  Dalton  has  travelled. 
Denies  Mr.  Dalton's  facts. 

Dr.  Holton  rises  to  give  light ;  mentions  the  old  rule  of  the 
census ;  found  impracticable ;  compelled  to  have  recourse  to 
numbers,  after  long  debate.  As  to  the  rule  of  representing  a 
State's  proportion,  Congress  must  hereafter  determine  the  mat- 
ter, and  make  an  internal  tax,  which  is  an  imperium  in  imperio ; 
it  will  bring  on  a  war.  I  think  the  new  rule  is  not  in  our  favor, 
but  am  in  favor  of  it,  for  it  is  all  the  rule  we  can  get. 

Dr.  Davis  wants  to  know  of  Dr.  Holton,  why  our  proportion 
has  been  lessened  ? 

Dr.  Holton  does  not  recollect,  but  Massachusetts  always 
insisted  we  stood  too  high  ;  but  the  reduction  was  on  no  fixed 
principle. 

Sam.  Thompson.  What  States,  in  the  debate,  opposed  the 
rule  of  numbers  ?     Asks  Dr.  Holton. 

Dr.  Holton  does  not  recollect.  He  was  against  the  rule  of 
numbers,  because  the  southern  States  had  more  land  and  less 
numbers,  than  the  eastern. 

Hon.  Mr.  Dana.  Answers  Dr.  Davis's  question,  as  it  lays  in 
his  mind.  The  reason  why  our  taxes  were  higher  during  the 
war  than  since,  was  because  we  were  free  from  the  public 
enemy,  and  money  must  be  obtained  where  it  could  be  had. 
Since  the  war,  other  States  have  been  recovering. 

Mr.  Dawes  observes  that  Dr.  Holton  likes  this  paragraph,  if 
the  Constitution  prevails.  Mr.  Randal  need  no  longer  lament 
the  want  of  abilities  and  eloquence  on  his  side,  since  Dr.  Holton 
has  spoken.  But  to  the  question.  Though  slaves  are  reckoned 
five  equal  to  three  now,  yet  in  a  few  years  slavery  must  be 
abolished,  and  in  the  mean  time,  slaves  may  be  taxed  on  impor- 
tation, sixty  shillings  per  head.      Slavery  will  not  die  of  an 


1788.]  JUDGE   PARSONS's    MINUTES.  303 

apoplexy,  but  of  a  consumption.  As  to  direct  taxation,  Con- 
gress now  have  powers  to  make  requisitions,  but  not  to  enforce 
them.  Considers  the  revenue,  as  it  relates  to  borrowing  money 
abroad.  Congress  may  never  exercise  direct  taxes.  Lands  are 
not  a  proper  rule  of  census  ;  numbers  are  a  better  rule. 

Mr.  Randal.  Sorry  to  hear  it  said  that  after  1808  negroes 
would  be  free.  If  a  southern  man  heard  it,  he  would  call  us 
pumpkins. 

Mr.  Wedgery  objects  to  Mr.  Dana's  description  of  the  south- 
ern States.     Their  land  is  better  than  ours. 

Mr.  Dana  says  he  never  compared  the  value  of  the  eastern  or 
southern  lands  ;  he  compared  only  the  mode  of  cultivation. 

Mr.  Wedgery  says  if  this  rule  is  for  an  equal  poll  tax,  he 
has  no  objection.  But  for  a  rule  of  apportionment,  it  is  unjust, 
southern  land  being  better  than  ours.  In  Virginia,  one  thou- 
sand acres  has  forty-eight  polls ;  in  Massachusetts,  a  family  of 
six,  to  fifty  acres,  makes  one  hundred  and  twenty  polls  to  the 
one  thousand  polls  [acres?].  In  legislation,  one  southern 
man  with  sixty  slaves,  will  have  as  much  influence  as  thirty- 
seven  freemen  in  the  eastern  States. 

Mr.  Strong.  This  mode  of  census  is  not  new.  Our  General 
Court  have  considered  it,  and  the  General  Court  have  agreed. 
The  southern  States  have  their  inconveniences ;  none  but 
negroes  can  work  there ;  the  buildings  are  worth  nothing. 
When  the  delegates  were  apportioned,  forty  thousand  was  the 
number.  Massachusetts  had  eight,  and  a  fraction  ;  New  Hamp- 
shire two,  and  a  large  fraction.  New  Hampshire  was  allowed 
three ;  Georgia  three,  &c.  Representation  is  large  enough, 
because  no  private  local  interests  are  concerned.  Very  soon, 
as  the  country  increases,  it  will  be  larger.  He  considered  the 
increasing  expense. 

Mr.  Wedgery  asks  whether  the  poverty  of  our  lands  was 
considered  ? 

Mr.  Sedgwick. 

Mr.  Randal  talks  a  great  deal,  and  says,  as  he  sits  down, 
that  he  has  done  better  than  he  expected. 

Col.  Porter. 

Mr.  Randal. 

Col.  Porter. 


304  JUDGE    PARSONS'S    MINUTES.  [1788. 

Mr. ,  of  Kittery,  spoke  against  the  slave  trade.     We 

shall  all  suffer  for  joining  with  them,  when  they  allow  the  slave 
trade. 

Mr.  Cabot  asks  the  gentleman  from  Sharon,  whether,  in  his 
five  hundred  miles  travel,  he  saw  five  thousand  people  who  live 
as  well  as  five  thousand  people  of  the  lowest  sort  here.  As  to 
the  slave  trade,  the  southern  States  have  the  slave  trade,  and 
are  sovereign  States.  This  Constitution  is  the  best  way  to  get 
rid  of  it. 

Mr.  Randal  says  he  believes  he  has,  but  is  not  certain.  If 
they  do  not,  it  is  their  own  fault. 

Mr.  Nasson.     Southern  States  are  not  poor. 

Gen.  Thompson.     As  to  age — slavery — religion. 

Adjourned  to  3  o'clock. 

3  o'clock,  P.  M. 

Mr.  Gore  spoke  upon  the  rule  of  census,  upon  the  number  of 
representatives. 

Mr.  Parsons. 

Dr.  Taylor. 

Mr.  Jones,  of  Boston. 

Mr.  Cooley  asks  how  the  quota  is  to  be  apportioned  upon  the 
inhabitants  of  the  State. 

Mr.  King.  Perhaps  Congress  may  never  exercise  this  power. 
They  must  first  demand  it  of  the  State,  and  if  they  will  not  assess 
and  pay  it,  then  Congress  will  assess  and  collect  it,  and  it  is 
to  be  presumed  that  Congress  will  adopt  the  usual  rule  in  a 
State. 

Mr.  Shurtleff.     He  now  understands  it. 

Hon.  Mr.  Dana.  The  question  now  seems  to  be,  whether 
Congress  will  ever  have  the  necessity  of  levying  direct  taxes — 
an  attack  of  one  State  is  an  attack  upon  all — guards  against 
the  prejudice  of  education — the  advocates  for  the  Constitution 
are  the  friends  of  the  people — high  Whigs — they  early  braved 
the  common  danger.  The  nation  should  have  power  to  avail 
itself  of  all  the  national  resources.  There  is  no  danger — New 
England  will  have  a  sufficient  influence  to  preserve  itself.  No 
standing  army,  because  in  no  sudden  danger. 

Mr.  Wedgery.     The  question  is,  how  that  is  to  be  appor- 


1788.]  JUDGE   PARSONS'S    MINUTES.  305 

tioned  ?  Merchants  in  Congress  will  oppose  imposts,  and  have 
direct  taxation  on  polls. 

Dench.     He  is  satisfied. 

Maj.  Fuller  is  for  direct  taxes  in  time  of  war  only.  Georgia 
has  too  many  representatives.  Remove  these  doubts,  and  I  am 
for  the  Constitution. 

Hon.  Mr.  White  has  difficulty  about  Georgia,  and  two  or 
three  States  at  the  southward. 

Mr.  Randal  moves  Mr.  Gerry  may  be  asked  to  satisfy  Major 
Fuller's  difficulty. 

Mr.  Wedgery  objects,  and  moves  that  a  time  may  be  assigned 
to  ask  questions,  and  it  is  seconded  ;  but  the  motion  is  with- 
drawn, and  Mr.  Randal's  motion  prevailed,  to  ask  Mr.  Gerry 
the  reasons  for  the  requisition. 


Saturday,  January  19, 1788. 

Proceeded  to  the  next  paragraph — no  debate.  To  the  next — 
no  debate.     To  the  next — the  Senate — 

Mr.  Cooley.  As  it  has  been  proved  that  the  biennial  elec- 
tions are  better  than  annual,  so  sexennial  are  better  ;  there- 
fore, we  had  better  proceed. 

Hon.  Mr.  Singlet ary  is  against  the  Senate  being  chosen  for 
six  years — they  may  make  themselves  perpetual — will  move 
their  families  there — have  high  wages — no  religion  is  necessary 
— we  may  have  an  atheist  or  a  pagan.  * 

Dr.  Davis.  Mr.  Singletary  has  not  reverted  to  the  rotation. 
There  will  probably  be  but  one  session  in  a  year,  and  there  is 
no  reason  to  suppose  senators  for  so  short  a  time  will  carry  their 
families  with  them. 

Mr.  Shurtleff.  The  rotation  is  only  in  the  first  choice  ; 
afterwards  there  is  no  rotation. 

Dr.  Taylor.  The  rotation  is  a  shadow  and  not  a  substance, 
and  will  be  no  security  for  the  people.  There  will  be  more 
than  one  session  ;  probably  they  will  be  there  all  the  time. 

Mr.  Dawes.  The  senators  can  never  feel  independent ;  every 
two  years  one-third  will  come  fresh  from  the  people.     They 

39 


306  JUDGE    PARSONS'S    MINUTES.  [1788. 

ought  to  have  a  longer  tenure  than  the  representatives,  as  a 
balance  ;  and  their  business  being  more  difficult,  they  should 
have  more  time  to  inform  themselves. 

Gen.  Thompson  is  against  the  power  of  the  Senate,  as  each 
State,  however  small,  has  as  much  influence  as  a  great  State. 

Mr.  Singletary  repeats  his  old  objections,  and  wishes  to  have 
it  discussed  fully. 

Mr.  Cooley  is  against  the  present  mode  of  arguing.  We 
should  confine  ourselves  to  mere  inquiry  and  information,  and 
not  go  so  deep  into  the  merits  of  the  several  paragraphs. 

Gen.  Brooks,  of  Medford.  His  object  is  to  grant  the 
necessary  powers  for  the  benefit  of  the  people,  and  then  to  pro- 
vide suitable  checks  ;  that  is  the  case  here.  1.  The  choice  by 
the  legislatures.  2.  They  feel  all  the  inconveniences  they  lay 
on  others.  3.  They  can  do  nothing  without  the  consent  of  the 
representatives,  who  will  always  watch  over  them,  and  impeach 
them  if  they  behave  amiss. 

Mr.  Wedgery.  They  are  only  answerable  to  their  constitu- 
ents, by  not  being  rechosen  at  the  end  of  six  years. 

Mr.  Gerry's  answer,  in  writing,  produced  and  filed — respect- 
ing Georgia  having  three  representatives. 

Mr.  King  will  give  the  answer,  which  he  does  at  large.  The 
estimate  by  which  the  requisitions  are  made,  was  made  in  1782; 
no  alteration  since.  Georgia  has  great  additions  and  emigra- 
tion, and  is  now  in  an  Indian  war.  Connecticut  and  New 
Hampshire  have  paid  nothing.  If  I  was  for  it  now,  it  is 
improper,  till  we  are  more  united. 

*     Mr.  Dawes  reads  resolves  of  Congress  to  support  Mr.  King's 
statements. 

Mr.  Dalton.  All  the  difficulties  Gen.  Thompson  has  made, 
show  the  necessity  of  adopting  this  government,  to  do  us 
justice. 

Hon.  Mr.  Dana  says  the  reason  why  the  small  States  have  the 
same  weight  in  the  Senate,  is  because  the  Senate  represents  the 
sovereignty.  The  large  gain  by  having  the  popular  branch 
introduced. 

Hon.  Mr.  Strong.  There  were  large  debates  on  this  subject 
in  the  Convention.  The  Convention  would  have  broke  up  if 
it  had  not  been  agreed  to  allow  an  equal  representation  in  the 


1788.]  JUDGE   PARSONS's    MINUTES.  307 

Senate.     It  was  an  accommodation,  reported  by  a  Committee, 
of  which  Mr.  Gerry  was  one. 

Mr.  Jones,  of  Bristol,  objects  to  length  of  time  for  which  the 
Senate  are  chosen.  Is  for  their  being  chosen  annually.  If  they 
behave  well,  they  may  be  rechosen,  otherwise  they  ought  not. 
Senators  will  now  carry  their  families  with  them  to  the  seat  of 
government,  and  forget  their  own  States.  We  had  not  yet 
asked  advice  of  God  about  it.  Should  have  had  a  fast  before. 
He  moved  for  one  in  the  house  ;  he  was  not  seconded.  We 
have  hurried  too  much,  and  the  election  of  delegates  to  this 
Convention,  was  too  soon.     We  first  must  adore  God. 

Mr.  Ames.  Senate  not  chosen  for  too  long  a  time.  Consol- 
idation not  proper — country  too  large  for  that  purpose.  We 
must  guard  against  the  consolidation  of  the  States — represen- 
tation must  therefore  be  equal  among  the  States  in  the  Union 
who  represent  the  sovereignty.  They  should  have  a  longer 
tenure  than  the  representatives — their  business  is  more  impor- 
tant— they  negotiate  with  foreign  powers — and  every  two  years 
one-third  of  the  Senate  will  return  to  the  people. 

Mr.  Shurtleff.  The  Convention  says  they  aimed  at  consol- 
idating the  Union. 

Mr.  Parsons.  The  distinction  is  between  consolidation  of 
the  States,  and  a  consolidation  of  the  Union. 

Mr.  Jones,  of  Bristol,  is  still  for  annual  elections — great 
danger  from  a  longer  time. 

Mr.  King.  The  average  length  of  time  is  but  four  years,  for 
every  time  one-third  is  chosen,  one-third  will  vacate  in  two 
years,  and  one-third  in  four  years.  As  to  their  forgetting  their 
States,  the  legislature  will  instruct  them  from  time  to  time. 
No  senator  will  dare  to  disobey — necessary  they  have  time  to 
inquire  into  the  character  of  men,  as  they  advise  to  the  appoint- 
ment of  officers,  and  negotiate  with  foreign  States. 

Dr.  Taylor.  Mr.  King's  object  is  to  show  that  the  election 
of  senators  is  not  sexennial,  and  that  the  States  have  a  greater 
check  now  than  in  the  old  Confederation.  But  they  are  always 
chosen  for  six  years,  and  the  check  under  the  new  Constitution 
is  not  so  great — they  are  chosen  annually — a  rotation — and  are 
liable  to  be  recalled. 

Mr.  Cooley.     Experience  teaches  us  that  rulers  should  be 


308  JUDGE    PARSONS's    MINUTES.  [1788. 

under  restraint.  Congress  have  great  powers — sometimes  a 
majority  of  a  quorum  is  required — sometimes  two-tliirds  pres- 
ent, as  in  treaties. 

Gen.  Brooks,  of  Lincoln,  denies  the  fact. 

Mr.  Reed  moves  Mr.  Gerry  may  be  asked  about  the  matter. 
Then  Mr.  Gerry  said  he  was  putting  in  writing  a  state  of  facts 
upon  this  matter. 

Adjourned. 


Monday,  January  21, 1788,  A.  M. 

Mr.  Parsons  assigns  the  reasons  why  two-thirds  of  the  sena- 
tors are  requisite  for  convictions. 

Mr.  Ames,  on  the  fourth  section.  Assigns  two  reasons  in  favor 
of  that  section.  1.  As  the  first  Congress  will  be  chosen  pursu- 
ant to  State  regulations,  and  therefore  equal,  if  Congress  were 
to  fix  an  unequal  place,  to  influence  the  choice  in  favor  of  one 
member,  it  would  be  opposed  by  the  other  members.  2.  If  we 
can  trust  our  own  legislature,  can  we  trust  the  legislatures  of 
the  other  States  rather  than  Congress  ?  This  section  is  not  a 
trap,  but  a  security  for  the  liberties  of  the  people,  and  intro- 
duced to  guard  them. 

Mr.  Dana  once  thought-  it  dangerous  and  unnecessary  ;  is 
now  convinced  to  the  contrary.  1.  The  representation  is  to 
proceed  directly  from  the  people — the  people  ought  to  be  equally 
represented,  and  have  equal  influence — remarks  on  Rhode 
Island — there  must  be  a  power s 

Mr.  Cooley  states  any  objection  unnecessary,  because  the 
rights  of  the  people  are  secured  by  oath. 

Mr.  Parsons. 

Dr.  Taylor. 

Mr.  Parsons,  in  reply. 

Mr.  King.  Distinct  ideas  of  time,  place  and  manner — pur- 
sues Ames's  ideas  of  trusting  the  legislatures  of  the  other 
States — corporate  representation  not  the  same  as  by  numbers — 
the  present  situation  of  Connecticut — South  Carolina — Charles- 
ton sends  thirty,  and  given  districts  send  given  numbers  of  rep- 


1788.]  JUDGE    PARSONS'S    MINUTES.  309 

resentatives,  without  regard  to  the  number  of  electors — the 
controlling  power,  therefore,  is  necessary. 
Adjourned. 

3  o'clock,  P.  M.' 

Mr.  Parsons  gives  the  reasons  why  two-thirds  are  necessary 
to  expulsion. 

Dr.  Taylor  objects.  As  to  publishing  journal  from  time  to 
time,  is  uncertain  ;  it  means  any  thing  or  nothing. 

Mr.  King  says,  the  phrase  must  be  determined  according  to  the 
subject  matter  to  which  it  is  applied — from  session  to  session. 

Mr.  Wedgery.  He  has  no  doubt  as  to  the  words  "  from  time 
to  time,"  but  objects  as  to  the  clause  of  secrecy — each  house 
may  think  it  proper  to  keep  every  thing  secret. 

Mr.  Gorham.  As  to  secrecy,  the  interest  of  the  State 
requires,  many  times,  secrecy.  No  other  government  ever 
required  in  its  Constitution  that  the  journals  should  be  pub- 
lished.    In  cases  of  treaties,  secrecy  is  necessary. 

Dr.  Taylor.     His  only  objection  is,  as  to  the  time. 

Rev.  Mr.  Perley.  Alarms  of  Lexington — God  raised  up 
Washington,  a  better  man  than  General  Thompson.  Should 
Washington  have  published  his  secret  council  to  his  armies,  he 
could  not  have  defied  Gen.  Howe,  &c. 

Dr.  Taylor,  to  the  sixth  section.  Under  the  old  Confedera- 
tion, each  State  paid  its  own  delegates,  and  no  corruption ;  is 
not  for  an  alteration. 

Col.  Porter.  There  has  been  complaint.  Rhode  Island 
would  pay  their  delegates  in  paper  money — some  States  have 
not  sent  because  they  had  not  money — equal,  it  should  be  a 
common  charge — this  Convention  is  so  supported. 

Mr.  Sedgwick.  In  favor  of  the  section — the  practice  in 
every  State. 

Mr.  King.  If  the  section  does  not  take  place  the  people  may 
be  deprived  of  privileges,  by  the  legislatures  refusing  to  make 
provision. 

Paragraph,  exclusion  from  office. 

Mr.  Gorham.  To  take  away  all  inducement  to  ill-adminis- 
tration, the  exclusion  was  provided. 

Mr.  Parsons  added,  that  if  a  member  was  to  resign,  he  could 


310  JUDGE    PARSONS^    MINUTES.  [1788. 

not  take  a  place  until  the  time  for  which  he  was  elected  was 
expired. 

Section  seventh — no  debate. 

Section  eighth,  first  paragraph — for  laying  duty,  &c. 

Gen.  Brooks,  of  Lincoln.  Has  doubts  about  the  clause  of 
the  general  warfare  [welfare] — whether  there  should  not  have 
been  some  limitation. 

Gen.  Thompson  seems  to  think  nobody  now  understands  it. 

Mr.  King.  The  present  clause  the  most  important.  We 
have  already  considered  the  organization  of  the  legislature,  and 
now  come  to  powers  to  be  vested  in  it.  This  Constitution  is  to 
be  formed  by  the  people,  the  old  Confederation  by  the  States — 
the  old  Confederation  radically  defective  as  to  raising  money. 
In  Holland  the  several  provinces  never  advanced  the  quota, 
though  strictly  bound — Holland,  by  force,  compelled  one  of  the 
states  to  .pay  its  quota — to  relieve  the  state,  they  used  to 
demand  double  of  what  they  wanted,  and  get  what  they  could 
— Holland  advanced  almost  the  whole,  and  having  but  one  vote, 
could  never  get  the  accounts  settled.  Considers  the  conduct  of 
the  several  American  States  during  the  late  war.  Nobody  will 
object  to  the  impost  and  excise,  but  to  direct  taxation. 

Hon.  Mr.  White.  The  other  States  will  always  out-vote  us. 
As  to  Holland,  they  are  already  got  into  Lordships — no  collect- 
ing the  money  but  by  the  point  of  the  sword — that  is  the  design 
of  this  Constitution,  after  they  have  built  the  forts  and  got  the 
ten  miles  square. 

Mr.  Dawes.  The  reason  of  giving  this  power  is  to  render 
the  sword  unnecessary,  for  without  this  power  Congress  cannot 
compel  a  State  to  pay,  without  an  army — perhaps  Congress 
may  never  have  the  necessity,  as  they  now  have  imposts  and 
excises.  But  Congress  will  not  raise  direct  taxes  but  for  neces- 
sity. They  will  be  chosen  by  the  people,  and  will  feel  as  the 
people  feel,  and  therefore  will  not  abuse  their  power — necessary 
that  Congress  should  have  the  power  of  imposts  and  excises — 
that  they  encourage  agriculture  by  checking  the  importation 
and  consumption  of  foreign  produce — necessity  of  Congress 
having  the  regulation  of  commerce — talks  about  agriculture 
and  manufactures — population  from  migration — convenient 
places  for  mills  for  manufacturing.      But  we  cannot  encourage 


1788.]  >  JUDGE    PARSONS'S    MINUTES.  311 

manufactures  until  Congress  have  these  powers — when  they 
have  these  powers,  Congress  will  have  but  little  occasion  for 
direct  taxation — we  may  have  war,  and  want  money — to  collect 
it  by  requisition  is  nugatory — without  an  army — Congress  will 
first  demand  it,  and  each  State  may  raise  it  in  such  a  way  as 
they  like  best. 

Mr.  Bodman.  Objects  to  direct  taxation.  Congress  should 
have  some  powers,  but  it  is  difficult  to  draw  the  line,  but  it 
ought  to  be  drawn  between  the  sovereignty  .of  general  govern- 
ment and  of  each  State.  Now,  the  sovereignty  of  this  State  is 
given  up,  as  the  general  government  may  prevent  our  collecting 
any  taxes.  Now  if  the  power  had  been  conditional,  if  a  State 
refused,  he  should  have  no  objection.  Now,  Congress  may 
prevent  each  State  from  supporting  its  own  government. 

Mr.  Sedgwick.  The  same  objection  applies  as  between  a  State 
and  its  towns — states  the  necessity  of  Congress  having  this  power. 

Mr.  Singletary.  The  power  is  unlimited  in  Congress — he 
objects  against  it — a  new  case — as  much  power  as  was  ever 
given  to  a  despotic  prince — will  destroy  all  power  in  this  of 
raising  taxes,  and  we  have  nothing  left — the  only  security  is, 
we  may  have  an  honest  man,  but  we  may  not  have — we  may 
have  an  atheist,  pagan,  Mahommedan — must  take  care  of  pos- 
terity— few  nations  enjoy  the  liberty  of  Englishmen.  Is  for 
giving  up  some  power,  but  not  every  thing — no  bill  of  rights — 
civil  and  sacred  privileges  will  all  go. 

Col.  Fuller. 

Gen.  Thompson.  He  would  not  adopt  the  Constitution  if  it 
was  perfect,  till  he  saw  what  our  sister  States  will  do.  Massa- 
chusetts being  a  leading  State,  ought  to  stand  by.  We  send 
delegates  to  Convention  to  amend,  and  not  make  a  new  one. 
Only  two  of  our  delegates  signed  it — overpowered  by  Pennsyl- 
vania delegates.  This  Constitution  will  not  help  our  trade — if 
the  other  States  who  have  not  paid,  will  not  pay,  we  must  make 
them  by  fair  means — better  draw  than  drive — we  must  support 
the  old  Confederation — if  only  nine  accept,  we  cannot  touch 
the  other  four — if  we  attempt  to  force  them,  we  shall  be  torn 
to  pieces,  for  foreign  States  will  help  them.  The  Constitution 
is  in  doubtful  terms  ;  it  can't  be  understood.  Union  is  neces- 
sary ;  division  will  destroy  us. 


312  JUDGE    PARSONS's    MINUTES.  ,  [1788. 

Maj.  Kinsley.  Power  is  not  dangerous,  if  people  have  proper 
checks — checks  were  proper  under  the  old  Confederation — we 
have  them  not  under  the  new.  Under  the  old  Confederation, 
the  delegates  were  our  servants  ;  now  they  are  our  masters,  and 
we  have  no  control  over  any  usurpation  of  theirs — they  have 
all  our  money,  a  standing  army,  a  Federal  town.  Tells  the 
story  of  the  Decemviri,  but  mistakes  it.  The  British  Parlia- 
ment first  altered  from  annual  to  triennial,  then  to  septennial — 
people  uneasy  under  it — every  session  an  exertion  is  made  to 
repeal  the  septennial  bill,  but  fails  through  bribery  and  corrup- 
tion— our  Senate,  on  an  average,  for  four  years — we  shall  soon 
see  the  time  when  bribery  and  corruption  will  be  employed 
to  obtain  elections — under  these  circumstances,  he  is  not  for 
trusting  these  powers  with  any  one  body  of  men. 


Tuesday,  January  22,  1788. 
Not  well  enough  to  take  Minutes. 


Wednesday,  January  23, 1788. 

Mr.  Pierce,  of  Partridgefield.  Is  [for]  a  general  government 
— if  it  will  be  safe — but  if  we  grant  a  power  to  lay  direct  taxes, 
Congress  will  not  lay  imposts.  Congress  should  not  have  power 
to  lay  direct  taxes,  but  in  war.  Senate  chosen  for  too  long  a 
time — should  not  be  chosen  longer  than  the  house,  and  the 
house  may  balance  them. 

Hon.  Mr.  Varnum.  The  powers  of  Congress  are  sufficiently 
defined  in  the  grant,  and  no  need  of  a  bill  of  rights — Congress 
have  not  all  our  resources,  they  have  only  a  concurrent  right  to 
taxes  and  excises,  and  can  make  laws  only  to  support  a  concur- 
rent right,  and  so  no  consolidation  of  States — union  would 
answer  no  purpose  with  these  powers.  Congress  may  abuse  the 
power,  but  there  is  no  probability.  If  Congress  have  no  power 
to  call  on  a  delinquent  State,  it  is  an  encouragement  to  delin- 


1788.]  JUDGE    PARSONS's    MINUTES.  313 

quency.  He  then  considers  the  conduct  of  the  States  lately — 
Congress  must  have  this  power  in  peace  as  well  as  in  war — 
they  can  make  no  law  but  what  is  necessary  for  the  common 
good. 

Mr.  Choate.  Congress  must  defend  us  abroad,  and  preserve 
to  us  peace  at  home — they  must  therefore  have  the  means,  and 
the  means  are  delegated  by  the  people  to  their  servants — depriv- 
ing the  delegates  of  these  means,  is  depriving  the  people  of 
the  means  of  defence  and  self-preservatipn — it  would  also 
deprive  us  of  the  means  of  regulating  our  commerce  and  pro- 
tecting our  trade — there  can  be  no  dividing  the  supreme  power 
— it  must  be  wholly  delegated,  or  wholly  remain  with  the  peo- 
ple, and  limits  are  inconvenient — if  direct  tax  was  only  when 
imposts  and  excises  are  insufficient,  Congress  might  lay  trifling 
imposts  and  excises — if  it  was  limited,  as  to  war,  it  would  injure 
us  in  hiring,  for,  the  better  security  we  can  give,  the  easier  will 
be  the  terms — we  may  lay  aside  party  spirit,  as  it  is  a  subject  of 
the  most  importance — our  security  is  in  elections  at  stated 
times. 

Mr.  Cooley  asks,  if  Mr.  Choate  means  that  if  the  people 
delegate  any  power,  they  must  delegate  all  ? 

Mr.  Choate  replies.  He  does  not  mean  that  if  the  people 
grant  one  kind  of  power,  they  must  grant  all  kinds  of  power, 
but  the  kind  of  power  we  give,  we  must  give  all. 

Dr.  Jarvis.  Mr.  Choate's  ideas  are  agreeable  to  his  own, 
but  asks  why  the  French  are  pointed  out  as  our  best  friends. 

Gen.  Thompson.  Against^  these  powers — not  necessary — 
standing  armies  are  a  curse — take  care  of  the  militia,  they  are 
virtuous  men — soldiers  in  a  standing  army  are  the  worst  men — 
standing  armies  are  never  necessary,  witness  Burgoyne — we  are 
virtuous,  enlightened,  rich — raise  our  own  produce — cannot  be 
starved,  or  taken  by  Britain — can  live  without  trade — the  riches 
of  the  country  are  in  a  laboring  people — Massachusetts  will  be 
one  of  the  four,  he  hopes,  and  will  stand  out — Clinton  against 
it  before  he  knew  what  it  was,  but  had  a  hint  of  it — nations 
will  not  fall  upon  us — not  true  if  one  nation  attacks  us,  another 
will  defend  us — we  are  in  debt — that  is  an  advantage,  for  they 
cannot  carry  the  land — do  not  let  us  grow  too  fast,  we  shall 
grow  out  of  shape.     Now,  I  have  proved  that  we  have  liberty, 

40 


314  JUDGE    PARSONS'S    MINUTES.  [1788. 

property  and  virtue — we  cannot  influence  other  nations  without 
they  find  their  account  in  it.  The  Constitution  is  not  clear — no 
bill  of  rights,  which  is  a  bar — the  learned  are  not  agreed 
about  it.  Some  people  say  we  should  swallow  a  bone  for  the 
sake  of  the  meat,  and  then  pick  the  bone  out.  Now  for  the 
section — Britain  never  authorized  the  Parliament  to  pay  an 
army  for  two  years. 

Rev.  Mr.  Niles,  of  Abington,  wishes  to  know  what  limits 
would  suit  him. 

Gen.  Thompson  says  he  is  now  tired. 

Gov.  Bowdoin.  A  diversity  of  opinion  is  to  be  expected — 
when  the  Revolution  commenced,  such  was  the  spirit  of  the 
people,  that  requisitions  were  sufficient,  but  not  now.  States 
have  refused,  and  compelled  Congress  to  increase  the  public 
debt  by  further  loans — states  the  terms  of  the  loans — they  must 
be  punctually  complied  with — Congress  will  not  act  like  a  fac- 
tion in  Rhode  Island.  Our  foreign  creditors  are  able  to  force 
payment  by  reprisal,  which  will  essentially  injure  this  Common- 
wealth. 

Dr.  Taylor  wishes  to  have  the  Constitution  discussed  at 
large,  and  not  by  paragraphs. 

Mr.  Parsons. 

Adjourned. 

3  o'clock,  P.  M. 

A  motion  was  made  to  consider  the  Constitution,  at  large. 
After  debate,  the  motion  was  adjourned  to  ten  o'clock,  next 
morning. 

Adjourned  to  9  o'clock,  next  morning. 


Thursday,  January  24,  1788. 

Some  unimportant  debates  till  ten  o'clock — then  a  motion 
to  consider  the  Constitution,  upon  the  whole,  and  not  by  para- 
graphs. After  debate,  it  was  ordered  to  subside,  by  a  great 
majority.     The  eighth  section  was  then  read,  and  some  debate. 

Adjourned. 


1788.]  JUDGE    PARSONS'S    MINUTES.  315 

,  3  O'CLOCK,  P.  M. 

Eighth  section. 

Mr.  Dench.  These  powers  will  dissolve  the  State  govern- 
ments. 

Mr.  Cabot  answered  Mr.  Dench. 

Mr.  Dench  replied. 

Gen.  Brooks,  of  Medford,  answers  Mr.  Dench  at  large,  by 
showing  the  Federal  government  cannot  exist,  but  on  the  exist- 
ence of  the  several  governments. 

Maj.  Hosmer  wishes  to  have  explained  the  Federal  town. 

Mr.  Strong  explains  it.  Congress  must  have  exclusive  legis- 
lation where  they  sit,  to  prevent  or  punish  insults. 

Dr.  Taylor.  The  district  is  too  large — may  contain  barracks 
and  stores. 

Mr.  King.  Words,  in  their  nature  and  language,  are  imper- 
fect. The  Convention  must  either  enumerate  the  rights  of  the 
general  government,  or  the  rights  of  the  State  governments — 
most  for  the  liberties  of  the  States  to  enumerate  the  powers  of 
the  general  government,  and  all  not  enumerated  still  remain  to 
the  States — rights  of  all,  therefore,  accurately  denned,  which 
he  illustrates  by  direct  taxes — the  power  of  availing  itself  of  the 
whole  resources,  is  essential — there  is  no  government  without 
it,  except  Turkey.  Under  the  new  government,  the  wants  of 
each  government  will  be  confined,  but  the  wants  of  the  general 
government  must  be  unconfined — people  suppose  they  can 
increase  the  general  government  without  lessening  the  State's 
power — 'tis  not  true.  Our  State  now,  is  not  a  sovereign  State 
— we  cannot  make  peace,  or  war,  or  treaties — no  aristocracy  in 
the  new  government. 

Dr.  Willard  has  the  thirteenth  article  of  the  Confederation 
read,  and  the  tenth  article  of  the  sixth  section  of  ours  was 
read,  and  observed  that  we  ought  to  be  jealous  when  our  Con- 
stitution is  in  danger. 

Mr.  King  says,  the  people  at  all  times  have  the  control  of 
their  Constitution. 

Dr.  Willard.  Our  governments  are  governments  of  laws 
and  not  of  men,  and  the  Constitution  cannot  be  altered  but 
according  to  the  compact. 


316  JUDGE    PARSONS'S    MINUTES.  [1788. 

Mr.  Jones,  of  Boston.  The  word  consolidation  has  different 
ideas,  as  different  metals  melted  into  one  mass,  two  twigs  tied 
into  oiip  bundle. 

Mr.  Dench  insists  upon  it,  by  consolidation  under  the  Federal 
government,  will  dissolve  the  powers  of  the  States,  /and  render 
our  elections  insecure. 

Rev.  Mr.  West  answered  it. 

Gem  Thompson.  Unconstitutional  to  adopt  it — if  we  do,  it 
will  be  of  no  force — our  delegates  did  not  keep  within  the  line 
of  their  duty. 

Mr.  Gokham.  The  delegates  kept  within  their  line — the 
powers  authorized  the  reporting  the  Federal  Constitution.  Some 
articles  of  our  bill  of  rights  read. 

Mr.  Sedgwick.  The  only  question  is,  what  is  for  the  general 
good  and  happiness  of  the  people. 

Mr.  Strong,  (who  did  not  sign,)  says,  the  concurrence  of 
three  to  sign  not  necessary — a  majority  makes  a  quorum,  viz., 
three  ;  and  a  majority  of  the  quorum  gives  the  vote  of  the 
State — through  sickness  he  was  obliged  to  return  home,  but 
had  he  been  there  he  should  have  signed  it — then  shows  that 
the  delegates  acted  within  their  line — under  the  words  provis- 
ions and  alterations,  this  new  Constitution  may  be  reported — 
but  we  have  nothing  to  do  with  it — our  business  is  solely  to 
adopt  or  reject  the  Constitution. 

Dr.  Willard  charges  King  with  treating  some  of  the  members 
illiberally,  as  insinuating  that  some  of  them  listened  to  out-of- 
doors  whispers. 

Mr.  King  denies  the  charge — he  only  said  that  if  any  people 
did  listen  to  such  whispers,  they  did  wrong. 

Mr.  Dalton  observes  that  Mr.  Singletary  introduced  out-of- 
door  talk,  and  gave  a  just  foundation  for  Mr.  King's  observa- 
tions. 

Gen.  Brooks,  of  Lincoln.  The  rights  of  the  general  govern- 
ment are  distinct  from  the  particular  governments,  because  all 
rights  not  given  to  the  general  government  remain  to  the 
States — the  word  guaranty  does  not  imply  a  gift  or  grant,  but  a 
warrant  and  defence. 

Mr.  Wedgery.  Our  Constitutions  are  not  our  defence — why 
should  Congress  guarantee  a  republican  form  ? — they  may,  not- 


1788.]  JUDGE   PARSONS'S    MINUTES.  317 

withstanding,  unite  us  into  one  republican  form — every  body 
knows  that  Congress  have  no  power  but  what  is  given  them — 
the  question  is,  what  is  given  them. 

Hon.  Mr.  Adams.     To  guarantee  is  not  to 

Mr.  Parsons,  on  the  guarantee. 

Mr.  Dawes. 

Adjourned. 


Friday,  January  25, 1788,  A.  M. 

Conversation  of  the  ninth  section. 

Gen.  Yarnum  observes  on  the  fourth  section,  first  article,  on 
Turner's  and  Wedgery's  arguments  on  that  section ;  then 
observes  on  the  ninth  section :  powers  of  regulating  trade  are 
necessary  for  the  good  of  the  whole — to  encourage  our  shipping 
— and  then  makes  a  variety  of  excellent  observations. 

Mr.  Choate.  Suppose  a  power  of  attorney  to  transact  a 
particular  object — the  attorney  can  go  no  further — if  the  power 
was  general,  and  he  afterwards  gave  a  new  power  to  a  second 
person,  for  a  particular  object,  the  second  power  can  go  no 
further  to  control  the  first,  than  to  the  particular  object  to  which 
it  extends.     The  same  reasoning  applies  to  the  Constitution. 

Mr.  Shurtleff  reads  the  section  where  the  constitutional 
laws  of  Congress  are  to  be  paramount  to  State  laws,  which  he 
says  gives  all  unlimited  powers. 

Mr.  Ames.  If  this  Constitution  will  destroy  the  liberties  of 
the  country,  we  should  reject  it ;  but  such  -is  the  ruin  if  we 
reject  it,  we  ought  to  be  sure  our  liberties  are  in  danger  before 
we  reject  it.  Our  liberties  cannot  be  preserved  without  union — 
the  Confederation  is  a  dead  letter — the  country  teeming  with 
new  States — a  seminal  soil — without  union  the  new  States  will 
be  opposed  to  us — surrounded  by  hostile  enemies — Spain  and 
Britain,  they  injure  us,  because  they  despise  us.  He  went  on, 
and  made  an  elegant  and  pertinent  speech. 

Gen.  Thompson.  I  am  for  union,  and  that  something  must 
be  done,  but  not  adopt  this  Constitution — I  hope  we  shall  reject 
"this — our  sister  States  are  divided — other  States  will  follow  us, 


318  JUDGE    PARSONS's    MINUTES.  [1788. 

we  should  therefore  stand  by,  and  not  be  too  hasty.  Suppose 
only  nine  States  adopt  it — then  four  will  not  adopt  it — no 
foreign  States  know — thirteen  not  nine — we  should  unite,  and 
we  can  get  a  new  system — send  a  new  Convention — cruel  and 
wicked  to  alter,  but  on  the  terms  of  the  old  Confederation, 
except  at  the  last  cast. 

Mr.  Singletary.  I  know  the  principles  I  formerly  acted 
upon,  I  act  upon  the  same  now — for  the  liberties,  for  the  liber- 
ties of  the  people — the  English  claimed  all  our  property,  and 
to  do  what  they  please — the  lands  will  bear  all  the  burdens — gen- 
tlemen now  supporting  this  Constitution  will  be  in  government. 

Col.  Smith,  of  Lanesborough.  The  two  things  farmers  have 
to  dread,  are  1.  Anarchy;  2.  Tyranny.  Anarchy  leads  to 
tyranny,  and  while  we  are  trying  and  trying  for  amendments, 
some  tyrant  will  set  up,  and  the  people,  to  relieve  themselves 
from  anarchy  [will  obey  him] .  Our  security  is  that  the  com- 
mon interest  is  our  common  defence. 

Mr.  Parsons  spoke  on  ambiguities. 

Adjourned. 

3  o'clock,  P.  M. 

Mr.  Ames  called  upon  gentlemen  to  show  why  Congress, 
under  this  new  Constitution,  has  more  power  than  under  the 
old  Confederation. 

Mr.  Singletary,  in  answer,  showed  the  checks  were  different 
— annual  elections — rotation — recall — in  the  old,  and  not  in  the 
new. 

Mr.  Wedgery.  By  the  new  Constitution,  Congress  can  lay 
no  direct  tax  butjon  polls,  where  the  poor  will  pay  as  much  as 
the  rich — objects  to  representation — thirty  thousand  men  on  a 
sand  hill  will  pay  as  much  as  the  same  numbers  in  the  Garden 
of  Eden — our  debt  is  our  safety,  as  long  as  we  can  pay  the 
interest.  Mr.  Ames  appears  to  be  conscience-struck ;  a  lawyer, 
and  conscience-struck ! — perhaps  it  is  for  the  poor  paying  as 
much  as  the  rich.  States  ought  not  to  have  an  equal  represen- 
tation in  the  Senate,  according  to  interest — but  it  is  said  we 
could  not  do  better — very  pretty — the  great  must  give  way  to 
the  less — suppose  nine  adopt  and  four  reject,  what  will  you  do  ? 
Use  the  sword  ?     No,  we  shall  be  ruined — the  four  will  be  jus-* 


1788. J  JUDGE    PARSONS'S    MINUTES.  319 

tified,  because  each  State  must  consent  by  the  old  Confedera- 
tion— some  benefit  will  arise  if  nine  States  accept,  as  it  will 
prevent  paper  money,  and  save  the  States,  by  endorsing  them 
to  a  citizen  of  another  State. 

Mr.  Gorham.  His  objection  to  impost  goes  to  the  old  Con- 
federation as  well  as  to  the  new — one  State  has  a  provision  in 
its  Constitution  that  there  shall  be  no  poll  tax. 

Mr.  Cooley  said,  he  never  had  advanced  that  all  direct  tax 
was  on  the  polls. 

Mr.  Jones,  of  Boston,  shows  the  advantages,  to  all  classes, 
from  the  new  Constitution. 

Mr.  Jones,  of  Bristol,  says,  power  to  regulate  the  trade 
abroad  is  enough. 

Col.  Porter.  To  grant  only  an  impost  is  to  invite  enemies 
to  attack  us,  for  shutting  up  our  ports  is  to  destroy  our 
resources. 

Col.  Taylor  says,  he  is  now  convinced  we  have  no  need  of 
granting  a  direct  tax,  as  the  impost  is  enough  for  war  and 
peace. 

Gen.  Varnum.  To  say  we  will  not  grant  a  direct  tax  to 
Congress,  is  to  say  that  we  will  not  have  the  power  of  a  direct 
tax,  for  Congress  are  the  people,  especially  as  in  war  our  imposts 
are  destroyed. 

Mr.  Dench  wishes  to  go  to  the  next  session  [section  ?] . 

Mr.  King.  If  direct  taxes  can  only  be  collected  from  polls, 
a  good  reason  for  rejecting  the  Constitution — but  it  is  not  true 
— the  apportionment  in  the  Constitution  is  only  among  the 
States,  and  not  upon  the  individuals  in  a  State — in  the  last  case, 
Congress  have  a  discretionary  power — as  to  equal  vote  of  States 
in  the  Senate,  we  could  have  no  union  without  it. 

Mr.  Pierce,  of  Partridgefield.  Powers  in  Constitution  are 
dangerous;  1.  Direct  taxes  ;  2.  Duty  on  imposts  include  excises, 
and  so  a  State  can,  by  the  tenth  section,  lay  excises. 

Mr.  Sedgwick  was  going  to  give  an  answer,  but  it  was  said 
not  to  be  in  order,  and  the  ninth  section  was  read. 

Mr.  Dalton.  In  favor  of  first  paragraph  because  we  gain  a 
right  in  time  to  abolish  the  slave  trade. 

Mr.  Kinsley  wants  to  know  the  reason  why  vessels  from  one 
State  to  another  are  not  obliged  to  enter,  &c. 


320  JUDGE    PARSONS's    MINUTES.  [1788. 

Mr.  Jones.  That  no  duties  should  be  laid  on  the  exports  ot 
a  State. 

Gen.  Thompson.     It  is  contrived  to  enable  them  to  run. 

Dr.  Jarvis.  It  is  when  a  vessel  bound  to  one  State  makes  a 
harbor  in  another,  he  is  held  to  pay  duties. 

Deacon  Sever  and  Deacon  Phillips  give  the  same. 

Mr.  Gore  the  same. 

Mr.  Cabot  explains  it  fully. 

Mr.  Neal  talks  against  the  slave  trade. 

Mr.  Cooley  asks,  whether  negro  slaves,  emigrating  into  this 
State,  will  not  be  considered  as  a  poll,  to  increase  our  ratio  of 
taxes  ? 

Rev.  Mr.  Backus  answers  Mr.  Neal,  and  shows  we  have  now 
gained  a  check  which  we  had  not  before,  and  hopes  in  time  we 
shall  stop  the  slave  trade. 

Mr.  Bodman  says,  those  born  slaves  in  the  southern  States 
may  still  continue  slaves. 

Gen.  Thompson.  If  the  southern  States  would  not  give  up 
the  right  of  slavery,  then  we  should  not  join  with  them — Wash- 
ington's character  fell  fifty  per  cent,  by  keeping  slaves — it  is  all 
a  contrivance,  and  Washington  at  the  head — our  delegates  over- 
powered by  Washington  and  others. 

Mr.  Jones,  of  Bristol,  objects  to  Article  V.,  because  we  can't 
amend  this  section  for  twenty  years. 


Monday,  January  28,  1788,  3  P.  M. 

First  section,  second  article — Executive. 

Mr.  Gorham.  All  governments  require  an  executive — this 
section  fixes  the  mode  of  appointment — the  people  at  large  could 
not  choose — the  legislature  of  Congress  could  not  choose,  he 
would  then  be  their  creature " 

23  [Here  the  Minutes  end  abruptly.] 


1788.]  LEGISLATIVE    AfTION,  321 


ACTION  OF  THE  GENERAL  COURT. 

[Resolve  to  print  the  Address  of  the  Committee  appointed  by  the  Convention.} 

Commonwealth  of  Massachusetts. 

In  Senate,  March  29, 1788. 

Whereas,  a  Convention,  chosen  by  the  People  of  this  Com- 
monwealth, by  their  Resolve  of  the  7th  of  February,  1788, 
appointed  a  Committee  to  prepare  "  An  Address  to  the  People, 
stating  the  principles  of  the  said  Constitution,  the  various 
objections  which  were  made  against  it,  the  answers  they 
received,  and  explaining  the  absolute  necessity  of  adopting  some 
energetic  system  of  Federal  government  for  the  preservation  of 
the  Union,  and  that  the  same  be  published,"  and  whereas,  the 
said  Convention,  by  their  said  Resolve,  recommended  to  the 
General  Court  their  making  provision  for  the  publication  of  the 
same ;  be  it 

Resolved,  That  Messrs.  Adams  &  Nourse,  Printers  to  the 
General  Court,  print  the  said  Address,  and  lay  their  accounts 
before  the  General  Court  for  allowance  and  payment. 

Sent  down  for  concurrence.    . 

S.  Adams,  President 

In  the  House  op  Representatives,  March  29, 1788. 
Read  and  non-concurred. 

J.  Warren,  Speaker. 


[Extract  from  the  Journal  of  the  House  of  Representatives.] 

Saturday,  March  29, 1788,  9  o'clock,  A.  M. 

The  Hon.  L.  Thompson  brought  down  a  Resolve  of  Senate 
of  this  day,  directing  the  Printers  to  the  General  Court  to  print 

41 


322  LEGISLATIVE    ACTION.  [1788. 

the  Address  of  the  Committee  of  the  late  Convention  to  the 
people,  agreeably  to  their  Resolution  of  the  7th  of  February 
last — sent  down  for  concurrence. 

A  motion  was  made  and  seconded,  that  the  consideration  of 
the  said  Resolve  be  referred  to  the  next  session  of  the  General 
Court,  and  the  question  being  put,  passed  in  the  negative. 

The  question  of  concurrence  was  then  put,  and  passed  in  the 
negative  also.  ** 


[Extract  from  the  Senate  Journal.] 

Saturday,  March  29, 1788. 

Resolve  directing  the  Printers  to  print  the  Address  of  the 
Convention,  sent  down  for  concurrence,  came  up  non-concurred. 

**  [We  find  no  report  of  the  discussion  upon  this  question,  or  of  the  reasons 
influencing  the  House  in  their  action,  in  the  newspapers  of  the  day.] 


1788.]  PUBLIC    SENTIMENT   OF   THE    DAY.  323 


PUBLIC  SENTIMENT  OF  THE  DAY. 

[Of  the  good  feeling  with  which  the  large  minority  submitted 
to  the  decision  of  the  majority,  and  of  the  general  enthusiasm 
with  which  the  harmonious  conclusion  of  the  Convention  was 
welcomed  by  the  people,  some  idea  may  be  formed  from  the 
subjoined  extracts  from  the  columns  of  the  Centinel,  of  February 
9  and  13, 1788 :— ] 

On  the  ratification  being  declared,  a  very  large  concourse  of 
spectators  testified  their  satisfaction  by  repeated  huzzas  ;  and 
the  whole  Convention,  having  been  previously  invited,  par- 
took, with  a  number  of  the  respectable  citizens,  at  a  decent 
repast,  prepared  in  the  Senate  Chamber ;  where,  in  mutual 
congratulations  and  testimonials  of  satisfaction,  all  party  ideas 
were  done  away,  and  such  a  spirit  of  joy,  union  and  urbanity 
diffused,  as,  if  continued,  must  be  attended  with  the  most 
happy  consequences  through  the  Commonwealth.  The  toasts 
given,  were  truly  conciliatory,  and  were,  we  believe,  drank 
with  sincerity  by  every  one  present.  All  appeared  willing  to 
bury  the  hatchet  of  animosity,  and  to  smoke  the  calumet  of 
union  and  love. 

After  this  repast,  the  Convention  dissolved.  Thus  far,  the 
proceedings  of  the  Convention.      Now  for  those  of  the  people. 

The  citizens  of  Boston  have  ever  shown  themselves  advo- 
cates for  freedom ;  therefore,  when  a  motion  had  obtained,  one 
of  the  greatest  objects  of  which  is  "  to  secure  the  blessings  of 
liberty  to  themselves  and  their  posterity,"  they  could  not  resist 
the  strong  impulse  they  must  have  had,  publicly  to  testify  their 
gratitude  for  the  pleasing  event.  Nor  have  they.  On  the 
decision  being  declared,  the  bells  in  the  several  public  build- 
ings, communicated  the  happy  intelligence  to  every  part  of  the 
town,  by  a  peal,  which  continued  for  several  hours,  and  which 
has  been  continued  with  short  intervals  ever  since.  The  dis- 
charge of  cannon,  and  other  demonstrations  of  joy,  took  place 


324:  PUBLIC    SENTIMENT    OF    THE    DAY.  [1788. 

on  Wednesday  and  Thursday,  but  it  was  left  to  yesterday  to 
produce  an  exhibition,  to  which,  America 'has  never  before  wit- 
nessed an  equal,  and  which  has  exceded  any  thing  of  the  kind 
Europe  can  boast  of. 

The  Committee  of  Tradesmen  met  on  Thursday,  and  by  public 
advertisements,  requested  the  attendance  of  the  mechanics  and 
artisans  of  every  description,  in  town,  at  Faneuil  Hall,  at  9 
o'clock,  yesterday,  in  order  to  form,  and  proceed  in  Grand  Pro- 
cession therefrom,  to  testify  their  approbation  of  the  ratification 
of  the  Federal  Constitution  by  the  Convention  of  this  Common- 
wealth, the  9th  inst.,  and  deputed  their  Chairman  to  request 
their  brethren,  the  husbandmen  of  the  adjacent  towns,  to  join 
them,  who,  though  the  notice  was  very  short,  accordingly 
appeared  in  town  at  9  o'clock ;  when,  the  several  trades  being 
met,  at  11  o'clock,  in  real  Grand  Procession,  the  whole  moved 
from  the  hall,  and  the  following  was  the 


ORDER  OF  TJIE  PROCESSION. 

Sixteen  Foresters,  with  axes,  and  brush  scythes. 
Music. 

A     PLOUGH, 

drawn  by  two  horses,  and  two  yokes  of  oxen,  with  a  person 

holding  it,  and  others  clearing  away  the  obstructions. 

[The  Sons  of  Freedom  venerate  the  Plough.] 

Three  Sowers,  with  baskets  strewing  grain,  and  smoking  their 

pipes. 

A  Brush-Harrow,  drawn  by  a  horse. 

A  large  Roller,  drawn  by  a  horse  and  pair  of  oxen. 

Four  Reapers,  with  sickles,  &c. 

Three  Thrashers,  with  flails. 

Four  Mowers,  witli  scythes,  followed  by  eighteen  Haymakers, 

with  rakes,  <fcc. 
Eight   Husbandmen,   with  hoes,   spades,    and   other   farming 

utensils. 

A  Winnower,  with  a  fan. 

A  Cart,  drawn  by  a  yoke  of  oxen,  with  flax-dressers  at  work, 

and  in  working  dresses. 


1788.]  PUBLIC    SENTIMENT    OF    THE    DAY.  325 

A  yoke  of  fat  Cattle,  with  killers,  properly  equipped. 

A  Cart,  loaded  with  Beef,  followed  by  eight  master  butchers,  in 

clean  frocks,  with  cleavers,  &c. 

[The  above  were  our  worthy  brethren  of  Roxbury.] 

BLACKSMITHS, 

Preceded  by  Messrs.  Clough  and  Baker, 

To  the  number  of  seventy-three,  carrying  implements  of  their 

craft,  decorated  with  ribbons,  &c. 

SHIPWRIGHTS, 

Preceded  by  Deacon  Sharp, 
To  the  number  of  forty-three,  with  tools  decorated,  &c. 

ROPE-MAKERS, 

Preceded  by  Mr.  J.  Richardson, 

To  the  number  of  seventy-five,  their  waists  encircled  with  hemp, 

with  a  cable  sled,  drawn  by  workmen,  decorated  with 

colors,  and  attended  with  martial  music. 

MAST-MAKERS, 

Preceded  by  Mr.  S.  Harris, 
To  the  number  of  thirty,  with  tools  decorated,  <fec. 

SAIL-MAKERS, 

Preceded  by  Deacon  Barrett, 
To  the  number  of  thirty,  with  their  tools. 

SHIP-JOINERS, 

Preceded  by  Mr.  T.  Uran, 
To  the  number  of  thirty-four,  with  their  tools,  decorated. 

BLOCK-MAKERS, 

Preceded  by  Mr.  J.  Brewer, 
To  the  number  of  thirty,  with  tools,  &q. 

MATHEMATICAL   INSTRUMENT   MAKERS, 

To  the  number  of  six,  with  instruments,  &c. 

COOPERS, 

Preceded  by  Capt.  J.  Wheelwright, 
To  the  number  of  fifty-three,  with  tools,  decorated,  &c. 

BOAT-BUILDERS, 

Preceded  by  Mr.  T.  Hichborn, 
To  the  number  of  twenty,  with  tools,  <fcc. 


326  PUBLIC    SENTIMENT   OF   THE    DAY.  [1788. 

COACH   AND   CHAISE  *MAKERS, 

Preceded  by  Maj.  Hawes, 
To  the  number  of  eight,  with  a  coach  painted  on  paper. 

PAINTERS, 

Preceded  by  Col.  Mason, 
To  the  number  of  twenty-five,  with  pallets,  <fcc,  decorated. 

HEAD-BUILDERS, 

To  the  number  of  four,  in  one  rank,  with  their  moulds, 
decorated. 

CARVERS, 

Preceded  by  Mr.  J.  Skillings, 
With  tools,  <fcc,  decorated,  to  the  number  of  twelve. 

RIGGERS, 

To  the  number  of  eighteen,  with  tools,  &c. 

GLAZIERS   AND   PLUMBERS, 

Preceded  by  Capt.  Norton  Brailsford, 
To  the  number  of  sixteen,  with  diamonds,  <fec. 

FOUNDERS   AND   COPPER-SMITHS,      ' 

Preceded  by  Mr.  Caldwell, 
To  the  number  of  ten,  with  tools. 

CABINET-MAKERS, 

Preceded  by  Mr.  Bright, 
To  the  number  of  thirteen. 

PEWTERERS, 

To  the  number  of  six,  in  one  rank. 

TINMEN, 

To  the  number  of  three,  in  one  rank. 

BAKERS, 

Preceded  by  Mr.  J.  Jenkins, 
To  the  number  of  forty,  with  their  tools,  &c. 

TANNERS   AND  CURRIERS, 

Preceded  by  Mr.  S.  Bass, 
To  the  number  of  twenty-eight,  with  tools,  <fcc. 

SHOEMAKERS, 

Preceded  by  Mr.  S.  Bangs, 
To  the  number  of  fifty,  with  lasts,  &c,  decorated. 


1788.]  PUBLIC    SENTIMENT   OF    THE    DAY.  327 

TAILORS, 

Preceded  by  Mr.  T.  Capron, 
To  the  number  of  fifty-six,  with  their  tools,  measures,  <fcc. 

HATTERS, 

Preceded  by  Major  Seward, 
To  the  number  of  twenty-six,  with  their  bows,  furs,  <fcc. 

TALLOW-CHANDLERS , 

To  the  number  of  eight,  with  a  miniature  press,  moulds,  &c. 
Mr.  Vose,  on  horseback. 

The  ship  Federal  Constitution,  on  runners,  drawn  by  thirteen 

horses, 
John  Foster  Williams,  Esq.,  Commander, 

Lieut.  Weeks,  y t 

Lieut.  Adams,  jJW$T  Manned  by 

Mr.  L&  Mo'me,  Master,         jffi^^l  thirteen  seamen 

Mr.  E.  Sigourney,         ^^^^^^^      and  marines. 
Purser,  *UB&*m£*^&&&&^& 

With  full  colors  flying,  followed  by  captains  of  vessels,  eighty- 
five  seamen,  dressed  in  ribbons,  and  about  two  hundred 
and  fifty  of  the  principal  merchants  in  town. 

SHIP-BUILDERS, 

To  the  number   of  twenty,  with   a   sled,  drawn  by  thirteen 
horses,  bearing  a  large  long  boat,  representing  the  old  ship 
Confederation  hauled  up,  over  which  was  erected  a 
large  platform  emblem  of  a  dock-yard,  with  thir- 
teen ships,  of  various  sizes,  therein  ;  the 
workmen  with  their  tools,  <fec. 

CARPENTERS, 

Preceded  by  Mr.  Crafts, 

To* the  number  of  one  hundred  and  thirty-six,  with  tools  of 

every  sort,  decorated. 

MASONS, 

'   Preceded  by  Major  Bell, 
To  the  number  of  seventy,  with  trowels,  &c,  as  at  work. 

WHEELWRIGHTS, 

To  the  number  of  thirty,  with  the  insignia  of  their  crafts. 


328  PUBLIC    SENTIMENT    OF    THE    DAT.  [1788. 

PRINTERS, 

Preceded  by  Mr.  B.  Edes, 

To  the  number  of  fifteen,  with  a  stand,  drawn  on  a  sled,  and 

compositors  at  work. 

BOOKBINDERS, 

With  their  ploughs,  &c. 

CHAIR-MAKERS, 

Preceded  by  Mr.  Allcock, 
To  the  number  of  six. 


To  the  number  of  twelve,  with  tools,  decorated,  <fcc. 

TOBACCONISTS, 

Preceded  by  Mr.  McElroy, 
To  the  number  of  thirteen,  with  tools,  emblematical  of  their 

profession. 


To  the  number  of  fifteen,  with  hammers,  <fcc. 

HORN   BUTTON   AND   COMB-MAKERS, 

in  one  rank. 

A   MILLER. 
LEATHER-DRESSERS, 

Preceded  by  Major  W.  Dawes,  on  horseback, 

(dressed  in  skins,) 

To  the  number  of  twenty,  with  skins,  and  working  tools. 

CARD-MAKERS, 

To  the  number  of  twelve,  with  wire,  &c. 

The  Committee  of  Tradesmen,  viz. :  John  Lucas,  Esq.,  J\lr. 

Joseph  Clark,  Col.  Paul  Revere,  Capt.  Rhodes,  Deacon 

William  Bordman,  Joshua  Witherle,  Esq.,  and 

Capt.  David  Spear,  with  a  band  of  music,  in 

a  sleigh,  drawn   by   four  horses. 

The  Republican    Volunteers,   commanded  by   Capt.   Gray, 
closed  the  procession. 


1788."]       PUBLIC  SENTIMENT  OF  THE  DAY.         329 

The  numbers  stated  are  those  of  the  master-workmen,  and 
were  taken  from  an  actual  enumeration  of  the  procession,  at 
two  o'clock.  At  other  times  in  the  day,  the  procession  was 
much  more  full. 

In  this  order  the  whole  proceeded  by  the  houses  of  the  several 
gentlemen  who  represented  this  town  in  Convention,  and  testi- 
fied their  approbation  of  their  conduct  by  three  huzzas  from 
the  whole  line  and  salutes  from  the  ship,  and  the  volunteer 
company.  About  four  o'clock  the  procession  arrived  at  the 
hall,  where  refreshment  was  liberally  provided,  at  which  as 
many  as  could  find  admittance,  partook  ;  but  though  the  hall 
will  hold  fifteen  hundred  men,  not  above  one-third  of  the  pro- 
cession could  get  in.  However,  we  were  happy  that  our  country 
friends  were  accommodated  to  their  wishes. 

We  have  not  time  to  give  a  just  account  of  this  beautiful 
parade.  We  can  only  say,  that  the  perfect  order  and  urbanity, 
the  dignity  and  solemnity  that  marked  the  procession  through 
the  whole  day,  were  such  as  had  a  most  interesting  effect  on  the 
numerous  spectators  which  a  scene  so  august  and  novel  collected 
together. 

.At  two  o'clock,  when  the  procession  passed  by  the  State 
House,  Capt.  Johnson's  company  of  artillery  honored  them 
with  a  salute  of  thirteen  guns. 


[From  the  Centinel  of  February  13,  1788.] 

On  Friday  evening  last,  the  long  boat,  called  the  Old  Con- 
federation, which  had  been  exhibited  in  the  procession  that  day, 
was  drawn  to  the  Common,  where  the  officers,  owners  and  crew, 
called  a  jury  of  carpenters  to  inspect  her,  who  after  examining 
every  part,  found  her  bottom  so  defective,  and  her  timber  and 
planks  so  rotten,  that  they  were  unanimous  in  their  verdict,  to 
condemn  her,  as  unfit  for  any  further  service.  She  was  accord- 
ingly ordered  to  be  burnt,  which  was  immediately  done,  in 
presence  of  an  applauding  concourse  of  citizens. 

42 


330 


PUBLIC    SENTIMENT    OF    THE    DAY. 


[1788. 


[The  following  song  and  ballad,  (a  verse  of  which  has  already 
been  quoted,)  give  a  lively  idea  of  the  spirit  of  the  times : — ] 

THE    RAISING. 

A  NEW  SONG  FOR  FEDERAL  MECHANICS. 


It  will  yet  rise. 


Come  muster,  my  lads,  your  mechanical  tools, 

Your  saws  and  your  axes,  your  hammers  and  rules  ; 

Bring  your  mallets  and  planes,  your  level  and  line, 

And  plenty  of  pins  of  American  pine  ; 

For  our  roof  we  will  raise,  and  our  song  still  shall  be — 
A  government  firm,  and  our  citizens  free. 

II. 

Come,  up  with  the  Plates,  lay  them  firm  on  the  wall, 

Like  the  people  at  large,  they're  the  ground-work  of  all ; 

Examine  them  well  and  see  that  they're  sound, 

Let  no  rotten  parts  in  our  building  be  found ; 

For  our  roof  we  will  raise,  and  our  song  still  shall  be — 
Our  government  firm,  and  our  citizens  free. 


in. 
Now  hand  up  the  Girders,  lay  each  in  his  place, 
Between  them  the  Joists  must  divide  all  the  space ; 
Like  assembly-men,  these  should  lie  level  along, 
Like  Girders,  our  Senate  prove  loyal  and  strong ; 

For  our  roof  we  will  raise,  and  our  song  still  shall  be — 

A  government  firm,  over  citizens  free. 

86  [The  New  Hampshire  Convention  had,  at  this  time,  adjounaed  to  a  future 
day,  without  taking  a  vote  upon  the  question  of  ratification.] 


1788.]  PUBLIC   SENTIMENT   OF   THE   DAY.  331 

IV. 

The  Rafters  now  frame — your  King-Posts  and  Braces, 
And  drive  your  pins  home,  to  keep  all  in  their  places  ; 
Let  wisdom  and  strength  in  the  fabric  combine, 
And  your  pins  be  all  made  of  American  pine  ; 

For  our  roof  we  will  raise,  and  our  song  still  shall  be — 

A  government  firm,  over  citizens  free. 

v. 

Our  King-Posts  are  judges — how  upright  they  stand, 
Supporting  the  Braces,  the  laws  of  the  land — 
The  laws  of  the  land,  which  divide  right  from  wrong, 
And  strengthen  the  weak,  by  weak'ning  the  strong  ; 

For  our  roof  we  will  raise,  and  our  song  still  shall  be — 
Laws  equal  and  just  for  a  people  that's  free. 

VI. 

Up !  up  with  the  Rafters — each  frame  is  a  State  ! 

How  nobly  they  rise  !  their  span,  too,  how  great ! 

From  the  north  to  the  south,  o'er  the  whole  they  extend, 

And  rests  on  the  walls,  while  the  walls  they  defend, 

For  our  roof  we  will  raise,  and  our  song  still  shall  be — 
Combined  in  strength,  yet  as  citizens  free. 

VII. 

Now  enter  the  Purlins,  and  drive  your  pins  through, 
And  see  that  your  joints  are  drawn  home,  and  all  true  ; 
The  Purlins  will  bind  all  the  rafters  together, 
The  strength  of  the  whole  shall  defy  wind  and  weather ; 

For  our  roof  we  will  raise,  and  our  song  still  shall  be — 

United  as  States,  but  as  citizens  free. 

VIII. 

Come,  raise  up  the  Turret — our  glory  and  pride — 
In  the  centre  it  stands — o'er  the  whole  to  preside ; 
The  sons  of  Columbia  shall  view  with  delight 
Its  pillars,  and  arches,  and  towering  height ; 

Our  roof  is  now  rais'd,  and  our  song  still  shall  be — 

A  Federal  head,  o'er  a  people  still  free. 


332  PUBLIC    SENTIMENT   OF   THE    DAY.  [1788. 

IX. 

Huzza !  my  brave  boys,  our  work  is  complete, 

The  world  shall  admire  Columbia's  fair  seat ; 

Its  strength  against  tempests  and  time  shall  be  proof, 

And  thousands  shall  come  to  dwell  under  our  Roof. 

Whilst  we  drain  the  deep  bowl,  our  toast  still  shall  be — 
Our  government  firm,  and  our  citizens  free. 


A    YANKEE    SONG. 

The  'Yention  did  in  Boston  meet, 
But  State  House  could  not  hold  'em, 

So  then  they  went  to  Fed'ral  Street, 
And  there  the  truth  was  told  'em — 

Yankee  doodle,  keep  it  up ! 

Yankee  doodle,  dandy, 
Mind  the  music  and  the  step, 

And  with  the  girls  be  handy. 

They  ev'ry  morning  went  to  prayer, 

And  then  began  disputing, 
'Till  opposition  silenc'd  were, 

By  arguments  refuting. 

Yankee  doodle,  <fcc. 

Then  'Squire  Hancock  like  a  man, 

Who  dearly  loves  the  nation, 
By  a  concil'atory  plan, 

Prevented  much  vexation. 

Yankee  doodle,  <fcc. 

He  made  a  woundy  Fed'ral  speech, 

With  sense  and  elocution ; 
And  then  the  'Vention  did  beseech 

T'  adopt  the  Constitution. 

Yankee  doodle,  &c. 


1788.]  PUBLIC    SENTIMENT    OF    THE    DAY.  333 

The  question  being  outright  put, 

(Each  voter  independent,) 
The  Fed'ralists  agreed  t'  adopt, 

And  then  propose  amendment. 

Yankee  doodle,  <fcc. 


The  other  party  seeing  then 

The  people  were  against  'em, 
Agreed  like  honest,  faithful  men, 

To  mix  in  peace  amongst  'em. 

Yankee  doodle,  &c. 

The  Boston  folks  are  deuced  lads, 

And  always  full  of  notions  ; 
The  boys,  the  girls,  their  mams  and  dads, 

Were  fill'd  with  joy's  commotions. 

Yankee  doodle,  &o. 

So  straightway  they  procession  made, 

Lord !  how  nation  fine,  Sir ! 
For  every  man  of  every  trade 

Went  with  his  tools to  dine,  Sir. 

Yankee  doodle,  &c. 

John  Foster  Williams  in  a  ship, 

Joined  in  the  social  band,  Sir, 
And  made  the  lasses  dance  and  skip, 

To  see  him  sail  on  land,  Sir. 

Yankee  doodle,  &c. 

Oh,  then  a  whapping  feast  begun, 

And  all  hands  went  to  eating ; 
They  drank  their  toasts,  shook  hands,  and  sung, 

Huzza!  for  'Vention  meeting, 

Yankee  doodle,  &c. 


334  PUBLIC   SENTIMENT    OF   THE    DAT.  [1788, 

Now  politicians  of  all  kinds, 

Who  are  not  yet  decided, 
May  see  how  Yankees  speak  their  minds, 

And  yet  are  not  divided. 

Yankee  doodle,  <fec. 

Then  from  this  sample  let  'em  cease 

Inflammatory  writing, 
For  Freedom,  Happiness  and  Peace, 

Is  better  far  than  fighting. 

Yankee  doodle,  &c. 

So  here  I  end  my  Fed'ral  song, 

Composed  of  thirteen  verses ; 
May  agriculture  nourish  long, 

And  commerce  fill  our  purses  ! 
Yankee  doodle,  &c. 


1788.]  SPIRIT    OF    THE    PRESS.  335 


SPIRIT  OF  THE  PRESS. 

[In  both  the  Chronicle  and  Centinel,  series  of  elaborate  essays 
in  favor  of  and  opposed  to  the  Federal  Constitution,  were  con- 
tinued during  the  period  that  the  question  of  ratification  was 
pending.  From  many,  as  exhibiting  the  tone  and  scope  of  the 
discussion,  we  have  selected  the  following  from  the  Independent 
CJironicle.] 

ON  THE  FEDERAL  GOVERNMENT. 

NUMBER   ONE. 

It  is  impossible  for  an  honest  and  feeling  mind,  of  any  nation 
or  country  whatever,  to  be  insensible  to  the  present  circum- 
stances of  America.  Were  I  an  East  Indian  or  a  Turk,  I  should 
consider  this  singular  situation  of  a  part  of  my  fellow  creatures, 
as  most  curious  and  interesting.  Intimately  connected  with  the 
country,  as  a  citizen  of  the  Union,  I  confess  it  entirely  engrosses 
my  mind  and  feelings. 

To  take  a  proper  view  of  the  ground  on  which  we  stand,  it 
may  be  necessary  to  recollect  the  manner  in  which  the  United 
States  were  originally  settled  and  established.*  Want  of  charity 
in  the  religious  systems  of  Europe  and  of  justice  in  their  polit- 
ical governments,  were  the  principal  moving  causes  which  drove 
the  emigrants  of  various  countries  to  the  American  continent. 
The  Congregationalists,  Quakers,  Presbyterians  and  other  Brit- 
ish dissenters,  the  Catholics  of  England  and  Ireland,  the 
Huguenots  of  France,  the  German  Lutherans,;  Calvinists  and 
Moravians,  with  several  other  societies,  established  themselves 
in  the  different  colonies,  thereby  laying  the  ground  of  that 
Catholicism  in  ecclesiastical  affairs,  which  has  been  observable 
since  the  late  Revolution.  Religious  liberty  naturally  promotes 
corresponding  dispositions  in  matters  of  government.  The  Con- 
stitution of  England,  as  it  stood  on  paper,  was  one  of  the  freest 
at  that  time  existing  in  the  world,  and  the  American  colonies 
considered  themselves  as  entitled  to  the  fullest  enjoyment  of  it. 
Thus,  when  the  ill-judged  discussions  of  later  times  in  England 
brought  into  question  the  rights  of  this  country  as  it  stood  con- 


336  SPIRIT   OF    THE   PRESS.  [1788. 

nected  with  the  British  crown,  we  were  found  more  strongly 
impressed  with  their  importance,  and  accurately  acquainted 
with  their  extent,  than  the  wisest  and  most  learned  of  our 
brethren  beyond  the  Atlantic.  When  the  greatest  names  in 
Parliament  insisted  on  the  power  of  that  body  over  the  com- 
merce of  the  colonies,  and  even  the  right  to  bind  us  in  all  cases 
whatsoever,  America,  seeing  that  it  was  only  another  form  of 
tyranny,  insisted  upon  the  immutable  truth,  that  taxation  and 
representation  are  inseparable,  and  while  a  desire  of  harmony 
and  other  considerations  induced  her  into  an  acquiescence  in 
the  commercial  regulations  of  Great  Britain,  it  was  done  from 
the  declared  necessity  of  the  case,  and  with  a  cautious,  full  and 
absolute  saving  of  our  voluntarily  suspended  rights.  The  Par- 
liament was  persevering,  and  America  continued  firm  till  hostil- 
ities and  open  war  commenced,  and  finally  the  late  Revolution 
closed  the  contest  forever. 

'Tis  evident  from  this  short  detail,  and  the  reflections  which 
arise  from  it,  that  the  quarrel  between  the  United  States  and 
the  Parliament  of  Great  Britain,  did  not  arise  so  much  from 
objections  to  the  form  of  government,  though  undoubtedly  a 
better  one  by  far  is  now  within  our  reach,  as  from  a  difference 
concerning  certain  important  rights  resulting  from  the  essential 
principles  of  liberty,  which  the  Constitution  preserved  to  all  the 
subjects  actually  residing  within  the  realm.  It  was  not  asserted 
by  America  that  the  people  of  the  Island  of  Great  Britain  were 
slaves,  but  that  we,  though  possessed  absolutely  of  the  same 
rights,  were  not  admitted  to  enjoy  an  equal  degree  of  freedom. 

When  the  Declaration  of  Independence  completed  the  separa- 
tion between  the  two  countries,  new  governments  were  neces- 
sarily established.  Many  circumstances  led  to  the  adoption  of 
the  republican  form,  among  which  was  the  predilection  of  the 
people.  In  devising  the  frames  of  government  it  may  have 
been  difficult  to  avoid  extremes  opposite  to  the  vices  of  that  we 
had  just  rejected  ;  nevertheless,  many  of  the  State  Constitutions 
we  have  chosen,  are  truly  excellent.  Our  misfortunes  have 
been,  that  in  the  first  instance  we  adopted  no  national  govern- 
ment at  all,  but  we  kept  together  by  common  danger  only,  and 
that  in  the  confusions  of  a  civil  war  we  framed  a  Federal  Con- 
stitution, now  universally  admitted  to  be  inadequate  to  the 


1788.]  SPIRIT    OF    THE    PRESS.  337 

preservation  of  liberty,  property,  and  the  Union.  The  question 
is  not,  then,  how  far  our  State  Constitutions  are  good,  or  other- 
wise—the object  of  our  wishes  is,  to  amend  and  supply  the 
evident  and  allowed  errors  and  defects  of  the  Federal  govern- 
ment. Let  us  consider  awhile,  that  which  is  now  proposed  to 
us — let  us  compare  it  with  the  so  much  boasted  British  form  of 
government,  and  see  how  much  more  it  favors  the  people,  and 
how  completely  it  secures  their  rights,  remembering  at  the  same 
time,  that  we  did  not  dissolve  our  connection  with  that  country 
so  much  on  account  of  its  Constitution,  as  the  perversion  and 
maladministration  of  it. 

In  the  first  place,  let  us  look  at  the  nature  and  powers  of  the 
head  of  that  country,  and  those  of  the  ostensible  head  of  ours. 

The  British  King  is  the  great  Bishop  or  Supreme  Head  of  an 
established  church,  with  an  immense  patronage  annexed.  In 
this  capacity  he  commands  a  number  of  votes  in  the  House  of 
Lords,  by  creating  bishops,  who,  besides  their  great  incomes,  have 
votes  in  that  assembly,  and  are  judges  in  the  last  resort.  They 
have  also  many  honorable  and  lucrative  places  to  bestow,  and 
thus,  from  their  wealth,  learning,  dignities,  powers  and  patron- 
age, give  a  great  lustre  and  an  enormous  influence  to  the 
crown. 

In  America,  our  President  will  not  only  be  without  these 
influencing  advantages,  but  they  will  be  in  the  possession  of  the 
people  at  large,  to  strengthen  their  hands  in  the  event  of  a  con- 
test with  him.  All  religious  funds,  honors  and  powers,  are  in 
the  gift  of  numberless  unconnected,  disunited  and  contending 
corporations,  wherein  the  principle  of  perfect  equality  univer- 
sally prevails.  In  short,  danger  from  ecclesiastical  tyranny, 
that  long  standing  and  still  remaining  curse  of  the  people — that 
sacrilegious  engine  of  royal  power  in  some  countries,  can  be 
feared  by  no  man  in  the  United  States.  In  Britain,  their  king 
is  for  life ;  in  America,  our  president  will  always  be  one  of  the 
people  at  the  end  of  four  years.  In  that  country,  the  king  is 
hereditary,  and  may  be  an  idiot,  a  knave,  or  a  tyrant  by  nature, 
or  ignorant  from  neglect  of  his  education,  yet  cannot  be 
removed,  for  "  he  can  do  no  wrong."  In  America,  as  the  pres- 
ident is  to  be  one  of  the  people  at  the  end  of  his  short  term,  so 
will  he  and  his  fellow-citizens  remember,  that  he  was  originally 

43 


338  SPIRIT    OF    THE    PRESS.  [1788. 

one  of  the  people,  and  that  he  is  created  by  their  breath.  Fur- 
ther, he  cannot  be  an  idiot,  probably  not  a  knave  or  a  tyrant, 
for  those  whom  nature  makes  so,  discover  it  before  the  age 
of  thirty-five,  until  which  period  he  cannot  be  elected.  It 
appears  that  we  have  not  admitted  that  he  can  do  no  wrong,  but 
have  rather  presupposed  he  may  and  will  sometimes  do  wrong, 
by  providing  for  his  impeachment,  his  trial,  and  his  peaceable 
and  complete  removal. 

In  England,  the  king  has  a  power  to  create  members  of  the 
upper  house,  who  are  judges  in  the  highest  court,  as  well  as 
legislators.  Our  president  not  only  cannot  make  members  of 
the  upper  house,  but  their  creation,  like  his  own,  is  byihe 
people,  through  their  representatives,  and  a  member  of  assem- 
bly may  and  will  be  as  certainly  dismissed  at  the  end  of  his  year 
for  electing  a  weak  or  wicked  senator,  as  for  any  other  blunder 
or  misconduct. 

The  king  of  England  has  legislative  power,  while  our  presi- 
dent can  only  use  it  when  the  other  servants  of  the  people  are 
divided.  But  in  all  great  cases  affecting  the  national  interests 
or  safety,  his  modified  and  restrained  power  must  give  way  to 
the  sense  of  two-thirds  of  the  legislature.  In  fact,  it  amounts 
to  no  more  than  a  serious  duty  imposed  upon  him,  to  request 
both  houses  to  reconsider  any  matter  on  which  he  entertains 
doubts  or  feels  apprehensions,  and  here  the  people  have  a  strong 
hold  upon  him,  from  his  sole  and  personal  responsibility. 

The  president  of  the  upper  house  (or  the  chancellor)  in  Eng- 
land, is  appointed  by  the  king,  while  our  vice-president,  who  is 
chosen  by  the  people  through  the  electors  and  the  senate,  is  not 
at  all  dependent  on  the  president,  but  may  exercise  equal  pow- 
ers on  some  occasions.  In  all  royal  governments  an  helpless 
infant  or  an  inexperienced  youth,  may  wear  the  crown.  Our 
president  must  be  matured  by  the  experience  of  years,  and 
being  born  among  us,  his  character  at  thirty-five  must  be  fully 
understood.  Wisdom,  virtue,  and  active  qualities  of  mind  and 
body,  can  alone  make  him  the  first  servant  of  a  free  and 
enlightened  people. 

Our  president  will  fall  very  far  short  indeed  of  any  prince  in 
his  annual  income,  which  will  not  be  hereditary,  but  the  abso- 
lute allowance  of  the  people  passing  through  the  hands  of  their 


178&.]  SPIRIT    OF    THE   PRESS.  339 

other  servants,  from  year  to  year,  as  it  becomes  necessary. 
There  will  be  no  burdens  on  the  nation  to  provide  for  his  heir 
or  other  branches  of  his  family.  'Tis  probable,  from  the  state 
of  property  in  America,  and  other  circumstances,  that  many 
citizens  will  exceed  him  in  show  and  expense,  those  daz- 
zling trappings  of  kingly  rank  and  power.  He  will  have  no 
authority  to  make  a  treaty  without  two-thirds  of  the  Senate, 
nor  can  he  appoint  ambassadors  or  other  great  officers  without 
their  approbation,  which  will  remove  the  idea  of  patronage  and 
influence,  and  of  personal  obligation  and  dependence.  The 
appointment  of  even  the  inferior  officers  may  be  taken  out  of 
his  hands  by  an  act  of  Congress,  at  any  time  ;  he  can  create  no 
nobility  or  titles  of  honor,  nor  take  away  offices  during  good 
behavior.  His  person  is  not  so  much  protected  as  that  of  a 
member  of  the  House  of  Representatives  ;  for  he  may  be  pro- 
ceeded against  like  any  other  man  in  the  ordinary  course  of 
law.  He  appoints  no  officer  of  the  separate  States.  He  will 
have  no  influence  from  placemen  in  the  legislature,  nor  can  he 
prorogue  or  dissolve  it.  He  will  have  no  power  over  the  treas- 
ures of  the  state  ;  and  lastly,  as  he  is  created  through  the 
electors,  by  the  people  at  large,  he  must  ever  look  up  to  the 
support  of  his  creators.  From  such  a  servant,  with  powers  so 
limited  and  transitory,  there  can  be  no  danger,  especially  when 
we  consider  the  solid  foundations  on  which  our  national  liber- 
ties are  immovably  fixed  by  the  other  provisions  of  this  excel- 
lent Constitution.  Whatever  of  dignity  or  authority  he  pos- 
sesses, is  a  delegated  part  of  their  majesty  and  their  political 
omnipotence,  transiently  vested  in  him  by  the  people  themselves 
for  their  own  happiness.  An  American  Citizen. 


ON  THE  FEDERAL  GOVERNMENT. 

NUMBER  two. 
We  have  seen  that  the  late  honorable  Convention,  in  desig- 
nating the  nature  of  the  chief  executive  office  of  the  United 
States,  have  deprived  it  of  all  the  dangerous  appendages  of 
royalty,  and  provided  for  the  frequent  expiration  of  its  limited 


340  SPIRIT    OF    THE    PRESS.  [1788. 

powers.  As  our  president  bears  no  resemblance  to  a  king,  so 
we  shall  see  the  senate  have  no  similitude  to  nobles. 

First  then,  not  being  hereditary,  their  collective  knowledge, 
wisdom  and  virtue,  are  not  precarious,  for  by  these  qualities 
alone  are  they  to  obtain  their  offices  ;  and  they  will  have  none 
of  the  peculiar  follies  and  vices  of  those  men,  who  possess 
power  merely  because  their  fathers  held  it  before  them,  for  they 
will  be  educated  (under  equal  advantages  and  with  equal  pros- 
pects) among  and  on  a  footing  with  the  other  sons  of  a  free 
people.  If  we  recollect  the  characters  who  have,  at  various 
periods,  filled  the  seats  of  Congress,  we  shall  find  this  expecta- 
tion perfectly  reasonable.  Many  young  men  of  genius,  and 
many  characters  of  more  matured  abilities,  without  fortune,  have 
been  honored  with  that  trust.  Wealth  has  had  but  few  repre- 
sentatives there,  and  those  have  been  generally  possessed  of 
respectable  personal  qualifications.  There  have  also  been  many 
instances  of  persons,  not  eminently  endowed  with  mental  qual- 
ities, who  have  been  sent  thither  from  a  reliance  on  their  vir- 
tues, public  and  private.  As  the  senators  are  still  to  be  elected 
by  the  legislatures  of  the  States,  there  can  be  no  doubt  of  equal 
safety  and  propriety  in  their  future  appointment,  especially  as 
no  further  pecuniary  qualification  is  required  by  the  Constitu- 
tion. 

They  can  hold  no  other  office,  civil  or  military,  under  the 
United  States,  nor  can  they  join  in  making  provisions  for  them- 
selves, either  by  creating  new  places,  or  increasing  the  emolu- 
ments of  old  ones.  As  their  sons  are  not  to  succeed  them,  they 
will  not  be  induced  to  aim  at  an  increase  or  perpetuity  of  their 
powers,  at  the  expense  of  the  liberties  of  the  people,  of  which 
those  sons  will  be  a  part.  They  possess  a  much  smaller  share 
of  the  judicial  power  than  the  upper  house  in  Britain,  for  they 
are  not,  as  there,  the  highest  court  in  civil  affairs.  Impeach- 
ments alone  are  the  cases  cognizable  before  them,  and  in  what 
other  place  could  matters  of  that  nature  be  so  properly  and 
safely  determined  ?  Tho  judges  of  the  federal  courts  will  owe 
their  appointments  to  the  president  and  senate,  therefore  may 
not  feel  so  porfectly  free  from  favor,  affection  and  influence,  as 
the  upper  house,  who  receive  their  power  from  the  people, 
through    their    State    representatives,  and    are    immediately 


1788.]  SPIRIT    OF    THE    PRESS.  341 

responsible  to  those  assemblies,  and  finally  to  the  nation  at 
large.  Thus  we  see  when  a  daring  or  dangerous  offender  is 
brought  to  the  bar  of  public  justice,  the  people  who  alone  can 
impeach  him  by  their  immediate  representatives,  will  cause  him 
to  be  tried,  not  by  judges  appointed  in  the  heat  of  the  occasion, 
but  by  two-thirds  of  a  select  body,  chosen  a  long  time  before, 
for  various  purposes,  by  the  collected  wisdom  of  their  State 
legislatures.  From  a  pretence  or  affection  of  extraordinary 
purity  and  excellence  of  character,  their  word  of  honor  is  the 
sanction  under  which  these  high  courts  in  other  countries  have 
given  their  sentence  ;  but  with  us,  like  the  other  judges  of  the 
Union,  like  the  rest  of  the  people  of  which  they  are  never  to 
forget  they  are  a  part,  it  is  required,  that  they  be  on  oath. 

No  ambitious,  undeserving  or  unexperienced  youth  can 
acquire  a  seat  in  this  house  by  means  of  the  most  enormous 
wealth  or  most  powerful  connections,  till  thirty  years  have 
ripened  his  abilities  and  fully  discovered  his  merits  to  his  coun- 
try— a  more  rational  ground  of  preference  surely  than  mere 
property. 

The  senate,  though  more  independent  of  the  people  as  to  the 
free  exercise  of  their  judgment  and  abilities,  than  the  house  of 
representatives,  by  the  longer  term  of  their  office,  must  be  older 
and  more  experienced  men,  and  the  public  treasures,  the  sinews 
of  the  state,  cannot  be  called  forth  by  their  original  motion. 
They  may  restrain  the  profusion  or  errors  of  the  house  of  repre- 
sentatives, but  they  cannot  take  the  necessary  measures  to  raise 
a  national  revenue. 

The  people,  through  the  electors,  prescribe  them  such  a  presi- 
dent as  shall  be  best  qualified  to  control  them. 

They  can  only,  by  conviction  on  impeachment,  remove  and 
incapacitate  a  dangerous  officer,  but  the  punishment  of  him  as 
a  criminal  remains  within  the  province  of  the  courts  of  law,  to 
be  conducted  under  all  the  ordinary  forms  and  precautions, 
which  exceedingly  diminishes  the  importance  of  their  judicial 
powers.  They  are  detached,  as  much  as  possible,  from  local 
prejudices  in  favor  of  their  respective  States,  by  having  a  sepa- 
rate and  independent  vote,  for  the  sensible  and  conscientious 
use  of  which,  every  member  will  find  his  person,  honor  and 
character  seriously  bound.    He  cannot  shelter  himself,  under  a 


342  SPIRIT    OF   THE    PRESS.  [1788. 

vote  in  behalf  of  his  State,  among  his  immediate  colleagues. 
As  there  are  only  two,  he  cannot  be  voluntarily  or  involuntarily 
governed  by  the  majority  of  the  deputation.  He  will  be  obliged, 
by  wholesome  provisions,  to  attend  his  public  duty,  and  thus  in 
great  national  questions  must  give  a  vote,  of  the  honesty  of 
which  he  will  find  it  necessary  to  convince  his  constituents. 

The  senate  must  always  receive  the  exceptions  of  the  presi- 
dent against  any  of  their  legislative  acts,  which,  without  serious 
deliberation  and  sufficient  reasons,  they  will  seldom  disregard. 
They  will  also  feel  a  considerable  check  from  the  constitutional 
powers  of  the  State  legislatures,  whose  rights  they  will  not  be 
disposed  to  infringe,  since  they  are  the  bodies  to  which  they  owe 
their  existence,  and  are  moreover  to  remain  the  immediate 
guardians  of  the  people. 

And  lastly,  the  senate  will  feel  the  mighty  check  of  the  house 
of  representatives — a  body  so  pure  in  its  election,  so  intimately 
connected,  by  its  interests  and  feelings,  with  the  people  at  large, 
so  guarded  against  corruption  and  influence ;  so  much,  from  its 
nature,  above  all  apprehensions,  that  it  must  ever  be  able  to 
maintain  the  high  ground  assigned  to  it  by  the  Federal  Consti- 
tution. An  American  Citizen. 


ON  THE  FEDERAL  GOVERNMENT. 

NUMBER  THREE. 

In  pursuing  the  consideration  of  the  new  Federal  Constitu- 
tion, it  now  remains  to  examine  the  nature  and  powers  of  the 
house  of  representatives — the  immediate  delegates  of  the  people. 

Each  member  of  this  truly  popular  assembly  will  be  chosen 
by  about  six  thousand  electors,  by  the  poor  as  well  as  the  rich. 
No  decayed  and  venal  borough  will  have  an  unjust  share  in 
their  determinations— no  old  Sarum  will  send  thither  a  repre- 
sentative by  a  voice  of  a  single  elector.36  As  we  shall  have  no 
royal  ministers  to  purchase  votes,  so  we  shall  have  no  votes  for 
sale.     For  the  suffrages  of  six  thousand  enlightened  and  inde- 

x  [This  is  the  case  (in  1788)  with  that  British  borough.] 


1788.]  SPIRIT    OF   THE   PRESS.  343 

pendent  freemen  are  above  all  f'price.  When  the  increasing 
population  of  the  country  should  render  the  body  too  large  at 
the  rate  of  one  member  for  every  thirty  thousand  persons,  they 
will  be  returned  at  the  greater  rate  of  one  for  every  forty  or 
fifty  thousand,  which  will  render  the  electors  still  more  incor- 
ruptible. For  this  regulation  is  only  designed  to  prevent  a 
smaller  number  than  thirty  thousand  from  having  a  representa- 
tive. Thus  we  see  a  provision  follows,  that  no  State  shall  have 
less  than  one  member  ;  for  if  a  new  and  greater  number  should 
hereafter  be  fixed  on,  which  shall  exceed  the  whole  of  the 
inhabitants  of  any  State,  such  State,  without  this  wholesome 
provision,  would  lose  its  voice  in  the  house  of  representatives — 
a  circumstance  which  the  Constitution  renders  impossible. 

The  people  of  England,  whose  House  of  Commons  is  filled 
with  military  and  civil  officers  and  pensioners,  say  their  liberties 
would  be  perfectly  secured  by  triennial  parliaments.  With  us 
no  placemen  can  sit  among  the  representatives  of  the  people, 
and  two  years  are  the  constitutional  term  of  their  existence. 
Here  again,  least  wealth,  powerful  connections,  or  even  the 
unwariness  of  the  people  should  place  in  this  important  trust 
an  undeserving,  unqualified  or  inexperienced  youth,  the  wisdom 
of  the  Convention  has  proposed  an  absolute  incapacity  till  the 
age  of  twenty-five.  At  twenty-one  a  young  man  is  made  the 
guardian  of  his  own  interest,  but  he  cannot  for  a  few  years 
more  be  intrusted  with  the  affairs  of  the  nation.  He  must  be 
an  inhabitant  of  the  State  that  elects  him,  that  he  may  be  inti- 
mately acquainted  with  their  particular  circumstances.  The 
house  of  representatives  is  not,  as  the  senate,  to  have  a  presi- 
dent chosen  for  them  from  without  their  body,  but  are  to  elect 
their  speaker  from  their  own  number.  They  will  also  appoint 
all  their  other  officers.  In  great  state  cases,  they  will  be  the 
grand  inquest  of  the  nation,  for  they  possess  the  sole  and  uncon- 
trollable power  of  impeachment.  They  are  neither  to  wait  the 
call  nor  abide  the  prorogations  and  dissolutions  of  a  perverse  or 
ambitious  prince,  for  they  are  to  meet  at  least  once  in  every 
year,  and  sit  on  adjournments  to  be  agreed  on  between  them- 
selves and  the  other  servants  of  the  people.  Should  they  differ 
in  opinion,  the  president,  who  is  a  temporary  fellow  servant, 
and  not  their  hereditary  master,  has  a  mediatorial  power  to 


344  SPIRIT    OF    THE    PRESS.  [1788. 

adjust  it  for  them,  but  cannot  prevent  their  constitutional 
meeting  within  the  year.  They  can  compel  the  attendance  of 
the  members,  that  their  public  duty  may  not  be  evaded  in 
times  of  difficulty  or  danger.  The  vote  of  each  representative 
can  be  always  known,  as  well  as  the  proceedings  of  the  house, 
that  so  the  people  may  be  acquainted  with  the  conduct  of  those 
in  whom  they  repose  so  important  a  trust.  As  was  observed  of 
the  senators,  they  cannot  make  new  offices  for  themselves,  nor 
increase,  for  their  own  benefit,  the  emoluments  of  old  ones,  by 
which  the  people  will  be  exempted  from  needless  additions  to 
the  public  expenses  on  such  sordid  and  mercenary  principles. 
They  are  not  to  be  restrained  from  the  firm  and  plain  language 
which  becomes  the  independent  representatives  of  freemen,  for 
there  is  to  be  a  perfect  liberty  of  speech.  Without  their  consent 
no  moneys  can  be  obtained,  no  armies  raised,  no  navies  pro- 
vided. They  alone  can  originate  bills  for  drawing  forth  the 
revenues  of  the  Union,  and  they  will  have  a  negative  upon 
every  legislative  act  of  the  other  house.  So  far,  in  short,  as  the 
sphere  of  Federal  jurisdiction  extends,  they  will  be  controllable 
only  by  the  people,  and  in  contentions  with  the  other  brand), 
so  far  as  they  shall  be  right,  they  must  ever  finally  prevail. 

Such,  my  countrymen,  are  some  of  the  cautionary  provisions 
of  the  frame  of  government  your  faithful  Convention  have  sub- 
mitted to  your  consideration,  such  the  foundation  of  peace, 
liberty  and  safety,  which  have  been  laid  by  their  unwearied 
labors.  They  have  guarded  you  against  all  servants  but  those 
"  whom  choice  and  common  good  ordains,"  against  all  masters 
"  save  preserving  Heaven." 

An  American  Citizen. 


ON  THE  FEDERAL  GOVERNMENT. 

NUMBER   POUR. 

In  considering  the  respective  powers  of  the  president,  the 
senate  and  the  house  of  representatives,  under  the  Federal  Con- 
stitution, we  have  seen  a  part  of  the  wholesome  precautions, 
which  are  contained  in  the  new  system.     Let  us  examine  what 


1788.]  SPIRIT    OF   THE   PRESS.  345 

farther  securities  for  the  safety  and  happiness  of  the  people  are 
contained  in  the  general  stipulations  and  provisions. 

The  United  States  guarantee  to  every  State  in  the  Union  a 
separate  republican  form  of  government.  From  thence  it  fol- 
lows, that  any  man  or  body  of  men,  however  rich  or  powerful, 
who  shall  make  an  alteration  in  the  form  of  goverment  of  any 
State,  whereby  the  powers  thereof  shall  be  attempted  to  be  taken 
out  of  the  hands  of  the  people  at  large,  will  stand  guilty  of  high 
treason  ;  or  should  a  foreign  power  seduce  or  overawe  the  peo- 
ple of  any  State  so  as  to  cause  them  to  vest  in  the  families  of 
any  ambitious  citizens  or  foreigners  the  powers  of  hereditary 
governors,  whether  as  kings  or  nobles,  that  such  investment  of 
powers  would  be  void  in  itself,  and  every  person  attempting  to 
execute  them,  would  also  be  guilty  of  treason. 

No  religious  test  is  ever  to  be  required  of  any  officer  or  servant 
of  the  United  States.  The  people  may  employ  any  wise  and 
good  citizen  in  the  execution  of  the  various  duties  of  the  gov- 
ernment. In  Italy,  Spain  and  Portugal,  no  Protestant  can  hold 
a  public  trust.  In  England  every  Presbyterian,  and  other  per- 
son not  of  their  established  church,  is  incapable  of  holding  an 
office.  No  such  impious  deprivation  of  the  rights  of  men  can 
take  place  under  the  new  Federal  Constitution.  The  Conven- 
tion has  the  honor  of  proposing  the  first  public  act,  by  which 
any  nation  has  ever  divested  itself  of  a  power,  every  exercise  of 
which  is  a  trespass  on  the  majesty  of  Heaven. 

No  qualification  in  moneyed  or  landed  property  is  required 
by  the  proposed  plan ;  nor  does  it  admit  any  preference  from 
the  preposterous  distinctions  of  birth  and  rank.  The  office  of 
the  president,  a  senator,  and  a  representative,  and  every  other 
place  of  power  or  profit,  are  therefore  open  to  the  whole  body  of 
the  people.  Any  wise,  informed  and  upright  man,  be  his  prop- 
erty what  it  may,  can  exercise  the  trusts  and  powers  of  the 
state,  provided  he  possesses  the  moral,  religious  and  politi- 
cal virtues  which  are  necessary  to  secure  the  confidence  of  his 
fellow-citizens. 

The  importation  of  slaves  from  any  foreign  country  is,  by  a- 
clear  implication,  held  up  to  the  world  as  equally  inconsistent 
with  the  dispositions  and  the  duties  of  the  people  of  America. 
A  solid  foundation  is  laid  for  exploding  the  principles  of  negro 

44 


346  SPIRIT    OF    THE   PRESS.  [1788. 

slavery,  in  which  many  good  men  of  all  parties  in  Pennsylvania, 
and  throughout  the  Union,  have  already  concurred.  The  tem- 
porary reservation  of  any  particular  matter  must  ever  be  deemed 
an  admission  that  it  should  be  done  away.  This  appears  to 
have  been  well  understood.  In  addition  to  the  arguments 
drawn  from  liberty,  justice  and  religion,  opinions  against  this 
practice,  founded  in  sound  policy,  have  no  doubt  been  urged. 
Regard  was  necessarily  paid  to  the  peculiar  situation  of  our 
Southern  fellow-citizens  ;  but  they,  on  the  other  hand,  have  not 
been  insensible  of  the  delicate  situation  of  our  national  charac- 
ter on  this  subject. 

The  people  will  remain,  under  the  proposed  Constitution,  the 
fountain  of  power  and  public  honor.  The  president,  the  senate 
and  house  of  representatives,  will  be  the  channels  through 
which  the  stream  will  flow — but  it  will  flow  from  the  people, 
and  from  them  only.  Every  office,  religious,  civil  and  military, 
will  be  either  their  immediate  gift,  or  it  will  come  from  them 
through  the  hands  of  their  servants.  And  this,  as  observed 
before,  will  be  guaranteed  to  them  under  the  State  Constitu- 
tions which  they  respectively  approve  ;  for  they  cannot  be  royal 
forms,  cannot  be  aristocratical,  but  must  be  republican. 
.  The  people  of  those  States  which  have  faithfully  discharged 
their  duty  to  the  Union,  will  be  no  longer  subjected  alone  to 
the  weight  of  the  public  debts.  Proper  arrangements  will  call 
forth  the  just  proportion  of  their  sister  States,  and  our  national 
•character  will  again  be  as  unstained,  as  it  was  once  exalted. 
Elevation  to  independence,  with  the  loss  of  our  good  name,  is 
only  to  be  conspicuous  in  disgrace.  The  liberties  of  a  people 
involved  in  debt  are  as  uncertain  as  the  liberty  of  an  individual 
in  the  same  situation.  Their  virtue  is  more  precarious.  The 
unfortunate  citizen  must  yield  to  the  operation  of  the  laws, 
while  a  bankrupt  nation  too  easy  annihilates  the  sacred  obliga- 
tions of  gratitude  and  honor,  and  becomes  execrable  and  infa- 
mous. I  cannot  refrain  from  reminding  my  fellow-citizens  of 
our  near  approach  to  that  deplorable  situation,  which  must  be 
our  miserable  condition,  if  the  defects  of  the  old  Confederation 
remain  without  amendment.  The  proposed  Constitution  will 
cure  the  evil,  and  restore  us  to  our  rank  among  mankind. 

Laws,  made  after  the  commission  of  the  fact,  have  been  a 


1788.]  SPIRIT    OF    THE    PRESS.  347 

dreadful  engine  in  the  hands  of  tyrannical  governors.  Some  of 
the  most  virtuous  and  shining  characters  in  the  world  have 
been  put  to  death,  by  laws  formed  to  render  them  punishable, 
for  parts  of  their  conduct  which  innocence  permitted,  and  to 
which  patriotism  impelled  them.  These  have  been  called 
ex  post  facto  laws,  and  are  exploded  by  the  new  s}rstem.  If  a 
time  of  public  contention  shall  hereafter  arrive,  the  firm  and 
ardent  friends  to  liberty  may  know  the  length  to  which  they 
can  push  their  noble  opposition,  on  the  foundation  of  the  laws.. 
Should  their  country's  cause  impel  them  further,  they  will  be 
acquainted  with  the  hazard,  and  using  those  arms  which  Provi- 
dence has  put  into  their  hands,  will  make  a  solemn  appeal  to 
"  the  power  above." 

The  destruction  of  the  ancient  republics  was  occasioned  in 
every  instance  by  their  being  ignorant  of  a  great  political  posi- 
tion, which  was  left  for  America  to  discover  and  establish. 
Self-evident  as  the  truth  appears,  we  find  no  friend  to  liberty  in 
ancient  Greece  or  Rome  asserting,  that  taxation  and  representa- 
tion were  inseparable.  The  Roman  citizens,  proud  of  their  own 
liberty,  imposed,  in  the  freest  times  of  the  Commonwealth,  the 
most  grievous  burdens  on  their  wretched  provinces.  At  other 
times  we  find  thousands  of  their  citizens,  though  residing  with- 
in the  walls  of  Rome,  deprived  of  legislative  representatives. 
When  America  asserted  the  novel  truth,  Great  Britain,  though 
boasting  herself  as  alone  free  among  the  modern  nations,  denied 
it  by  her  legislature,  and  endeavored  to  refute  it  by  her  arms — 
the  reasoning  of  tyrants.  But  the  attempt  was  vain,  for  the 
voice  of  truth  was  heard  above  the  thunders  of  the  war,  and 
reached  the  ears  of  all  nations.  Henceforth  the  people  of  the 
earth  will  consider  this  position  as  the  only  rock  on  which  they 
can  found  the  temple  of  liberty,  that  taxation  and  representa- 
tion are  inseparable.  Our  new  Constitution  carries  it  into 
execution  on  the  most  enlarged  and  liberal  scale,  for  a  repre- 
sentative will  be  chosen  by  six  thousand  of  his  fellow-citizens, 
a  senator  by  half  a  sovereign  State,  a  president  by  a  whole 
nation.  v 

The  old  Federal  Constitution  "contained  many  of  the  same 
things,  which  from  error  or  disingenuousness  are  urged  against 
the  new  one.     Neither  of  them  have  a  bill  of  rights,  nor  does 


348  SPIRIT    OF    THE   PRESS.  [1788. 

either  notice  the  liberty  of  the  press,  because  they  are  already 
provided  for  by  the  State  Constitutions ;  and  relating'  only  to 
personal  rights,  they  could  not  be  mentioned,  in  a  contract 
among  sovereign  States. 

Both  the  old  and  new  Federal  Constitutions,  and  indeed  the 
Constitution  of  Pennsylvania,  admit  of  courts  in  which  no  use 
is  made  of  a  jury.  The  board  of  property,  the  court  of  admi- 
ralty, and  the  high  court  of  errors  and  appeals,  in  the  State  of 
Pennsylvania,  as  also  the  court  of  appeals  under  the  old  Con- 
federation, exclude  juries.  Trial  by  jury  will  therefore  be  in 
the  express  words  of  the  Pennsylvania  Constitution, "  as  hereto 
fore," — almost  always  used,  though  sometimes  omitted.  Trials 
for  lands  lying  in  any  State  between  persons  residing  in  such 
State,  for  bonds,  notes,  book  debts,  contracts,  trespasses,  assump- 
tions, and  all  other  matters  between  two  or  more  citizens  of  any 
States,  will  be  held  in  the  State  courts  by  juries,  as  now.  In 
these  cases  the  Federal  courts  cannot  interfere.  But  when  a 
dispute  arises  between  the  citizens  of  any  State  about  lands 
lying  out  of  the  bounds  thereof,  or  when  a  trial  is  to  be  had 
between  the  citizens  of  any  State,  and  those  of  another,  or  the 
government  of  another,  the  private  citizen  will  not  be  obliged 
to  go  into  a  court  constituted  by  the  State,  with  which,  or  with 
the  citizens  of  which,  his  dispute  is.  He  can  appeal  to  a  disin- 
terested Federal  court.  This  is  surely  a  great  advantage,  and 
promises  a  fair  trial,  and  an  impartial  judgment.  The  trial  by 
jury  is  not  excluded  in  these  Federal  courts.  In  all  criminal 
cases,  where  the  property,  liberty  or  life  of  the  citizens  is  at 
stake,  he  has  the  benefit  of  a  jury.  If  convicted  on  impeach- 
ment, which  is  never  done  by  a  jury  in  any  country,  he  cannot 
be  fined,  imprisoned  or  punished,  but  only  may  be  disqualified 
from  doing  public  mischief  by  losing  his  office,  and  his  capacity 
to  hold  another.  If  the  nature  of  his  offence,  besides  its  danger 
to  his  country,  should  be  criminal  in  itself — should  involve  a 
charge  of  fraud,  murder  or  treason — he  may  be  tried  for  such 
crime,  but  cannot  be  convicted  without  a  jury.  In  trials  about 
property  in  the  Federal  courts,  which  can  only  be  as  above 
stated,  there  is  nothing  in  the  new  Constitution  to  prevent  a 
trial  by  jury.  No  doubt  it  will  be  the  mode  in  every  case, 
wherein  it  is  practicable.    This  will  be  adjusted  by  law,  and  it 


1788.]  SPIRIT   OF   THE    PRESS.  349 

could  not  be  done  otherwise.  In  short,  the  sphere  of  jurisdic- 
tion for  the  Federal  courts  is  limited,  and  that  sphere  only  is 
subject  to  the  regulations  of  our  Federal  government.  The 
known  principles  of  justice,  the .  attachment  to  trial  by  jury, 
whenever  it  can  be  used,  the  instructions  of  the  State  legisla 
tures,  the  instructions  of  the  people  at  large,  the  operation  of  the 
Federal  regulations  on  the  property  of  a  president,  a  senator,  a 
representative,  a  judge,  as  well  as  on  that  of  a  private  citizen, 
will  certainly  render  those  regulations  as  favorable  as  possible 
to  property  ;  for  life  and  liberty  are  put  more  than  ever  into  the 
hands  of  the  juries.  Under  the  present  Constitution  of  all  the 
States,  a  public  officer  may  be  condemned  to  imprisonment  or 
death  on  impeachment,  without  a  jury  ;  but  the  new  Federal 
Constitution  protects  the  accused,  till  he  shall  be  convicted, 
from  the  hands  of  power,  by  rendering  a  jury  the  indispensable 
judges  of  all  crimes. 

The  influence  which  foreign  powers  may  attempt  to  exercise 
in  our  affairs  was  foreseen,  and  a  wholesome  provision  has  been 
made  against  it ;  for  no  person  holding  an  office  under  the 
United  States  is  permitted  to  enjoy  any  foreign  honors,  powers 
or  emoluments. 

The  apprehensions  of  the  people  have  been  excited,  perhaps 
by  persons  with  good  intentions,  about  the  powers  of  the  new 
government  to  raise  an  army.  Let  us  consider  this  point  with 
moderation  and  candor.  As  enemies  will  sometimes  insult  us, 
invade  our  country,  and  capture  our  property,  it  is  clear  a  power 
in  our  government  to  oppose,  restrain  or  destroy  them,  is  neces- 
sary to  our  honor,  safety  and  existence.  The  military  should, 
however,  be  regarded  with  a  watchful  eye  ;  for  it  is  a  profession 
that  is  liable  to  dangerous  perversion.  But  the  powers  vested 
in  the  Federal  government  do  not  go  the  length  which  has  been 
said.  A  standing  army  is  not  granted  or  intended,  for  there 
can  be  no  provision  for  its  continuing  three  years,  much  less  for 
its  permanent  establishment.  Two  years  are  the  utmost  time 
for  which  the  money  can  be  given.  It  will  be  under  all  the 
restrictions  which  wisdom  and  jealousy  can  suggest,  and  the 
original  grant  of  the  supplies  must  be  made  by  the  house  of 
representatives,  the  immediate  delegates  of  the  people.  The 
senate  and  president,  who  also  derive  their  power  from  the  pea- 


350  SPIRIT   OF   THE    PRESS.  [1788. 

pie,  appoint  the  officers  ;  and  the  heads  of  the  departments,  who 
must  submit  their  accounts  to  the  whole  legislature,  arc  to  pay 
and  provide  them,  as  shall  be  directed  by  the  laws  that  shall 
contain  the  conditions  of  the  grant.  The  militia,  who  are  in 
fact  the  effective  part  of  the  people  at  large,  will  render  many 
troops  quite  unnecessary.  They  will  form  a  powerful  check 
upon  the  regular  troops,  and  will  [generally  be  sufficient  to 
overawe  them — for  our  detached  situation  will  seldom  give 
occasion  to  raise  an  army,  though  a  few  scattered  companies 
may  often  be  necessary.  But  whenever,  even  on  the  most  obvi- 
ous reasons,  an  army  shall  bo.  raised,  the  several  States  will  be 
called,  by  the  nature  of  things,  to  attend  to  the  condition  of  the 
militia.  Republican  jealousy,  the  guardian  angel  of  these 
States,  will  watch  the  motions  of  our  military  citizens,. even 
though  they  will  be  the  soldiers  of  a  free  people.  There  is  a 
wide  difference  between  the  troops  of  such  a  Commonwealth  as 
ours,  founded  on  equal  and  unalterable  principles,  and  those  of 
a  regal  government,  where  ambition  and  oppression  are  the  pro- 
fession of  the  king.  In  the  first  case,  a  military  officer  is  the 
occasional  servant  of  the  people,  employed  for  their  defence  ;  in 
the  second,  he  is  the  ever  ready  instrument  to  execute  the 
schemes  of  conquest  or  oppression,  with  which  the  mind  of  his 
royal  master  may  be  disturbed. 

Observations  have  been  made  on  the  power  given  to  the  Fed- 
eral government,  in  regard  to  the  elections  of  representatives 
and  senators.  The  regulations  of  these  elections  are,  by  the 
first  part  of  the  clause,  to  be  prescribed  by  the  State  legisla- 
tures, who  are  certainly  the  proper  bodies,  if  they  will  always 
execute  the  duty.  But  in  case  the  Union  or  the  public  safety 
should  be  endangered  by  an  omission  of  this  duty,  as  in  the 
case  of  Rhode  Island,  then  the  legislature  of  the  United  States 
can  name  for  the  people  a  convenient  time,  and  do  other  matters 
necessary  to  insure  the  free  exercise  of  their  right  of  election. 
The  exception,  in  regard  to  the  places  of  choosing  senators,  was 
made  from  due  respect  to  the  sovereignty  of  the  State  legisla- 
tures, who  are  to  elect  the  senators,  and  whose  place  of  meeting 
ought  not  to  be  prescribed  to  them  by  any  authority,  except 
indeed,  as  we  always  must,  by  the  authority  of  the  people. 
This  power  given  to  the  Federal  legislature  is  no  more  than  what 


1788.]  SPIRIT    OF    THE    PRESS.  351 

is  possessed  by  the  governments  of  all  the  States.  The  Consti- 
tution of  Pennsylvania  permits  two-thirds  of  such  cities  and 
counties,  as  shall  elect  representatives,  to  exercise  all  the  powers 
of  the  General  Assembly,  "  as  fully  and  amply  as  if  the  whole 
were  present, "  should  any  part  of  the  State  neglect  or  refuse  to 
perform  their  duty  in  this  particular.  In  short,  it  is  a  power 
necessary  to  preserve  the  social  compact  of  each  State  and  the 
confederation  of  the  United  States. 

Besides  the  securities  for  the  liberties  of  the  people  arising 
out  of  the  Federal  government,  they  are  guarded  by  their  State 
Constitutions,  and  by  the  nature  of  things  in  the  separate  States. 
The  governor  or  president  in  each  Commonwealth,  the  coun- 
cils, senates,  assemblies,  judges,  sheriffs,  grand  and  petit  juries, 
officers  of  militia,  clergy  and  lay  officers  of  all  churches,  State 
and  county  treasurers,  prothonotaries,  registers,  presidents  and 
other  officers  of  universities,  colleges  and  academies,  wardens  of 
ports  and  cities,  burgesses  of  towns,  commissioners  of  counties, 
county  lieutenants,  and  many  other  officers  of  power  and  influ- 
ence, will  still  be  chosen  within  each  State,  without  any  possible 
interference  of  the  Federal  government.  The  separate  States 
will  also  choose  all  the  members  of  the  legislative  and  executive 
branches  of  the  United  States.  The  people  at  large  in  each 
State  will  choose  their  Federal  representatives,  and,  unless 
ordered  otherwise  by  the  State  legislatures,  may  choose  the 
electors  of  the  president  and  vice-president  of  the  Union.  And 
lastly,  the  legislatures  of  the  States  will  have  the  election  of  the 
senate,  as  they  have  heretofore  had  of  the  members  of  Congress. 
Let  us  then,  with  a  candor  worthy  of  the  subject,  ask  ourselves, 
whether  it  can  be  feared  that  a  majority  of  the  representatives, 
each  of  whom  will  be  chosen  by  six  thousand  enlightened  free- 
men, can  betray  their  country  ?  Whether  a  majority  of  the 
senate,  each  of  whom  will  be  chosen  by  the  legislature  of  a  free, 
sovereign  and  independent  State,  without  any  stipulations  in 
favor  of  wealth  or  the  contemptible  distinctions  of  birth  or  rank, 
and  who  will  be  closely  observed  by  the  State  legislatures,  can 
destroy  our  liberties,  controlled  as  they  arc  too  by  the  house  of 
representatives  ? — or  whether  a  temporary,  limited  executive 
officer,  watched  by  the  representatives,  by  the  senate,  by  the 
State  legislatures,  by  his  personal  enemies  among  the  people  of 


352  SPIRIT    OF   THE   PRESS.  [1788. 

his  own  State,  by  the  jealousy  of  the  people  of  rival  States,  and 
by  the  whole  of  the  people  of  the  Union,  can  ever  endanger  our 
freedom  ? 

Permit  me,  my  fellow-citizens,  to  close  these  observations  by 
remarking,  that  there  is  no  spirit  of  arrogance  in  the  new  Fed- 
eral Constitution.  It  addresses  you  with  becoming  modesty, 
admitting  that  it  may  contain  errors.  Let  us  give  it  a  trial ; 
and  when  experience  has  taught  its  mistakes,  the  people,  whom 
it  preserves  absolutely  all  powerful,  can  reform  and  amend 
them.  That  I  may  be  perfectly  understood,  I  will  acknowledge, 
its  acceptance  by  all  the  States,  without  delay,  is  the  second 
wish  of  my  heart.  The  first  is,  that  our  country  may  be  virtu- 
ous and  free.  An  American  Citizen. 


OPINION  OF  DR.  FRANKLIN. 

The  following  Address  of  His  Excellency  Benjamin  Franklin, 
Esq.,  to  the  President  of  the  late  Continental  Convention, 
was  delivered  by  him  immediately  before  his  signing  the 
proposed  Constitution  for  the  United  States.  It  may  be 
relied  on  as  authentic — coming  from  a  gentleman  of  respecta- 
bility. 

Mr.  President :  I  confess  that  I  do  not  entirely  approve  of 
this  Constitution  at  present, — but,  Sir,  I  am  not  sure  I  shall 
never  approve  it:  for  having  lived  long,  I  have  experienced 
many  instances  of  being  obliged  by  better  information  or  fuller 
consideration,  to  change  opinions  even  on  important  subjects, 
which  I  once  thought  right,  but  found  to  be  otherwise.  It  is 
therefore  that  the  older  I  grow,  the  more  apt  I  am  to  doubt  my 
own  judgment,  and  to  pay  more  respect  to  the  judgment  of 
others.  Most  men,  indeed,  as  well  as  most  sects  in  religion, 
think  themselves  in  possession  of  all  truth,  and  that  wherever 
others  differ  from  them,  it  is  so  far  error.  Steele,  a  Protestant, 
in  a  dedication,  tells  the  Pope,  that  the  only  difference  between 
our  two  churches,  in  their  opinions  of  the  certainty  of  their 
doctrine,  is,  the  Romish  church  is  infallible,  and  the  church  of 


1788.]  SPIRIT    OF   THE    PRESS.  353 

England  is  never  in  the  wrong.  But  though  many  private  per- 
sons think  almost  as  highly  of  their  own  infallibility  as  that  of 
their  sect,  few  express  it  so  naturally  as  a  certain  French  lady, 
who,  in  a  little  dispute  with  her  sister,  said,  I  don't  know  how 
it  happens,  sister,  but  I  meet  with  no  body  but  myself  that  is 
always  in  the  right. 

In  these  sentiments,  Sir,  I  agree  to  this  Constitution,  with  all 
its  faults,  if  they  are  such  ; — because  I  think  a  general  govern- 
ment necessary  for  us,  and  there  is  no  form  of  government  but 
what  may  be  a  blessing  to  the  people,  if  well  administered  ; — 
and  I  believe,  farther,  that  this  is  likely  to  be  well  administered 
for  a  course  of  years,  and  can  only  end  in  despotism,  as  other 
forms  have  done  before  it,  when  the  people  shall  become  so 
corrupted  as  to  need  despotic  government,  being  incapable  of 
any  other. 

I  doubt,  too,  whether  any  other  Convention  we  can  obtain, 
may  be  able  to  make  a  better  Constitution.  For  when  you 
assemble  a  number  of  men,  to  have  the  advantage  of  their  joint 
wisdom,  you  inevitably  assemble  with  those  men,  all  their  preju- 
dices, their  passions,  their  errors  of  opinion,  their  local  interests, 
aild  their  selfish  views.  From  such  an  assembly,  can  a  perfect 
production  be  expected  ?  It  therefore  astonishes  me,  Sir,  to 
find  this  system  approaching  so  near  to  perfection  as  it  does. 
And  I  think  it  will  astonish  our  enemies  who  are  waiting  with 
confidence  to  hear  that  our  councils  are  confounded  like  those 
of  the  builders  of  Babel,  and  that  our  States  are  on  the  point  of 
separation — only  to  meet  hereafter  for  the  purpose  of  cutting 
one  another's  throats.  Thus  I  consent,  Sir,  to  this  Constitution, 
because  I  expect  no  better,  and  because  I  am  not  sure  that  it  is 
not  the  best.  Much  of  the  strength  and  efficiency  of  any  govern- 
ment in  procuring  and  securing  happiness  to  the  people,  depends 
on  opinion, — on  the  general  opinion  of  the  goodness  of  that 
government,  as  well  as  of  the  wisdom  and  integrity  of  its  gov- 
ernors. I  hope,  therefore,  that  for  our  own  sakes  as  a  part 
of  the  people,  and  for  the  sake  of  our  posterity,  we  shall 
act  heartily  and  unanimously  in  recommending  this  Constitu- 
tion, wherever  our  influence  may  extend,  and  turn  our  future 
thoughts  and  endeavors  to  the  means  of  having  it  well  admin- 
istered. 

45 


354  SPIRIT    OF    THE    PRESS.  [1788. 

On  the  whole,  Sir,  I  cannot  help  expressing  a  wish  that  every 
member  of  the  Convention  who  may  still  have  objections  to  it, 
would,  with  me  on  this  occasion,  doubt  a  little  of  his  own  infal- 
libility, and  to  make  manifest  our  unanimity,  put  his  name  to 
this  instrument. 


SPEECH  OF  JAMES  WILSON. 

Speech  delivered  by  James  Wilson,  Esq.,  explanatory  of  the 
general  principles  of  the  proposed  Federal  Constitution ; 
upon  a  motion  made  by  the  Hon.  Thomas  M'Kean,  in  the 
Convention  of  the  State  of  Pennsylvania,  on  Saturday,  No- 
vember 24th,  1787  :  [a  speech  which  exercised  considerable 
influence  not  only  in  Pennsylvania  but  also  in  Massachusetts.] 

As  the  only  member  of  this  respectable  body,  who  had  the 
honor  of  a  seat  in  the  late  Federal  Convention,  it  is  peculiarly 
my  duty,  Mr.  President,  to  submit  to  your  consideration  the 
general  principles  that  have  produced  the  national  Constitution, 
which  has  been  framed  and  proposed  by  the  assembled  dele- 
gates of  the  United  States,  and  which  must  finally  stand  or  fall 
by  the  concurrent  decision  of  this  Convention,  and  of  others 
acting  upon  the  same  subject,  under  similar  powers  and  author- 
ity. To  frame  a  government  for  a  single  City  or  State,  is  a 
business  both  in  its  importance  and  facility,  widely  different 
from  the  task  intrusted  to  the  Federal  Convention,  whose  pros- 
pects were  extended  not  only  to  thirteen  independent  and 
sovereign  States,  some  of  which  in  territorial  jurisdiction,  popu- 
lation, and  resource,  equal  the  most  respectable  nations  of 
Europe,  but  likewise  to  innumerable  States  yet  unformed,  and 
to  myriads  of  citizens  who  in  future  ages  shall  inhabit  the  vast 
uncultivated  regions  of  the  continent.  The  duties  of  that  body, 
therefore,  were  not  limited  to  local  or  partial  considerations, 
but  to  the  formation  of  a  plan  commensurate  with  a  great  and 
valuable  portion  of  the  globe. 

I  confess,  Sir,  that  the  magnitude  of  the  object  before  us, 
filled  our  minds  with  awe  and  apprehension.     In  Europe  the 


1788.]  SPIRIT    OF    THE    PRESS.  355 

opening  and  extending  the  navigation  of  a  single  river,  has 
been  deemed  an  act  of  imperial  merit  and  importance  ;  but  how 
insignificant  does  it  seem  when  we  contemplate  the  scene  that 
nature  here  exhibits,  pouring  forth  the  Potomac,  the  Rappahan- 
nock, the  Susquehanna,  and  other  innumerable  rivers,  to  dig- 
nify, adorn  and  enrich  our  soil.  But  the  magnitude  of  the 
object  was  equalled  by  the  difficulty  of  accomplishing  it,  when  we 
considered  the  uncommon  dexterity  and  address  that  were 
necessary  to  combat  and  reconcile  the  jarring  interests  that 
seemed  naturally  to  prevail,  in  a  country,  which,  presenting  a 
coast  of  fifteen  hundred  miles  to  the  Atlantic,  is  composed  of 
thirteen  distinct  and  independent  States,  varying  essentially  in 
their  situation  and  dimensions,  and  in  the  number  and  habits 
of  their  citizens.  Their  interests,  too,  in  some  respects  really 
different,  and  in  many  apparently  so ;  but  whether  really  or 
apparently,  such  is  the  constitution  of  the  human  mind,  they 
make  the  same  impression,  and  are  prosecuted  with  equal  vigor 
and  perseverance.  Can  it  then  be  a  subject  for  surprise  that 
with  the  sensations  indispensably  excited  by  so  comprehensive 
and  so  arduous  an  undertaking,  we  should  for  a  moment  yield 
to  despondency,  and  at  length,  influenced  by  the  spirit  of  con- 
ciliation, resort  to  mutual  concession,  as  the  only  means  to 
obtain  the  great  end  for  which  we  were  convened  ?  Is  it  a  mat- 
ter of  surprise  that  where  the  springs  of  dissension  were  so 
numerous  and  so  powerful,  some  force  was  requisite  to  impel 
them  to  take,  in  a  collected  state,  a  direction  different  from  that 
which  separately  they  would  have  pursued  ? 

There  was  another  reason,  that  in  this  respect  increased  the 
difficulties  of  the  Federal  Convention — the  different  tempers 
and  dispositions  of  the  people  for  whom  they  acted.  But,  how- 
ever widely  they  may  differ  upon  other  topics,  they  cordially 
agree  in  that  keen  and  elevated  sense  of  freedom  and  independ- 
ence, which  has  been  manifested  in  their  united  and  successful 
opposition  to  one  of  the  most  powerful  kingdoms  of  the  world. 
Still  it  was  apprehended  by  some,  that  their  abhorrence  of  con- 
straint would  be  the  source  of  objection  and  opposition ;  but,  I 
confess,  that  my  opinion,  formed  upon  a  knowledge  of  the  good 
sense,  as  well  as  the  high  spirit  of  my  constituents,  made  me 
confident  that  they  would  esteem  that  government  to  be  the  best 


356  SPIRIT    OF    THE   PRESS.  [1788. 

which  was  best  calculated  eventually  to  establish  and  secure  the 
dignity  and  happiness  of  their  country.  Upon  this  ground,  I  have 
occasionally  supposed  that  my  constituents  have  asked  the 
reason  of  my  assent  to  the  several  propositions  contained  in  the 
plan  before  us.  My  answer,  though  concise,  is  a  candid,  and,  I 
think,  a  satisfactory  one — because  I  thought  them  right ;  and 
thinking  them  right,  it  would  be  a  poor  compliment  indeed  to 
presume  they  could  be  disagreeable  to  my  constituents — a  pre- 
sumption that  might  occasion  a  retort  to  which  I  wish  not  to 
expose  myself,  as  it  would  again  be  asked,  "  Is  this  the  opinion 
you  entertain  of  those  who  have  confided  in  your  judgment  ? 
From  what  ground  do  you  infer  that  a  vote  right  in  itself  would 
be  disagreeable  to  us  ? "  and  it  might  with  justice  be  added, 
"  this  sentiment  evinces  that  you  deserve  not  the  trust  which 
we  reposed  in  you."  No,  Sir  !  I  have  no  right  to  imagine  that 
the  reflected  rays  of  delegated  power  can  displease  by  a  bright- 
ness that  proves  the  superior  splendor  of  the  luminary  from 
which  they  proceed. 

The  extent  of  country^for  which  the  new  Constitution  was 
required,  produced  another  difficulty  in  the  business  of  the 
Federal  Convention.  It  is  the  opinion  of  some  celebrated 
writers,  that  to  a  small  territory,  the  democratical,  to  a  mid- 
dling territory,  (as  Montesquieu  has  termed  it,)  the  monarchical, 
and,  to  an  extensive  territory,  the  despotic  form  of  government, 
is  best  adapted.  Regarding,  then,  the  wide  and  almost  unbound- 
ed jurisdiction  of  the  United  States,  at  first  view,  the  hand  of 
despotism  seemed  necessary  to  control,  connect,  and  protect  it ; 
and  hence  the  chief  embarrassment  arose.  For,  we  knew  that, 
although  our  constituents  would  cheerfully  submit  to  the  legis- 
lative restraints  of  a  free  government,  they  would  spurn  at  every 
attempt  to  shackle  them  with  despotic  power. 

In  this  dilemma,  a  Federal  Republic  naturally  presented  itself 
to  our  observation,  as  a  species  of  government  which  secured  all 
the  internal  advantages  of  a  republic,  at  the  time  time  that  it 
maintained  the  external  dignity  and  force  of  a  monarchy.  The 
definition  of  this  form  of  government  may  be  found  in  Mon- 
tesquieu, who  says,  I  believe,  that  it  consists  in  assembling 
distinct  societies,  which  are  consolidated  into  a  new  body,  capa- 
ble of  being  increased  by  the  addition  of  other  members  ; — an 


1788.]  SPIRIT    OF    THE    PRESS.  357 

expanding   quality   peculiarly  fitted   to   the   circumstances    of 
America. 

But,  while  a  Federal  Republic  removed  one  difficulty,  it  intro- 
duced another,  since  there  existed  not  any  precedent  to  assist 
our  deliberations ;  for,  though  there  are  many  single  govern- 
ments, both  ancient  and  modern,  the  history  and  principles  of 
which  are  faithfully  preserved,  and  well  understood,  a  perfect 
confederation  of  independent  states  is  a  system  hitherto  unknown. 
The  Swiss  Cantons,  which  have  often  been  mentioned  hi  that 
light,  cannot  properly  be  deemed  a  Federal  Republic,  but  merely 
a  system  of  united  states.  The  united  Netherlands  are  also  an 
assemblage  of  States  ;  yet,  as  their  proceedings  are  not  the  result 
of  their  combined  decisions,  but  of  the  decisions  of  each  State 
individually,  their  association  is  evidently  wanting  in  that  qual- 
ity which  is  essential  to  constitute  a  Federal  Republic.  With 
respect  to  the  Germanic  body,  its  members  are  of  so  dispropor- 
tionate a  size,  their  separate  governments  and  jurisdictions  so 
different  in  nature  and  extent,  the  general  purpose  and  opera- 
tion of  their  union  so  indefinite  and  uncertain,  and  the  exterior 
power  of  the  House  of  Austria  so  prevalent,  that  little  informa- 
tion could  be  obtained  or  expected  from  that  quarter.  Turning, 
then,  to  ancient  history,  we  find  the  Achaean  and  Lycian  Leagues, 
and  the  Amphyctionic  Council  bearing  a  superficial  resemblance 
to  a  Federal  Republic ;  but  of  all  these,  the  accounts  which 
have  been  transmitted  to  us  are  too  vague  and  imperfect  to 
supply  a  tolerable  theory,  and  they  are  so  destitute  of  that 
minute  detail  from  which  practical  knowledge  may  be  derived, 
that  they  must  now  be  considered  rather  as  subjects  of  curiosi- 
ty, than  of  use  or  information. 

Government,  indeed,  taken  as  a  science,  may  yet  be  consid- 
ered in  its  infancy ;  and  with  all  its  various  modifications,  it 
has  hitherto  been  the  result  of  force,  fraud,  or  accident.  For, 
after  the  lapse  of  six  thousand  years  since  the  creation  of  the 
world,  America  now  presents  the  first  instance  of  a  people 
assembled  to  weigh  deliberately  and  calmly,  and  to  decide  leis- 
urely and  peaceably,  upon  the  form  of  government  by  which 
they  will  bind  themselves  and  their  posterity.  Among  the 
ancients,  three  forms  of  government  seem  to  have  been  correctly 
known, — the  monarchical,  aristocrat ical,  and  democratical, — 


358  SPIRIT    OF    THE    PRESS.  [1788. 

but  their  knowledge  did  not  extend  beyond  those  simple  kinds, 
though  much  pleasing  ingenuity  has  occasionally  been  exercised 
in  tracing  a  resemblance  of  mixed  government  in  some  ancient 
institutions,  particularly  between  them  and  the  British  Consti- 
tution. But,  in  my  opinion,  the  result  of  these  ingenious 
refinements  does  more  honor  to  the  moderns  in  discovering, 
than  to  the  ancients  in  forming,  the  similitude.  In  the  work  of 
Homer,  it  is  supposed  by  his  enthusiastic  commentators,  the 
seeds  of  every  science  are  to  be  found ;  but,  in  truth,  they  are 
first  observed  in  subsequent  discoveries,  and  then  the  fond 
imagination  transplants  them  to  the  book.  Tacitus,  who  lived 
towards  the  close  of  that  period  which  is  called  ancient,  who 
had  read  the  history  of  all  antecedent  and  cotemporary  govern- 
ments, who  was  perfectly  competent  to  judge  of  their  nature, 
tendency  and  quality,  Tacitus  considers  a  mixed  government 
as  a  thing  rather  to  be  wished  than  expected  ;  and,  if  ever  it 
did  occur,  it  was  his  opinion,  that  it  could  not  last  long.  One 
fact,  however,  is  certain,  that  the  ancients  had  no  idea  of  repre- 
sentation, that  essential  to  every  system  of  wise,  good,  and 
efficient  government.  It  is  surprising,  indeed,  how  very  imper- 
fectly, at  this  day,  the  doctrine  of  representation  is  understood 
in  Europe.  Even  Great  Britain,  which  boasts  a  superior 
knowledge  of  the  subject,  and  is  generally  supposed  to  have 
carried  it  into  practice,  falls  far  short  of  its  true  and  genuine 
principles.  For,  let  us  inquire,  does  representation  pervade  the 
constitution  of  that  country  ?  No.  Is  it  either  immediately  or 
remotely  the  source  of  the  executive  power  ?  No.  For  it  is 
not  any  part  of  the  British  constitution,  as  practised  at  this  time, 
that  the  king  derives  his  authority  from  the  people.  Formerly 
that  authority  was  claimed  by  hereditary  or  divine  right ;  and 
even  at  the  revolution,  when  the  government  was  essentially 
improved,  no  other  principle  was  recognized  but  that  of  an 
original  contract  between  the  sovereign  and  the  people — a  con- 
tract which  rather  excludes  than  implies  the  doctrine  of  repre- 
sentation. Again — is  the  judicial  system  of  England  grounded 
on  representation  ?  No.  For  the  judges  are  appointed  by  the 
king,  and  he,  as  we  have  already  observed,  derives  not  his  maj- 
esty or  power  from  the  people.  Lastly,  then,  let  us  review  the 
legislative  body  of  that  nation,  and  even  there,  though  we  find 


1788.]  SPIRIT    OF    THE    PRESS.  359 

representation  operating  as  a  check,  it  cannot  be  considered  as 
a  pervading  principle.  The  lords,  acting  with  hereditary  right, 
or  under  an  authority  immediately  communicated  by  regal  pre- 
rogative, are  not  the  representatives  of  the  people,  and  yet  they, 
as  well  as  the  sovereign,  possess  a  negative  power  in  the  para- 
mount business  of  legislation.  Thus  the  vital  principle  of  the 
British  constitution  is  confined  to  a  narrow  corner,  and  the 
world  has  left  to  America  the  glory  and  happiness  of  forming  a 
government,  where  representation  shall  at  once  supply  the  basis 
and  the  cement  of  the  superstructure.  For,  representation, 
Sir,  is  the  true  chain  between  the  people  and  those  to  whom 
they  intrust  the  administration  of  the  government ;  and  though 
it  may  consist  of  many  links,  its  strength  and  brightness  never 
should  be  impaired.  Another,  and  perhaps  the  most  important 
obstacle  to  the  proceedings  of  the  Federal  Convention,  arose  in 
drawing  the  line  between  the  national  and  the  individual  gov- 
ernments of  the  States. 

On  this  point  a  general  principle  readily  occurred,  that  what- 
ever object  was  confined  in  its  nature  and  operation  to  a  partic- 
ular State,  ought  to  be  subject  to  the  separate  government  of 
the  States  ;  but  whatever  in  its  nature  and  operation  extended 
beyond  a  particular  State,  ought  to  be  comprehended  within 
the  Federal  jurisdiction.  The  great  difficulty,  therefore,  was 
the  application  of  this  general  principle,  for  it  was  found  imprac- 
ticable to  enumerate  and  distinguish  the  various  objects  to 
which  it  extended,  and  as  the  mathematics  only  are  capable  of 
demonstration,  it  ought  not  to  be  thought  extraordinary  that 
the  Convention  could  not  develop  a  subject  involved  in  such 
endless  perplexity.  If,  however,  the  proposed  Constitution 
should  be  adopted,  I  trust  that  in  the  theory  there  will  be  found 
such  harmony,  and  in  the  practice  such  mutual  confidence 
between  the  national  and  individual  governments,  that  every 
sentiment  of  jealousy  and  apprehension  will  be  effectually 
destroyed.  But,  Sir,  permit  me  to  ask,  whether  on  the  ground 
of  a  union,  the  individual  or  national  government  ought  most 
to  be  trusted  ?  For  my  part,  I  think  it  more  natural  to  presume 
that  the  interest  of  each  would  be  pursued  by  the  whole,  than 
the  reverse  of  the  proposition,  that  the  several  States  would 
prefer  the  interest  of  the  confederated  body ;  for  in  the  general 


360  SPIRIT    OF   THE   PRESS.  [1788. 

government  each  is  represented,  but  in  the  separate  govern- 
ments, only  the  separate  States. 

These  difficulties,  Mr.  President,  which  embarrassed  the  Fed- 
eral Convention,  are  not  represented  to  enhance  the  merit  of 
surmounting  them,  but  with  a  more  important  view,  to  show 
how  unreasonable  it  is  to  expect  that  the  plan  of  government 
should  correspond  with  the  wishes  of  all  the  States,  of  all  the 
citizens  of  any  one  State,  or  of  all  the  citizens  of  the  united 
continent.  I  remember  well,  Sir,  the  effect  of  those  surround- 
ing difficulties  in  the  late  Convention.  At  one  time  the  great 
and  interesting  work  seemed  to  be  at  a  stand ;  at  another,  it 
proceeded  with  energy  and  rapidity ;  and  when  at  last  it  was 
accomplished,  many  respectable  members  beheld  it  with  wonder 
and  admiration.  But  having  pointed  out  the  obstacles  which 
they  had  to  encounter,  I  shall  now  beg  leave  to  direct  your 
attention  to  the  end  which  the  Convention  proposed. 

Our  wants,  imperfections  and  weakness,  Mr.  President,  natu- 
rally incline  us  to  society ;  but  it  is  certain  society  cannot  exist 
without  some  restraints.  In  a  state  of  nature  each  individual 
has  a  right,  uncontrolled,  to  act  as  his  pleasure  or  his  interest 
may  prevail ;  but  it  must  be  observed  that  this  license  extends 
to  every  individual,  and  hence  the  state  of  nature  is  rendered 
insupportable  by  the  interfering  claims,  and  the  consequent 
animosities  of  men,  who  are  independent  of  every  power  and 
influence  but  their  passions  and  their  will.  On  the  other  hand, 
in  entering  into  the  social  compact,  though  the  individual  parts 
with  a  portion  of  his  natural  rights,  yet,  it  is  evident  that  he 
gains  more  by  the  limitation  of  the  liberty  of  others,  than  he 
loses  by  the  limitation  of  his  own — so  that  in  truth,  the  aggre- 
gate of  liberty  is  more  in  society  than  it  is  in  a  state  of  nature. 

It  is  then,  Sir,  a  fundamental  principle  of  society,  that  the 
welfare  of  the  whole  shall  be  pursued  and  not  of  a  part,  and  the 
measures  necessary  to  the  good  of  the  community  must  conse- 
quently be  binding  upon  the  individuals  that  compose  it.  This 
principle  is  universally  allowed  to  be  just  with  respect  to  single 
governments,  and  there  are  instances  in  which  it  applies  with 
equal  force  to  independent  communities ;  for  the  situation  and 
circumstances  of  states  may  make  it  as  necessary  for  them  as 
for  individuals,  to  associate.     Hence,  Mr.  President,  the  impor- 


1788.]  SPIRIT    OF    THE    PRESS.  361 

tant  question  arises— are  such  the  situation  and  circumstances 
of  the  American  States  ?  ' 

At  this  period,  America  has  it  in  her  power  to  adopt  either  of 
the  following  modes  of  government:  She  may  dissolve  the 
individual  sovereignty  of  the  States,  and  become  one  consoli- 
dated empire  ;  she  may  be  divided  into  thirteen  separate,  inde- 
pendent and  unconnected  commonwealths  ;  she  may  be  erected 
into  two  or  more  confederacies  ;  or,  lastly,  she  may  become  one 
comprehensive  Federal  Republic. 

Allow  me,  Sir,  to  take  a  short  view  of  each  of  these  supposi- 
tions. Is  it  probable  that  the  dissolution  of  the  State  govern- 
ments, and  the  establishment  of  one  consolidated  empire,  would 
be  eligible  in  its  nature,  and  satisfactory  to  the  people  in  its 
administration  ?  I  think  not,  as  I  have  given  reasons  to  show 
that  so  extensive  a  territory  could  not  be  governed,  connected, 
and  preserved,  but  by  the  supremacy  of  despotic  power.  All 
the  exertions  of  the  most  potent  emperors  of  Rome  were  not 
capable  of  keeping  that  empire  together,  which  in  extent  was 
far  inferior  to  the  dominion  of  America.  Would  an  independent, 
an  unconnected  situation,  without  any  associating  head,  be 
advantageous  or  satisfactory.  The  consequences  of  this  system 
would  at  one  time  expose  the  States  to  foreign  insult  and  depre- 
dations, and,  at  another,  to  internal  jealousy,  contention,  and 
war.  Then  let  us  consider  the  plan  of  two  or  more  confederacies, 
which  has  often  been  suggested,  and  which  certainly  presents 
some  aspects  more  inviting  than  either  of  the  preceding  modes, 
since  the  subjects  of  strife  would  not  be  so  numerous,  the 
strength  of  the  confederates  would  be  greater,  and  their  interests 
more  united.  But  even  here,  when  we  fairly  weigh  the  advan- 
tages and  the  disadvantages,  we  shall  find  the  last  greatly 
preponderating ;  the  expenses  of  government  would  be  consid- 
erably multiplied,  the  seeds  of  rivalship  and  animosity  would 
spring  up,  and  spread  the  calamities  of  war  and  tumult  through 
the  country  ;  for  though  the  sources  of  rancor  might  be  dimin- 
ished, their  strength  and  virulence  would  probably  be  increased. 

Of  these  three  species  of  government,  however,  I  must  observe, 
that  they  obtained  no  advocates  in  the  Federal  Convention,  nor 
can  I  presume  that  they  will  find  advocates  here,  or  in  any  of 
our  sister  States.     The  general  sentiment  in  that  body,  and,  I 

46 


362  SPIRIT    OF   THE   PRESS.  [1788. 

believe,  the  general  sentiment  of  the  citizens  of  America,  is 
expressed  in  the  motto  which  some  of  them  have  chosen,  unite 
or  tiie ;  and  while  we  consider  the  extent  of  the  country,  so 
intersected  and  almost  surrounded  with  navigable  rivers,  so 
separated  and  detached  from  the  rest  of  the  world,  it  is  natural 
to  presume  that  Providence  has  designed  us  for  an  united  peo- 
ple, under  one  great  political  compact.  If  this  is  a  just  and 
reasonable  conclusion,  supported  by  the  wishes  of  the  people, 
the  Convention  did  right  in  proposing  a  single  confederated 
republic.  But  in  proposing  it,  they  were  necessarily  led,  not 
only  to  consider  the  situation,  circumstances,  and  interests  of 
one,  two,  or  three  States,  but  of  the  collective  body ;  and  as  it 
is  essential  to  society  that  the  welfare  of  the  whole  should  be 
preferred  to  the  accommodation  of  a  part,  they  followed  the 
same  rule  in  promoting  the  national  advantages  of  the  Union, 
in  preference  to  the  separate  advantages  of  the  States.  A  prin- 
ciple of  candor,  as  well  as  duty,  lead  to  this  conduct ;  for,  as  I 
have  said  before,  no  government,  either  single  or  confederated, 
can  exist,  unless  private  and  individual  rights  are  subservient 
to  the  public  and  general  happiness  of  the  nation.  It  was  not 
alone  the  State  of  Pennsylvania,  however  important  she  may  be 
as  a  constituent  part  of  the  Union,  that  could  influence  the 
deliberations  of  a  Convention,  formed  by  a  delegation  from  all 
the  United  States,  to  devise  a  government  adequate  to  their 
common  exigencies,  and  impartial  in  its  influence  and  operation. 
In  the  spirit  of  union,  inculcated  by  the  nature  of  their  commis- 
sion, they  framed  the  Constitution  before  us,  and  in  the  same 
spirit,  they  submit  it  to  the  candid  consideration  of  their  con- 
stituents. 

Having  made  some  remarks  upon  the  nature  and  principles 
of  civil  society,  I  shall  now  take  a  cursory  notice  of  civil  liberty, 
which  is  essential  to  the  well-being  of  civil  government.  The 
definition  of  civil  liberty  is,  briefly,  that  portion  of  natural  liberty 
which  men  resign  to  the  government,  and  which  then  produces 
more  happiness  than  it  would  have  produced  if  retained  by  the 
individuals  who  resign  it ; — still,  however,  leaving  to  the  human 
mind  the  full  enjoyment  of  every  privilege  that  is  not  incompat- 
ible  with  the  peace  and  order  of  society.  Here  I  am  easily  led 
to  the  consideration  of  another  species  of  liberty,  which  has  not 


1788.]  SPIRIT    OF    THE    PRESS.  363 

yet  received  a  discriminating  name,  but  which  I  will  venture  to 
term  Federal  liberty.  This,  Sir,  consists  in  the  aggregate  of 
the  civil  liberty  which  is  surrendered  by  each  State  to  «the 
national  government ;  and  the  same  principles  that  operate  in 
the  establishment  of  a  single  society,  with  respect  to  the  rights 
reserved  or  resigned  by  the  individuals  that  compose  it,  will 
justly  apply  in  the  case  of  a  confederation  of  distinct  and  inde- 
pendent States. 

These  observations  have  been  made,  Mr.  President,  in  order  to 
preface  a  representation  of  the  state  of  the  Union,  as  it  appeared 
to  the  late  Convention.  We  all  know,  and  we  have  all  felt, 
that  the  present  system  of  confederation  is  inadequate  to  the 
government  and  the  exigencies  of  the  United  States.  Need  I 
describe  the  contrasted  scene  which  the  Revolution  has  presented 
to  our  view  ?  On  the  one  hand,  the  arduous  struggle  in  the 
cause  of  liberty,  terminated  by  a.  glorious  and  triumphant  peace ; 
on  the  other,  contention  and  poverty  at  home,  discredit  and 
disgrace  abroad.  Do  we  not  remember  what  high  expectations 
were  formed  by  others  and  by  ourselves,  on  the  return  of  peace  ? 
And  have  those  honorable  expectations  from  our  national  char- 
acter been  realized  ?  No !  What  then  has  been  the  cause  of 
disappointment  ?  Has  America  lost  her  magnanimity  or  perse- 
verance ?  No.  Has  she  been  subdued  by  any  high  handed 
invasion  of  her  liberties  ?  Still  I  answer,  no  ;  for,  dangers  of 
that  kind  were  no  sooner  seen,  than  they  were  repelled.  But 
the  evil  has  stolen  in  from  a  quarter  little  suspected,  and  the 
rock  of  Freedom,  which  stood  firm  against  the  attacks  of  a  for- 
eign foe,  has  been  sapped  and  undermined  by  the  licentiousness 
of  our  own  citizens.  Private  calamity  and  public  anarchy  have 
prevailed,  and  even  the  blessing  of  independency  has  been 
scarcely  felt  or  understood  by  a  people  who  have  dearly  achiev- 
ed it. 

Shall  I,  Sir,  be  more  particular  in  this  lamentable  history  ? 
The  commencement  of  peace  was  likewise  the  commencement ' 
of  our  distresses  and  disgrace.  Devoid  of  power,  we  could 
neither  prevent  the  excessive  importations  which  lately  deluged 
the  country,  nor  even  raise  from  that  excess  a  contribution  to 
the  public  revenue ;  devoid  of  importance,  we  were  unable  to 
command  a  sale  for  our  commodities  in  a  foreign  market ; 


364  SPIRIT    OF   THE    PRESS.  [1788. 

devoid  of  credit,  our  public  securities  were  melting  in  the  hands 
of  their  deluded  owners,  like  snow  before  the  sun ;  devoid  of 
dignity,  we  were  inadequate  to  perform  treaties  on  our  own 
part,  or  to  compel  a  performance  on  the  part  of  a  contracting 
nation.  In  short,  Sir,  the  tedious  tale  disgusts  me,  and  I  fondly 
hope  it  is  unnecessary  to  proceed.  The  years  of  languor  are 
over.  We  have  seen  dishonor  and  destruction,  it  is  true,  but 
we  have  at  length  penetrated  the  cause,  and  are  now  anxious  to 
obtain  the  cure.  The  cause  need  not  be  specified  by  a  recapitu- 
lation of  facts ;  every  act  of  Congress,  and  the  proceedings  of 
every  State  are  replete  with  proofs  in  that  respect,  and  all  point 
to  the  weakness  and  imbecility  of  the  existing  Confederation ; 
while  the  loud  and  concurrent  voice  of  the  people  proclaims  an 
efficient  national  government  to  be  the  only  cure.  Under  these 
impressions,  and  with  these  views,  the  late  Convention  were 
appointed  and  met ;  the  end  which  they  proposed  to  accomplish 
being  to  frame  one  national  and  efficient  government,  in  which 
the  exercise  of  beneficence,  correcting  the  jarring  interests  of 
every  part,  should  pervade  the  whole,  and  by  which  the  peace, 
freedom  and  happiness  of  the  United  States  should  be  perma- 
nently insured.  The  principles  and  means  that  were  adopted 
by  the  Convention  to  obtain  that  end,  are  now  before  us,  and 
will  become  the  great  object  of  our  discussion.  But  on  this 
point,  as  upon  others,  permit  me  to  make  a  few  general  observa- 
tions. 

In  all  governments,  whatever  is  their  form,  however  they  may 
be  constituted,  there  must  be  a  power  established  from  which 
there  is  no  appeal,  and  which  is  therefore  called  absolute, 
supreme  and  uncontrollable.  The  only  question  is,  where  that 
power  is  lodged  ?  A  question  that  will  receive  different  answers 
from  the  different  writers  on  the  subject.  Sir  William  Black- 
stone  says,  it  resides  in  the  omnipotence  of  the  British  Parlia- 
ment, or,  in  other  words,  corresponding  with  the  practice  of  that 
country,  it  is  whatever  the  British  Parliament  pleases  to  do :  so 
that  when  that  body  was  so  base  and  treacherous  to  the  rights 
of  the  people  as  to  transfer  the  legislative  authority  to  Henry 
the  Eighth,  his  exercising  that  authority  by  proclamations  and 
edicts,  could  not,  strictly  speaking,  be  termed  unconstitutional, 
for  under  the  act  of  parliament  his  will  was  made  the  law,  and 


1788.]  SPIRIT   OF   THE   PRESS.  365 

therefore  his  will  became  in  that  respect  the  constitution  itself. 
But  were  we  to  ask  some  politicians  who  have  taken  a  faint  and 
inaccurate  view  of  our  establishments,  where  does  this  supreme 
power  reside  in  the  United  States  ?  they  would  probably  answer, 
in  their  Constitutions.  This,  however,  though  a  step  nearer  to 
the  fact,  is  not  a  just  opinion ;  for,  in  truth,  it  remains  and 
flourishes  with  the  people,  and  under  the  influence  of  that  truth 
we,  at  this  moment,  sit,  deliberate  and  speak.  In  other  coun- 
tries, indeed,  the  revolutions  of  government  are  connected  with 
war,  and  all  its  concomitant  calamities.  But  with  us,  they  are 
considered  as  the  means  of  obtaining  a  superior  knowledge  of 
the  nature  of  government,  and  of  accomplishing  its  end.  That 
the  supreme  power,  therefore,  should  be  vested  in  the  people,  is, 
in  my  judgment,  the  great  panacea  of  human  politics.  It  is  a 
power  paramount  to  every  constitution,  inalienable  in  its  nature, 
and  indefinite  in  its  extent.  For,  I  insist,  if  there  are  errors  in 
government,  the  people  have  the  right  not  only  to  correct  and 
amend  them,  but  likewise  totally  to  change  and  reject  its  form  ; 
and  under  the  operation  of  that  right,  the  citizens  of  the  United 
States  can  never  be  wretched  beyond  retrieve,  unless  they  are 
wanting  to  themselves. 

Then  let  us  examine,  Mr.  President,  the  three  species  of 
simple  governments,  which,  as  I  have  already  mentioned,  are 
the  monarchical,  aristocratical  and  democratical.  In  a  mon- 
archy, the  supreme  power  is  vested  in  a  single  person ;  in  an 
aristocracy,  it  is  possessed  by  a  body,  not  formed  upon  the  prin- 
ciple of  representation,  but  enjoying  their  station  by  descent, 
by  election  among  themselves,  or  in  right  of  some  personal  or 
territorial  qualification  ;  and,  lastly,  in  a  democracy,  it  is  inher- 
ent in  the  people,  and  is  either  exercised  by  themselves  or  by 
their  representatives.  Each  of  these  systems  has  its  advantages 
and  its  disadvantages.  The  advantages  of  a  monarchy  are 
strength,  dispatch  and  unity;  its  disadvantages  are  expense, 
tyranny  and  war.  The  advantages  of  an  aristocracy  are  experi- 
ence, and  the  wisdom  resulting  from  education ;  its  disadvan- 
tages are  the  dissension  of  the  governors,  and  the  oppression  of 
the  people.  The  advantages  of  a  democracy  are  liberty,  caution, 
industry,  fidelity,  and  an  opportunity  of  bringing  forward  the 
talents  and  abilities  of  the  citizens,  without  regard  to  birth  or 


366  SPIRIT    OF   THE   PRESS.  [1788. 

fortune  ;  its  disadvantages  are  dissension  and  imbecility,  for  the 
assent  of  many  being  required,  their  exertions  will  be  feeble, 
and  their  counsels  too  soon  discovered. 

To  obtain  all  the  advantages,  and  to  avoid  all  the  incon- 
veniences of  these  governments,  was  the  leading  object  of  the 
late  Convention.  Having,  therefore,  considered  the  formation 
and  principles  of  other  systems,  it  is  natural  to  inquire  of  what 
description  is  the  Constitution  before  us  ?  In  its  principles,  Sir, 
it  is  purely  democratical ;  varying  indeed,  in  its  form,  in  order 
to  admit  all  the  advantages,  and  to  exclude  all  the  disadvantages 
which  are  incidental  to  the  known  and  established  constitutions 
of  government.  But  when  we  take  an  extensive  and  accurate 
view  of  the  streams  of  power  that  appear  through  this  great  and 
comprehensive  plan, — when  we  contemplate  the  variety  of  their 
directions,  the  force  and  dignity  of  their  currents, — when  we 
behold  them  intersecting,  embracing,  and  surrounding  the  vast 
possessions  and  interests  of  the  continent,  and  when  we  see 
them  distributing  on  all  hands,  beauty,  energy  and  riches,  still, 
however  numerous  and  wide  their  courses,  however  diversified 
and  remote  the  blessings  they  diffuse,  we  shall  be  able  to  trace 
them  all  to  one  great  and  noble  source — the  People. 

Such,  Mr.  President,  are  the  general  observations  with  which 
I  have  thought  necessary  to  trouble  you.  In  discussing  the 
distinct  propositions  of  the  Federal  plan,  I  shall  have  occasion 
to  apply  them  more  particularly  to  that  subject,  but  at  present, 
I  shall  conclude  with  requesting  the  pardon  of  the  Convention 
for  having  so  long  intruded  upon  their  patience. 


BRUTUS.— No.  I. 

When  the  public  is  called  to  investigate  and  decide  upon  a 
question  in  which  not  only  the  present  members  of  the  community 
are  deeply  interested,  but  upon  which  the  happiness  and  misery 
of  generations  yet  unborn  is  in  great  measure  suspended,  the 
benevolent  mind  cannot  help  feeling  itself  peculiarly  interested 
in  the  result. 


1788.]  SPIRIT   OF   THE    PRESS.  367 

In  this  situation,  I  trust  the  feeble  efforts  of  an  individual,  to 
lead  the  minds  of  the  people  to  a  wise  and  prudent  deter- 
mination, cannot  fail  of  being  acceptable  to  the  candid  and 
dispassionate  part  of  the  community.  Encouraged  by  this  con- 
sideration, I  have  been  induced  to  oifer  my  thoughts  upon  the 
present  important  crisis  of  our  public  affairs. 

Perhaps  this  country  never  saw  so  critical  a  period  in  their 
political  concerns.  We  have  felt  the  feebleness  of  the  ties  by 
which  these  United  States  are  held  together,  and  the  want  of 
sufficient  energy  in  our  present  Confederation,  to  manage,  in 
some  instances,  our  general  concerns.  Various  expedients 
have  been  proposed  to  remedy  these  evils,  but  none  have  suc- 
ceeded. At  length  a  Convention  of  the  States  has  been  assem- 
bled, they  have  formed  a  Constitution  which  will  now,  probably, 
be  submitted  to  the  people  to  ratify  or  reject,  who  are  the  foun- 
tain of  all  power,  to  whom  alone  it  of  right  belongs  to  make  or 
unmake  constitutions  or  forms  of  government,  at  their  pleasure. 
The  most  important  question  that  was  ever  proposed  to  the 
decision  of  any  people  under  heaven,  is  before  you,  and  you  are 
to  decide  upon  it  byjnen  of  your  own  election,  chosen  specially  for 
this  purpose.  If  the  Constitution,  offered  to  your  acceptance, 
be  a  wise  one,  calculated  to  preserve  the  invaluable  blessings  of 
liberty,  to  secure  the  inestimable  rights  of  mankind,  and  pro- 
mote human  happiness,  then,  if  you  accept  it,  you  will  lay  a 
lasting  foundation  of  happiness  for  millions  yet  unborn ;  gen- 
erations to  come  will  rise  up  and  call  you  blessed.  You  may 
rejoice  in  the  prospects  of  this  vast  extended  continent  becoming 
filled  with  freemen,  who  will  assert  the  dignity  of  human  nature. 
You  may  solace  yourselves  with  the  idea,  that  society,  in  this 
favored  land,  will  fast  advance  to  the  highest  point  of  perfection  ; 
the  human  mind  will  expand  in  knowledge  and  virtue,  and  the 
golden  age  be,  in  some  measure,  realized.  But  if,  on  the  other 
hand,  this  form  of  government  contains  principles  that  will  lead 
to  the  subversion  of  liberty — if  it  tends  to  establish  a  despotism, 
or,  what  is  worse,  a  tyrannic  aristocracy  ;  then,  if  you  adopt  it, 
this  only  remaining  asylum  for  liberty  will  be  shut  up,  and 
posterity  will  execrate  your  memory. 

Momentous  then  is  the  question  you  have  to  determine,  and 
you  are  called  upon  by  every  motive  which  should  influence  a 


368  SPIRIT    OF   THE    PRESS.  [1788. 

noble  and  virtuous  mind,  to  examine  it  well,  and  to  make  up  a 
wise  judgment.  It  is  insisted,  indeed,  that  this  Constitution 
must  be  received,  be  it  ever  so  imperfect.  If  it  has  its  defects, 
it  is  said,  they  can  be  best  amended  when  they  are  experienced. 
But  remember,  when  the  people  once  part  with  power,  they 
can  seldom  or  never  resume  it  again  but  by  force.  Many 
instances  can  be  produced  in  which  the  people  have  voluntarily 
increased  the  powers  of  their  rulers ;  but  few,  if  any,  in  which 
rulers  have  willingly  abridged  their  authority.  This  is  a  sufficient 
reason  to  induce  you  to  be  careful,  in  the  first  instance,  how  you 
deposit  the  powers  of  government. 

With  these  few  introductory  remarks,  I  shall  proceed  to  a 
consideration  of  this  Constitution. 

The  first  question  that  presents  itself  on  the  subject  is,  whether 
a  confederated  government  be  the  best  for  the  United  States  or 
not  ?  Or  in  other  words,  whether  the  thirteen  United  States 
should  be  reduced  to  one  great  republic,  governed  by  one  legis- 
lature, and  under  the  direction  of  one  executive  and  judiciary  ; 
or  whether  they  should  continue  thirteen  confederated  repub- 
lics, under  the  direction  and  control  of  a  supreme  Federal  head 
for  certain  defined,  national  purposes  only  ? 

This  inquiry  is  important,  because,  although  the  government 
reported  by  the  Convention  does  not  go  to  a  perfect  and  entire 
consolidation,  yet  it  approaches  so  near  to  it,  that  it  must,  if 
executed,  certainly  and  infallibly  terminate  in  it. 

This  government  is  to  possess  absolute  and  uncontrollable 
powers,  legislative,  executive  and  judicial,  with  respect  to  every 
object  to  which  it  extends,  for  by  the  last  clause  of  section 
eighth,  article  first,  it  is  declared,  that  the  Congress  shall  have 
power  "  to  make  all  laws  which  shall  be  necessary  and  proper  for 
carrying  into  execution  the  foregoing  powers,  and  all  other 
powers  vested  by  this  Constitution  in  the  government  of  the 
United  States,  or  in  any  department  or  office  thereof."  And 
by  the  sixth  article,  it  is  declared,  "  that  this  Constitution,  and 
the  laws  of  the  United  States,  which  shall  be  made  in  pursuance 
thereof,  and  the  treaties  made,  or  which  shall  be  made,  under 
the  authority  of  the  United  States,  shall  be  the  supreme  law  of 
the  land  ;  and  the  judges  in  every  State  shall  be  bound  thereby, 
any  thing  in  the  Constitution  or  law  of  any  State  to  the  con- 


1788.]  SPIRIT   OF   THE   PRESS.  369 

trary  notwithstanding."  It  appears  from  these  articles,  that 
there  is  no  need  of  any  intervention  of  the  State  governments, 
between  the  Congress  and  the  people,  to  execute  anyone  power 
vested  in  the  general  government,  and  that  the  Constitution 
and  laws  of  every  State  are  nullified  and  declared  void,  so  far 
as  they  are  or  shall  be  inconsistent  with  this  Constitution,  or 
the  laws  made  in  pursuance  of  it,  or  with  treaties  made  under 
the  authority  of  the  United  States.  The  government,  then,  so 
far  as  it  extends,  is  a  complete  one,  and  not  a  confederation.  It 
is  as  much  one  complete  government  as  that  of  New  York  or 
Massachusetts  ;  has  as  absolute  and  perfect  powers  to  make  and 
execute  all  laws,  to  appoint  officers,  institute  courts,  declare 
offences,  and  annex  penalties,  with  respect  to  every  object  to 
which  it  extends,  as  any  other  in  the  world.  So  far,  therefore, 
as  its  powers  reach,  all  ideas  of  confederation  are  given  up  and 
lost.  It  is  true  this  government  is  limited  to  certain  objects,  or 
to  speak  more  properly,  some  small  degree  of  power  is  still  left 
to  the  States  ;  but  a  little  attention  to  the  powers  vested  in  the 
general  government,  will  convince  every  candid  man,  that  if  it 
is  capable  of  being  executed,  all  that  is  reserved  for  the  indi- 
vidual States  must  very  soon  be  annihilated,  except  so  far  as 
they  are  barely  necessary  to  the  organization  of  the  general 
government.  The  powers  of  the  general  legislature  extend  to 
every  case  that  is  of  the  least  importance — there  is  nothing  val- 
uable to  human  nature,  nothing  dear  to  freemen,  but  what  is 
within  its  power.  It  has  authority  to  make  laws  which  will 
affect  the  lives,  the  liberty,  and  property  of  every  man  in  the 
United  States ;  nor  can  the  Constitution  or  laws  of  any  State, 
in  any  way  prevent  or  impede  the  full  and  complete  execution 
of  every  power  given.  The  legislative  power  is  competent  to  lay 
taxes,  duties,  imposts,  and  excises  ; — there  is  no  limitation  to 
this  power,  unless  it  be  said  that  the  clause  which  directs  the 
use  to  which  those  taxes  and  duties  shall  be  applied,  may  be 
said  to  be  a  limitation ;  but  this  is  no  restriction  of  the  power 
at  all,  for  by  this  clause  they  are  to  be  applied  to  pay  the  debts 
and  provide  for  the  common  defence  and  general  welfare  of  the 
United  States ;  but  the  legislature  have  authority  to  contract 
debts  at  their  discretion ;  they  are  the  sole  judges  of  what  is 
necessary  to  provide  for  the  common  defence,  and  they  only  are 

47 


370  SPIRIT    OF   THE   PRESS.  [1788. 

to  determine  what  is  for  the  general  welfare:  this  power, 
therefore,  is  neither  more  nor  less  than  a  power  to  lay 
and  collect  taxes,  imposts,  and  excises,  at  their  pleasure ;  not 
only  the  power  to  lay  taxes  unlimited,  as  to  the  amount  they 
may  require,  but  it  is  perfect  and  absolute  to  raise  them  in  any 
mode  they  please.  No  State  legislature,  or  any  power  .in  the 
State  governments,  have  any  more  to  do  in  carrying  this  into 
effect  than  the  authority  of  one  State  has  to  do  with  that  of 
another.  In  the  business,  therefore,  of  laying  and  collecting 
taxes,  the  idea  of  confederation  is  totally  lost,  and  that  of  one 
entire  republic  is  embraced.  It  is  proper  here  to  remark,  that 
the  authority  to  lay  and  collect  taxes  is  the  most  important  of 
any  power  that  can  be  granted  ;  it  connects  with  it  almost  all 
other  powers,  or  at  least  will  in  process  of  time  draw  all  others 
after  it ;  it  is  the  great  mean  of  protection,  security,  and 
defence,  in  a  good  government,  and  the  great  engine  of  oppres- 
sion and  tyranny  in  a  bad  one.  This  cannot  fail  of  being  the 
case,  if  we  consider  the  contracted  limits  which  are  set  by  this 
Constitution,  to  the  State  governments,  on  this  article  of  raising 
money.  No  State  can  emit  paper  money,  lay  any  duties  or 
imposts,  on  imports,  or  exports,  but  by  consent  of  the  Congress; 
and  then  the  net  produce  shall  be  for  the  benefit  of  the  United 
States :  the  only  means,  therefore,  left  for  any  State  to  support 
its  government  and  discharge  its  debts,  is  by  direct  taxation ; 
and  the  United  States  have  also  power  to  lay  and  collect  taxes, 
in  any  way  they  please.  Every  one  who  has  thought  on  the 
subject,  must  be  convinced  that  but  small  sums  of  money  can  be 
collected  in  any  country,  by  direct  tax  ;  when  the  Federal  gov- 
ernment begins  to  exercise  the  right  of  taxation  in  all  its  parts, 
the  legislatures  of  the  several  States  will  find  it  impossible  to  raise 
moneys  to  support  their  governments.  Without  money  they 
cannot  be  supported,  and  they  must  dwindle  away,  and,  as 
before  observed,  their  powers  be  absorbed  in  that  of  the  general 
government. 

It  might  be  here  shown,  that  the  power  in  the  Federal  legis- 
lature, to  raise  and  support  armies  at  pleasure,  as  well  in  peace 
as  in  war,  and  their  control  over  the  militia,  tend  not  only  to  a 
consolidation  of  the  government,  but  the  destruction  of  liberty. 
I  shall  not,  however,  dwell  upon  these,  as  a  few  observations 


1788.]  SPIRIT   OF   THE   PRESS.  371 

upon  the  judicial  power  of  this  government,  in  addition  to  the 
preceding,  will  fully  evince  the  truth  of  the  position. 

The  judicial  power  of  the  United  States  is  to  be  vested  in  a 
supreme  court,  and  in  such  inferior  courts  as  Congress  may, 
from  time  to  time,  ordain  and  establish.  The  powers  of  these 
courts  are  very  extensive ;  their  jurisdiction  comprehends  all 
civil  causes,  except  such  as  arise  between  citizens  of  the  same 
State ;  and  it  extends  to  all  cases  in  law  and  equity  arising 
under  the  Constitution.  One  inferior  court  must  be  established, 
I  presume,  in  each  State,  at  least,  with  the  necessary  executive 
officers  appendant  thereto.  It  is  easy  to  see,  that  in  the  com- 
mon course  of  things,  these  courts  will  eclipse  the  dignity,  and 
take  away  from  the  respectability,  of  the  State  courts.  These 
courts  will  be,  in  themselves,  totally  independent  of  the  States, 
deriving  their  authority  from  the  United  States,  and  receiving 
from  them  fixed  salaries  ;  and  in  the  course  of  human  events  it 
is  to  be  expected,  that  they  will  swallow  up  all  the  powers  of 
the  courts  in  the  respective  States. 

How  far  the  clause  in  the  eighth  section  of  the  first  article 
may  operate  to  do  away  all  idea  of  Confederated  States,  and  to 
effect  an  entire  consolidation  of  the  whole  into  one  general  gov- 
ernment, it  is  impossible  to  say.  The  powers  given  by  this  article 
are  very  general  and  comprehensive,  and  it  may  receive  a  con- 
struction to  justify  the  passing  almost  any  law.  A  power  to 
make  all  laws,  which  shall  be  necessary  and  proper,  for  carrying 
into  execution  all  powers  vested  by  the  Constitution  in  the 
government  of  the  United  States,  or  any  department  or  officer 
thereof,  is  a  power  very  comprehensive  and  definite,  and  may, 
for  aught  I  know,  be  exercised  in  such  manner  as  entirely  to 
abolish  the  State  legislatures.  Suppose  the  legislature  of  a 
State  should  pass  a  law  to  raise  money  to  support  their  govern- 
ment and  pay  the  State  debt ;  may  the  Congress  repeal  this 
law,  because  it  may  prevent  the  collection  of  a  tax  which  they 
may  think  proper  and  necessary  to  lay,  to  provide  for  the  general 
welfare  of  the  United  States  ?  For  all  laws  made,  in  pursuance 
of  this  Constitution,  are  the  supreme  law  of  the  land,  and  the 
judges  in  every  State  shall  be  bound  thereby,  any  thing  in  the 
Constitution  or  laws  of  the  different  States  to  the  contrary  not- 
withstanding.    By  such  a  law,  the  government  of  a  particular 


372  SPIRIT   OF    THE    PRESS.  [1788. 

State  might  bo  overturned  at  one  stroke,  and  thereby  be  depriv- 
ed of  every  means  of  its  support. 

It  is  not  meant,  by  stating  this  case,  to  insinuate  that  the 
Constitution  would  warrant  a  law  of  this  kind  !  or  unnecessarily 
to  alarm  the  fears  of  the  people,  by  suggesting  that  the  Federal 
legislature  would  be  more  likely  to  pass  the  limits  assigned 
them  by  the  Constitution,  than  that  of  an  individual  State,  fur- 
ther than  they  are  less  responsible  to  the  people.  But  what  is 
meant  is,  that  the  legislature  of  the  United  States  are  vested 
with  the  great  and  uncontrollable  powers  of  laying  and  collect- 
ing taxes,  duties,  imposts,  and  excises ;  of  regulating  trade, 
raising  and  supporting  armies,  organizing,  arming,  and  disci- 
plining the  militia,  instituting  courts,  and  other  general  powers  ; 
and  are  by  this  clause  invested  with  the  power  of  making  all 
laws,  proper  and  necessary,  for  carrying  all  these  into  execution  ; 
and  they  may  so  exercise  this  power  as  entirely  to  annihilate  all 
the  State  governments,  and  reduce  this  country  to  one  single 
government.  And  if  they  may  do  it,  it  is  pretty  certain  they 
will ;  for  it  will  be  found  that  the  power  retained  by  individual 
States,  small  as  it  is,  will  be  a  clog  upon  the  wheels  of  the  gov-" 
ernment  of  the  United  States ;  the  latter,  therefore,  will  be 
naturally  inclined  to  remove  it  out  of  the  way.  Besides,  it  is  a 
truth  confirmed  by  the  unerring  experience  of  ages,  that  every 
man,  and  every  body  of  men,  invested  with  power,  are  ever  dis- 
posed to  increase  it,  and  to  acquire  a  superiority  over  every 
thing  that  stands  in  their  way.  This  disposition,  which  is 
implanted  in  human  nature,  will  operate  in  the  Federal  legisla- 
ture to  lessen  and  ultimately  to  subvert  the  State  authority, 
and  having  such  advantages,  will  most  certainly  succeed,  if  the 
Federal  government  succeeds  at  all.  It  must  be  very  evident, 
then,  that  what  this  Constitution  wants  of  being  a  complete 
consolidation  of  the  several  parts  of  the  Union  into  one  complete 
government,  possessed  of  perfect  legislative,  judicial,  and  execu- 
tive powers,  to  all  intents  and  purposes,  it  will  necessarily 
acquire  in  its  exercise  in  operation. 

Let  us  now  proceed  to  inquire,  as  I  at  first  purposed,  whether 
it  be  best  the  thirteen  United  States  should  be  reduced  to  one 
great  republic,  or  not  ?  It  is  here  taken  for  granted,  that  all 
agree  in  this,  that  whatever  government  we  adopt,  it  ought  to 


1788.]  SPIRIT   OF   THE    PRESS.  373 

be  a  free  one ;  that  it  should  be  so  framed  as  to  secure  the  lib- 
erty of  the  citizens  of  America,  and  such  an  one  as  to  admit  of 
a  full,  fair,  and  equal  representation  of  the  people.  The  ques- 
tion, then,  will  be,  whether  a  government  thus  constituted,  and 
founded  on  such  principles,  is  practicable,  and  can  be  exercised 
over  the  whole  United  States,  reduced  into  one  State  ? 

If  respect  is  to  be  paid  to  the  opinion  of  the  greatest  and 
wisest  men  who  have  ever  thought  or  wrote  on  the  science  of 
government,  we  shall  be  constrained  to  conclude,  that  a  free 
republic  cannot  succeed  over  a  country  of  such  immense  extent, 
containing  such  a  number  of  inhabitants,  and  these  increasing 
in  such  rapid  progression,  as  that  of  the  whole  United  States. 
Among  the  many  illustrious  authorities  which  might  be  pro- 
duced to  this  point,  I  shall  content  myself  with  quoting  only 
two.  The  one  is  the  Baron  De  Montesquieu,  Spirit  of  Laws, 
Chap,  xvi.,  Vol.  1.  "  It  is  natural  to  a  republic  to  have  only 
a  small  territory,  otherwise  it  cannot  long  subsist.  In  a  large 
republic  there  are  men  of  large  fortunes,  and  consequently  of 
less  moderation  ;  there  are  trusts  too  great  to  be  placed  in  any 
"single  subject ;  he  has  interest  of  his  own ;  he  soon  begins  to 
think  that  he  may  be  happy,  great  and  glorious,  by  oppressing 
his  fellow-citizens  ;  and  that  he  may  raise  himself  to  grandeur 
on  the  ruins  of  his  country.  In  a  large  republic,  the  public 
good  is  sacrificed  to  a  thousand  views  ;  it  is  subordinate  to 
exceptions,  and  depends  on  accidents.  In.  a  small  one,  the 
interest  of  the  public  is  easier  perceived,  better  understood,  and 
more  within  the  reach  of  every  citizen  ;  abuses  are  of  less  extent, 
and  of  course  are  less  protected."  Of  the  same  opinion  is  the 
Marquis  Beccarari. 

History  furnishes  no  example  of  a  free  republic,  any  thing 
like  the  extent  of  the  United  States.  The  Grecian  republics 
were  of  small  extent ;  so  also  was  that  of  the  Romans.  Both  of 
these,  it  is  true,  in  process  of  time,  extended  their  conquests 
over  large  territories  of  country  ;  and  the  consequence  was,  that 
their  governments  were  changed  from  that  of  free  govoi'iiments 
to  those  of  the  most  tyrannical  that  ever  existed  in  the  world. 

Not  only  the  opinion  of  the  greatest  men,  and  the  experience 
of  mankind,  are  against  the  idea  of  an  extensive  republic,  but  a 
variety  of  reasons  may  be  drawn  from  the  reason  and  nature  of 


374  SPIRIT   OF   THE   PRESS.  [1788. 

things,  againt  it.  In  every  government  the  will  of  the  sovereign 
is  the  law.  In  despotic  governments,  the  supreme  authority 
being  lodged  in  one,  his  will  is  law,  and  can  be  as  easily 
expressed  to  a  large,  extensive  territory  as  to  a  small  one.  In  a 
pure  democracy,  the  people  are  the  sovereign,  and  their  will  is 
declared  by  themselves ;  for  this  purpose  they  must  all  come 
together  to  deliberate  and  decide.  This  kind  of  government 
cannot  be  exercised,  therefore,  over  a  country  of  any  considera- 
ble extent ;  it  must  be  confined  to  a  single  city,  or  at  least 
limited  to  such  bounds  as  that  the  people  can  conveniently 
assemble,  be  able  to  debate,  understand  the  subject  submitted 
to  them,  and  declare  their  opinion  concerning  it. 

In  a  free  republic,  although  all  laws  are  derived  from  the 
consent  of  the  people,  yet  the  people  do  not  declare  their  con- 
sent by  themselves  in  person,  but  by  representatives,  chosen  by 
them,  who  are  supposed  to  know  the  minds  of  their  constitu- 
ents, and  to  be  possessed  of  integrity  to  declare  this  mind. 

In  every  free  government,  the  people  must  give  their  assent 
to  the  laws  by  which  they  are  governed.  This  is  the  true  crite- 
rion between  a  free  government  and  an  arbitrary  one.  The 
former  are  ruled  by  the  will  of  the  whole,  expressed  in  any 
manner  they  may  agree  upon ;  the  latter  by  the  will  of  one,  or 
a  few.  If  the  people  are  to  give  their  assent  to  the  laws,  by 
persons  chosen  and  appointed  by  them,  the  manner  of  the 
choice  and  the  number  chosen  must  be  such  as  to  possess,  be 
disposed,  and  consequently  qualified  to  declare  the  sentiments 
of  the  people ;  for  if  they  do  not  know,  or  are  not  disposed  to 
speak  the  sentiments  of  the  people,  the  people  do  not  govern, 
but  the  sovereignty  is  in  a  few.  Now,  in  a  large,  extended 
country,  it  is  impossible  to  have  a  representation  possessing  the 
sentiments,  and  of  integrity  to  declare  the  minds  of  the  people, 
without  having  it  so  numerous  and  unwieldy  as  to  be  subject,  in 
great  measure,  to  the  inconveniency  of  a  democratic  govern- 
ment. 

The  territory  of  the  United  States  is  of  vast  extent ;  it  now 
contains  near  three  millions  of  souls,  and  is  capable  of  containing 
much  more  than  ten  times  that  number.  Is  it  practicable  for  a 
country,  so  large  and  numerous  as  they  will  soon  become,  to 
elect  a  representation  that  will  speak  their  sentiments,  without 


1788.]  .      SPIRIT   OF   THE   PRESS.  375 

their  becoming  so  numerous  as  to  be  incapable  of  transacting 
public  business  ?     It  certainly  is  not. 

In  a  republic,  the  manners,  sentiments  and  interests  of  the 
people  should  be  similar.  If  this  be  not  the  case,  there  will  be 
a  constant  clashing  of  opinions  ;  and  the  representatives  of  one 
part  will  be  continually  striving  against  those  of  the  other.  This 
will  retard  the  operations  of  government,  and  prevent  such 
conclusions  as  will  promote  the  public  good.  If  we  apply  this 
remark  to  the  condition  of  the  United  States,  we  shall  be  con- 
vinced that  it  forbids  that  we  should  be  one  government.  The 
United  States  includes  a  variety  of  climates. '  The  productions 
of  the  different  parts  of  the  Union  are  very  variant,  and  their 
interests,  of  consequence,  diverse.  Their  manners  and  habits 
differ  as  much  as  their  climates  and  productions ;  and  their 
sentiments  are  by  no  means  coincident.  The  laws  and  customs 
of  the  several  States  are,  in  many  respects,  very  diverse,  and  in 
some  opposite  ;  each  would  be  in,  favor  of  its  own  interests  and 
customs ;  and,  of  consequence,  a  legislature,  formed  of  repre- 
sentatives from  the  respective  parts,  would  not  only  be  too 
numerous  to  act  with  any  care  or  decision,  but  would  be  com- 
posed of  such  heterogeneous  and  discordant  principles,  as  would 
constantly  be  contending  with  each  other. 

The  laws  cannot  be  executed  in  a  republic  of  an  extent  equal 
to  that  of  the  United  States,  with  promptitude. ' 

The  magistrates  in  every  government  must  be  supported  in 
the  execution  of  the  laws,  either  by  an  armed  force,  maintained 
at  the  public  expense  for  that  purpose,  or  by. the  people  turning 
out  to  aid  the  magistrate  upon  his  command,  in  case  of  resist- 
ance. 

In  despotic  governments,  as  well  as  in  all  the  monarchies  of 
Europe,  standing  armies  are  kept  up  to  execute  the  commands 
of  the  prince  or  the  magistrate,  and  are  employed  for  this  pur- 
pose when  occasion  requires ;  but  they  have  always  proved  the 
destruction  of  liberty,  and  are  abhorrent  to  the  spirit  of  a  free 
republic.  In  England,  where  they  depend  upon  the  parliament 
for  their  annual  support,  they  have  always  been  complained  of 
as  oppressive  and  unconstitutional,  and  are  seldom  employed  in 
executing  the  laws ;  never  except  on  extraordinary  occasions, 
and  then  under  the  direction  of  a  civil  magistrate. 


376  SPIRIT    OF    THE    PRESS.  [1788. 

A  free  republic  will  never  keep  a  standing  army  to  execute 
its  laws.  It  must  depend  upon  the  support  of  its  citizens.  But 
when  a  government  is  to  receive  its  support  from  the  aid  of  the 
citizens,  it  must  be  so  constructed  as  to  have  the  confidence, 
respect,  and  affection  of  the  people.  Men  who,  upon  the  call  of 
the  magistrate,  offer  themselves  to  execute  the  laws,  are  influ- 
enced to  do  it  either  by  affection  to  the  government,  or  from 
fear ;  where  a  standing  army  is  at  hand  to  punish  offenders, 
every  man  is  actuated  by  the  latter  principle,  and  therefore, 
when  the  magistrate  calls,  will  obey  ;  but,  where  this  is  not  the 
case,  the  government  must  rest  for  its  support  upon  the  confi- 
dence and  respect  which  the  people  have  for  their  government  and 
laws.  The  body  of  the  people  being  attached,  the  government 
will  always  be  sufficient  to  support  and  execute  its  laws,  and  to 
operate  upon  the  fears  of  any  faction  which  may  be  opposed  to 
it,  not  only  to  prevent  any  opposition  to  the  execution  of  the 
laws  themselves,  but  also  to  compel  the  most  of  them  to  aid  the 
magistrate ;  but  the  people  will  not  be  likely  to  have  such  con- 
fidence in  their  rulers,  in  a  republic  so  extensive  as  the  United 
States,  as  is  necessary  for  these  purposes.  The  confidence 
which  the  people  have  in  their  rulers,  in  a  free  republic,  arises 
from  their  knowing  them,  from  their  being  responsible  to  them 
for  their  conduct,  and  from  the  power  they  have  of  displacing 
them  when  they  misbehave ;  but  in  a  republic  of  the  extent  of 
this  continent,  the  people  in  general  would  be  acquainted  with 
very  few  of  their  rulers ;  the  people  at  large  would  know  little 
of  their  proceedings,  and  it  would  be  extremely  difficult  to 
change  them.  The  people  in  Georgia  and  New  Hampshire 
would  not  know  one  another's  mind,  and  therefore  could  not 
act  in  concert  to  enable  them  to  effect  a  general  change  of 
representatives.  The  different  parts  of  so  extensive  a  country 
could  not  possibly  be  made  acquainted  with  the  conduct  of  their 
representatives,  nor  be  informed  of  the  reasons  upon  which 
measures  were  founded.  The  consequence  will  be,  they  will 
have  no  confidence  in  their  legislature,  suspect  them  of  ambi- 
tious views,  be  jealous  of  every  measure  they  adopt,  and  will 
not  support  the  laws  they  pass.  Hence  the  government  will  be 
nerveless  and  inefficient,  and  no  way  will  be  left  to  render  it 
otherwise,  but  by  establishing  an  armed  force  to  execute  the 


1788.]  SPIRIT   OF    THE    PRESS.  377 

laws  at  the  point  of  the  bayonet — a  government  of  all  others 
the  most  to  be  dreaded. 

In  a  republic  of  such  vast  extent  as  the  United  States,  the 
legislature  cannot  attend  to  the  various  concerns  and  wants  of 
its  different  parts.  It  cannot  be  sufficiently  numerous  to  be 
acquainted  with  the  local  condition  and  wants  of  the  different 
districts,  and  if  it  could,  it  is  impossible  it  should  have  sufficient 
time  to  attend  to  and  provide  for  all  the  variety  of  cases  of  this 
nature  that  would  be  continually  arising. 

In  so  extensive  a  republic,  the  great  officers  of  government 
would  soon  become  above  the  control  of  the  people,  and  abuse 
their  powers  to  the  purpose  of  aggrandizing  themselves,  and 
oppressing  them.  The  trust  committed  to  the  executive  offices, 
in  a  country  of  the  extent  of  the  United  States,  must  be  various 
and  of  magnitude.  The  command  of  all  the  troops  and  navy  of 
the  republic,  the  appointment  of  officers,  the  power  of  pardoning 
offences,  the  collecting  of  all  the  public  revenues,  and  the  power 
of  expending  them,  with  a  number  of  other  powers,  must  be 
lodged  and  exercised  in  every  State,  in  the  hands  of  a  few. 
When  these  are  attended  with  great  honor  and  emolument,  as 
they  always  will  be  in  large  States,  so  as  greatly  to  interest  men 
to  pursue  them,  and  to  be  proper  objects  for  ambitious  and 
designing  men,  such  men  will  be  ever  restless  in  their  pursuit 
after  them.  They  will  Use  the  power,  when  they  have  acquired 
it,  to  the  purposes  of  gratifying  their  own  interest  and  ambition, 
and  it  is  scarcely  possible,  in  a  very  large  republic,  to  call  them 
to  account  for  their  misconduct,  or  to  prevent  their  abuse  of 
power. 

These  are  some  of  the  reasons  by  which  it  appears,  that  a  free 
republic  cannot  long  subsist  over  a  country  of  the  great  extent 
of  these  States.  If  then  this  new  Constitution  is  calculated  to 
consolidate  the  thirteen  States  into  one,  as  it  evidently  is,  it 
ought  not  to  be  adopted. 

Though  I  am  of  opinion,  that  it  is  a  sufficient  objection  to 
this  government,  to  reject  it,  that  it  creates  the  whole  Union 
into  one  government  under  the  form  of  a  republic,  yet  if  this 
objection  was  obviated,  there  are  exceptions  to  it  which  are  so 
material  and  fundamental,  that  they  ought  to  determine  every 
man,  who  is  a  friend  to  the  liberty  and  happiness  of  mankind, 

48 


378  SPIRIT   OF   THE   PRESS.  [1788. 

not  to  adopt  it.  I  beg  the  candid  and  dispassionate  attention  of 
my  countrymen,  while  I  state  these  objections — they  are  such  as 
have  obtruded  themselves  upon  my  mind  upon  a  careful  atten- 
tion to  the  matter,  and  such  as  I  sincerely  believe  are  well 
founded.  There  are  many  objections,  of  small  moment,  of 
which  I  shall  take  no  notice.  Perfection  is  not  to  be  expected 
in  any  thing  that  is  the  production  of  man,  and  if  I  did  not  in 
my  conscience  believe  that  this  scheme  was  defective  in  the  fun- 
damental principles — in  the  foundation  upon  which  a  free  and 
equal  government  must  rest — I  would  hold  my  peace. 

Brutus. 


BRUTUS.— No.  II. 

1  flatter  myself  that  my  last  address  established  this  position, 
that  to  reduce  the  thirteen  States  into  one  government,  would 
prove  the  destruction  of  our  liberties. 

But  lest  this  truth  should  be  doubted  by  some,  I  will  now 
proceed  to  consider  its  merits. 

Though  it  should  be  admitted,  that  the  arguments  against 
reducing  all  the  States  into  one  consolidated  government,  are 
not  sufficient  fully  to  establish  this  point,  yet  they  will,  at  least, 
justify  this  conclusion,  that  informing  a  tJonstitution  for  such  a 
country,  great  care  should  be  taken  to  limit  and  define  its  pow- 
ers, adjust  its  parts,  and  guard  against  an  abuse  of  authority. 
How  far  attention  has  been  paid  to  these  objects,  shall  be  the 
subject  of  future  inquiry.  When  a  building  is  to  be  erected 
which  is  intended  to  stand  for  ages,  the  foundation  should  be 
firmly  laid.  The  Constitution  proposed  to  your  acceptance  is 
designed,  not  for  yourselves  alone,  but  for  generations  yet 
unborn.  The  principles,  therefore,  upon  which  the  social  com- 
pact is  founded,  ought  to  have  been  clearly  and  precisely  stated, 
and  the  most  express  and  full  declaration  of  rights  to  have 
been  made.  But  on  this  subject  there  is  almost  an  entire 
silence. 

If  we  may  collect  the  sentiments  of  the  people  of  America, 
from  their  own  most  solemn  declarations,  they  hold  this  truth  as 


1788.]  SPIRIT    OF   THE    PRESS.  379 

self-evident,  that  all  men  are  by  nature  free.  No  one  man, 
therefore,  or  any  class  of  men,  have  a  right,  by  the  law  of 
nature,  or  of  God,  to  assume  or  exercise  authority  over  their 
fellows.  The  origin  of  society,  then,  is  to  be  sought,  not  in  any 
natural  right  which  one  man  has  to  exercise  authority  over 
another,  but  in  the  united  consent  of  those  who  associate.  The 
mutual  wants  of  men  at  first  dictated  the  propriety  of  forming 
societies ;  and  when  they  were  established,  protection  and 
defence  pointed  out  the  necessity  of  instituting  government. 
In  a  state  of  nature  every  individual  pursues  his  own  interest ; 
in  this  pursuit  it  frequently  happened,  that  the  possessions  or 
enjoyments  of  one  were  sacrificed  to  the  views  and  designs 
of  another ;  thus  the  weak  were  a  prey  to  the  strong,  the 
simple  and  unwary  were  subject  to  impositions  from  those  who 
were  more  crafty  and  designing.  In  this  state  of  things, 
every  individual  was  insecure ;  common  interest,  therefore, 
directed  that  government  should  be  established,  in  which  the 
force  of  the  whole  community  should  be  collected,  and  under 
such  directions,  as  to  protect  and  defend  every  one  who  com 
posed  it.  The  common  good,  therefore,  is  the  end  of  civil  gov- 
ernment, and  common  consent,  the  foundation  on  which  it  is 
established.  To  effect  this  end,  it  was  necessary  that  a  certain 
portion  of  natural  liberty  should  be  surrendered,  in  order  that 
what  remained  should  be  preserved.  How  great  a  proportion 
of  natural  freedom  is*  necessary  to  be  yielded  by  individuals, 
when  they  submit  to  government,  I  shall  not  inquire.  So  much, 
however,  must  be  given,  as  will  be  sufficient  to  enable  those  to 
whom  the  administration  of  the  government  is  committed,  to 
establish  laws  for  the  promoting  the  happiness  of  the  communi- 
ty, and  to  carry  those  laws  into  effect.  But  it  is  not  necessary, 
for  this  purpose,  that  individuals  should  relinquish  all  their 
natural  rights.  Some  are  of  such  a  nature  that  they  cannot  be 
surrendered.  Of  this  kind  are  the  rights  of  conscience,  the 
right  of  enjoying  and  defending  life,  &c.  Others  are  not  neces- 
sary to  be  resigned  in  order  to  attain  the  end  for  which  govern- 
ment is  instituted,  these  therefore  ought  not  to  be  given  up.  To 
surrender  them,  would  counteract  the  very  end  of  government, 
to  wit,  the  common  good.  From  these  observations  it  appears^ 
that  in  forming  a  government  on  its  true  principles,  the  foiuida- 


380  SPIRIT   OF   THE   PRESS.  [1788 

tion  should  be  laid  in  the  manner  I  before  stated,  by  expressly 
reserving  to  the  people  such  of  their  essential  rights  as  are  not 
necessary  to  be  parted  with.  The  same  reasons  which  at  first 
induced  mankind  to  associate  and  institute  government,  will 
operate  to  influence  them  to  observe  this  precaution.  If  they 
had  been  disposed  to  conform  themselves  to  the  rule  of  immu- 
table righteousness,  government  would  not  have  been  requisite. 
It  was  because  one  part  exercised  fraud,  oppression  and  violence 
on  the  other,  that  men  came  together,  and  agreed  that  certain 
rules  should  be  formed  to  regulate  the  conduct  of  all,  and  the 
power  of  the  whole  community  lodged  in  the  hands  of  rulers  to 
enforce  an  obedience  to  them.  But  rulers  have  the  same  propen- 
sities as  other  men ;  they  are  as  likely  to  use  the  power  witli  which 
they  are  vested,  for  private  purposes,  and  to  the  injury  and 
oppression  of  those  over  whom  they  are  placed,  as  individuals 
in  a  state  of  nature  are  to  injure  and  oppress  one  another.  It  is 
therefore  as  proper  that  bounds  should  be  set  to  their  authority, 
as  that  government  should  have  at  first  been  instituted  to 
restrain  private  injuries. 

This  principle,  which  seems  so  evidently  founded  in  the  reason 
and  nature  of  things,  is  confirmed  by  universal  experience. 
Those  who  have  governed,  have  been  found  in  all  ages  ever 
active  to  enlarge  their  powers  and  abridge  the  public  liberty. 
This  lias  induced  the  people  in  all  countries,  where  any  sense 
of  freedom  remained,  to  fix  barriers  against  the  encroachments 
of  their  rulers.  The  country  from  which  we  have  derived  our 
origin,  is  an  eminent  example  of  this.  Their  magna  charta  and 
bill  of  rights  have  long  been  the  boast,  as  well  as  the  security 
of  that  nation.  I  need  say  no  more,  I  presume,  to  an  American, 
than  that  this  principle  is  a  fundamental  one,  in  all  the  Consti- 
tutions of  our  own  States ;  there  is  not  one  of  them  but  what  is 
either  founded  on  a  declaration  or  bill  of  rights,  or  has  certain 
express  reservation  of  rights  interwoven  in  the  body  of  them. 
From  this  it  appears,  that  at  a  time  when  the  pulse  of  liberty 
beat  high,  and  when  an  appeal  was  made  to  the  people  to  form 
Constitutions  for  the  government  of  themselves,  it  was  their 
universal  sense,  that  such  declarations  should  make  a  part  of 
their  frames  of  government.    It  is,  therefore,  the  more  aston- 


1788.]  SPIRIT    OF   THE   PRESS.  381 

ishing,  that  this  grand  security  to  the  rights  of  the  people  is  not 
to  be  found  in  this  Constitution. 

It  has  been  said,  in  answer  to  this  objection,  that  such  declara- 
tion of  rights,  however  requisite  they  might  be  in  the  Constitu- 
tions of  the  States,  are  not  necessary  in  the  general  Constitution, 
because,  "  in  the  former  case,  everything  which  is  not  reserved 
is  given ;  but  in  the  latter,  the  reverse  of  the  proposition  prevails, 
and  every  thing  which  is  not  given  is  reserved."  It  requires 
but  little  attention  to  discover,  that  this  mode  of  reasoning  is 
rather  specious  than  solid.  The  powers,  rights  and  authority, 
granted  to  the  general  government  by  this  Constitution,  are  as 
complete,  with  respect  to  every  object  to  which  they  extend,  as 
that  of  any  State  government — it  reaches  to  every  thing  which 
concerns  human  happiness — life,  liberty,  and  property  are  under 
its  control.  There  is  the  same  reason,  therefore,  tiiat  the  exer- 
cise of  power,  in  this  case,  should  be  restrained  within  proper 
limits,  as  in  that  of  the  State  governments.  To  set  this  matter 
in  a  clear  light,  permit  me  to  instance  some  of  the  articles  of  the 
bills  of  rights  of  the  individual  States,  and  apply  them  to  the 
case  in  question. 

For  the  security  of  life,  in  criminal  prosecutions,  the  bills  of 
rights  of  most  of  the  States  have  declared,  that  no  man  shall 
,  be  held  to  answer  for  a  crime  until  he  is  made  fully  acquainted 
with  the  charge  brought  against  him  ;  he  shall  not  be  compelled 
to  accuse,  or  furnish  evidence  against  himself — the  witnesses 
against  him  shall  be  brought  face  to  face,  and  he  shall  be  fully 
heard  by  himself  or  counsel.  That  it  is  essential  to  the  security 
of  life  and  liberty,  that  trial  of  facts  be  in  the  vicinity  where 
they  happen.  Are  not  provisions  of  this  kind  as  necessary  in 
the  general  government,  as  in  that  of  a  particular  State  ?  The 
powers  vested  in  the  new  Congress  extend  in  many  cases  to  life  ; 
they  are  authorized  to  provide  for  the  punishment  of  a  variety 
of  capital  crimes,  and  no  restraint  is  laid  upon  them  in  its  exer- 
cise, save  only,  that  "  the  trial  of  all  crimes,  except  in  cases  of 
impeachment,  shall  be  by  jury  ;  and  such  trial  shall  be  in  the 
State  where  the  said  crimes  shall  have  been  committed."  No 
man  is  secure  of  a  trial  in  the  county  where  he  is  charged  to 
have  committed  a  crime ;  he  may  be  broxight  from  Niagara  to 
New  York,  or  carried  from  Kentucky  to  Richmond  for  trial  for 


382  SPIRIT    OF   THE    PRESS.  [1788. 

an  offence  supposed  to  be  committed.  What  security  is  there, 
that  a  man  shall  be  furnished  with  a  full  and  plain  description 
of  the  charges  against  him  ?  That  he  shall  be  allowed  to  pro- 
duce all  proof  he  can  in  his  favor?  That  he  shall  see  the 
witnesses  against  him  face  to  face,  or  that  he  shall  be  fully- 
heard  in  his  own  defence  by  himself  or  counsel  ? 

For  the  security  of  liberty  it  has  been  declared,  "  that  exces- 
sive bail  should  not  be  required,  nor  excessive  fines  imposed, 
nor  cruel  or  unusual  punishments  inflicted.  That  all  warrants, 
without  oath  or  affirmation,  to  search  suspected  places,  or  seize 
any  person,  his  papers  or  property,  are  grievous  and  oppres- 
sive." 

These  provisions  are  as  necessary  under  the  general  govern- 
ment as  under  that  of  the  individual  States ;  for  the  power  of 
the  former  is  as  complete  to  the  purpose  of  requiring  bail, 
imposing  fines,  inflicting  punishments,  granting  search  war- 
rants, and  seizing  persons,  papers,  or  property,  in  certain  cases, 
as  the  other. 

For  the  purpose  of  securing  the  property  of  the  citizens,  it  is 
declared  by  all  the  States,  "  that  in  all  controversies  at  law, 
respecting  property,  the  ancient  mode  of  trial  by  jury  is  one  of 
the  best  securities  of  the  rights  of  the  people,  and  ought  to 
remain  sacred  and  inviolable.' ' 

Does  not  the  same  necessity  exist  of  reserving  this  right 
under  their  national  compact,  as  in  that  of  the  States  ?  Yet 
nothing  is  said  respecting  it.  In  the  bills  of  rights  of  the  States 
it  is  declared,  that  a  well  regulated  militia  is  the  proper  and 
natural  defence  of  a  free  government ;  that  as  standing  armies 
in  time  of  peace  are  dangerous,  they  are  not  to  be  kept  up,  and 
that  the  military  should  be  kept  under  strict  subordination  to, 
and  controlled  by,  the  civil  power. 

The  same  security  is  as  necessary  in  this  Constitution,  and 
much  more  so  ;  for  the  general  government  will  have  the  sole 
power  to  raise  and  to  pay  armies,  and  are  under  no  control  in 
the  exercise  of  it ;  yet  nothing  of  this  is  to  be  found  in  this  new 
system. 

I  might  proceed  to  instance  a  number  of  other  rights,  which 
were  as  necessary  to  be  reserved,  such  as,  that  elections  should 
be  free,  that  the  liberty  of  the  press  should  be  held  sacred ;  but 


1788.]  SPIRIT    OF    THE    PRESS.  383 

the  instances  adduced  are  sufficient  to  prove  that  this  argument 
is  without  foundation.  Besides,  it  is  evident  that  the  reason 
here  assigned  was  not  the  true  one,  why  the  framers  of  this 
Constitution  omitted  a  bill  of  rights  ;  if  it  had  been,  they  would 
not  have  made  certain  reservations,  while  they  totally  omitted 
others  of  more  importance.  We  find  they  have,  in  the  ninth 
section  of  the  first  article  declared,  that  the  writ  of  habeas 
corpus  shall  not  be  suspended,  unless  in  cases  of  rebellion, — 
that  no  bill  of  attainder,  or  ex  post  facto  law,  shall  be  passed, — 
that  no  title  of  nobility  shall  be  granted  by  the  United  States, 
&c.  If  every  thing  which  is  not  given  is  reserved,  what  pro- 
priety is  there  in  these  exceptions  ?  Does  this  Constitution  any 
where  grant  the  power  of  suspending  the  habeas  corpus,  to 
make  ex  post  facto  laws,  pass  bills  of  attainder,  or  grant  titles 
of  nobility  ?  It  certainly  does  not  in  express  terms.  The  only 
answer  that  can  be  given  is,  that  these  are  implied  in  the 
general  powers  granted.  With  equal  truth  it  may  be  said,  that 
all  the  powers  which  the  bills  of  rights  guard  against  the  abuse 
of,  are  contained  or  implied  in  the  general  ones  granted  by  this 
Constitution. 

So  far  is  it  from  being  true,  that  a  bill  of  rights  is  less  neces- 
sary in  the  general  Constitution  than  in  those  of  the  States,  the 
contrary  is  evidently  the  fact.  This  system,  if  it  is  possible  for 
the  people  of  America  to  accede  to  it,  will  be  an  original  com- 
pact ;  and  being  the  last,  will,  in  the  nature  of  things,  vacate 
every  former  agreement  inconsistent  with  it.  For  it  being  a 
plan  of  government  received  and  ratified  by  the  whole  people,  all 
other  forms  which  are  in  existence  at  the  time  of  its  adoption, 
must  yield  to  it.  This*  is  expressed  in  positive  and  unequivocal 
terms  in  the  sixth  article:  "That  this  Constitution,  and  the 
laws  of  the  United  States  which  shall  be  made  in  pursuance 
thereof,  and  all  treaties  made,  or  which  shall  be  made,  under 
the  authority  of  the  United  States,  shall  be  the  supreme  law  of 
the  land  ;  and  the  judges  in  every  State  shall  be  bound  thereby, 
any  thing  in  the  Constitution,  or  laws  of  any  State,  to  the  con- 
trary notwithstanding." 

"  The  senators  and  representatives  before-mentioned,  and  the 
members  of  the  several  State  legislatures,  and  all  executive  and 
iwlicH  officers,  both  of  the  United  State?,  and  of  the  ror?rrJ 


384  SPIRIT   OP   THE   PRESS.  [1788. 

States,  shall  be  bound,  by  oath  or  affirmation,  to  support  this 
Constitution." 

It  is  therefore  not  only  necessarily  implied  thereby,  but  posi- 
tively expressed,  that  the  different  State  Constitutions  are 
repealed  and  entirely  done  away,  so  far  as  they  are  inconsistent 
with  this,  with  the  laws  which  shall  be  made  in  pursuance 
thereof,  or  with  treaties  made,  or  which  shall  be  made,  under 
the  authority  of  the  United  States.  Of  what  avail  will  the  Con- 
stitutions of  the  respective  States  be  to  preserve  the  rights  of  its 
citizens  ?  Should  they  be  plead,  the  answer  would  be,  the  Con- 
stitution of  the  United  States,  and  the  laws  made  in  pursuance 
thereof,  is  the  supreme  law,  and,  all  legislatures  and  judicial 
officers,  whether  of  the  General  or  State  governments, -are  bound 
by  oath  to  support  it.  No  privilege,  reserved  by  the  bills  of 
rights,  or  secured  by  the  State  governments,  can  limit  the  power 
granted  by  this,  or  restrain  any  laws  made  in  pursuance  of  it. 
It  stands,  therefore,  on  its  own  bottom,  and  must  receive  a  con- 
struction by/ itself,  without  any  reference  to  any  other.  And 
hence  it  was  of  the  highest  importance,  that  the  most  precise 
and  express  declarations  and  reservations  of  rights  should  have 
been  made. 

This  will  appear  the  more  necessary,  when  it  is  considered, 
that  not  only  the  Constitution  and  laws  made  in  pursuance 
thereof,  but  all  treaties  made,  under  the  authority  of  the  United 
States,  are  the  supreme  law  of  the  land,  and  supersede  the- Con- 
stitutions of  all  the  States.  The  power  to  make  -treaties,  is 
vested  in  the  president,  by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of 
two-thirds  of  the  senate.  I  do  not  find  any  limitation  or  restric- 
tion to  the  exercise  of  this  power.  The  most  important  article 
in  any  Constitution  may  therefore  be  repealed,  even  without  a 
legislative  act.  Ought  not  a  government,  vested  with  such 
extensive  and  indefinite  authority,  to  have  been  restricted  by  a 
declaration  of  rights  ?     It  certainly  ought. 

So  clear  a  point  is  this,  that  I  cannot  help  suspecting  that 
persons  who  attempt  to  persuade  people  that  such  reservations 
were  less  necessary  under  this  Constitution  than  under  those  of 
the  States,  are  wilfully  endeavoring  to  deceive,  and  to  lead  you 
into  an  absolute  state  of  vassalage. 

Brutus. 


1788.]  SPIRIT   OF   THE   PRESS.  385 


BRUTUS.— No.  III. 

In  the  investigation  of  the  Constitution,  under  your  consid- 
eration, great  care  should  be  taken  that  you  do  not  form  your 
opinions  respecting  it  from  unimportant  provisions,  or  fallacious 
appearances. 

On  a  careful  examination,  you  will  find  that  many  of  its  parts, 
of  little  moment,  are  well  formed ;  in  these  it  has  a  specious 
resemblance  of  a  free  government,  but  this  is  not  sufficient  to 
justify  the  adoption  of  it ;  the  gilded  pill  is  often  found  to  con- 
tain the  most  deadly  poison. 

You  are  not,  however,  to  expect  a  perfect  form  of  government, 
any  more  than  to  meet  with  perfection  in  man ;  your  views, 
therefore,  ought  to  be  directed  to  the  main  pillars  upon  which 
a  free  government  is  to  rest ;  if  these  are  well  placed,  on  a 
foundation  that  will  support  the  superstructure,  you  should  be 
satisfied,  although  the  building  may  want  a  number  of  orna- 
ments, which,  if  your  particular  tastes  were  gratified,  you  would 
have  added  to  it.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  foundation  is  inse- 
curely laid,  and  the  main  supports  are  wanting,  or  not  properly 
fixed,  however  the  fabric  may  be  decorated  and  adorned,  you 
ought  to  reject  it. 

Under  these  impressions,  it  has  been  my  object  to  turn  your 
attention  to  the  principal  defects  in  this  system. 

I  have  attempted  to  show,  that  a  consolidation  of  this  exten- 
sive continent,  under  one  government,  for  internal  as  well  as 
external  purposes,  which  is  evidently  the  tendency  of  this  Con- 
stitution, cannot  succeed  without  a  sacrifice  of  your  liberties  ; 
and  therefore  that  the  attempt  is  not  only  preposterous,  but 
extremely  dangerous ;  and  I  have  shown,  independent  of  this, 
that  the  plan  is  radically  defective  in  a  fundamental  principle, 
which  ought  to  be  found  in  every  free  government,  to  wit,  a 
declaration  of  rights. 

I  shall  now  proceed  to  take  a  nearer  view  of  this  system,  to 
examine  its  parts  more  minutely,  and  show  that  the  powers  are 
not  properly  deposited  for  the  security  of  public  liberty. 

The  first  important  object  that  presents  itself  in  the  organi- 
zation of  this  government,  is  the  legislature.     This  is  to  be 

49 


386  SPIRIT   OF    THE   PRESS.  [1788. 

composed  of  two  branches — the  first  to  be  called  the  general 
assembly,  and  is  to  be  chosen  by  the  people  of  the  respective 
States,  in  proportion  to  the  number  of  their  inhabitants,  and  is 
to  consist  of  sixty-five  members,  with  powers  in  the  legislature 
to  increase  the  number,  not  to  exceed  one  for  every  thirty  thou- 
sand inhabitants.  The  second  branch  is  to  be  called  the  senate, 
and  is  to  consist  of  twenty-six  members,  two  of  which  are  to  be 
chosen  by  the  legislatures  of  each  of  the  States. 

In  the  former  of  these  there  is  an  appearance  of  justice,  in 
the  appointment  of  its  members  ;  but  if  the  clause  which  pro- 
vides for  this  branch  be  stripped  of  its  ambiguity,  it  will  be 
found  that  there  is  really  no  equality  of  representation,  even  in 
this  house. 

The  words  are,  "  representatives  and  direct  taxes  shall  be 
apportioned  among  the  several  States,  which  may  be  included 
in  this  Union,  according  to  their  respective  numbers,  which 
shall  be  determined  by  adding  to  the  whole  number  of  free  per- 
sons, including  those  bound  to  service  for  a  term  of  years,  and 
excluding  Indians  not  taxed,  three-fifths  of  all  other  persons.' ■ 
What  a  strange  and  unnecessary  accumulation  of  words  are  here 
used  to  conceal  from  the  public  eye  what  might  have  been 
expressed  in  the  following  concise  manner :  Representatives 
are  to  be  proportioned  among  the  States  respectively,  according 
to  the  number  of  freemen  and  slaves  inhabiting  them,  counting 
five  slaves  for  three  free  men. 

"  In  a  free  state,"  says  the  celebrated  Montesquieu,  "  every 
man,  who  is  supposed  to  be  a  free  agent,  ought  to  be  concerned 
in  his  own  government,  therefore  the  legislature  should  reside 
in  the  whole  body  of  the  people,  or  their  representatives."  But 
it  has  never  been  alleged  that  those  who  are  not  free  agents 
can,  upon  any  rational  principle,  have  any  thing  to  do  in  gov. 
ernment,  either  by  themselves  or  others.  If  they  have  no  share 
in  government,  why  is  the  number  of  members  in  the  assembly 
to  be  increased  on  their  account  ?  Is  it  because  in  some  of  the 
States,  a  considerable  part  of  the  property  of  the  inhabitants 
consists  in  a  number  of  their  fellow-men,  who  are  held  in  bond- 
age, in  defiance  of  every  idea  of  benevolence,  justice  and  religion, 
and  contrary  to  all  the  principles  of  liberty  which  have  been 
publicly  avowed  in  the  late  glorious  Revolution  ?     If  this  be  a 


1788.]  SPIRIT   OF   THE   PRESS.  387 

just  ground  for  representation,  the  horses  in  some  of  the  States, 
and  the  oxen  in  others,  ought  to  be  represented — for  a  great 
share  of  property  in  some  of  them  consists  in  these  animals  ; 
and  they  have  as  much  control  over  their  own  actions  as  these 
poor  unhappy  creatures,  who  are  intended  to  be  described  in 
the  above  recited  clause,  by  the  words,  "  all  other  persons." 
By  this  mode  of  apportionment,  the  representatives  of  the  differ- 
ent parts  of  the  Union  will  be  extremely  unequal ;  in  some  of 
the  Southern  States  the  slaves  are  nearly  equal  in  number  to 
the  free  men  ;  and  for  all  these  slaves  they  will  be  entitled  to  a 
proportionate  share  in  the  legislature  ;  this  will  give  them  an 
unreasonable  weight  in  the  government,  which  can  derive  no 
additional  strength,  protection,  nor  defence  from  the  slaves,  but 
the  contrary.  Why,  then,  should  they  be  represented  ?  What 
adds  to  the  evil  is,  that  these  States  are  to  be  permitted  to  con- 
tinue the  inhuman  traffic  of  importing  slaves  until  the  year 
1808 — and  for  every  cargo  of  these  unhappy  people  which  unfeel- 
ing, unprincipled,  barbarous  and  avaricious  wretches  may  tear 
from  their  country,  friends  and  tender  connections,  and  bring 
into  those  States,  they  are  to  be  rewarded  by  having  an  increase 
of  members  in  the  general  assembly.  There  appears,  at  the 
first  view,  a  manifest  inconsistency,  in  the  apportionment  of 
representatives  in  the  senate,  upon  the  plan  of  a  consolidated 
government.  On  every  principle  of  equity  and  propriety,  repre- 
sentation in  a  government  should  be  in  exact  proportion  to  the 
numbers,  or  the  aids  afforded  by  the  persons  represented.  How 
unreasonable  and  unjust  then  is  it,  that  Delaware  should  have 
a  representation  in  the  senate  equal  to  Massachusetts  or  Vir- 
ginia ?  The  latter  of  which  contains  ten  times  her  numbers, 
and  is  to  contribute  to  the  aid  of  the  general  government  in 
that  proportion  ?  This  article  of  the  Constitution  will  appear 
the  more  objectionable,  if  it  is  considered,  that  the  powers  vested 
in  this  branch  of  the  legislature  are  very  extensive,  and  greatly 
surpass  those  lodged  in  the  assembly,  not  only  for  general  pur- 
poses, but,  in  many  instances,  for  the  internal  police  of  the 
States.  The  other  branch  of  the  legislature,  in  which,  if  in 
either,  a  faint  spark  of  democracy  is  to  be  found,  should  have 
been  properly  organized  and  established  ;  but  upon  examination 
you  will  find,  that  this  branch  does  not  possess  the  qualities  of  a 


388  SPIRIT   OF   THE   PRESS.  [1788, 

just  representation,  and  that  there  is  no  kind  of  security,  imper- 
fect as  it  is,  for  its  remaining  in  the  hands  of  the  people. 

It  has  been  observed,  that  the  happiness  of  society  is  the  end 
of  government — that  every  free  government  is  founded  in  com- 
pact ;  and  that,  because  it  is  impracticable  for  the  whole  com- 
munity to  assemble,  or  when  assembled,  to  deliberate  with 
wisdom  and  decide  with  dispatch,  the  mode  of  legislating  by 
representation  was  devised. 

The  very  term,  representative,  implies  that  the  person  or  body 
chosen  for  this  purpose,  should  resemble  those  who  appoint 
them.  A  representation  of  the  people  of  America,  if  it  be  a  true 
one,  must  be  like  the  people.  It  ought  to  be  so  constituted, 
that  a  person  who  is  a  stranger  to  the  country,  might  be  able  to 
form  a  just  idea  of  their  character  by  knowing  that  of  their  rep- 
resentatives. They  are  the  sign — the  people  are  the  thing  signi- 
fied. It  is  absurd  to  speak  of  one  thing  being  the  representative 
of  another,  upon  any  other  principle.  The  ground  and  reason 
of  representation,  in  a  free  government,  implies  the  same  thing. 
Society  instituted  government  to  promote  the  happiness  of  the 
whole,  and  this  is  the  great  end  always  in  view  in  the  delegation 
of  powers.  It  must  then  have  been  intended,  that  those  who 
are  placed  instead  of  the  people,  should  possess  their  sentiments 
and  feelings,  and  be  governed  by  their  interests,  or,  in  other 
words,  should  bear  the  strongest  resemblance  of  those  in  whose 
room  they  are  substituted.  It  is  obvious,  that  for  an  assembly 
to  be  a  true  likeness  of  the  people  of  any  country,  they  must  be 
considerably  numerous.  One  man,  or  a  few  men,  cannot  possi- 
bly represent  the  feelings,  opinions,  and  characters  of  a  great 
multitude.  In  this  respect,  the  new  Constitution  is  radically 
defective.  The  house  of  assembly,  which  is  intended  as  a  repre- 
sentation of  the  people  of  America,  will  not,  nor  cannot,  in  the 
nature  of  things,  be  a  proper  one.  Sixty-five  men  cannot  be 
found  in  the  United  States  who  hold  the  sentiments,  possess  the 
feelings,  or  are  acquainted  with  the  wants  and  interests  of  this 
vast  country.  This  extensive  continent  is  made  up  of  a  number 
of  different  classes  of  people  ;  and  to  have  a  proper  representa- 
tion of  them,  each  class  ought  to  have  an  opportunity  of  choosing 
their  best  informed  men  for  the  purpose  ;  but  this  cannot  possi- 
bly be  the  case  in  so  small  a  number.     The  State  of  New  York, 


1788.]  SPIRIT   OF   THE   PRESS.  389 

on  the  present  apportionment,  will  send  six  members  to  the 
assembly  ;  I  will  venture  to  affirm  that  number  cannot  be  found 
in  the  State,  who  will  bear  a  just  resemblance  to  the  several 
classes  of  people  who  compose  it.  In  this  assembly,  the  farmer, 
merchant,  mechanic,  and  other  various  orders  of  people,  ought 
to  be  represented  according  to  their  respective  weight  and  num- 
bers ;  and  the  representatives  ought  to  be  intimately  acquainted 
with  the  wants,  understand  the  interests  of  the  several  orders  in 
the  society,  and  feel  a  proper  sense  and  becoming  zeal  to  pro- 
mote their  prosperity.  I  cannot  conceive  that  any  six  men  in 
this  State  can  be  found  properly  qualified  in  these  respects  to 
discharge  such  important  duties ;  but,  supposing  it  possible  to 
find  them,  is  there  the  least  degree  of  probability  that  the  choice 
of  the  people  will  fall  upon  such  men  ?  According  to  the  com- 
mon course  of  human  affairs,  the  natural  aristocracy  of  the 
country  will  be  elected.  Wealth  always  creates  influence,  and 
this  is  generally  much  increased  in  large  family  connections  ;  this 
class  in  society  will  for  ever  have  a  great  number  of  dependents  ; 
besides,  they  will  always  favor  each  other.  It  is  their  interest  to 
combine — they  will  therefore  constantly  unite  their  efforts  to 
procure  men  of  their  own  rank  to  be  elected ;  they  will  con- 
centre all  their  force  in  every  part  of  the  State  into  one  point, 
and  by  acting  together,  will  most  generally  carry  their  election. 
It  is  probable  that  but  few  of  the  merchants,  and  those  of  the 
most  opulent  and  ambitious,  will  have  a  representation  from 
their  body — few  of  them  are  characters  sufficiently  conspicuous 
to  attract  the  notice  of  the  electors  of  the  State  in  so  limited  a 
representation.  The  great  body  of  the  yeomen  of  the  country 
cannot  expect  any  of  their  order  in  this  assembly — the  station 
will  be  too  elevated  for  them  to  aspire  to — the  distance  between 
the  people  and  their  representatives  will  be  so  very  great,  that 
there  is  no  probability  that  a  farmer,  however  respectable,  will 
be  chosen.  The  mechanics,  of  every  branch,  must  expect  to  be 
excluded  from  a  seat  in  this  body  ;  it  will  and  must  be  esteemed 
a  station  too  high  and  exalted  to  be  filled  by  any  but  the  first 
men  in  the  State,  in  point  of  fortune  ;  so  that  in  reality  there 
will  be  no  part  of  the  people  represented  but  the  rich,  even  in 
that  branch  of  the  legislature  which  is  called  the  democratic. 
The  well-born,  and  highest  orders  in  life,  as  they  term  them- 


390  SPIRIT    OF    THE    PRESS.  [1788. 

selves,  will  be  ignorant  of  the  sentiments  of  the  middling  class 
of  citizens,  strangers  to  their  ability,  wants  and  difficulties,  and 
void  of  sympathy  and  fellow  feeling.  This  branch  of  the  legis- 
lature will  no#  only  be  an  imperfect  representation,  but  there 
will  be  no  security  in  so  small  a  body  against  bribery  and  cor- 
ruption. It  will  consist  at  first,  of  sixty-five,  and  can  never 
exceed  one  for  every  thirty  thousand  inhabitants.  A  majority  of 
these,  that  is,  thirty-three,  are  a  quorum,  and  a  majority  of 
which,  or  seventeen,  may  pass  any  law.  A  majority  of  the  sen- 
ate, or  fourteen,  are  a  quorum,  and  eight  of  them  may  pass  any 
law  ;  so  that  twenty-five  men  will  have  the  power  to  give  away 
all  the  property  of  the  citizens  of  these  States.  What  security, 
therefore,  can  there  be  for  the  people,  where  their  liberties  and 
property  are  at  the  disposal  of  so  few  men  ?  It  will  literally  be 
a  government  in  the  hands  of  the  few,  to  oppress  and  plunder 
the  many.  You  may  conclude,  with  a  great  degree  of  certain- 
ty, that  it,  like  all  others  of  a  similar  nature,  will  be  managed 
by  influence  and  corruption,  and  that  the  period  is  not  far  dis- 
tant when  this  will  be  the  case,  if  it  should  be  adopted  ;  for  even 
now  there  are  some  among  us  whose  characters  stand  high  in 
the  public  estimation,  and  who  have  had  a  principal  agency  in 
framing  this  Constitution,  who  do  not  scruple  to  say,  that  this 
is  the  only  practicable  mode  of  governing  a  people  who  think 
with  that  degree  of  freedom  which  the  Americans  do.  This 
government  will  have  in  their  gift  a  vast  number  of  offices  of 
great  honor  and  emolument.  The  members  of  the  legislature 
are  not  excluded  from  appointments  ;  and  twenty-five  of  them, 
as  the  case  may  be,  being  secured,  any  measure  maybe  carried. 

The  rulers  of  this  country  must  be  composed  of  very  different 
materials  from  those  of  any  other  of  which  history  gives  us  any 
account :  if  the  majority  of  the  legislature  are  not,  before 
many  years  they  will  be  entirely  at  the  devotion  of  the  execu- 
tive, and  these  States  will  be  soon  under  the  absolute  domina- 
tion of  one  or  a  few,  with  the  fallacious  appearance  of  being 
governed  by  men  of  their  own  election. 

The  more  I  reflect  on  this  subject,  the  more  firmly  am  I  per- 
suaded, that  the  representation  is  merely  nominal — a  mere 
burlesque,  and  that  no  security  is  provided  against  corruption 
and  undue  influence.    No  free  people  on  earth,  who  have 


1788.]  SPIRIT    OF    THE    PRESS.  391 

elected  persons  to  legislate  for  them,  ever  reposed  that  confi- 
dence in  so  small  a  number.  The  British  House  of  Commons 
consists  of  five  hundred  and  fifty-eight  members  ;  the  number 
of  inhabitants  in  Great  Britain  is  computed  at  eight  millions — 
this  gives  one  member  for  a  little  more  than  fourteen  thousand, 
which  exceeds  double  the  proportion  this  country  can  ever 
have  ;  and  yet  we  require  a  larger  representation  in  proportion 
to  our  numbers,  than  Great  Britain,  because  this  country  is 
much  more  extensive,  and  differs  more  in  its  productions,  inter- 
ests, manners  and  habits.  The  democratic  branch  of  the  legis- 
latures of  the  several  States  in  the  Union  consists,  I  believe,  at 
present,  of  near  two  thousand  ;  and  this  number  was  not  thought 
too  large  for  the  security  of  liberty  by  the  framers  of  our  State 
Constitutions.  Some  of  the  States  may  have  erred  in  this 
respect,  but  the  difference  between  two  thousand  and  sixty-five 
is  so  very  great  that  it  will  bear  no  comparison. 

Other  objections  offer  themselves  against  this  part  of  the 
Constitution — I  shall  reserve  them  for  a  future  paper,  when  I 
shall  show,  defective  as  this  representation  is,  no  security  is 
provided,  that  even  this  shadow  of  the  right  will  remain  with 
the  people.  Brutus. 


BRUTUS.— No.  IV. 

There  can  be  no  free  government  where  the  people  are  not 
possessed  of  the  power  of  making  the  laws  by  which  they  are 
governed,  either  in  their  own  persons,  or  by  others  substituted 
in  their  stead. 

Experience  has  taught  mankind,  that  legislation  by  repre- 
sentatives is  the  most  eligible,  and  the  only  practicable  mode  in 
which  the  people  of  any  country  can  exercise  this  right,  either 
prudently  or  beneficially.  But  then  it  is  a  matter  of  the  highest 
importance,  in  forming  this  representation,  that  it  be  so  consti- 
tuted as  to  be  capable  of  understanding  the  true  interest  of  the 
society  for  which  it  acts,  and  so  disposed  as  to  pursue  the  good 
and  happiness  of  the  people  as  its  ultimate  end.     The  object  of 


392  SPIRIT   OF   THE   PRESS.  [1788. 

every  free  government  is  the  public  good,  and  all  lesser  interests 
yield  to  it.  That  of  every  tyrannical  government  is  the  happi- 
ness and  aggrandizement  of  one,  or  a  few,  and  to  this  the  public 
felicity  and  every  other  interest  must  submit.  The  reason  of 
this  difference  in  these  governments  is  obvious.  The  first  is  so 
constituted  as  to  collect  the  views  and  wishes  of  the  whole  peo- 
ple in  that  of  their  rulers,  while  the  latter  is  so  framed  as  to 
separate  the  interests  of  the  governors  from  that  of  the  governed. 
The  principle  of  self-love,  therefore,  that  will  influence  the  one 
to  promote  the  good  of  the  whole,  will  prompt  the  other  to  fol- 
low its  own  private  advantage.  The  great  art,  therefore,  in 
forming  a  good  Constitution,  appears  to  be  this,  so  to  frame  it 
as  that  those  to  whom  the  power  is  committed  shall  be  subject 
to  the  same  feelings,  and  aim  at  the  same  objects  as  the  people 
do  who  transfer  to  them  their  authority.  There  is  no  possible 
way  to  effect  this  but  by  an  equal,  full  and  fair  representation  ; 
this,  therefore,  is  the  great  desideratum  in  politics.  However 
fair  an  appearance  any  government  may  make,  though  it  may 
possess  a  thousand  plausible  articles,  and  be  decorated  with  ever 
so  many  ornaments,  yet  if  it  is  deficient  in  this  essential  princi- 
ple of  a  full  and  just  representation  of  the  people,  it  will  be  only 
like  a  painted  sepulchre, — for,  without  this,  it  cannot  be  a  free 
government ;  let  the  administration  of  it  be  good  or  ill,  it  still 
will  be  a  government,  not  according  to  the  will  of  the  people, 
but  according  to  the  will  of  a  few. 

To  test  this  new  Constitution  then,  by  this  principle,  is  of  the 
last  importance.  It  is  to  bring  it  to  the  touch-stone  of  national 
liberty,  and  I  hope  I  shall  be  excused,  if,  in  this  paper,  I  pursue 
the  subject  commenced  in  my  last  number,  to  wit,  the  necessity 
of  an  equal  and  full  representation  in  the  legislature.  In  that, 
I  showed  that  it  was  not  equal,  because  the  smallest  States  are 
to  send  the  same  number  of  members  to  the  senate  as  the  larg- 
est, and  because  the  slaves,  who  afford  neither  aid  nor  defence  to 
the  government,  are  to  increase  the  proportion  of  members.  To 
prove  that  it  was  not  a  just  or  adequate  representation,  it  was 
urged,  that  so  small  a  number  could  not  resemble  the  people, 
or  possess  their  sentiments  and  dispositions.  That  the  choice  of 
members  would  commonly  fall  upon  the  rich  and  great,  while 
the  middling  class  of  the  community  would  be  excluded.     That 


1788.]  SPIRIT   OF   THE   PRESS.  393 

in  so  small  a  representation  there  was  no  security  against  bribery 
and  corruption. 

The  small  number  which  is  to  compose  this  legislature  will 
not  only  expose  it  to  the  danger  of  that  kind  of  corruption,  and 
undue  influence,  which  will  arise  from  the  gift  of  places  of 
honor  and  emolument,  or  the  more  direct  one  of  bribery,  but  it 
will  also  subject  it  to  another  kind  of  influence  no  less  fatal  to  the 
liberties  of  the  people,  though  it  be  not  so  flagrantly  repugnant 
to  the  principles  of  rectitude.  It  is  not  to  be  expected  that  a 
legislature  will  be  found  in  any  country  that  will  not  have  some 
of  its  members  who  will  pursue  their  private  ends,  and  for 
which  they  will  sacrifice  the  public  good.  Men  of  this  character 
are,  generally,  artful  and  designing,  and  frequently  possess  bril- 
liant talents  and  abilities ;  they  commonly  act  in  concert,  and 
agree  to  share  the  spoils  of  their  country  among  them  ;  they  will 
keep  their  object  ever  in  view,  and  follow  it  with  constancy.  To 
effect  their  purpose,  they  will  assume  any  shape,  and,  Proteus 
like,  mould  themselves  into  any  form.  Where  they  find  mem- 
bers proof  against  direct  bribery  or  gifts  of  offices,  they  will 
endeavor  to  mislead  their  minds  by  specious  and  false  reason- 
ing, to  impose  upon  their  unsuspecting  honesty  by  an  affectation 
of  zeal  for  the  public  good ;  they  will  form  juntos,  and  hold 
out-door  meetings ;  they  will  operate  upon  the  good  nature  of 
their  opponents  by  a  thousand  little  attentions,  and  tease  them 
into  compliance  by  the  earnestness  of  solicitation.  Those  who 
are  acquainted  with  the  manner  of  conducting  business  in 
public  assemblies,  know  how  prevalent  art  and  address  are  in 
carrying  a  measure,  even  over  men  of  the  best  intentions  and  of 
good  understanding.  The  firmest  security  against  this  kind  of 
improper  and  dangerous  influence,  as  well  as  all  other,  is  a 
strong  and  numerous  representation  ;  in  such  a  house  of  assem- 
bly, so  great  a  number  must  be  gained  over,  before  the  private 
views  of  individuals  could  be  gratified,  that  there  could  be  scarce 
a  hope  of  success.  But  in  the  Federal  assembly  seventeen  men 
are  all  that  is  necessary  to  pass  a  law.  It  is  probable  it  will 
seldom  happen  that  more  than  twenty-five  will  be  requisite  to 
form  a  majority.  When  it  is  considered  what  a  number  of  places 
of  honor  and  emolument  will  be  in  the  gift  of  the  executive,  the 
powerful  influence  that  great  and  designing  men  have  over  the 

60 


394  SPIRIT   OF   THE   PRESS.  [1788. 

honest  and  unsuspecting,  by  their  art  and  address,  their  sooth- 
ing manners  and  civilities,  and  their  cringing  flattery,  joined 
with  their  affected  patriotism, — when  these  different  species  of 
influence  are  combined,  it  is  scarcely  to  be  hoped  that  a  legisla- 
ture, composed  of  so  small  a  number  as  the  one  proposed  by  the 
new  Constitution,  will  long  resist  their  force.  A  farther  objec- 
tion against  the  feebleness  of  the  representation  is,  that' it  will 
not  possess  the  confidence  of  the  people.  The  execution  of  the 
laws  in  a  free  government  must  rest  on  this  confidence,  and  this 
must  be  founded  on  the  good  opinion  they  entertain  of  the 
framers  of  the  laws.  Every  government  must  be  supported, 
either  by  the  people  having  such  an  attachment  to  it  as  to  be 
ready,  when  called  upon,  to  support  it,  or  by  a  force  at  the 
command  of  the  government,  to  compel  obedience.  The  latter 
mode  destroys  every  idea  of  a  free  government ;  for  the  same 
force  that  may  be  employed  to  compel  obedience  to  good  laws, 
might,  and  probably  would  be  used  to  wrest  from  the  people 
their  constitutional  liberties.  Whether  it  is  practicable  to  have 
a  representation  for  the  whole  Union  sufficiently  numerous  to 
obtain  that  confidence  which  is  necessary  for  the  purpose  of 
internal  taxation,  and  other  powers  to  which  this  proposed  gov- 
ernment extends,  is  an  important  question.  I  am  clearly  of 
opinion  it  is  not,  and  therefore  I  have  stated  this  in  my  first 
number,  as  one  of  the  reasons  against  going  into  so  entire  a 
consolidation  of  the  States.  One  of  the  most  capital  errors  in 
the  system  is,  that  of  extending  the  powers  of  the  Federal  gov- 
ernment to  objects  to  which  it  is  not  adequate,  which  it  cannot 
exercise  without  endangering  public  liberty,  and  which  it  is  not 
necessary  they  should  possess,  in  order  to  preserve  the  Union 
and  manage  our  national  concerns  ;  of  this,  however,  I  shall 
treat  more  fully  in  some  future  paper.  But,  however  this  may 
be,  certain  it  is,  that  the  representation  in  the  legislature  is  not 
so  formed  as  to  give  reasonable  ground  for  public  trust. 

In  order  for  the  people  safely  to  repose  themselves  on  their 
rulers,  they  should  not  only  be  of  their  own  choice,  but  it  is 
requisite  they  should  be  acquainted  with  their  abilities  to  man- 
age the  public  concerns  with  wisdom.  They  should  be  satisfied 
that  those  who  represent  them  are  men  of  integrity,  who  will 
pursue  the  good  of  the  community  with  fidelity,  and  will  not  be 


1788.]  SPIRIT   OF    THE    PRESS.  395 

turned  aside  from  their  duty  by  private  interest,  or  corrupted 
by  undue  influence ;  and  that  they  will  have  such  a  zeal  for  the 
good  of  those  whom  they  represent,  as  to  excite  them  to  be 
diligent  in  their  service ;  but  it  is  impossible  the  people  of  the 
United  States  should  have  sufficient  knowledge  of  their  repre- 
sentatives, when  the  members  are  so  few,  to  acquire  any  rational 
satisfaction  on  either  of  these  points.  The  people  of  this  State 
will  have  very  little  acquaintance  with  those  who  may  be  chosen 
to  represent  them ;  a  great  part  of  them  will,  probably,  not 
know  the  characters  of  their  own  members,  much  less  that  of  a 
majority  of  those  who  will  compose  the  Federal  assembly ;  they 
will  consist  of  men  whose  names  they  have  never  heard,  and  of 
whose  talents  and  regard  for  the  public  good  they  are  total 
strangers  to  ;  and  they  will  have  no  persons  so  immediately  of 
their  choice  so  near  them,  of  their  neighbors  and  of  their  own 
rank  in  life,  that  they  can  feel  themselves  secure  in  trusting 
their  interest  in  their  hands.  The  representatives  of  the  people 
cannot,  as  they  now  do,  after  they  have  passed  laws,  mix  with 
the  people,  and  explain  to  them  the  motives  which  induced  the 
adoption  of  any  measure,  point  out  its  utility,  and  remove  objec- 
tions, or  silence  unreasonable  clamors  against  it.  The  number 
will  be  so  small  that  but  a  very  few  of  the  most  sensible  and 
respectable  yeomanry  of  the  country  can  ever  have  any  knowl- 
edge of  them  ;  being  so  far  removed  from  the  people,  their  station 
will  be  elevated  and  important,  and  they  will  be  considered  as 
ambitious  and  designing.  They  will  not  be  viewed  by  the  peo- 
ple as  part  of  themselves,  but  as  a  body  distinct  from  them,  and 
having  separate  interests  to  pursue ;  the  consequence  will  be, 
that  a  perpetual  jealousy  will  exist  in  the  minds  of  the  people 
against  them ;  their  conduct  will  be  narrowly  watched,  their 
measures  scrutinized,  and  their  laws  opposed,  evaded,  or  reluc- 
tantly obeyed.  This  is  natural,  and  exactly  corresponds  with 
the  conduct  of  individuals  towards  those  in  whose  hands  they 
intrust  important  concerns.  If  the  person  confided  in  be  a 
neighbor,  with  whom  his  employer  is  intimately  acquainted, 
whose  talents,  he  knows,  are  sufficient  to  manage  the  business 
with  which  he  is  charged,  his  honesty  and  fidelity  unsuspected, 
and  his  friendship  and  zeal  for  the  service  of  his  principal 
unquestionable,  he  will  commit  his  affairs  into  his  hands  with 


396  SPIRIT   OF    THE   PRESS.  [1788. 

unreserved  confidence,  and  feel  himself  secure ;  all  the  trans- 
actions of  the  agent  will  meet  with  the  most  favorable  construc- 
tion, and  the  measures  he  takes  will  give  satisfaction.  But,  if 
the  person  employed  be  a  stranger,  whom  he  has  never  seen, 
and  whose  character  for  ability  or  fidelity  he  cannot  fully  learn 
— if  he  is  constrained  to  choose  him,  because  it  was  not  in  his 
power  to  procure  one  more  agreeable  to  his  wishes,  he  will  trust 
him  with  caution,  and  be  suspicious  of  all  his  conduct. 

If,  then,  this  government  should  not  derive  support  from  the 
will  of  the  people,  it  must  be  executed  by  force,  or  not  executed 
at  all ;  either  case  would  lead  to  the  total  destruction  of  liberty. 
The  Convention  seemed  aware  of  this,  and  have*  therefore  pro- 
vided for  calling  out  the  militia  to  execute  the  laws  of  the 
Union.  If  this  system  was  so  framed  as  to  command  that 
respect  from  the  people  which  every  good  free  government  will 
obtain,  this  provision  was  unncessary — the  people  would  sup- 
port the  civil  magistrate.  This  power  is  a  novel  one  in  free 
governments  ;  these  have  depended  for  the  execution  of  the  laws 
on  the  posse  comitatus,  and  never  raised  an  idea  that  the  people 
would  refuse  to  aid  the  civil  magistrate  in  executing  those  laws 
they  themselves  had  made.  I  shall  now  dismiss  the  subject  of 
the  incompetency  of  the  representation,  and  proceed,  as  I  prom- 
ised, to  show,  that  impotent  as  it  is,  the  people  have  no  security 
that  they  will  enjoy  the  exercise  of  the  right  of  electing  this 
assembly,  which,  at  best,  can  be  considered  but  as  the  shadow 
of  representation. 

By  section  four,  article  one,  the  Congress  are  authorized,  at 
any  time,  by  law,  to  make,  or  alter,  regulations  respecting  the 
time,  place  and  manner  of  holding  elections  for  senators  and 
representatives,  except  as  to  the  places  of  choosing  senators. 
By  this  clause  the  right  of  election  itself  is,  in  a  great  measure, 
transferred  from  the  people  to  their  rulers.  One  would  think 
that  if  any  thing  was  necessary  to  be  made  a  fundamental  article 
of  the  original  compact,  it  would  be  that  of  fixing  the  brandies 
of  the  legislature,  so  as  to  put  it  out  of  its  power  to  alter  itself 
by  modifying  the  election  of  its  own  members  at  will  and  pleas- 
ure. When  a  people  once  resign  the  privilege  of  a  fair  election, 
they  clearly  have  none  left  worth  contending  for. 

It  is  clear  that  under  this  article,  the*  Federal  legislature  may 


1788.]  SPIRIT   OF   THE   PRESS.  397 

institute  such  rules  respecting  elections  as  to  lead  to  the  choice 
of  one  description  of  men.  The  weakness  of  the  representation 
tends  but  too  certainly  to  confer  on  the  rich  and  well-born  all 
honors  ;  but  the  power  granted  in  this  article  may  be  so  exer- 
cised as  to  secure  it  almost  beyond  a  possibility  of  control.  The 
proposed  Congress  may  make  the  whole  State  one  district,  and 
direct  that  the  capital  (the  city  of  New  York,  for  instance) 
shall  be  the  place  for  holding  the  election ;  the  consequence 
would  be,  that  none  but  men  of  the  most  elevated  rank  in  socie- 
ty would  attend,  and  they  would  as  certainly  choose  men  of 
their  own  class,  as  it  is  true  what  the  Apostle  Paul  saith,  "  that 
no  man  ever  yet  hated  his  own  flesh,  but  nourisheth  and  cher- 
isheth  it."  They  may  declare  that  those  members  who  have 
the  greatest  number  of  votes  shall  be  considered  as  duly  elected ; 
the  consequence  would  be  that  the  people,-  who  are  dispersed  in 
the  interior  parts  of  the  State,  would  give  their  votes  for  a 
variety  of  candidates,  while  any  order,  or  profession,  residing  in 
populous  places,  by  uniting  their  interests,  might  procure  whom 
they  pleased  to  be  chosen, — and  by  this  means  the  representa- 
tives of  the  State  may  be  elected  by  one-tenth  part  of  the  people 
who  actually  vote.  This  may  be  effected  constitutionally,  and 
by  one  of  those  silent  operations  which  frequently  takes  place 
without  being  noticed,  but  which  often  produces  such  changes 
as  entirely  to  alter  a  government,  subvert  a  free  constitution, 
and  rivet  the  chains  on  a  free  people  before  they  perceive  they 
are  forged.  Had  the  power  of  regulating  elections  been  left 
under  the  direction  of  the  State  legislatures,  where  the  people 
are  not  only  nominally  but  substantially  represented,  it  would 
have  been  secure ;  but  if  it  was  taken  out  of  their  hands,  it 
surely  ought  to  have  been  fixed  on  such  a  basis  as  to  have  put 
it  out  of  the  power  of  the  Federal  legislature  to  deprive  the 
people  of  it  by  law.  Provision  should  have  been  made  for 
marking  out  the  States  into  districts,  and  for  choosing,  by  a 
majority  of  votes,  a  person  out  of  each  of  them,  of  permanent 
property  and  residence  in  the  district  which  he  was  to  repre- 
sent. 

If  the  people  of  America  will  submit  to  a  Constitution  that 
will  vest  in  the  hands  of  any  body  of  men  a  right  to  deprive 
them  by  law  of  the  privilege  of  a  fair  election,  they  will  submit 


398  SPIRIT   OF    THE   PRESS.  [1788. 

to  almost  any  thing.  Reasoning  with  them  will  be  in  vain,  they 
must  be  left  until  they  are  brought  to  reflection  by  feeling 
oppression.  They  will  then  have  to  wrest  from  their  oppressors, 
by  a  strong  hand,  that  which  they  now  possess,  and  which  they 
may  retain  if  they  will  exercise  but  a  moderate  share  of  pru- 
dence and  firmness. 

I  know  it  is  said  that  the  dangers  apprehended  from  this 
clause  are  merely  imaginary,  that  the  proposed  general  legisla- 
ture will  be  disposed  to  regulate  elections  upon  proper  principles, 
and  to  use  their  power  with  discretion,  and  to  promote  the  pub- 
lic good.  On  this,  I  would  observe,  that  constitutions  are  not 
so  necessary  to  regulate  the  conduct  of  good  rulers  as  to  restrain 
that  of  bad  ones.  Wise  and  good  men  will  exercise  power  so 
as  to  promote  the  public  happiness  under  any  form  of  govern- 
ment. If  we  are  to  take  it  for  granted  that  those  who  administer 
the  government  under  this  system  will  always  pay  proper  atten- 
tion to  the  rights  and  interests  of  the  people,  nothing  more  was 
necessary  than  to  say  who  should  be  invested  with  the  powers  of 
government,  and  leave  them  to  exercise  it  at  will  and  pleasure. 
Men  are  apt  to  be  deceived,  both  with  respect  to  their  own  dis- 
positions and  those  of  others.  Though  this  truth  is  proved  by 
almost  every  page  of  the  history  of  nations,  to  wit,  that  power, 
lodged  in  the  hands  of  rulers  to  be  used  at  discretion,  is  almost 
always  exercised  to  the  oppression  of  the  people,  and  the  aggran- 
dizement of  themselves  ;  yet  most  men  think  if  it  was  lodged  in 
their  hands  they  would  not  employ  it  in  this  manner.  Thus 
when  the  prophet  Elisha  told  Hazael,  "  I  know  the  evil  that 
thou  wilt  do  unto  the  children  of  Israel ;  their  strongholds  wilt 
thou  set  on  fire,  and  their  young  men  wilt  thou  slay  with  the 
sword,  and  wilt  dash  their  children,  and  rip  up  their  women 
with  child."  Hazael  had  no  idea  that  he  ever  should  be  guilty 
of  such  horrid  cruelty,  and  said  to  the  prophet,  "  Is  thy  servant 
a  dog  that  he  should  do  this  great  thing."  Elisha  answered, 
"  The  Lord  hath  showed  me  that  thou  shalt  be  king  of  Syria." 
The  event  proved,  that  Hazael  only  wanted  an  opportunity  to 
perpetrate  these  enormities  without  restraint,  and  he  had  a  dis- 
position to  do  them,  though  he  himself  knew  it  not. 

Brutus. 


1788.]  LETTERS.  399 


LETTERS. 

[The  following  letters  are  quoted  for  the  purpose  of  giving 
an  idea  of  the  interest  which  was  felt  throughout  the  country, 
in  the  progress  of  the  discussion  in  Massachusetts.  The  two 
letters  from  Knox  to  Livingston  were  kindly  furnished  to  the 
Committee  by  Mr.  George  Bancroft.  The  others  have  been 
copied  from  the  "^Writings  of  Washington,"  edited  by  Mr. 
Jared  Sparks,  and  the  "  Correspondence  of  the  Revolution," 
by  the  same  learned  and  faithful  editor.] 

EXTRACT  FROM  A  LETTER  FROM  HENRY  KNOX. 

New  York,  14  January,  1788. 

The  Massachusetts  Convention  were  to  meet  on  the  9th. 
The  decision  of  Connecticut  will  influence,  in  a  degree,  their 
determination,  and  I  have  no  doubt  the  Constitution  will  be 
adopted  in  Massachusetts.  But  it  is  at  this  moment  questiona- 
ble whether  it  will  be  by  a  large  majority.  There  are  three 
parties  existing  in  that  State  at  present,  differing  in  their  num- 
bers, and  greatly  differing  in  their  wealth  and  talents. 

The  first  is  the  commercial  part  of  the  State,  to  which  are 
added  all  the  men  of  considerable  property,  the  clergy,  the 
lawyers,  including  the  judges  of  all  the  courts,  and  all  the 
officers  of  the  late  army,  and  also  the  neighborhood  of  all  the 
great  towns.  Its  numbers  may  include  three-sevenths  of  the 
State.  This  party  are  for  the  most  vigorous  government.  Per- 
haps many  of  them  would  have  been  still  more  pleased  with 
the  new  Constitution,  had  it  been  more  analagous  to  the  British 
constitution. 

The  second  party  are  the  eastern  part  of  the  State,  lying 
beyond  New  Hampshire,  formerly  the  province  of  Maine.  This 
party  are  chiefly  looking  towards  the  erection  of  a  new  State, 
and  the  majority  of  them  will  adopt  or  reject  the  new  Constitu- 
tion as  it  may  facilitate  or  retard  their  designs,  without  regard- 
ing the  merits  of  the  great  question  ;  this  party,  two-sevenths. 


400  LETTERS.  [1788. 

The  third  party  are  the  insurgents,  or  their  favorers,  the 
great  majority  of  whom  are  for  an  annihilation  of  debts,  public 
and  private  ;  and  therefore  they  will  not  approve  the  new  Con- 
stitution ;  this  party,  two-sevenths. 

If  the  first  and  second  party  agree,  as  is  most  probable,  and 
also  some  of  the  party  stated  as  in  the  insurgent  interest,  the 
Constitution  will  be  adopted  by  a  great  majority,  notwithstand- 
ing all  the  exertions  to  the  contrary. 


JAMES  MADISON,  IN  CONGRESS,  TO  GEORGE  WASHINGTON. 

[extract.] 

New  York,  20  January,  1788. 

The  intelligence  from  Massachusetts  begins  to  be  very 
ominous  to  the  Constitution.  The  anti-Federal  party  is  rein- 
forced by  the  insurgents,  and  by  the  province  of  Maine,  which 
apprehends  greater  obstacles  to  her  scheme  of  a  separate  gov- 
ernment from  the  new  system,  than  may  be  otherwise  experi- 
enced. And  according  to  the  prospect  at  the  date  of  the  latest 
letters,  there  was  very  great  reason  to  fear,  that  the  voice  of 
that  State  would  be  in  the  negative.  The  operation  of  such  an 
event  on  this  State  may  easily  be  foreseen.  Its  legislature  is 
now  sitting,  and  is  much  divided.  A  majority  of  the  Assembly 
are  said  to  be  friendly  to  the  merits  of  the  Constitution.  A 
majority  of  the  senators  actually  convened  are  opposed  to  a 
submission  of  it  to  the  Convention.  The  arrival  of  the  absent 
members  will  render  the  voice  of  that  branch  uncertain  on  the 
point  of  a  Convention.  The  decision  of  Massachusetts  either 
way  will  involve  the  result  in  this  State.  The  minority  in  Penn- 
sylvania is  very  restless  under  their  defeat.  If  they  can  get  an 
Assembly  to  their  wish,  they  will  endeavor  to  undermine  what 
has  been  done  there.  If  backed  by  Massachusetts,  they  will 
probably  be  emboldened  to  make  some  more  rash  experiment. 
The  information  from  Georgia  continues  to  be  favorable.  The 
little  we  get  from  South  Carolina  is  of  the  same  complexion. 


1788.]  LETTERS.  401 


JAMES  MADISON,  IN  CONGRESS,  TO  GEORGE  WASHINGTON. 

New  York,  25  January,  1788. 

Dear  Sir : — I  have  been  favored,  since  my  last,  with  yours  of 
the  10th  instant,  with  a  copy  of  the  Governor's  letter  to  the 
Assembly.  I  do  not  know  what  impression  the  latter  may  make 
in  Virginia.  It  is  generally  understood  here  that  the  argu- 
ments contained  in  it  in  favor  of  the  Constitution  are  much 
stronger  than  the  objections  which  prevented  his  assent.  His 
arguments  are  forcible  in  all  places,  and  with  all  persons.  His 
objections  are  connected  with  his  particular  way  of  thinking  on 
the  subject,  in  which  many  of  the  adversaries  to  the  Constitu- 
tion do  not  concur. 

The  information  from  Boston  by  the  mail,  on  the  evening 
before  last,  has  not  removed  our  suspense.  The  following  is  an 
extract  of  a  letter  from  Mr.  King,  dated  on  the  16th  instant : — 

"  We  may  have  three  hundred  and  sixty  members  in  our 
Convention.  Not  more  than  three  hundred  and  thirty  have 
yet  taken  their  seats.  Immediately  after  the  settlement  of  elec- 
tions, the  Convention  resolved  that  they  would  consider  and 
freely  deliberate  on  each  paragraph,  without  taking  a  question 
on  any  of  them  individually  ;  and  that,  on  the  question  whether 
they  would  ratify,  each  member  should  be  at  liberty  to  discuss 
the  plan  at  large.  This  resolution  seems  to  preclude  the  idea 
of  amendments,  and  hitherto  the  measure  has  not  been  sug- 
gested. I  however  do  not,  from  this  circumstance,  conclude 
that  it  may  not  hereafter  occur. 

"  The  opponents  of  the  Constitution  moved  that  Mr.  Gerry 
should  be  requested  to  take  a  seat  in  the  Convention,  to  answer 
such  inquiries  as  the  Convention  should  make  concerning  facts 
which  happened  in  the  passing  of  the  Constitution.  Although 
this  seems  to  be  a  very  irregular  proposal,  yet,  considering  the 
jealousies  which  prevail  with  those  who  made  it,  (who  are  cer- 
tainly not  the  most  enlightened  part  of  the  Convention,)  and 
the  doubt  of  the  issue,  had  it  been  made  a  trial  of  strength,  sev- 
eral friends  of  the  Constitution  united  with  the  opponents,  and 
the  resolution  was  agreed  to,  and  Mr.  Gerry  has  taken  his  seat. 

51 


402  LETTERS.  [1788. 

To-morrow,  we  are  told,  certain  inquiries  are  to  be  moved  for 
by  the  opposition,  and  that  Mr.  Gerry,  under  the  idea  of  stating 
facts,  is  to  state  his  reasons,  &c.  This  will  be  opposed  ;  and 
we  shall,  on  the  division,  be  able  to  form  some  idea  of  our  rela- 
tive strength.  From  the  men  who  are  in  favor  of  the  Consti- 
tution, any  reasonable  explanation  will  be  given ;  and  argu- 
ments really  new,  and  in  my  judgment,  most  excellent,  have 
been  and  will  be  produced  in  its  support.  But  what  will  be  its 
fate,  I  confess  I  am  unable  to  discern.  No  question  ever  classed 
the  people  of  this  State  in  a  more  extraordinary  manner,  or 
with  more  apparent  firmness." 

A  Congress  of  seven  States  was  made  up  on  Monday.  Mr. 
Cyrus  Griffin  has  been  placed  in  the  chair.  This  is  the  only 
step  yet  taken. 

I  remain,  with  the  highest  respect  and  attachment,  &c, 

James  Madison,  Jr. 


BENJAMIN  LINCOLN  TO  GEORGE  WASHINGTON. 

Boston,  27  January,  1788. 

My  Dear  General : — I  have  the  pleasure  of  inclosing  two  news- 
papers, in  which  are  the  debates  of  the  Convention  to  Saturday, 
the  19th.  They  are  not  forward  enough  to  give  your  Excel- 
lency a  just  state  of  the  business.  I  therefore  am  induced  to 
observe,  that,  yesterday,  we  were  on  the  ninth  section.  The 
opposition  seem  now  inclined  to  hurry  over  the  business,  and 
bring  on,  as  soon  as  possible,  the  main  question.  However, 
this  they  are  not  permitted  to  do.  It  is  pretty  well  known  what 
objections  are  on  the  minds  of  the  people  ;  it  becomes,  there- 
fore, necessary  to  obviate  them,  if  possible.  We  have,  hitherto, 
done  this  with  success.  The  opposition  see  it,  and  are  alarmed, 
for  there  are  a  vast  many  people  attending  in  the  galleries,  (we 
now  assemble  in  one  of  our  meeting-houses,)  and  most  of  the 
arguments  are  published  in  the  papers.     Both  are  of  use. 


1788.]  LETTERS.  403 

Your  Excellency  will  see,  in  the  paper,  propositions  for 
adopting  the  Constitution  on  conditions.  This  will  not  be 
attended  to.  It  is  possible,  if  we  adopt  it  absolutely,  that  the 
Convention  may  recommend  certain  amendments.  It  will 
never,  I  presume,  be  adopted  on  any  conditions.  It  will  pass 
absolutely,  or  be  rejected.  I  have  now  higher  expectations  that 
it  will  pass  than  when  I  last  wrote.  I  think  the  friends  to  it 
increase  daily.  However,  I  would  not  raise  your  Excellency's 
expectations  too  high.  It  is  yet  impossible  to  determine,  abso 
lutely,  its  fate.  Mr.  Gerry,  as  mentioned  in  my  last,  left  the 
Convention  in  dudgeon.  He  has  not  since  returned  to  it.  1 
presume  he  will  not  return. 
With  the  highest  esteem, 

I  have  the  honor  of  being,  my  dear  General,  &c, 

Benjamin  Lincoln. 


GEORGE  WASHINGTON  TO  BENJAMIN  LINCOLN. 

Mount  Vernon,  31  January,  1788. 

Dear  Sir  : — Your  favor  of  the  9th  instant  came  to  hand  last 
evening.  As  you  know  whatever  concerns  your  happiness  and 
welfare  cannot  be  indifferent  to  me,  you  will  very  readily  be- 
lieve me,  when  I  assure  you,  that  I  take  a  feeling  part  in  your 
anxiety  and  distress  on  account  of  your  son,  and  most  sincerely 
wish  for  his  recovery. 

I  thank  you,  my  dear  Sir,  for  your  observations  upon  the 
advantages  which  might  accrue  from  a  settlement  of  the  eastern 
parts  of  your  State.37  I  am  very  sorry  to  find  there  is  likely  to 
be  so  powerful  an  opposition  to  the  adoption  of  the  proposed 
plan  of  government  with  you  ;  and  I  am  entirely  of  your  opin- 
ion, that  the  business  of  the  Convention  should  be  conducted 
with  moderation,  candor  and  fairness,  which  are  not  incompat- 
ible with  firmness.  Although,  as  you  justly  observe,  the  friends 
of  the  new  system  may  bear  down  the  opposition,  yet  they 

87  The  new  lands  in  the  District  of  Maine. 


404  LETTERS.  [1788. 

would  never  be  able,  by  precipitate  or  violent  measures,  to 
soothe  and  reconcile  their  minds  to  the  exercise  of  the  govern- 
ment, which  is  a  matter  that  ought  as  much  as  possible  to  be 
kept  in  view,  and  temper  their  proceedings. 

"What  will  be  the  fate  of  the  Constitution  in  this  State  is  im- 
possible to  tell,  at  a  period  so  far  distant  from  the  meeting  of 
the  Convention.  My  private  opinion  of  the  matter,  however, 
is,  that  it  will  certainly  be  adopted.  There  is  no  doubt  but  the 
decision  of  other  States  will  have  great  influence  here,  particu- 
larly of  one  so  respectable  as  Massachusetts. 

I  feel  myself  much  obliged  by  your  promise  to  inform  me  of 
whatever  transpires  in  your  Convention  worthy  of  attention, 
and  assure  you  that  it  will  be  gratefully  received. 

With  the  sincerest  regard,  and  the  most  ardent  desire  that 
your  distress  may  be  removed  by  the  recovery  of  your  son,  I 
am,  dear  Sir,  <fcc, 

George  Washington. 


BENJAMIN  LINCOLN  TO  GEORGE  WASHINGTON. 

Boston,  3  February,  1788. 

My  Dear  General : — Your  Excellency  will  find,  by  the  papers 
of  yesterday,  which  I  do  myself  the  pleasure  to  inclose,  that  the 
Governor  has  taken  his  seat  as  President  of  the  Convention  ; 
and  that  he  came  forward  with  a  motion  for  the  adoption  of  the 
Constitution,  and  subjoined  a  recommendation  that  some  alter- 
ations may  take  place  in  it.  The  motion  has  taken  up  a  con- 
siderable time.  Those  in  the  opposition  want  the  Constitution 
to  be  accepted  upon  condition  that  the  alterations  be  made. 
This  they  will  not  be  able  to  carry. 

Yesterday  noon,  a  motion  was  made  that  the  motion  under 
consideration  should  be  committed.  This  was  agreed  to,  and  a 
large  committee  was  raised,  consisting  of  two  members  from 
each  of  the  large  counties,  and  of  one  for  two  small  ones.  It 
was  also  agreed  that  each  county  should  nominate  their  own 
members,  and  that  they  should  take  one  who  had  given  his 


1788.]  LETTERS.  405 

opinion  for,  and  one  who  had  given  his  opinion  against,  the 
Constitution,  in  each  county  wherein  two  were  chosen.  I 
expect  they  will  report  to-morrow  afternoon,  to  which  time  the 
Convention  stands  adjourned.  I  hope  good  will  arise  from  the 
measure,  and  that  the  main  question  will  he  taken  by  Wednes- 
day next.  The  gentlemen  in  the  opposition  urge  that  the  Gov- 
ernor's motion  ought  to  be  divided,,  and  that  the  first  question 
be  taken  simply,  "  Whether  they  will  or  will  not  accept  the 
Constitution  ?"  They  are  opposed  in  this,  and  I  hope  the  large 
committee  will  adjust  the  matter,  and  put  an  end  to  any  further 
dispute  upon  the  question. 

We  find  ourselves  exceedingly  embarrassed  by  the  temper 
which  raged  the  last  winter  in  some  of  the  counties.  Many  of 
the  insurgents  are  in  the  Convention  ;  even  some  of  Shays's 
officers.  A  great  proportion  of  those  men  are  high  in  the  oppo- 
sition. We  could  hardly  expect  any  thing  else  ;  nor  could  we, 
I  think,  justly  suppose  that  those  men  who  were  so  lately  intox- 
icated with  large  draughts  of  liberty,  and  who  were  thirsting 
for  more,  would,  in  so  short  a  time,  submit  to  a  Constitution 
which  would  further  take  up  the  reins  of  government  which, 
in  their  opinion,  were  too  strait  before.  I  hope  people  abroad 
will  consider  this  matter,  and  make  proper  allowances  for  a  clog 
of  this  kind.     I  think  the  Constitution  will  pass. 

I  have  the  honor  of  being,  my  dear  General, 
With  perfect  esteem,  &c, 

Benjamin  Lincoln. 


JAMES  MADISON,  IN  CONGRESS,  TO   GEORGE  WASHINGTON. 

New  York,  3  February,  1788. 

Dear  Sir  : — Another  mail  has  arrived  from  Boston,  without 
terminating  the  conflict  between  our  hopes  and  fears.  I  have 
a  letter  from  Mr.  King  of  the  27th,  which,  after  dilating  some- 
what on  the  ideas  in  his  former  letters,  concludes  with  the 
following  paragraph : — 


406  LETTERS.  [1788. 

"  We  have  avoided  every  question  which  would  have  shown 
the  division  of  the  house.  Of  consequence,  we  are  not  positive 
of  the  members  on  each  side.  By  the  last  calculation  we  made 
on  our  side,  we  were  doubtful  whether  we  exceeded  them,  or 
they  us,  in  numbers.  They,  however,  say  that  they  have  a 
majority  of  eight  or  twelve  against  us.  We  by  no  means 
despair." 

Another  letter  of  the  same  date,  from  another  member,  gives 
the  following  picture  : — 

"  Never  was  there  an  assembly  in  this  State  in  possession  of 
greater  ability  and  information  than  the  present  Convention  ; 
yet  I  am  in  doubt  whether  they  will  approve  the  Constitution. 
There  are,  unhappily,  three  parties  opposed  to  it.  First :  all 
men  who  are  in  favor  of  paper  money  and  tender  laws.  Those 
are  more  or  less  in  every  part  of  the  State.  Second :  all  the 
late  insurgents  and  their  abettors.  In  the  three  great  western 
counties  they  are  very  numerous.  We  have  in  the  Convention 
eighteen  or  twenty  who  were  actually  in  Shays's  army.  Third  : 
a  great  majority  of  the  members  from  the  Province  of  Maine. 
Many  of  them  and  their  constituents  are  only  squatters  upon 
other  people's  land,  and  they  are  afraid  of  being  brought  to 
account.  They  also  think,  though  erroneously,  that  their  favor- 
ite plan  of  being  a  separate  State  will  be  defeated.  Add  to 
these,  the  honest,  doubting  people,  and  they  make  a  powerful 
host.  The  leaders  of  this  party  are  a  Mr.  Wedgery,  Mr.  Thorn-' 
son  and  Mr.  Nasson,  from  the  Province  of  Maine  ;  a  Dr.  Tay- 
lor, from  the  county  of  Worcester,  and  Mr.  Bishop,  from  the 
neighborhood  of  Rhode  Island. 

"  To  manage  the  cause  against  them,  are  the  present  and  late 
governor,  three  judges  of  the  supreme  court,  fifteen  members  of 
the  senate,  twenty  from  among  the  most  respectable  of  the 
clergy,  ten  or  twelve  of  the  first  characters  at  the  bar,  judges 
of  probate,  high-sheriffs  of  counties,  and  many  other  respecta- 
ble people,  merchants,  &c. ;  Generals  Heath,  Lincoln,  Brooks, 
and  others  of  the  late  army.  With  all  this  ability  in  support 
of  the  cause,  I  am  pretty  well  satisfied  we  shall  lose  the  ques- 
tion, unless  we  can  take  off  some  of  the  opposition  by  amend- 


1788.]  LETTERS.  407 

ments.  I  do  not  mean  such  as  are  to  be  made  conditions  of 
the  ratification,  but  recommendatory  only.  Upon  this  plan  I 
flatter  myself  we  ma^  possibly  get  a  majority  of  twelve  or 
fifteen,  if  not  more.'' 

The  legislature  of  this  State  has  voted  a  Convention  on  June 
17th.  I  remain,  &c,  - 

James  Madison,  Jr. 


GEORGE  WASHINGTON  TO  JAMES  MADISON,  IN   CONGRESS. 

[extract.] 

Mount  Vernon,  5  February,  1788. 

I  am  sorry  to  find  by  yours  and  other  accounts  from  Massa- 
chusetts, that  the  decision  of  its  Convention,  at  the  time  of  their 
respective  dates,  remained  problematical.  A  rejection  of  the 
new  form  by  that  State  would  invigorate  the  opposition,  not 
only  in  New  York,  but  in  all  those  which  are  to  follow  ;  at  the 
same  time  it  would  afford  materials  for  the  minority,  in  such  as 
have  actually  agreed  to  it,  to  blow  the  trumpet  of  discord  more 
loudly.  The  acceptance  by  a  bare  majority,  though  preferable 
to  a  rejection,  is  also  to  be  deprecated.  It  is  scarcely  possible 
to  form  any  decided  opinion  of  the  general  sentiment  of  the 
people  of  this  State  on  this  point.  Many  have  asked  me  with 
anxious  solicitude  if  you  did  not  mean  to  get  into  the  Conven- 
tion, conceiving  it  of  indispensable  necessity.  Colonel  Mason, 
who  returned  but  yesterday,  I  am  told  has  offered  himself  for 
Stafford  county,  and  his  friends  say  he  can  be  elected  not  only 
in  that,  but  in  the  counties  of  Prince  William  and  Fauquier 
also.  The  truth  of  this  I  know  not.  I  rarely  go  from  home, 
and  my  visitors,  who,  for  the  most  part,  are  travellers  and 
strangers,  have  not  the  best  means  of  information. 


408  LETTERS.  [1788. 


BENJAMIN  LINCOLN  TO  GEORGE  WASHINGTON. 

Boston,  6  February,  1788. 

My  Dear  General : — The  Convention  this  evening  ratified  the 
Constitution  ;  present,  three  hundred  and  fifty-five  members  ; 
one  hundred  and  eighty-seven  yeas,  and  one  hundred  and  sixty- 
eight  nays  ;  nineteen  majority  in  favor  of  the  adoption. 

As  I  mentioned  to  you  in  my  last,  the  spirit  which  operated 
the  last  winter  had  its  influence  in  the  appointment  of  members 
for  the  Convention,  and  was  a  clog  upon  us  through  the  whole 
business.  To  this  source  may  be  ascribed  the  great  opposition 
we  have  experienced  through  the  long  debates,  and  the  small- 
ness  of  the  majority.  I  hope  the  neighboring  States  will  con- 
sider this,  and  not  suffer  it  to  weigh  in  their  decisions. 

Yesterday  there  was  a  motion  for  an  adjournment,  which  cost 
us  the  whole  day.  Upon  the  question  at  evening,  there  were 
about  one  hundred  majority  against  it ;  this  was  a  damper  upon 
the  opposition,  and  they  had  little  hope  after.  When,  this  even- 
ing, the  question  went  against  them,  some  of  the  leaders  arose, 
and  assured  the  Convention  that  they  were  convinced  that  the 
debates  had  been  conducted  with  fairness  and  candor,  and  that 
they  should  return  with  dispositions  to  satisfy  the  minds  of  their 
constituents,  and  to  preserve  the  peace  and  order  of  the  people 
at  large.  I  hope  and  trust  they  will,  and  that  we  shall  soon 
enjoy  the  blessings  of  a  good  government. 

I  shall  continue  to  write  to  your  Excellency,  whilst  any  thing 
relative  to  this  great  subject  shall  turn  up  here  worthy  your 
notice.     Forgive  the  haste  ;  the  post-office  will  be  shut. 
And  believe  me,  with  the  sincerest  esteem  and  regard, 
My  dear  General,  &c, 

Benjamin  Lincoln. 

P.  S.  Upon  the  issue  of  the  question,  every  demonstration 
of  joy  was  discovered  among  the  people. 


1788.]  LETTERS.  409 

BENJAMIN  LINCOLN  TO  GEORGE  WASHINGTON. 
[extract.] 

Boston,  9  February,  1788. 

Nothing  very  material  has  taken  place  since  my  last,  saving 
what  is  mentioned  in  the  inclosed  paper.  By  that  you  will 
learn  what  was  the  temper  of  many  of  those  who  had  been  in 
the  opposition.  I  think  they  discovered  a  candor,  which  does 
them  honor,  and  promises  quiet  in  the  State.  Some,  however, 
will,  I  fear,  sow  the  seeds  of  discontent,  and  attempt  to  inflame 
the  minds  of  the  people  in  the  country.  They  have  no.  real 
object,  as  they  cannot  be  certain  that  it  will  ever  pass  nine 
States.  I  hope  and  trust  this  consideration  will  quiet  them  at 
present ;  when  it  shall  have  passed  nine  States,  it  will  be  too 
late  for  any  one  State  to  think  of  opposing  it. 

Considering  the  great  disorders,  which  took  place  in  this 
State  the  last  winter,  and  considering  the  great  influence  that 
the  spirit  which  then  reigned  has  had  since  upon  all  our  opera- 
tions, it  may  be  supposed  that  we  have  got  through  this  business 
pretty  well ;  and,  considering,  also,  that  when  we  came  together 
a  very  decided  majority  of  the  Convention  were  against  adopt- 
ing the  Constitution.  Every  exertion  will  be  made  to  inform 
the  people,  and  to  quiet  their  minds.  It  is  very  fortunate  for 
us,  that  the  clergy  are  pretty  generally  with  us.  They  have  in 
this  State  a  very  great  influence  over  the  people,  and  they  will 
contribute  much  to  the  general  peace  and  happiness. 


HENRY  KNOX  TO  GEORGE  WASHINGTON. 
[extract.] 

New  York,  10  February,  1788. 

The  Constitution  has  labored  in  Massachusetts  exceedingly 
more  than  was  expected.  The  opposition  has  not  arisen  from 
a  consideration  of  the  merits  or  demerits  of  the  tiling  itself,  as 
a  political  machine,  but  from  a  deadly  principle  levelled  at  the 

52 


410  LETTERS.  [1788. 

existence  of  all  government  whatever.  The  principle  of  insur 
gency  expanded,  deriving  fresh  strength  and  life  from  the  im- 
punity with  which  the  rebellion  of  last  year  was  suffered  to 
escape.  It  is  a  singular  circumstance,  that  in  Massachusetts, 
the  property,  the  ability,  and  the  virtue  of  the  State,  are  almost 
solely  in  favor  of  the  Constitution.  Opposed  to  it  are  the  late 
insurgents,  and  all  those  who  abetted  their  designs,  constituting 
four-fifths  of  the  opposition.  A  few,  very  few  indeed,  well- 
meaning  people  are  joined  to  them.  The  friends  of  the  Consti- 
tution in  that  State,  without  overrating  their  own  importance, 
conceived  that  the  decision  of  Massachusetts  would  most  prob- 
ably settle  the  fate  of  the  proposition.  They  therefore  proceed- 
ed most  cautiously  and  wisely,  debated  every  objection  with  the 
most  guarded  good  nature  and  candor,  but  took  no  questions 
on  the  several  paragraphs,  and  thereby  prevented  the  establish- 
ment of  parties.  This  conduct  has  been  attended  with  the  most 
beneficial  consequences.  It  is  now  no  secret,  that,  on  the  open- 
ing of  the  Convention,  a  majority  were  prejudiced  against  it. 


HENRY  KNOX  TO  ROBERT  R.  LIVINGSTON. 

New  York,  Sunday,  10  February,  1788. 

Dear  Sir : — I  send  you  a  summary  statement  of  my  last 
information  from  Boston.  In  a  few  days  I  expect  to  be  able  to 
congratulate  you  on  the  adoption  of  the  new  Constitution  by 
Massachusetts.  On  Wednesday,  the  30th  ultimo,  Mr.  Hancock 
was  well  enough  to  take  his  seat  in  the  Convention.  On  Thurs- 
day he  brought  forward  the  proposition  for  adopting  the  Consti- 
tution, and  for  recommending  certain  alterations,  agreeably  to 
the  paper  herein  inclosed.  The  propositions  were  seconded  by 
Mr.  Samuel  Adams,  and  committed  to  a  large  committee  of  two 
members  from  each  county,  a  majority  of  the  committee  being 
Federalists.  As  the  propositions  were  the  production  of  the 
Federalists,  after  mature  deliberation,  there  cannot  be  a  doubt 
that  the  committee  will  report  in  favor  of  the  propositions  as 
they  are  stated. 


1788.]  LETTERS.  411 

The  final  question  was  most  certainly  taken  in  the  Conven- 
tion somewhere  between  the  5th  and  8th  inst.  The  members 
of  the  Convention,  and  others,  who  wrote  to  me  on  the  3d  inst., 
have  no  doubt  with  respect  to  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution, 
bnt  they  do  not  flatter  themselves  with  a  large  majority.  A 
most  perfect  nnion  was  effected  between  the  friends  of  Mr. 
Hancock  and  Mr.  Bowdoin.  Handsome  things  are  said  of  the 
open  and  decisive  conduct  of  Mr.  Hancock,  and  also  of  Mr.  S. 
Adams,  notwithstanding  his  neutrality  in  the  first  part  of  the 
business.  Please  to  let  Mr.  Benson  see  this  letter. 
1  am,  with  great  esteem,  dear  Sir, 

Your  most  obedient  humble  servant, 

H.  Knox. 


HENRY  KNOX  TO  ROBERT  R.  LIVINGSTON. 

New  York,  13  February,  1788. 

My  Dear  Sir  : — The  new  Constitution  was  adopted  in  Massa- 
chusetts on  the  6th  instant,  by  a  majority  of  19.  The  whole 
present,  355  ;  187  for  it,  168  against  it. 

The  minority  behave  with  magnanimity  on  the  occasion, 
declaring  they  will  support  it  with  their  lives  and  fortunes. 
The  Boston  people  have  lost  their  senses  with  joy. 

Your  affectionate 

H.  Knox. 


GEORGE  WASHINGTON   TO  JAMES  MADISON,  IN  CONGRESS. 

[extract.] 

Mount  Vernon,  2  March,  1788. 

Sir : — The  decision  of  Massachusetts,  notwithstanding  its 
concomitants,  is  a  severe  stroke  to  the  opponents  of  the  proposed 
Constitution  in  this  State ;  and,  with  the  favorable  decision  of 
those  States  which  have  gone  before  it,  and  such  as  are  likely 


•/ 


412  LETTERS.  [1788. 

to  follow,  will  have  a  powerful  operation  on  the* minds  of  men, 
who  are  not  more  influenced  by  passion,  pique  and  resentment, 
than  they  are  by  candor,  moderation  and  judgment.  Of  the 
former  description,  however,  I  am  sorry  to  say  there  are  too 
many ;  and  among  them  some  who  would  hazard  every  thing 
rather  than  fail  in  their  opposition,  or  have  the  sagacity  of  their 
prognostications  impeached  by  the  issue. 


GEORGE  WASHINGTON  TO  HENRY  KNOX. 

[extract.] 

Mount  Vernon,  3  March,  1788. 

My  Dear  Sir : — I  pray  you  to  accept  my  acknowledgments  of 
your  favors  of  the  10th  and  14th  ultimo,  and  congratulation  on 
the  acceptance  of  the  new  Constitution  by  the  State  of  Massa- 
chusetts. Had  this  been  done  without  its  concomitants,  and 
by  a  larger  majority,  the  stroke  would  have  been  more  severely 
felt  by  the  anti-Federalists  in  other  States.  As  it  is,  it  operates 
as  a  damper  to  their  hopes,  and  is  a  matter  of  disappointment 
and  chagrin  to  them  all. 

Under  the  circumstances  enumerated  in  your  letters,  the 
favorable  decision  which  has  taken  place  in  that  State  could 
hardly  have  been  expected.  Nothing  less  than  the  good  sense, 
sound  reasoning,  moderation  and  temper  of  the  supporters  of 
the  measure,  could  have  carried  the  question.  It  will  be  very 
influential  on  the  equivocal  States.  In  the  two  which  are  next 
to  convene,  New  Hampshire  and  Maryland,  there  can  be  no 
doubt  of  its  adoption,  and  in  South  Carolina  but  little,  which 
will  make  nine  States,  without  a  dissentient.  The  force  of  this 
argument  is  hardly  to  be  resisted  by  local  sophistry.  Candor 
and  prudence,  therefore,  it  is  to  be  hoped  will  prevail ;  and  yet 
I  believe  there  are  some  characters  among  us,  who  would  hazard 
every  thing  rather  than  cease  their  opposition,  or  leave  to  the 
operation  of  the  government  the  chance  of  proving  the  fallacy 
of  their  predictions,  by  which  their  sagacity  and  foresight  might 
be  impeached. 


AMENDMENTS  TO  THE  CONSTITUTION. 


ARTICLES 

IN    ADDITION    TO,    AND    AMENDMENT    OF, 
THE 

CONSTITUTION  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES, 

Proposed  by  Congress,  and  ratified  by  the  Legislatures  of  the 
several  States,  pursuant  to  the  fifth  Article  of  the  original 
Constitution. 


Article  1.  Congress  shall  make  no  law  respecting  an 
establishment  of  religion,  or  prohibiting  the  free  exercise 
thereof,  or  abridging  the  freedom  of  speech,  or  of  the  press,  or 
the  right  of  the  people  peaceably  to  assemble,  and  to  petition 
the  government  for  a  redress  of  grievances. 

Art.  2.  A  well  regulated  militia,  being  necessary  to  the 
security  of  a  free  state,  the  right  of  the  people  to  keep  and 
bear  arms,  shall  not  be  infringed. 

Art.  3.  No  soldier  shall,  in  time  of  peace,  be  quartered  in 
any  house,  without  the  consent  of  the  owner,  nor  in  time  of 
war,  but  in  a  manner  to  be  prescribed  by  law. 

Art.  4.  The  right  of  the  people  to  be  secure  in  their  per- 
sons, houses,  papers,  and  effects,  against  unreasonable  searches 
and  seizures,  shall  not  be  violated,  and  no  warrant  shall  issue 
but  upon  probable  cause,  supported  by  oath  or  affirmation,  and 
particularly  describing  the  place  to  be  searched,  and  the  persons 
or  things  to  be  seized. 

Art.  5.  No  person  shall  be  held  to  answer  for  a  capital,  or 
otherwise  infamous  crime,  unless  on  a  presentment  or  indict- 


416  AMENDMENTS. 

merit  of  a  grand  jury,  except  in  cases  arising  in  the  land  or 
naval  forces,  or  in  the  militia,  when  in  actual  service  in  time  of 
war  or  public  danger ;  nor  shall  any  person  be  subject  for  the 
same  offence  to  be  twice  put  in  jeopardy  of  life  or  limb ;  nor 
shall  be  compelled  in  any  criminal  case  to  be  a  witness  against 
himself,  nor  be  deprived  of  life,  liberty  or  property,  without 
due  process  of  law ;  nor  shall  private  property  be  taken  for 
public  use,  without  just  compensation. 

Art.  6.  In  all  criminal  prosecutions,  the  accused  shall 
enjoy  the  right  to  a  speedy  and  public  trial,  by  an  impartial 
jury  of  the  State  and  district  wherein  the  crime  shall  have  been 
committed,  which  district  shall  have  been  previously  ascer- 
tained by  law,  and  to  be  informed  of  the  nature  and  cause  of 
the  accusation;  to  be  confronted  with  the  witnesses  against 
him  ;  to  have  compulsory  process  for  obtaining  witnesses  in  his 
favor,  and  to  have  the  assistance  of  counsel  for  his  defence. 

Art.  7.  In  suits  at  common  law,  where  the  value  in  con- 
troversy shall  exceed  twenty  dollars,  the  right  of  trial  by  jury 
shall  be  preserved,  and  no  fact  tried  by  a  jury  shall  be  other- 
wise re-examined  in  any  court  of  the  United  States,  than 
according  to  the  rules  of  the  common  law. 

Art.  8.  Excessive  bail  shall  not  be  required,  nor  excessive 
fines  imposed,  nor  cruel  and  unusual  punishments  inflicted. 

Art.  9.  The  enumeration  in  the  constitution,  of  certain 
rights,  shall  not  be  construed  to  deny  or  disparage  others 
retained  by  the  people. 

Art.  10.  The  powers  not  delegated  to  the  United  States  by 
the  Constitution,  nor  prohibited  by  it  to  the  States,  are  reserved 
to  the  States  respectively,  or  to  the  people. 

Art.  11.  The  judicial  power  of  the  United  States  shall  not 
be  construed  to  extend  to  any  suit  in  law  or  equity,  commenced 
or  prosecuted  against  one  of  the  United  States  by  citizens  of 
another  State,  or  by  citizens  or  subjects  of  any  foreign  state. 


AMENDMENTS.  417 

Art.  12.  The  electors  shall  meet  in  their  respective  States, 
and  vote  by  ballot  for  president  and  vice-president,  one  of 
whom,  at  least,  shall  not  be  an  inhabitant  of  the  same  State 
with  themselves ;  they  shall  name  in  their  ballots  the  person 
voted  for  as  president,  and  in  distinct  ballots  the  person  voted 
for  as  vice-president,  and  they  shall  make  distinct  lists  of  all 
persons  voted  for  as  president,  and  of  all  persons  voted  for  as 
vice-president,  and  of  the  number  of  votes  for  each,  which  lists 
they  shall  sign  and  certify,  and  transmit  sealed  to  the  seat  of 
the  government  of  the  United  States,  directed  to  the  president 
of  the  senate ;  the  president  of  the  senate  shall,  in  presence  of 
the  senate  and  house  of  representatives,  open  all  the  certificates 
and  the  votes  shall  then  be  counted ;  the  person  having  the 
greatest  number  of  votes  for  president,  shall  be  the  president, 
if  such  number  be  a  majority  of  the  whole  number  of  electors 
appointed ;  and  if  no  person  have  such  majority,  then  from  the 
persons  having  the  highest  numbers,  not  exceeding  three,  on 
the  list  of  those  voted  for  as  president,  the  house  of  representa- 
tive shall  choose  immediately,  by  ballot,  the  president.  But  in 
choosing  the  president  the  votes  shall  be  taken  by  States,  the 
representation  from  each  State  having  one  vote  ;  a  quorum  for 
this  purpose  shall  consist  of  a  member  or  members  from  two- 
thirds  of  the  States,  and  a  majority  of  all  the  States  shall  be 
necessary  to  a  choice.  And  if  the  house  of  representatives 
shall  not  choose  a  president  whenever  the  right  of  choice  shall 
devolve  upon  them,  before  the  fourth  day  of  March  next 
following,  then  the  vice-president  shall  act  as  president,  as  in 
the  case  of  the  death  or  other  constitutional  disability  of  the 
president.  The  person  having  the  greatest  number  of  votes  as 
vice-president,  shall  be  the  vice-president,  if  such  number  be  a 
majority  of  the  whole  number  of  electors  appointed ;  and  if  no 
person  have  a  majority,  then  from  the  two  highest  numbers  on 
the  list,  the  senate  shall  choose  the  vice-president ;  a  quorum 
for  the  purpose  shall  consist  of  two-thirds  of  the  whole  number 
of  senators,  and  a  majority  of  the  whole  number  shall  be  neces- 
sary to  a  choice.  But  no  person  constitutionally  ineligible  to 
the  office  of  president  shall  be  eligible  to  that  of  vice-president 
of  the  United  States. 

53 


The  Constitution  was  adopted  on  the  17th  September,  1787, 
by  the  Convention  appointed  in  pursuance  of  the  Resolution  of 
the  Congress  of  the  Confederation  of  the  21st  February,  1787, 
and  was  ratified  by  the  Conventions  of  the  several  States,  as 
follows,  viz. : 


Delaware,  . 

Dec.      7,  1787. 

Pennsylvania,     . 

"       12,  1787. 

New  Jersey, 

"       18,  1787. 

Georgia,     . 

Jan.      2,  1788. 

Connecticut, 

"   '     9,  1788. 

Massachusetts,    . 

Feb.      6,  1788. 

Maryland, . 

April  28,  1788. 

South  Carolina, 

May    23,  1788. 

New  Hampshire, ' 

June    21,  1788. 

Virginia,     . 

26,  1788. 

New  York, 

July    26,  1788. 

North  Carolina, 

Nov.    21,  1789. 

Rhode  Island,     . 

May    29,  1790. 

INDEX. 


Page. 

Abington,  Delegate  from, 37 

Acton  and  Carlisle,  Delegate  from 34 

Adams,  Delegate  from, 42 

Adams,  Benjamin,  Delegate, 34 

Daniel,  Delegate, 34 

John, 208,  239 

Mark,  Delegate, 38 

Samuel, .         .         .         .        .         : 24,  26 

Delegate 31,  203,  272 

Remarks  by, 108,  196,  209,  293 

Speech  of, 225,232 

Convention  vote  to  attend  the  funeral  of  his  Son,      .         .        62 
Amendments  introduced  and  withdrawn  by,     .         .  266 

Dr .        .  114 

&  Nourse,  printers,  place  assigned  to  for  the  purpose  of  taking 

minutes, 56,  57 

Adoption  of  the  Constitution 418 

Alden,  Noah,  Delegate, 32 

Alford,  Delegate  from 42 

Allis,  Josiah,  Delegate, 35 

Almsbury,  Delegate  from 33 

Almy,  William,  Delegate,  ...         . 38 

Amendments  to  the  Constitution, 413 

American  Revolution,  built  upon  the  principle  of  the  equal  right  of  all  men 

to  liberty  and  property,        . 253 

Ames,  Fisher,  Delegate, 32,  177 

Speech  of, 104,  108,  257,  287 

Remarks  by,    /    .        .        .  144,  147,  202,  206,  307,  308,  317,  318 

Moses,  Delegate, 38 

Amherst,  Delegate  from, 35 

Andover,  Delegate  from, 33 

Arms,  Consider,  Delegate, 35 

Articles  of  Confederation,  Convention  called  for  revising  the,      ...         25 

Ashburnham,  Delegate  from, 40 

Ashby,  Delegate  from, 34 

Ashfield,  Delegate  from, 36 


420  INDEX. 

Page. 

Ashley,  John,  Jun'r,  Delegate, 42 

Remonstrance  against  election  of,  .         .     48,  52,  53 

Athol,  Delegate  from, 40 

Attleborough,  Delegates  from, 38 

Augustus,  Emperor  of  Rome 263 

Austin,  Anthony, 52 

Augustin, 52 

Avery,  John .        .         .  k      .         .        .         .  24 

Backus,  Isaac,  Delegate, 37 

Speech  of, 251,  291 

Remarks  by, 320 

Baker,  Samuel,  Delegate, 40 

Thomas  M.,  Delegate, 40 

Baldwin,  Abraham, 15 

Bancroft,  George,  Letters  furnished  by, 399 

Barnard,  Lemuel 52 

Barnstable,  Delegate  from 37 

Barre,  Delegate  from, 39 

Barrell,  Nathaniel,  Delegate, 38 

Speech  of, 262 

Bartlett,  Bailey,  Delegate 33 

Bascom,  Moses,  Delegate 35 

Bassett,  Richard, 15 

Bath,  Delegate  from, 42 

Baxter,  John,  Jun'r,  Delegate, 32 

Baylies,  William,  Delegate 38 

Beal,  Zaccheus,  Delegate, .  41 

Bean,  Joshua,  Delegate,      .         . 42 

Becket,  Delegate|from 42 

Bedford,  Delegate  from, 34 

Bedford,  Gunning,  Jun'r 15 

Belchertown,  Delegate  from, 36 

Belknap,  Jeremy, 60 

Bell,  Daniel, 45 

Bellingham,  Delegate  from,         . 32 

Berkley,  Delegate  from, 38 

Bernardston,  Delegate  from,        . 36 

Berwick,  Delegate  from, 38 

Betts,  Comstock,  Delegate, 42 

Beverly,  Delegates  from 32 

Bigelow,  Abraham,  Delegate,                                • 34 

David,  Delegate 39 

Billerica,  Delegate  from, 34 

Bisbee,  Elijah,  Jun'r,  Delegate, 37 

Bishop,  Phanuel,  Delegate, 37 

Remarks  of, 120,121,122,293,294 

Black,  John,  Delegate, 39 

Blair,  John, 15 


INDEX.  421 


Page. 

Blair,  Timothy,  Delegate, 35 

Blaney,  Benjamin,  Delegate, 34 

Blanford,  Delegate  from, 35 

Blount,  William, 15 

Bodman,  William,  Delegate 35 

Remarks  by, 159,311,320 

Bolton,  Delegate  from, 40 

Bonney,  Benjamin,  Delegate, 36 

Boothbay,  Delegate  from, .        41 

Bordon,  Richard,  Delegate, 38 

Boston,  Delegates  from, 31 

the  Clergy  of,  invited  to  officiate  in  the  Convention,        ...         44 

Vote  of  thanks  to  the  inhabitants  of, 94,  282 

Procession  in 323—328 

Massacre,  March  5,  1770, 239 

Gazette,  &c,  extracts  from 64 

Bourn,  Shearjashub,  Delegate, 37 

Bowdoin,  James,  Delegate, 31,  250,  287 

Remarks  by,     ....  109,111,169,292,293,314 

Speech  of,         . 181,228,287 

Jun'r,  Delegate, 31 

Bowdoinham,  Delegate  from, 41 

Boxford,  Delegate  from, 33 

Boylston,  Delegate  from 40 

Bradbury,  Jacob,  Delegate, 38 

Bradford,  Delegate  from, 33 

Bradley,  Jesse,  Delegate, 43 

Braintree,  Delegates  from, 32 

Brattle  Street,  Meeting-house  in,  vote  offering  the  use  of  to  the  Convention,         44 

Vote  of  thanks  to  the  Proprietors  for 

their  offer  of  the  use  of  said  house,  46,  49 
Convention  to  assemble  at,    .         .         .         46 

Brearly,  David, 14 

Bribery  and  Corruption,  charge  of,  published  in  the  Boston  Gazette  and  the 

Country  Journal,    .....  G4,  150 

Action  of  Convention  in  relation  to  the  publication,  64,  65 

Bridgewater,  Delegate  from, 36 

Brigham,  Artemas,  Delegate, 40 

Brimfield,  Delegate  from, 35 

Bristol,  Delegate  from, 41 

Broad,  Hezekiah,  Delegate, 34 

Brookfield,  Delegates  from, 39 

Brookline,  Delegate  from, 32 

Brooks,  Eleazer,  Delegate, 34 

Remarks  by,     .        .         .        .  154,  200,  302,  308,  310,  316 

John,  Delegate, 34 

Remarks  by 102,111,143,288,306,315 

Broom,  Jacob, 15 


422  INDEX. 

Page. 

Brown,  Benjamin,  Delegate, 34 

David,  Delegate, 38 

Brunswick,  Delegate  from, 41 

Brutus,  Essays  with  the  signature  of, 366 — 398 

Buckland,  Delegate  from, .         .  36 

Buckminster,  Lawson,  Delegate, 34 

Bullard,  Jonathan,  Delegate, 39 

Burnham,  John,  Delegate, 33 

Bush,  David,  Delegate, 42 

Butler,  Pierce, 15 

Buxton,  Delegate  from, 38 

Cabot,  Francis,  Delegate 32 

George,  Delegate, 32 

Remarks  by, 122,  169,  227,  294 

Mr.,  Remarks  by,        .         .         .         .         .         .        304,  315,  320 

Cambridge,  Delegates  from, 33 

Cape  Elizabeth,  Delegate  from, 41 

Carlisle  and  Acton,  Delegate  from, 34 

Carlton,  Ebenezer,  Delegate, 33 

Carnes,  John,  Delegate 33 

Remarks  by, 118,290 

Carpenter,  Elisha,  Delegate, 42 

Carr,  James,  Delegate, 41 

Carroll,  Daniel 15 

Centinel,  newspaper.     See  Massachusetts  Centinel 

Chamberlin,  John,  Delegate -.        .         .  35 

Staples,  Delegate,    .         .        .         .         .         .    •     .         .         .  34 

Channing,  "William  E., 61 

Charlemont,  Delegate  from, 36 

Charles  II, 198 

Charlestown,  Delegate  from, .        .        .  33 

Charlton,  Delegates  from, 39 

Chelmsford,  Delegate  from, 34 

Chelsea,  Delegate  from, 32 

Chester,  Delegate  from, 36 

The  Bishop  of,  owns  that  England  is  deeply  involved  in  the  guilt  of 

the  Slave  Trade, 252 

Chesterfield,  Delegate  from, 36 

Choate,  John,  Delegate, 33 

Remarks  by, 179,313,317 

Cicero, 262 

Clark,  Adam,  Delegate, 35 

David, 52 

Israel,  Delegate, 33 

Kimbal,  Delegate 37 

Clergy  in  Boston,  invitation  to, 44 

attending  the  Debates,  seats  assigned  for, 47,  61 

Clymer,  George, 15 


INDEX.  423 

Page. 

Cogswell,  Jonathan,  Delegate, 33 

Collins,  Lemuel,  Delegate, 42 

Colrain,  Delegate  from, 36 

Colton,  Elihu,  Delegate, 36 

Committee  Qn  Credentials 31 

to  receive  the  Returns  of  the  several  towns,      .        .         .         .  43,  49 

to  examine  them  and  report, 43 

rule  of  examining  given  to 46 

Ileport  of, 49,  50 

to  collect,  count,  and  sort  the  votes  for  Secretary,      .         .         .         43 

to  prepare  Rules  and  Orders, 43 

Report  of, 46,  47 

to  collect,  &c,  votes  for  President  and  Vice-President,      .         .         44 
to  wait  upon  the  President,  and  inform  him  of  the  choice,  and 

request  his  acceptance, 44 

their  Report, .45 

to  view  the  accommodations  in  the  Meeting-house  in  Brattle 

Square, 44 

their  Report, 45 

to  examine  returns  of  members  to  fill  vacancies,        .        .         .  45,  48 
to  communicate  vote  of  thanks  to  proprietors  of  Brattle  Street 

Meeting-house, 46 

to  consider  expediency  of  the  Convention  removing  to  another 

place  in  Boston, 49,  50,  53 

on  the  Return  from  Taunton,  Report  of  accepted,     .        .        .  50,  51 
on  the   Remonstrance  of  certain  inhabitants  of  Williamstown, 

Report  of  accepted, 51,  52 

on  the  Remonstrance  of  certain  inhabitants  of  Great  Barring- 
ton,  Report  of, 53,  64 

to  wait  on  Hon.  Elbridge  Gerry,  and  request  him  to  take  a  seat 

in  the  House .  56,  57 

to  provide  a  more  convenient  place  for  the  Convention  to  sit  in,        58 

Report  of, 60 

to  prepare  a  Pay  Roll, 58,  59,  78,  92 

to  return  thanks  to  the  proprietors  of  the  Meeting-house  in  Long 

Lane, 60 

on  communication  from  the  printers  of  the  Boston  Gazette,  rel- 
ative to  a  charge  of  Bribery,  published  in  that  paper,        .         64 
to  take  into  consideration  the  subject  of  the  propositions  of  the 

President  of  the  Convention, 82 

their  Report,  ........         82—85 

to  prepare  an  Address  to  the  People, 92 

to  wait  upon  the  President  of  the  Convention,  and  Vice-Presi- 
dent, with  votes  of  thanks, 93 

Committees,  enjoined  to  sit, 48 

on  Remonstrances  against  elections  of  members,      .         .        .        48 

Reports  of, 49,50—54 

Compensation  of  Senators  and  Representatives, 152 


424  INDEX. 

Page. 

Comstock,  Nathan,  Delegate, 32 

Concord,  Delegate  from, 33 

Confederacy  of  the  United  Colonies  of  Plymouth,  Massachusetts,  Connec- 
ticut and  New  Haven,  in  1643,   117 

Confederation,  Articles  of,  Convention  called  for  revising,  ....         25 

Congress,  the  Constitution  to  be  laid  before,  &c .         15 

the  Constitution  submitted  to, 16,  17 

Powers  of, 154 

Connecticut 14,  15,  418 

Constantine, 251 

Constitution  of  the  United  States 1—15 

to  be  laid  before  Congress,  and  submitted  to  Conventions  of 

Delegates, 15,  16 

read  in  the  Convention, 99 

Ratification  of,  by  nine  States,  necessary,         .         .         .         .         16 

Letter  of  Elbridge  Gerry,  concerning, 24 

the  Convention  enter  upon  the  consideration  of,       .         .         .  57,  99 

Ratified 85—87 

Ratification  publicly  declared  at  the  State  House,  .  .  94,  282 
Amendments  and  Adoption  of  the,  ....  413—418 
Ratification  by  the  Conventions  of  the  several  States,  .  .  418 
Convention,  Grand  Federal,  held  Sept.  17,  1787,  proceedings  of,  .  .  1,  17 
of  Delegates,  held  in  Boston,  on  the  second  Wednesday  of  Jan- 
uary, A.  D.  1788, 29 

Action  of  the  Legislature  as  to  convening,  .  .'  .  .  19 
Resolutions  of  the  General  Court  for  calling,  ....         22 

Journal  of,  .    • 31—94 

agree  to  sit  in  Brattle  Street  Meeting-house,  ....  46 
enter  upon  the  consideration  of  the  Constitution,  .  .  .  57,  99 
adjourn  to  the  Meeting-house  in  Long  Lane,  ...  ^  60 
Propositions  submitted  to  by  the  President  of,  ...         79 

referred  to  a  Committee, 82 

Report  of  the  Committee, 82 — 85 

Constitution  ratified  by, 85 

Members  of  to  proceed  to  the  State  House  to  proclaim  the  rati- 
fication of  the  Federal  Constitution,  and  take  an  affectionate 

leave  of  each  other 92 

adjourn  to  the  State  House, 94,  282 

thanks  of  voted  to  the  inhabitants  of  Boston,  ....         94 

dissolved,         .         . 94,  282 

Debates  of  the 95 

Pay  Roll  allowed, 282 

Minutes  of  the  Debates  in,  kept  by  Chief  Justice  Parsons,  .  285 
called  for  revising  the  Articles  of  Confederation,       ...         25 

Conventions  of  Delegates  of  the  several  States, 15,16 

Ratification  of  the  Constitution  by, 418 

Conway,  Delegates  from 35 

Cooley,  Clark,  Delegate 35 


INDEX.  425 

Page 

Cooley,  Daniel,  Delegate, 85 

Remarks  by, .         .        149,  281 

Mr.,  Remarks  by,  .         .        .    302,304,  305,  306,  307,  308,  313,  319,  320 
Correspondence  of  the  Revolution,  edited  by  Jared  Sparks,  extracts  from,  .       399 

Coxhall,  Delegate  from,       .  39 

Cranch,  Richard,  Delegate, 32 

Credentials  of  members,  Committee  to  receive, 31 

Crocker,  Zacheus,  Delegate,        .  35 

Crosby,  Jonah,  Delegate 41 

Cummington  and  Plainfield,  Delegate  from,. 36 

Curtis,  Caleb,  Delegate, 39 

Samuel,  Delegate 39 

Cushing,  Joseph,  Delegate, 36 

Nathan,  Delegate,         . 36 

William,  Delegate, 3G 

chosen  Vice-President  of  the  Convention,      ...         44 

Cutts,  Richard  Fox,  Delegate, 3S 

Thomas,  Delegate, .38 

Dalton,  Tristram,  Delegate,  . 32,  176 

Remarks  by,  138,  144,  195,  206,  297,  299,  301,  302,  304,  316,  319 

Dana,  Francis,  Delegate, 33 

Speech  of, 117,135,141,209,289 

Remarks  by,  137,  148,  175,  176,  209,  303,  306,  308 

Stephen,  Delegate 33 

Mr.,  Motion  offered  by, .103 

r.9 


•  ;■  6, 


Danvers,  Delegates  from,    ......... 

Dartmouth,  Delegates  from, 38 

Davis,  Caleb,  Delegate, 31 

Remarks  by, 200 

John,  Delegate, 36 

Joseph,  Delegate, 40 

Moses,  Delegate, 41 

Thomas,  Delegate, 36 

Dr.,  Remarks  by,     .        . 302, 305 

Dawes,  Thomas  Jun'r 31 

Remarks  of,     .  102,  111,  139,  198,  288,  302,  305,  306,  310 

Speech  of, 156,  215 

Day,  Jonathan,  Delegate,    .  40 

Dayton,  Jonathan,      . 14 

Debates,  place  assigned  to  Benjamin  Russell  and  Messrs.  Adams  &  Nourse 

for  the  purpose  of  taking  minutes  of  the,       ,         .         .         .  56,  57 

Report  of  the, 95 

Minutes  of,  kept  by  Chief  Justice  Parsons, 285 

Decemviri  of  Rome, 161 

Dedham,  Delegates  from, 32 

Deerfield,  Delegate  from, 35 

Delaware, 15,  418 

Dench,  Gilbert,  Delegate, 34 

54 


426  INDEX. 

Page. 

Dench,  Gilbert,  Speech  of, 101,  108,  287 

Remarks  by,  142,  199,  200,  241,  290,  297,  299,  305,  315,  316,  319 

Motion  by, 265 

Denny,  Samuel,  Delegate, .         .         39 

DeWitt,  Francis,  Secretary  of  the  Commonwealth,      .         .         .  (Preface)  iv 

John,  a  celebrated  political  writer, 154 

Dickinson,  John, 15 

Dighton,  Delegates  from, 38 

Dorchester,  Delegates  from, 31 

Douglass,  Delegate  from 40 

Douglass,  Thomas  James,  Delegate, 36 

Dracut,  Delegate  from, 34 

Drown,  Frederick,  Delegate, 37 

Dudley,  Delegate  from, 40 

Dunbar,  Elijah,  Delegate 32 

Dunham,  Cornelius,  Delegate 39 

Dunlap,  John,  Delegate, 41 

Dunstable,  Delegate  from 34 

Durfee,  Thomas,  Delegate, 38 

Duxborough,  Delegate  from, 36 

Dwight,  Elijah,  Delegate, .       42,  48,  54,  55 

Justus,  Delegate, .36 

Dyer,  Joshua,  Delegate, 41 

Eager,  Nahum,  Delegate, 36 

Easthampton  and  Northampton,  Delegate  from, 35 

Eastman,  Benjamin,  Delegate,     .         . 35 

Easton,  Delegate  from, .38 

East  Sudbury,  Delegate  from, 34 

Eddy,  Samuel,  Delegate, 36 

Edes,  Messrs.  Benjamin,  and  Son,  printers,  Letter  from  referred,  .  64,  65,  151 

Edgartown,  Delegate  from, 39 

Edgcomb,  Delegate  from, 41 

Egremont,  Delegate  from 42 

Election,  Speeches  on,         .         .         ...         .        .        101—133,  148,  149,  269 

Ely,  Benjamin,  Delegate, 35 

Emerson,  Peter,  Delegate, 34 

Emery,  Jeremiah,  Delegate, 39 

Fales,  David,  Delegate 41 

Falmouth,  Maine,  Delegates  from, 40 

Massachusetts,  Delegate  from,    .......        37 

Farley,  Michael,  Delegate, 33 

Fearing,  Israel,  Delegate, 37 

Federal  Constitution,  the  ship 327 

Government,  Essays  on, 335 — 352 

Street,  name  of  Long  Lane,  changed  to 60—62 

Few,  William 15 

Field,  Samuel,  Delegate, 35 

Fisher,  Aaron,  Delegate, 36 


INDEX.  427 

Page. 

Fisher,  Jabez,  Delegate, 32 

Fisk,  Asa,  Delegate, 35 

Daniel,  Delegate, 34 

Fitch,  Ephraim,  Delegate, 42 

Fitchburg,  Delegate  from, 40 

Fitzsimons,  Thomas, 15 

Fletcher,  Joel,  Delegate 40 

Flint,  William,  Delegate, 34 

Forbes,  Daniel,  Delegate, 39 

Fovvle,  James,  Jun'r,  Delegate, 33 

Fowler,  Silas,  Delegate 36 

Fox,  John,  Delegate, 40 

Foxborough,  Delegate  from, 32 

Framingham,  Delegate  from,       .         .         .      • 34 

Franklin,  Delegate  from, 32 

Franklin,  Benjamin, 15,69 

Address  of,  immediately  before  signing  the  Constitution,       352 

Freeman,  Solomon,  Delegate, 37 

Freetown,  Delegates  from 38 

Frye,  John,  Delegate,  .        . •       .         .        40 

Fryeburg,  Delegate  from, 38 

Fuller,  Abraham,  Delegate, 34,  143 

John,  Delegate, 40 

Timothy,  Delegate, ...         40 

Colonel,  Remarks  by, 300 

Gannett,  Ezra  S 61 

General  Court,  Action  of, 321,  322 

Georgetown,  Maine  Delegate  from, 41 

Georgia, 15,  133,  418 

Gerry,  Elbridge 126,  143,  144,  147 

Letter  of  in  relation  to  the  American  Constitution,     .         .         24 
requested  to  take  a  seat  in  the  House,         .        .        .55,  56,  100 

requested  to  attend  the  Convention 56 

Letter  from,  accepting  the  invitation,         ...          58,  288 
Letter  from,  in  answer  to  question  respecting  representa- 
tives,   63 

Motion  made  and  seconded,  that  he  be  requested  to  give 

information  respecting  the  Senate,       ....         64 
Letter  from,  with  a  statement  of  facts  relative  to  the  con- 
struction of  the  Federal  Senate,  .         .        .         65 — 71 
Account  of  excitement  produced  by  the  announcement 

that  he"was  preparing  a  Letter  for  the  Convention,      71 — 75 

Letter  of,  read  in  the  Convention, 175 

Gilman,  Nicholas, 14 

Gilmore,  David,  Delegate, 41 

Gleazen,  Phineas,  Delegate, .        .        .         34 

Gloucester,  Delegates  from, 33 


428  INDEX. 

Page. 
Gloucester,  The  Bishop  of,  casts  the  reproacli  of  the  Slave  Trade  upon  the 

Americans 252 

Glover,  John,  Delegate 33 

Jonathan,  Delegate,        .       - 33 

Goddard,  Josiah,  Delegate, 40 

Goldsbury,  John,  Delegate 36 

Goodman,  Noah,  Delegate, 35 

Gore,  Christopher,  Delegate, 31,  176 

Speech  of, 113,164,213,288 

Remarks  by 141,  175,  304,  320 

Gorham,  Delegate  from, 41 

Gorhara,  Nathaniel,  Delegate, 14,  33 

Remarks  by,     118,  135,  151,  153,  168,  207,  289,  290,  291,294,  300,  309, 

316,  319,  320 

Grafton,  Delegate  from 40 

Granby,  Delegate  from, 35 

Grant,  Samuel,  Delegate, ....41 

Granville,  Delegates  from,  .  35 

Gray,  Delegate  from, 41 

Gray,  William,  Delegate, 32 

Great  Barrington,  Delegate  from 42 

Remonstrance  from  certain  inhabitants  of,       .        .    48,  53—55 

Green,  Jonathan,  Delegate, 34 

Greene,  Gen.  Nathaniel, 239 

Greenfield,  Delegate  from, .35 

Greenleaf,  Benjamin,  Delegate, 32 

Greenwich,  Delegate  from, 35 

Groton,  Delegates  from, 34 

Grout,  Jonathan,  Delegate, 40 

Ilabeas  Corpus, m  .        209,  210,  240 

Hadley,  Delegate  from 35 

Hale,  Moses,  Delegate 40 

Halifax,  Delegate  from, 37 

Hallowell,  Delegate  from, 41 

Hamilton,  Alexander, 14 

John,  Delegate, 35 

Hammond,  Nathaniel,  Delegate, 37 

Hancock,  Delegate  from, 42 

Hancock,  John, .        .        .        24,  239 

Governor,  extract  from  Message  of, 18 

Delegate 31 

chosen  President  of  the  Convention, 44 

Speech  of, 224 

Speech  of,  at  the  time  of  taking  the  question  of  ratification 

of  the  Constitution 278 

Proposition  submitted  by, 225 

extract  from  the  Speech  of,  at  the  General  Court,  Peb.  27, 

1788 283 


INDEX.  429 

Page. 

Hanover,  Delegate  from, 37 

Hardwick,  Delegate  from, 40 

Harnden,  John,  Delegate 34 

Harpswell,  Delegate  from,  .         .         . 41 

Harrrington,  Isaac,  Delegate, 40 

Harris,  S., 325 

Harvard,  Delegate  from, ....  40 

Harwich,  Delegates  from, .  37 

Harwood,  David,  Delegate, 39 

Hastings,  John,  Delegate, 35 

Hatfield,  Delegate  from, 35 

Hathaway,  James,  Delegate, 39 

Meletiah,  Delegate, 38 

Haverhill,  Delegate  from, 33 

Heath,  William,  Delegate, 31 

Letter  from, 59 

Remarks  by, 102 

Speech  of, 109,111,216,222,288 

Hemmenway,  Moses,  Delegate 38 

Henderson,  Joseph,  High- Sheriff  of  Suffolk,  ratification  of  the  Constitution 

proclaimed  by, 282 

Herrick,  Jacob,  Delegate 33 

Ezekiel,  Delegate, 42 

Hingham,  Delegates  from, 31 

Holden,  Delegate  from, 40 

Holden,  Stephen,  Delegate, 40 

Holliston,  Delegate  from, 34 

Holmes,  Abraham,  Delegate, 37 

Remarks  by 127,214 

Speech  of, 211 

Golten,  Samuel,  Delegate, 32 

Remarks  by, 132,  296,  302 

Homer, 358 

Hooper,  Hezekiah,  Delegate, 36 

Hopkinton,  Delegate  from 34 

Hosmer,  Joseph,  Delegate, 33 

Remarks  by, 315 

Howard,  Daniel,  Delegate, 36 

Jun'r,  Delegate, 36 

Howes,  Jonathan,  Delegate,        .         .         .     - 37 

Hubbard,  Jonathan,  Delegate, 36 

Remarks  by, 299 

Hubbardston,  Delegate  from 39 

Hull,  Delegate  from 32 

Huntington,  Samuel,  Governor  of  Connecticut,  Letter  from,  read,      .        .  60 

Hurlbert,  John,  Delegate, 42 

Hutchinson,  Israel,  Delegate, 32 

Ilsley,  Daniel,  Delegate, 40 


430  INDEX. 

Page. 
Independent  Chronicle,  newspaper,  extracts  from,         .         .         .     18,19,  24,335 

Ingersoll,  Jared, 15 

John,  Delegate, 35 

Ipswich,  Delegates  from 33 

Jackman,  Enoch,  Delegate, 33 

Jackson,  Joseph,  Delegate, 32 

William, 15,  16 

James  II 198 

Janes,  Ebenezer,  Delegate, 35 

Jarvis,  Charles,  Delegate, '.         .         .         .         31,  288 

Remarks  of,        ...         .  102,  126,  127,  130,  218,  313,  320 

Speech  of, 254 

Jenifer,  Daniel  of  St.  Thomas, 15 

Jenks,  Nathaniel,  Delegate, 39 

Jennings,  John,  Delegate, 36 

John,  King  of  England,  covenants  to  summon  certain  classes  of  men  to 

Parliament 114 

Johnson,  Jacob, 52 

William  Samuel, 14 

Jones,  John  Coffin,  Delegate, .         .         .         31 

Remarks  by,  ...  126,  141,  175,  208,  316,  319 

Thomas,  Delegate, 32 

William,  Delegate, 41 

Remarks  by,      .         .         .  126,  144,  146,  221,  299,  307,  319,  320 

Josselyn,  Benjamin,  Delegate, 39 

Journal  of  the  Convention  held  in  Boston, 31 — 94 

Julius  Caesar, 238 

Keep,  Jonathan,  Delegate, 34 

King,  Rufus, 14 

Delegate, 32 

Speech  of, 115,117,154,289 

Remarks  by,      121,  133,  134,  135,  137,  141,  144,  146,  147,  149,  151, 

153,  178,  196,  201,  202,  217,  291,  293,  298,  299,  300, 

304,  306,  307,  308,  309,  310,  315,  316,  319 

Kingston,  Delegate  from, 37 

Kinsley,  Martin, 40,  203 

Speech  of, 161 

Remarks  by, 312,319 

Kittery,  Delegates  from 38 

Remarks  by  Delegate  from, 304 

Kittridge,  Thomas,  Delegate, 33 

Knox,  Henry,  Letter  from, 399 

Letter  to  George  Washington,       ......       409 

Letter  to  Robert  R.  Livingston, 410,411 

Letter  from  George  Washington  to, 412 

Kuhn,  Jacob,  chosen  Messenger 43 

Lancaster,  Delegate  from 39 

Lanesborough,  Delegate  from, 42 


INDEX. 


431 


Page. 

Langdon,  John, 14 

Lawton,  Joshua,  Delegate, ....         52 

Lazell,  Edmund,  Delegate, 36 

Learned,  Jeremiah,  Delegate 39 

Lebanon,  Delegate  from, 38 

Lee,  Delegate  from, 41 

Legislature  of  Massachusetts,  Action  of  in  relation  to  calling  Convention,      19 — 24 

in  relation  to  printing  an  Address 

to  the  People, .         .         .       321,  322 

Leicester,  Delegate  from, 39 

Lenox,  Delegate  from, 42 

Leominster,  Delegate  from, 40 

Leonard,  Nathaniel,  Delegate, 37,  50 

Letter  from  Henry  Knox, 399 

400,  401,  405 

402,  404,  408,  409 

.       403 

407,  411 

.       409 

.         .       410,411 

.       412 

36 

.       239 

34 

34 

31 

.       297 

40£,  404,  408,  409 

.       403 

34 

410,411 

14 

60—62 

41 

36 

52 

42 

39 

33 

38 

36 

40 

33 

42 


from  James  Madison  to  George  Washington,  . 
from  Benjamin  Lincoln  to  George  Washington, 
from  George  Washington  to  Benjamin  Lincoln, 
from  George  Washington  to  James  Madison,  . 
from  Henry  Knox  to  George  Washington, 
from  Henry  Knox  to  Robert  R.  Livingston, 
from  George  Washington  to  Henry  Knox, 

Leverett,  Delegate  from, 

Lexington, 

Delegate  from, 

Lincoln,  Delegate  from, 

Lincoln,  Benjamin,  Delegate, 

Remarks  by 

Letters  to  George  Washington,     . 
Letter  from  George  Washington  to, 

Littleton,  Delegate  from, 

Livingston,  Robert,  Letters  from  Henry  Knox,  to, 

William, 

Long  Lane,  name  changed  to  Federal  Street, 
Longfellow,  Stephen,  Jr.,  Delegate,     .... 

Longmeadow,  Delegate  from, 

Loomis,  Zadok, 

Loudon,  Delegate  from, 

Low,  John,  Delegate  from  Coxhall,     .... 
Delegate  from  Gloucester, 

Nathaniel,  Delegate, 

Ludlow,  Delegate  from, 

Lunenburgh,  Delegate  from, 

Lurvey,  Benjamin,  Delegate, 

Lusk,  Thomas,  Delegate, 

Remarks  by, 208,  250 

Lynn  and  Lynnfield,  Delegates  from 33 

Madison,  James,  Jun'r, 15 

Letters  from,  to  George  Washington,        .        .        400,  401,  405 


432  INDEX. 

Page. 

Madison,  James,  Letters  from  George  Washington  to,                                  407,  411 

Magna  Charta,  the  foundation  of  the  imperfect  representation  of  England,  116 

Maine,  Province  of, 247 

Maiden,  Delegate  from 34 

Manchester,  Delegate  from, 33 

Mann,  Thomas,  Delegate,  .                           * 32 

Manning,  Richard,  Delegate, 32 

Mansfield,  Delegate  from, 38 

Mansfield,  Isaac,  Delegate, 33 

Marblehead,  Delegates  from, 33 

March,  Ebenezer,  Delegate, 32 

Marlborough,  Delegates  from, 34 

Marsh,  Nathaniel,  Delegate, 33 

Marshfield,  Delegate  from 36 

Marston,  Nymphas,  Delegate, 37 

Maryland 15,  418 

Mason,  Christopher,  Delegate, 38 

Timothy,  Delegate, 42 

Mr 68 

Massachusetts 14,  15,  155,  418 

Massachusetts  Centinel,  extracts  from  relating  to  change  of  name  of  Long 

Lane  to  Federal  Street,  .               *  .         .        .  61 
Account  of  an  excitement  in  the  Convention  by  the 
announcement  of  Mr.  Gerry  that  he  was  pre- 
paring a  Letter  for  the  Convention,          .         71 — 75 

of  Feb.  9th  and  13th,  1788,    ....       323,  329 

Maxwell,  Thompson,  Delegate .         .  36 

May,  Elisha,  Delegate, 38 

Mayhew,  William,  Delegate, 39 

Maynard,  Malachi,  Delegate, 35 

Stephen,  Delegate, 40 

McCobb,  William,  Delegate, 41 

McHenry,  James, 15 

Mclntier,  Ezra,  Delegate, 39 

Mcintosh,  William,  Delegate, 32 

McKean,  Thomas .  354 

McLellan,  Joseph,  Delegate, 41 

Medfield,  Delegate  from, 32 

Medford,  Delegate  from, 34 

Medway,  Delegate  from, 32 

Meeting-house  in  Brattle  Street,  use  of  offered  to  the  Convention,      .         .  44 

Vote  of  thanks  to  the  proprietors  of,         .  46 

the  Convention  agree  to  sit  therein,           .  46 

in  Long  Lane,  prepared  for  the  Convention  to  sit  in,  .         .  60 

Mendon,  Delegate  from 39 

Merrick,  Aaron,  Delegate 35 

Phinehas,  Delegate, 35 

Merrill,  Samuel,  Delegate 41 


INDEX.  433 

Page. 
Messenger  chosen, 43 

to  exclude  persons  not  admitted  by  special  order,        .         .         .        58 

Methuen,  Delegate  from, .         33 

Middleborough,  Delegates  from, 37 

Mifflin,  Thomas, 15 

Mighill,  Thomas,  Delegate 33 

Miller,  Simeon,  Delegate 33 

Milton,  Delegate  from, 31 

Minot,  George  Richards,  chosen  Secretary, 43 

John,  Delegate 34 

Minutes  kept  by  Chief  Justice  Parsons,  of  the  Debates  in  Convention,     285—320 

Milford,  Delegate  from, 40 

Mitchell,  David,  Delegate 41 

Elisha,  Delegate,- 36 

Monitors,  chosen,        .         .         . 43,  46,  47 

to  take  their  divisions  in  the  Meeting-house 46 

to  assign  a  place  to  Benjamin  Russell  and  Messrs.  Adams  & 

Nourse,  printers,  for  the  purpose  of  taking  Minutes,     .         .  5Q,  57 

Monson,  Delegate  from, 35 

Montague,  Delegate  from • 35 

Montague,  Admiral, 215 

Montesquieu,  Baron,  quoted,      .         .  110,  111,  113,  114,  228,  230,  288,  373,  386 

Montgomery,  Gen.  Richard, 239 

Morgan,  Abner,  Delegate, 35 

Morning  Prayers,  to  be  attended  by  the  Convention  daily,  ....        44 

Morris,  Gouverneur,  .        .         .         .» 15 

Robert, 15 

Morse,  Benjamin,  Delegate, 34 

Jonas,  Delegate, 34 

Mt.  Washington  and  Sheffield,  Delegate  from, 42 

Murray,  David,  Delegate, 41 

Nasson,  Samuel,  Delegate, 38 

Remarks  by, 137,208,243,290,301,304 

Motion  introduced  by, 195,  196 

Speech  of, 235—240,  281 

Natick,  Delegate  from, 34 

Neal,  James,  Delegate, 38 

Remarks  by, 209,  221,  320 

Needham,  Delegate  from, ~.         .        .         32 

Nero, 263 

New  Bedford,  Delegates  from, 38 

New  Braintree,  Delegate  from, 39 

Newbury,  Delegates  from, 32 

Newbury  Port,  Delegates  from 32 

Newcastle,  Delegate  from 41 

New  Gloucester,  Delegate  from, 41 

New  Hampshire, .         .         .  14,  15,  418 

New  Jersey, 14,  15,  418 

55 


434  INDEX. 


Page. 

New  Marlborough,  Delegate  from 42 

New  Salem,  Delegate  from, 35 

Newton,  Delegate  from 34 

Newton,  Seth,  Delegate, 40 

New  York, 14,  15,  418 

Nichols,  James,  Delegate, 39 

Nickerson, ,  a  pirate,  tried  without  a  jury, 215 

Niles,  Samuel,  Delegate, 37,  181 

Remarks  by 243,297,314 

Noble,  Zenos,  Delegate, 43 

Northborough,  Delegate  from 40 

Northbridge,  Delegate  from,       .         .         . 40 

North  Carolina 15,  418 

Northfield,  Delegate  from, •    ....         35 

Northampton,  Delegate  from, 35 

North  Yarmouth,  Delegates  from, 41 

Norton,  Delegate  from, 38 

Norwich,  Delegate  from, 36 

Nourse.    See  Adams  &  Nourse 

Noyes,  Daniel,  Delegate, 33 

Nye,  Samuel,  Delegate 33 

Thomas,  Delegate, 37 

Oakham,  Delegate  from, 39 

Old  Confederation,  the  ship,  ordered  to  be  burnt 329 

Old  State  House, 62 

Orange  and  Warwick  Delegate,  .         .         : 36 

Orders.    See  Rules  and  Orders 

Orne,  Azor,  Delegate, 33 

Remarks  by, 243 

Osgood,  Peter,  Jun'r,  Delegate, 33 

Otis,  Hon.  Mr. 118,  290 

Oxford,  Delegate  from, 39 

Palmer,  Delegate  from, 35 

Palmer,  Joseph,  Delegate, 37 

Paper  Money, 155 

Parker,  Timothy,  Delegate, 40 

Parliament  of  England, 114 

Parlin,  Asa,  Delegate, 34 

Parsons,  Theophilus,  Delegate 32,  126,  287 

Speech  of, 124,  189 

Remarks  by,       .  141,  153,  205,  243,  265,  307,  308,  309,  318 
moves  that  the  Convention  assent  to  and  ratify  the 

Constitution, 221 

Minutes  kept  by,  of  the  Debates  in  Convention,       285—320 

Partridge,  George,  Delegate, 36 

Partridgefield,  Delegate  from, 42 

Patrick,  Matthew,  Delegate, 40 

Patten,  Willis,  Delegate, 33 


INDEX.  435 

Page. 

Patterson,  "William 14 

Paxton,  Delegate  from 39 

Pay  Roll,  Committee  on, 58,  59,  78,  92 

passed  by  the  Convention, 282 

Pay  son,  George,  Delegate, 32 

Phillips,  Delegate, 32 

Speech  of, 222 

Pearson,  William,  Delegate, 33 

Peckham,  Samuel,  Delegate, 40 

Peirce,  Ebenezer,  Delegate, 42 

Remarks  by, 119,    291,293,312,319 

Mr.,  Remarks  by, 176 

Pelham,  Delegate  from, 35 

Pembroke,  Delegates  from, 37 

Pennsylvania, 15,  418 

Pepper,  Isaac,  Delegate, 36 

Pepperell,  Delegate  from, 34 

Pepperellboro',  Delegate  from 38 

Perley,  Samuel,  Delegate, 41,  126 

Remarks  by,      .  151,  309 

Petersham,  Delegates  from, 40 

Phelps,  John,  Delegate, 35 

Phillips,  William,  Delegate 31,  176,  320 

Speech  of, 166—168 

Remarks  by 243 

Pickett,  John,  Jun'r,  Delegate, 33 

Pierce,  Jeremiah,  Delegate, 42 

Mr.,  Remarks  by, 242,  298 

Pinckney,  Charles, 15 

Cotesworth, 15 

Pitts,  John,  Delegate, 34 

Remarks  by, 196 

Pittsfield,  Delegate  from, 42 

Plainfield  and  Cummington,  Delegate  from, 36 

Plymouth,  Delegates  from, 36 

Flympton,  Delegates  from, 37 

Pomeroy,  Lemuel,  Delegate,        . 35 

Popkin,  John  S., 60 

Porter,  Elisha,  Delegate, 35 

Remarks  by,  120,  152,  160,  208,  293,  294,  309,  319 

Portland,  Delegates  from, 40,  41 

Powers,  Asa,  Delegate, 36 

Pownalborough,  Delegates  from, 41 

Pratt,  Aaron,  Delegate, 37,  50 

Pratt,  John,  Delegate, - ...         38 

Prayers,  morning,  to  be  attended  by  the  Convention  daily,  .         .        .         44 

Preble,  Esaias,  Delegate, 38 

President  and  Vice-President  of  the  Convention  chosen,     ....        44 


436  INDEX. 

Page. 

Princeton,  Delegate  from, 40 

Printer,  any  who  may  apply,  to  be  furnished  with  the  proceedings  of  the 

Convention, 56 

Printers,  a  place  to  be  assigned  to,  for  the  purpose  of  taking  Minutes,  .         57 

place  assigned, 61 

of  the  Boston  Gazette  requested  to  appear  before  the  Convention,  64,  65 

Pulling,  Edward,  Delegate, 32 

Putnam,  Daniel,  Delegate, 40 

Pynchon,  William,  Delegate, 35 

Qualifications  of  Representatives 133,298 

Rainham,  Delegate  from, 38 

Randall,  Benjamin,  Delegate, 32 

Remarks  of,  .         .137,  138,  169,  282,  301,  302,  303,  304,  305 

Randolph, ,  Governor  of  Virginia,  extract  from  Letter  of,         .        .      267 

Ransom,  Elias, 52 

Rathbun,  Valentine,  Delegate, 42 

Ratification  of  the  Constitution, 85,  94,  282 

Read,  George, 15 

Reading,  Delegates  from, 34 

Reed,  Jesse,  Delegate,         ..........         36 

Reed,  Samuel,  Delegate, 34 

Mr.,  Motion  by, 308 

Refreshment,  members  of  the  Convention  invited  to,  by  inhabitants  of  Boston,        94 

Rehoboth,  Delegates  from, 37,  38 

Religious  Test, 190,222,251 

Remonstrances  against  elections  of  Members,  ....  "48,50,51 — 55 
Report  of  the  Debates  of  the  Convention,  .......        95 

Representation  in  Congress,  Speeches  on, 100,  101,  133 

Resolutions  for  calling  Convention  in  Boston, 22 

Returns  of  the  several  Towns,  Committee  to  receive  and  examine,  .  .  43,  48 
Revolution,  American,  built  upon  the  equal  right  of  all  men  to  liberty  and 

property, 253 

Rhode  Island, .        .        .        .        .418 

State  of,  recalls  its  Delegates  from  Congress,  .        .       120,152 

upon  request  of  Congress  refuses  to  send  them  on,        .        .       121 

Consequences  of  refusal, .121 

Rice,  Thomas,  Delegate, 41 

Richardson,  Moses,  Jun'r,  Delegate, 32 

Richmond,  Delegates  from, 42 

Richmond,  Sylvester,  Delegate, 38 

Robbins,  Nathaniel, 31 

Rochester,  Delegates  from, 37 

Rogers,  Daniel,  Delegate, 33 

Rome,  people  of,  deprived  of  their  rights, 161 

Rowley,  Delegate  from, 33 

Roxbury,  Delegates  from, 31 

Royalston,  Delegate  from, 40 

Rules  and  Orders,  Committee  to  prepare, 43 


INDEX.  437 

Page. 
Rules  and  Orders,  amended,  accepted,  and  to  be  put  up  in  a  conspicuous 

place 47 

Russell,  Benjamin,  place  assigned  to,  for  the  purpose  of  taking  Minutes,      .  56,  57 

Thomas,  Delegate, 31 

Speech  of,          .        .         . 241 

Rutland,  Delegate  from, 39 

Rutledge,  John, 15 

Salem,  Delegates  from, .         .  32 

Salisbury,  Delegates  from, 33 

Salsburgh,  Isaac 52 

Sandisfield,  Delegate  from, 42 

Sandwich,  Delegates  from, 37 

Sanford,  Delegate  from, 38 

Sawin,  Benjamin,  Delegate, 34 

Speech  of, 282 

Sawtell,  Obadiah,  Delegate, 34 

Sawyer,  Enoch,  Delegate, 32 

Scarlett,  Newman,  Delegate,       .                          34 

Scarborough,  Delegate  from,       .         ., 41 

Scituate,  Delegates  from,     .                          36 

Secretary  chosen, 43 

to  furnish  any  printer  with  the  proceedings,         .         .         .        .  56 
Secretary  of  the  Commonwealth,  Lieutenant-Governor,  and  Speaker  of  the 
House  of  Representatives  admitted  to  seats  on  the  floor  of  the  house  to 

hear  the  Debates, 69 

Sedgwick,  Theodore,  Delegate, 42,  176,  303 

Speech  of, 101,  292,  293,  298 

Remarks  by,       .  133,  152,  160,  197,  243,  309,  311,  316,  319 

Senate, 144—147,  305 

Senate  Chamber,  Members  of  Convention  invited  to  take  refreshments  at,  94 

Sever,  William,  Jun'r,  Delegate, 37 

Remarks  by, 320 

Severance,  Moses,  Delegate, 35 

Sewall,  Dummer,  Delegate, 42 

Shapleigh,  Delegate  from, 39 

Sharon,  Delegate  from, 32 

Shaw,  William,  Delegate 36 

Sheffield  and  Mount  Washington,  Delegate  from, 42 

Remonstrance   from    certain  inhabitants 

of, 48,  49,  52,  53 

Remonstrance  dismissed,  .        .        .         .  53 

Shelburne,  Delegate  from, 35 

Sheldon,  Benjamin,  Delegate, 35 

Shepard,  David,  Delegate 36 

Sheple,  Joseph,  Delegate, 34 

Sherburne,  Delegate  from, 34 

Sherman,  Asaph,  Delegate 39 

Roger, 14 


438  INDEX. 

Page. 

Shirley,  Delegate  from, 34 

Shrewsbury,  Delegate  from 40 

Shurtliff,  Francis,  Delegate 37 

Speech  of,     .         .         .         .  300,  301,  304,  305,  307,  317 

Shute,  Daniel,  Delegate, 31 

Speech  of, 220 

Shutesbury,  Delegate  from, 36 

Singletary,  Amos,  Delegate, 39,  204 

Speech  of, 266,  305,  306,  311,  318 

'Remarks  by, 143,  160,  201,  202 

Skinner,  Tompson  J.,  Delegate 42,48,51,52 

Slavery  and  the  Slave  Trade,  134,  138,  208,  217,  237,  251,  252,  300—304,  320,  387 

Slocum,  Holder,  Delegate 38 

Smith,  Abraham,  Delegate, 39 

John  K.,  Delegate, 40 

Jonathan,  Delegate, 42 

Remarks  by, 196,  203,  296,  318 

Jonah,  Delegate, 37 

Thomas,  Delegate, 37 

Snow,  Isaac,  Delegate, 41 

Remarks  by, 132 

Dr.,  Remarks  by, 297 

Solon, 228 

Song  and  Ballad, 330—334 

Soul,  Isaac,  Delegate, 37 

South  Hadley,  Delegate  from 35 

Southampton,  Delegate  from, 35 

Southborough,  Delegate  from, 40 

South  Brimfield,  Delegate  from, 35 

South  Carolina 14,    15,  418 

Southwick,  Delegate  from 36 

Southworth,  Jedidiah, 32 

Capt. ,  Speech  of, 277 

(from  Stoughton)  Remarks  by, 290 

Spaight,  Richard  Dobbs, 15 

Sparks,  Jared,  Extracts  from  the  «  Writings  of  Washington,"  edited  by,     .       399 

Spencer,  Delegate  from 39 

Spooner,  Walter,  Delegate, 38 

Sprague,  John,  Delegate 39 

Remarks  by 102,  290 

Mr.,  Remarks  by, «...       102 

Spring,  Marshall,  Delegate, 33 

presents  a  Letter  to  the  Convention  from  Mr.  Gerry,         .       2S8 

Springfield,  Delegate  from, 35 

Standing  Armies 180,  198 

States,  Conventions  of,  for  assent  and  ratification  of  the  Constitution,    15,  16,  418 

Stearns,  David,  Delegate, 40 

Stebbins,  Phinehas,  Delegate, 35 


INDEX.  439 

Page. 

Sterling,  Delegate  from, 40 

Stevens,  Stephen, 52 

Stillman,  Samuel,  Delegate, 31 

Remarks  by, 200 

Stockbridge,  Delegate  from, 42 

Stone,  Joseph,  Delegate, «...        40 

Stoneham,  Delegate  from, 34 

Stoughton,  Delegates  from, 32 

Stow,  Delegate  from, 34 

Strong,  Caleb,  Delegate, 35 

Remarks  by,  103, 121, 147, 199,  200,  243,  287,  294,  303,  306,  315,  316 

Sturbridge,  Delegate  from, 40 

Sudbury,  Delegate  from, 34 

Sumner,  Increase,  Delegate, 31,  195 

Speech  of, 130,162,210,240,295 

Sunderland,  Delegate  from,         .        .         . 35 

Sutton,  Delegates  from,       .         .         .     • 39 

Swanzey,  Delegates  from, 38 

Sylvester,  David,  Delegate,  .         .         .         ■         .         .         .         .  41 

Symmes,  William,  Jun'r,  Delegate,     .  33,  179 

Speech  of, .       169,  277 

Tacitus, 358 

Taunton,  Delegates  from,   . .         .         37 

Remonstrance  from, 50,  51 

Taylor,  Daniel,  Delegate, 42,  113 

John,  Delegate, 40 

Remarks  by, 290, 304,  308 

Speech  of,  on  Elections, 101 

Remarks  by,  118,  134,  135,  147,  149,  151,  189,  199,  200,  209,  227, 
243,  265,  281,  291,  292,  298,  300,  305,  307,  309,  313,  314,  315,  319 

Taxation  and  Representation  inseparable, 336,  347 

Taxes, 139,  207,  263,  299,  311,  312,  318,  319 

Temple,  Jonas,  Delegate, 40 

Templeton,  Delegate  from, 40 

Tewksbury,  Delegate  from, 34 

Thacher,  David,  Delegate 37 

Thomas,  Delegate, 32 

Speech  of, 244 

Thayer,  Elijah,  Delegate, 38 

Thomas,  Benjamin,  Delegate, 37 

Remarks  by, 243,  249 

Joshua,  Delegate, 36 

Thomaston,  Delegate  from, 41 

Thompson,  Edward,  Delegate 39 

William,  Delegate 41 

Hon.  L., 321 

Samuel,  Delegate, 41 


440  INDEX. 

Page. 

Thompson,  Samuel,  Remarks  by,  111,  112,  131,  133,  153,  160,  197,  202,  209,  243, 

293,  296,  298,  300,  302,  304,  306,  310,  311,  313,  314,  316, 

3,17,  320 

called  to  order 112 

Speech  of 113,180,208,288 

Thorndike,  Israel,  Delegate, 32 

Thurston,  Daniel,  Delegate, 33 

Tingley,  Pelatiah,  Delegate, 39 

Tisbury,  Delegate  from, 39 

Tisdale,  Ebenezer,  Delegate, 38 

Titcomb,  Jonathan,  Delegate 32 

Tobey,  Samuel,  Delegate, 38 

Tompson,  William,  Delegate, 34 

Tomson,  Isaac,  Delegate, ,        ...        37 

Topsfield,  Delegate  from, 33 

Topsham,  Delegate  from, 41 

Tories  and  Refugees,  .         .         .  .         .         .        .         .         .         .       141 

Townshend,  Delegate  from, 34 

Trial  by  Jury, 214,  215,  348 

Tufts,  Cotton,  Delegate,      .         .         . 31 

Turner,  Charles,  Delegate, 36 

Remarks  by 102,109,111,273,289,294 

Speech  of, 128,  288 

Incident  connected  with  the  Speech  of,      .         .         .         .275 

John,  Delegate, 37 

Tyringham,  Delegate  from, .        42 

Upton,  Delegate  from,         .         . 40 

Uxbridge,  Delegate  from, 40 

Varnum,  Joseph  Bradley,  Delegate *  .         .         .        .         34 

Remarks  by,       ..      .  178,208,236,312,317,319 

Vassalborough,  Delegate  from, 41 

Vaughn,  David,  Delegate, 43 

Virginia, 14,  15,  268,  418 

Wales,  Ebenezer,  Delegate, 31 

Remarks  by,  « 195 

Walpole,  Delegate  from, .32 

Waltham,  Delegate  from, 34 

Ward,  Delegate  from, 40 

Ware,  Delegate  from, 36 

Wareham,  Delegate  from 37 

Warren,  Ebenezer,  Delegate, 32 

James, .  24,  26 

Joseph, .       239 

Warwick  and  Orange,  Delegate  from 36 

Washburn,  Israel,  Delegate, 38 

Washington,  Delegate  from, 43 

Washington,  George, 14,  16,  17,  152,  239,  320 

Letters  from  James  Madison  to,.         .         .        400,  401,  405 


INDEX.  441 

Page. 
Washington,  George,  Letters  from  Benjamin  Lincoln  to,     .         402,  404,  408,  409 

Letter  to  Benjamin  Lincoln, 403 

Letters  to  James  Madison,  ....       407,411 

Letter  from  Henry  Knox  to 409 

Letter  to  Henry  Knox, •  412 

Waterborough,  Delegate  from, 39 

"Watertown,  Delegates  from, 33 

Waterman,  Freman,  Delegate, 37 

Webber,  John,  Delegate, 34 

Wedgery,  William,  Delegate, 41 

Remarks  by,   124,  130,  135,  142,  151,  195,  196,  203,  206,  207, 
240,  280,  295,  298,  300,  303,  304,  305,  306,  309,  316,  318 

Wellfleet,  Delegate  from, 37 

Wells,  Delegate  from 38 

Wells,  Agrippa,  Delegate, 36 

Wells,  Nathaniel,  Delegate, 38 

Wenham,  Delegate  from, 33 

Wentworth,  Thomas  M.,  Delegate, 38 

West,  Samuel,  Delegate, ' .         38,  316 

Speech  of,    .  130 

Remarks  by, 296 

Westborough,  Delegate  from, 40 

Western,  Delegate  from, 40 

Westfield,  Delegates  from,  ..........         35 

Westford,  Delegate  from, •.        .        .         34 

Westhampton,  Delegate  from, 36 

Westminster,  Delegate  from,       . .        40* 

Weston,  Delegate  from, 34 

Westport,  Delegate  from,' * 38 

West  Springfield,  Delegates  from, 35- 

West  Stockbridge,  Delegates  from, 42 

Weymouth,  Delegate  from, 31 

Whateley,  Delegate  from,    .        . 35 

Wheeler,  Asahel,  Delegate, 34 

Whitcomb,  Nathaniel,  Delegate,  ........         35 

White,  Abraham,  Delegate, .         .     •  38> 

Remarks  by,      102,  113,  118,  126,  156,  280,  289,  291,  298,  301, 

305,  310» 

Whiting,  William, 54,  55 

Whitney,  Daniel,  Delegate,         . 34 

Josiah,  Delegate, 40 

Gen.,  Speech  of, 281 

Whitman,  Charles,  Delegate, 34 

Levi,  Delegate, 37 

Wibird,  Anthony,  Delegate, 32 

Wilbraham,  Delegate  from, 35 

Wilder,  David,  Delegate, 40 

Ephraim,  Delegate,  .  40 

56 


442  INDEX. 

Page. 

Willard,  Jacob,  Delegate, 40 

Samuel,  Delegate 40 

Remarks  by, 168,169,315,316 

William  III 198 

Duration  of  Parliaments  limited  to  three  years  in  the  reign  of  114 

William,  Ephraim,  Delegate, 36 

Williams,  James,  Delegate, 37,  50 

John  Foster,  Commander  of  the  Ship  Federal  Constitution,         .  327 

Leonard,  Delegate, 34 

Williamsburgb,  Delegate  from 35 

Williamson,  Hugh, 15 

Williamstown,  Delegate  from 42 

Remonstrances  from  certain  inhabitants  of,  .         .         .     48,  51,  52 

Williston,  John,  Delegate, 35 

Willmarth,  Moses,  Delegate, 38 

Wilmington,  Delegate  from, 34 

Wilson,  James, 15 

Speech  of, 354 

Robert,  Delegate, 35 

Winchendon,  Delegate  from, *  .         .         .         .  40 

Windsor,  Delegate  from 42 

Winn,  Timotby,  Delegate, 33 

Winslow,  Delegate  from 41 

Winsor,  William,  Delegate, 38 

Winthrop,  Delegate  from, 42 

Winthrop,  John,  Delegate,  .         .        .  * 31 

Woburn,  Delegates  from, 33 

Wood,  Aaron,  Delegate, 32 

Joseph,  Delegate,     .  .         .         .         .    *   .         .         .         .  32 

Josiah,  Delegate 40 

Woods,  John,  Delegate, 39 

Woolwich,  Delegate  from,  .         .         .         .  *     .         .        \        .         .         .  41 

Worcester,  Delegate  from, 39 

Worthington,  Delegate  from 36 

Wrentham,  Delegate  from ....  32 

Writings  of  Washington,  edited  by  Jared  Sparks,  extracts  from,  .         .  399 

Wyman,  Nathaniel,  Delegate 41 

Yarmouth,  Delegates  from, 37 

Yeas  and  Nays,  on  propositions  of  the  President  of  the  Convention,  .  S7— 92 

York,  Delegates  from 38 

Young,  William 51,  92 


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